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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to develop a new concept of rationality in the field of planning and 
policy design. The argument maintains that classical pragmatism, in particular John 
Dewey’s work, holds the key for a thorough and timely reconstruction o f deliberative 
rationality.
The current project will develop a received “traditional” model of rational planning based 
on the Humean model o f rational agency. This “linear instrumental rationality” model will 
be criticised by challenging its agency theoretic presuppositions. The thesis will interpret 
Dewey’s epistemological, ethical and metaphysical contributions as chiefly aimed toward a 
reconstruction o f the Humean “Folk-Model” o f agency and rationality. Dewey’s notions o f  
imagination and intelligent inquiry will be discussed as central concepts in developing a 
new model of rational agency. His understanding o f deliberative democracy as embodying 
effective social intelligence bridges agency theoretic discussions and collective deliberation 
and planning. This thesis aspires to be both a conceptual philosophical exploration and a 
contribution to planning theory that can provide understanding and guidance in applied 
contexts. Two chapters at the ends will deal with the consequences o f this Deweyan 
reconstruction project for planning theory and practice. A novel model o f rational planning 
will be developed and the move from a traditional “linear instrumental” understanding o f  
rational planning to a new “situational transactive” model will be illustrated in two case 
studies of urban land use planning in the German Ruhr region.
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Part I
Context: Rationality and Planning
Introduction: Rationality, Agency and Planning
'Reason ’ as a noun signifies the happy cooperation o f a multitude o f dispositions. 'Reason ’ 
is not an antecedent force which serves as a panacea. It is a laborious achievement o f habit
needing to be continually worked over.
John Dewey
Planning and Deliberative Rationality
Rationality and its rank
Rationality is an important reference when it comes to directing, coordinating and 
justifying planning projects. In contexts where decisions affect large numbers o f people, 
rationality is a concept of more than theoretical interest. Personal decision-making can 
often pass as a spontaneous and idiosyncratic matter: what constitutes an agent’s 
deliberation process -  her impulses, motives or reasons -  remains mostly implicit (e.g. why 
a person chooses to study history rather than dentistry, or whom she chooses as a confidant 
in a personal matter). In contrast, projects that involve and affect large numbers o f people 
require explicit reasoning. The methods and standards of planning must be comprehensible, 
which is more than a democratic desideratum. It is a necessary prerequisite to achieving 
successful coordination in view o f problems that demand concerted efforts. In such cases a 
shared conception o f rationality, i.e. what constitutes a success-promoting process of 
deliberation and a satisfactory course of action, is o f great importance.
We often hear complaints that decision-makers override moral considerations in the name 
of expediency or some rational calculus; and morality is not the only normative framework 
in this competition. Rawls argued that in the public debate references to justice trump 
arguments forwarded in the name o f substantial moral standards. Elster adds that justice 
should supersede rationality as a normative framework in matters o f collective deliberation,
16
since rationality has no application outside the contexts o f personal decision-making. 
Contrary to such ideas, I hold that rationality provides powerful arguments in debates on 
planning and policy-making. Planners would rarely claim that rationality should trump all 
other normative demands in the same way that John Rawls suggested justice should trump 
other virtues in legitimising public institutions. However, a rational policy is prima facie 
one that can be publicly defended; whereas an acknowledged irrational planning decision is 
unlikely to find support, even if  there are strong moral or other normative reasons in its 
favour. We may, for example, find it morally problematic or even unjust to focus 
humanitarian aid on areas with more accessible infrastructures, as this may neglect others 
with equally urgent needs. Nevertheless we could not rationally defend any other strategy. I 
suspect therefore that rationality occupies a position that itself cannot easily be trumped by 
other normative standards. I will not inquire further into the clout of rationality relative to 
other normative concepts. Rather I will attempt to develop a new concept o f rationality that 
is able to incorporate normative and ethical concerns into its own definition.
Rationality as method
The spell-check o f Word for Windows marks the plural form “rationalities” as a mistake. 
Like capitalised concepts of Truth, Rationality or the Catholic Church, Microsoft has made 
its own bid for universal prevalence, which could explain the bias. I chose to ignore the 
rippled markings and continue to speak about rationality in the plural. I am convinced that 
any canonical concept o f rationality is the product of a history o f human inquiry, and as 
such is not without potential alternatives; more importantly, I believe that every rationality 
concept that we employ to understand and guide human activity is in occasional need o f a 
revision. I am convinced, moreover, that the next round of revision needs to be more than a 
routine check-up. The need for a fundamental reconstruction o f our concept of rationality is 
immanent, and the present thesis intends to explore this idea and make its contribution.
I approach rationality as a methodological framework, not as an independent normative 
standard a priori. Rationality as methodology requires developing, employing, criticising 
and, if necessary, abandoning or replacing normative principles. For example, traditional
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theories o f rationality often rely on a clear division between instrumental hypothetical 
considerations and questions o f value, preference or motivation. Separating these domains 
in deliberation processes is treated as a normative demand on rational decision-makers. 
Rationality as methodology refuses to accept such normative claims as given or necessary. I 
will argue that a methodological concept of rationality should reconsider this separation and 
ultimately refuse a strict divide between purely instrumental reasoning and ethical 
deliberation. Such incisive conceptual changes are impossible if  we start by defining 
minimal or necessary normative principles in determining the meaning o f rational decision­
making. Where traditional theorists reduce the core of instrumental rationality to a 
template, consisting only o f efficiency and consistency criteria, rationality as a method is 
concerned with useful approaches, helpful guiding principles and effective orientations in 
the complexity of experienced deliberation problems. Norms and abstract principles play an 
important role in guiding and justifying decisions, but we would be ill-advised to rely only 
on them as a priori justifications while neglecting practical insight and experience as 
grounds for defining fundamental principles.
Normative and descriptive theory
Rationality as methodology is an attempt to avoid positioning the concept of rationality on 
either side of the normative-descriptive divide. The concept o f rationality that I develop is 
neither strictly normative nor purely descriptive, but a bit of both at the same time.
Some readers o f my drafts have insisted that I should take a more clear position by 
indicating which o f my conclusions have a normative character and which are descriptive. I 
have tried to clarify the function and purpose o f some o f my arguments, but some 
ambiguities follow directly form the methodological understanding o f rationality. Many 
still hold that a theory o f rational planning either describes how actual decision-processes 
unfold, i.e. what rules and heuristics people employ in solving real problems; or else it must 
define the principles and norms that decision-makers should follow.
18
G.E.M. Anscombe’s (1957) distinction between “representative” and “directive” statements 
illustrates the different ways in which normative and descriptive sentences relate to their 
object by comparing “shopping lists” to “inventories.” If an inventory (a descriptive 
sentence) includes an item that is not found on the shelf, we would judge our inventory as 
incomplete or wrong. If an item on the shopping list (normative sentence) is not on the 
shelf we would judge our supplies as wanting and would not call our list “wrong.” A 
similar unilateral “direction o f fit” is often implied in the distinction between normative and 
descriptive rules. In some research projects on rationality this distinction is clearly visible. 
Many traditional theories of micro-economics, rational choice and decision-theory trace the 
normative principles o f rational acting and their implications. The direction o f fit here could 
be interpreted as (cf. Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla):
“Rationality —► Practice”
I.e. our practices are evaluated or guided by a normative standard o f rationality.
Anthropologists, in contrast, often seek to understand different rationalities as alternative 
ways that cultural communities make sense of their worlds. They define rationalities as 
contingent frameworks of rules and traditions by which members o f different societies 
establish social relations and coordinate their interactions. Authors like MacIntyre (1970a; 
1970b), Winch (1970a; 1970b), Levi-Strauss (1962), Geertz (1973; 1974; 1983; 1994) or 
Taylor (1982) often refrain from normative judgements that would expose the way alien 
practices like witchcraft or prophecy violate universal standards o f rational conduct. They 
see culturally embedded practices as the ultimate arbiters of judgements on rules and norms 
that they distinguish as “their rationality.” The direction o f fit would have to be turned 
around (cf. Dorstewitz and Kuruvilla 2007):
“Practices —► Rationality”
19
Rationality understood as methodology does not perfectly fit into either of these models. In 
the above-cited article, Shyama Kuruvilla and I described a third alternative (Dorstewitz 
and Kuruvilla 2007):
[R]ationality could serve as a standard o f procedural excellence that incorporates 
both normative and descriptive elements. As a normative standard, rationality would 
give orientation to practice. At the same time, in its heuristic function, it would remain 
embedded and intimately connected to the praxis that it informs ...we represent this 
relationship between practice and rationality as a bi-directional one:”
“Practice <-► Rationality”
In my interpretation o f rationality as methodology I would like to further specify this bi­
directional relationship. A methodology indicates how our knowledge o f tools, principles 
and relations are put to use in specific contexts. A methodology provides orientation, not in 
the form o f norms or imperatives but in terms of knowing what to do and how to go about 
doing it in certain circumstances. Guidelines are abstract principles that clarify the 
approach to be taken in certain situations. Guidelines and normative principles in a 
methodology depend in their formulation on experience and in their application on 
circumstances. Descriptive aspects are therefore as strong as normative ones; moreover 
their distinction seems inconclusive. I will point out that traditional concepts o f rationality 
in planning falsely assume that ends and performance measures must be defined before 
meaningful instrumental choice is possible. These arguments refer principally to the 
experience o f planners and to the observations of planning theorists. The consequences, 
however, are not merely descriptive. Such arguments do not only say something about how 
decision-processes normally unfold. If we follow the methodological route in developing a 
concept of rationality, we employ experience to formulate guiding norms and rules for 
orientation. Hence, these norms and rules can translate into actual practice because they are 
designed for it, giving methodological norms another empirical or descriptive edge.
20
Shyama Kuruvilla and I have argued that, in turn, (Dorstewitz & Kuruvilla)
“...where empirical practice and guiding norm become too disparate ... the normative 
m odel... may be as useful as a recipe for cup cakes when we have the ingredients for a 
T-bone steak.”
The relation between normative and descriptive aspects of my theory will remain 
problematic and ambiguous, but I will be as explicit as possible on the possible functions 
that my results can have. My aim is to develop a concept of rationality that is true to the 
empirical formation of deliberate agency and is therefore able to provide guidance in real- 
life planning situations. This rationality conception eschews hard and fast criteria like 
efficiency and optimality, and it avoids specifying normative axioms like consistency or 
completeness. It is an inquiry-centred approach, i.e. its guiding norms will be measured 
against the documented collective experience o f a discipline and against the background o f  
a philosophical psychology whose perspective is naturalist and whose central tenet is 
compatibility with experience.
Rawls developed the concept o f “reflective equilibrium” in order to determine how his 
principle of justice as fairness relates to public commonsense in living democratic 
institutions. “Reflective equilibrium” can be a helpful metaphor for understanding the 
project of rationality as methodology. Normative elements are also established and 
developed in view of empirical conventional aspects. However, stronger than in Rawls’ 
theory, a reflective equilibrium must balance normative principles with successful practice 
in problematic contexts. It is not enough to calibrate the equilibrium between a concept of 
rationality and an intellectual commonsense on what constitutes a rational decision.
Against rational planning
In recent decades an increasing number o f theorists have rejected the idea that social 
planning and policy-making could be understood as rational processes. Many have even 
argued that rationality, as traditionally defined, cannot be the measure o f good planning.
21
These theorists put forward persuasive arguments challenging traditional notions of  
rationality and their applicability to policy contexts.
Nevertheless a reference to rationality seems crucial in concerting efforts and in publicly 
justifying planning projects and policy decisions. If a project goes wrong, we seek reasons 
for its failure and ask whether it could have been avoided through foresight, more careful 
evaluation or better deliberation. Rationality is still the central virtue of planning. The 
planning theorist Charles Hoch confessed (1996b p.225):
“‘Rationality’ may not be everything but it is peculiarly ours.”
We should take recent critiques of rationality in planning seriously, but should not dismiss 
the concept altogether. We would risk losing orientation in our activities, coherence in our 
coordination, and public adherence to our strategies. It is therefore crucial to develop a 
conception o f deliberative rationality that is capable o f answering powerful philosophical 
and empirical doubts that had been cast over traditional rationality models. We need a 
conception o f rationality that helps to understand plans and guides planners in their own 
problem-contexts -  a conception that promises to bring our best capacities to fruition.
Deliberative rationality
Philosophical investigation into the concept of rationality can mean many different things. 
Rationality as an attribute of belief has been addressed by epistemologists and philosophers 
of science. Rationality as an attribute of decisions has recently received much attention 
from rational choice- and decision-theorists. Both of these quests have been predominantly 
concerned with defining normative criteria for substantiating the conditions under which 
we call a belief or a choice ‘rational. ’ Only recently have these fields opened themselves to 
more empirical perspectives in establishing rationality claims. Bruno Latour, for example, 
emphasised the need to take the context o f discovery more seriously in any theory o f good 
science, and behavioural economists discussed the place o f empirical problem-solving 
heuristics or survival strategies within a theory of rational choice.
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I define my project as a study o f “deliberative rationality.” By this I intend to avoid a 
narrow perspective on instances of decisions and the evaluation of choices. Deliberative 
rationality sees decision-making as an extended process, which I refer to as the formation of 
action. It covers everything from the initial disorientation that is felt in an indeterminate 
environment to the processes of deliberation over concrete option and decision-making. I 
later argue that even executive phases o f action and implementation should be part o f a 
theory o f deliberative rationality.
Chapters 3 and 6 will explicitly challenge the separation between an epistemic rationality of 
beliefs and a deliberative rationality o f choice and action. The main thrust in the idea of 
deliberative rationality is the inclusion o f empirical agency processes in a definition of 
rationality.
A Note on Method and Structure
Reconstructing planning theory
The present project tries to satisfy some demands for philosophical groundwork that 
disciplines like planning, management, and operational research have implicitly and 
explicitly posed. A look at recent literature in planning theory raises the suspicion that the 
project thoroughly revising the concept of rationality is already well under way. I argue, 
however, that Dewey’s contribution to building a comprehensive framework has hitherto 
been underestimated.
I distinguish between a received linear instrumental- and a reconstructed situational 
transactive model of rationality. The former is based on the Humean means-ends-scheme 
and holds that rationality must be defined by an efficient employment of means to further 
given ends and goals. The linear instrumental approach translates this rationality model into 
a procedural progression o f various planning stages. A typical example of such a process 
model is: (1) clarification o f mission-statements, (2) definition o f resources and possible
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courses of action as preconditions for (3) a formal decision process, and (4) coordinated 
implementation.
The situational transactive model, in contrast, holds that a theory of rational planning 
cannot presuppose that ends and problems will be defined in the beginning o f a planning 
process. Instead it claims that planning begins with perplexing and somewhat murky 
situations. The definition o f a problem to be solved or an end to be achieved is subject to an 
inquiry process. Further, this process should be allowed to take just as long as the entire 
planning project itself (including its implementation). The situational transactive model o f  
planning rejects the a priori prescription of an order in the progression o f planning stages. A 
procedural logic should not be part o f the definition o f rational planning. Actual planning 
processes require the flexibility to move freely between modes o f activity, such as defining 
a problem, designing a strategy, and realising a project.
A central aim o f this thesis is to develop the idea o f a situational transactive rationality 
(STR) in a systematic fashion. Aspects of this approach have frequently surfaced in 
planning theory but a coherent definition appears to be a novel project. I believe that 
Dewey’s contribution to building a comprehensive framework has thus far been 
underestimated.
My aim is not merely to sketch the difference between these two rationality models, but to 
put them to test in actual case studies (Chapter 9) o f urban planning projects from the 
German Ruhr region. I argue that each case manifests important aspects of one of the two 
rationality models, respectively. During the study of these cases I hope to elicit the two 
models and to show how the situational transactive approach holds its own in complex and 
multifaceted social settings.
The role of agency theory
This thesis asks: what would a satisfactory concept o f rationality for planning contexts look 
like? Before answering, we must first explain what would constitute a satisfactory answer
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to this question. I believe that any concept o f deliberative rationality relies on a particular 
agency theory. Hence, no convincing discussion of rationality can bypass reflections on the 
theory of agency.
What I envision is a somewhat dissident conception o f rationality. It should be a conception 
that is close to the experience o f planners in their fields and coherent with actual human 
deliberation processes, but this is precisely what will set it at odds with most traditional 
concepts o f rational action. At the same time it should be a conception that is able to 
provide orientation and guidance. Developing this new concept o f rationality requires the 
philosophical equivalent o f a root canal treatment, operating on the very foundations of our 
received agency theory. This reconstruction will make extensive use of resources provided 
by classical American pragmatism, namely by John Dewey’s philosophy.
Hume famously explained that reasons and passions are respectively the guiding and 
motivating components of human action. He postulated that we serve our motivations 
(passions) best if we allow our capacity of reasoning to work unhampered and unimpeded 
by wishes, ends or desires. This minimal definition o f rational agency relies on an agency 
theory that separates categories of ends (purposes, desires, or passions) and means (beliefs, 
cognitions, instruments or reasons). It further understands these categories as antecedent 
components of any decision-process and executive action.1
The traditional linear instrumental model o f planning relies on a Humean model of agency, 
which, in its simplest form, is called the Folk-Model o f agency. This Folk-Model is often 
depicted as follows:
1 I do not mean to prejudge the famous dispute about whether these components (interpreted as desires and 
beliefs) should be understood as causal antecedents of action or as logical premises in explaining human 
action (cf. contribution by Donald Davidson, Alasdair MacIntyre, G.-H . von Wright).
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Means
Ends
Decision ■=> Actions
Figure 1.1: The Folk-Model of Agency
I believe that no philosopher has done more than John Dewey to challenge the foundations 
o f this basic model, and I interpret the main thrust o f his work on epistemology, ethics and 
logic as a contribution to agency theory. Dewey offers more than a powerful critique o f  the 
Folk-Model. I argue that Dewey’s theory o f inquiry provides the key for a new conception 
o f rationality, and it is this new conception that can meet expressed demands for a more 
contemporary planning theory. For these reasons I give Dewey a prominent position in my 
work.
The present project was inspired by a section in Hans Joas’ (1996) book, “The Creativity of 
Action,” entitled “A non teleological interpretation of the intentionality o f action.” Joas 
argues that the traditional means-ends (or “Folk-“) model o f human agency fails to account 
for the origin o f its assumed ends- and means dimensions, thereby misconstruing their role 
in the formation o f agency. Joas argues with Dewey that the categories o f  instruments and 
purposes are only a product, not an antecedent, o f human agency. Joas explains that the 
very juxtaposition o f means and ends is merely a possibility and not a necessity in the 
formation o f  intentional agency. Defining separate pairs of ends and means can be 
instrumental for achieving coordination in our activities. But having an end or a clearly 
defined purpose is not a necessary precondition for initiating action. Agency theory can 
assume that we are habitually active. According to Dewey, we follow certain patterns and 
habits without the external motivating force of a goal or end until these habits and patterns 
are interrupted or inhibited. Our agency passes through phases or “situations ” o f habitual 
coordination, which become interrupted, turn problematic, and give way to efforts at re­
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establishing a habitual equilibrium. Joas proposed replacing the means-ends model of 
agency with one centred on such habitual and problematic “situations.” These ideas are 
discussed in detail in chapters 3 ,4  & 6.
Returning to the question of what a satisfactory concept of rationality for planning contexts 
would look like, my first claim is that we must begin by reflecting on the fundamentals of 
agency theory. This is o f course only part of the answer. Below I explain my strategy in 
more detail.
Chapter structure and strategy
Besides a thorough revision of the foundations of the concept of deliberative rationality in 
agency-theory, a few other important points must be worked out.
The main elements of my project are the following:
• Pointing out the relevance and direction o f a conceptual revision o f rationality in 
planning and policy making (Chapter 2).
• Presenting John Dewey’s philosophical project as a source for a fundamental 
critique of traditional agency theory (Folk-model) (Chapters 3&4 and part o f 5&6).
• Introducing and discussing an alternative conception o f deliberative rationality 
based on Dewey’s notions of imagination and inquiry (Chapters 5&6).
• Pointing out how this model relates to planning processes (Chapters 7-9).
Chapters 1&10 provide guidance to the project as a whole.
Below is a commented schedule o f the aim and content o f individual chapters:
Chapter 2 Rational Planning -  Some Theory and History
This chapter introduces the ideal type of a traditional linear instrumental model of 
rationality (LIR). I develop this idea with reference to a short historical background o f  
urban planning theory, and I discuss how LIR relies on the Humean Folk-Model o f agency. 
Following a critical discussion o f several distinctive aspects o f LIR, I will turn to some
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contemporary developments in planning and related disciplines which suggest the rise o f an 
alternative rationality model.
The following three chapters are structured as a systematic critique of the Humean Folk- 
Model o f agency as in Fig. 1.1.1 develop a Deweyan perspective that successively deals 
with the three resting points means-ends-action (or belief-desire-action) of the Folk-Model.
Chapter 3 Knowledge, Believe and the Primacy o f Action
I investigate the relationship between epistemic categories like (knowledge, cognition, 
belief) and actions. The aim is to show that these epistemic categories are not preconditions 
or premises for the formation of intentional agency but rather its product. This chapter will 
introduce “experience” as perhaps the most fundamental concept in Dewey’s philosophy.
Chapter 4 Purposes in View of Instruments -  Defining and Using Ends 
I proceed by examining the second leg o f the Folk-Model, which represents ends (desires or 
purposes), and ask questions about the origin and the philosophical foundation of 
motivations and value-premises in our agency. Dewey’s account roots the origin of 
purposes and value-premises within the context of unfolding agency and instrumental 
reflection. By the same token Dewey rejects the notion that values and motivations were to 
be regarded as external antecedents or premises in the formation o f deliberate agency. This 
part of Dewey’s theory yields two important results: 1. there is no strict separation between 
epistemic evaluative processes, 2. ends (including “final” purposes) are have meaning only 
in the context o f unfolding agency, where they play a functional role.
Chapter 5 Imagination in the Deliberation Process
Chapters 3&4 should yield the promised inversion of the ME A model. This, however, 
creates many questions, and in particular one looming gap: if means and ends cannot longer 
be understood as inputs or as logical antecedents for deliberative processes, if they are the 
outcome o f the formation of agency, what can we rest a model o f rationality on? The 
traditional criteria o f efficiency, optimality and success can no longer serve as standards for 
rational decision-making where their basic measures are floating. This chapter introduces
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Dewey’s notion of imagination as an alternative method of gaining orientation in such 
indeterminate situations where a clear definition o f means and ends dimensions is still 
missing. I will go beyond Dewey’s definition and provide a more inclusive look at various 
dimensions and functions of “imagination” in deliberation processes.
Chapter 6 Situation and Inquiry -  From Agency theory to Rationality 
By this point we will have left the Humean model of rational agency behind and need to see 
how a new “situational transactive” model begins to take shape. Chapter 6 discusses 
Dewey’s notion o f a “rhythm” of changing “situations” (oscillating between settled and 
problematic poles) as a new basic model o f agency-theory. Dewey’s concept of “situation” 
could thus replace the reference points “means” and “ends”, as Hans Joas previously 
suggested. A new concept o f rationality, based on Dewey’s notion o f intelligent inquiry 
will be introduced and discussed.
Chapter 7 Social Planning and Collective Intelligence
Some possible objections to this application must be answered pre-emptively: How can 
Dewey’s theory of intelligent agency apply to both individual and collective forms of 
deliberation? It will be argued that common objections to moving from individual to 
collective agency must be premised on the Humean framework. All distinctions that the 
Humean model relies on, including that between agent and environment, are, for Dewey, 
products rather than a priori starting points in a “transactive” agency theory. A Deweyan 
theory of rational action seems therefore less vulnerable to many concerns about the 
possibility o f moving from a theory o f individual deliberation to the aggregate level o f a 
rationality o f social action. Indeed Dewey provides a detailed theoretical account of 
collective and public forms o f deliberation, but he refuses to understand these as a second 
order form o f rationality that would have to be modelled upon individual decision-making. 
This interim chapter will briefly introduce Dewey’s notion o f “effective-” or “social 
intelligence.”
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Chapter 8 The Decision-cell - A  Pragmatist Planning Model
I will turn to the application o f Dewey’s framework in a new model o f planning and policy­
making processes. This “decision-cell model” is the product of my collaboration with 
Shyama Kuruvilla over several years (Dorstewitz and Kuruvilla 2007; Kuruvilla and 
Dorstewitz forthcoming).
Chapter 9 Mines and Malls - A  Tale o f Two Cities
I will illustrate the difference between the received “linear instrumental” approach and the 
proposed “situational-transactive” model by juxtaposing two brief case studies. Both 
examples describe recent urban land use planning projects in Germany’s Ruhr region and 
illustrate why planners have good reason not to ignore the situational transactive approach.
Chapter 10 Conclusion: Perspective and Critique
In the final chapter I will take a critical perspective on the project o f a Deweyan rationality 
concept as a whole. I will address likely criticism that my project will meet with and outline 
some possible approaches to their solution. The purpose here is not to solve all remaining 
problems in one sweep, but to indicate which direction future research will have to take.
Contribution and originality
What is the expected gain from this project? And wherein lays its innovation or 
achievement?
A number of points seem central to evaluating my project.
I am not aware of any other work that has so systematically reviewed John Dewey’s 
critique of the traditional Humean conception o f rationality. I construct a reading of 
Dewey’s epistemological, ethical and logical work which consequently sees him as an 
agency theorist. I elaborate upon Dewey’s rich and powerful idea o f imaginative inquiry as 
the foundation stone of a new concept of deliberative rationality.
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The interest here is not purely philosophical. I intend to construct a bridge between 
planning theory and the tradition o f philosophical pragmatism. My ambition is to show that 
classical pragmatist thought o f the late 19th and early 20th centuries had already worked out 
solutions to problems that still haunt planning theorists in the 21st century.
Not only will I point out the relevance of this philosophical reconstruction project for 
policy-makers and planning theorists, I shall also apply the theory in a new deliberation 
model for planning processes, and will relate the conceptual results of this project to case 
studies where I illustrate the difference between a more traditional (LIR) and a 
reconstructed (STR) approach.
Dewey
Exegesis vs. problem-solving
In the beginning o f my studies, at the Essen University in Germany, I was taught that 
philosophical dissertations fall into two classes: those interpreting a philosopher’s position, 
and others directed at solving a philosophical problem.
The problem with this dualism between problem-focused and exegetic work is not only that 
it reeks o f the unfortunate divide between continental hermeneutics and Angelo-Saxon 
analytics, it also insinuates that understanding a philosopher’s ideas could be separated 
from solving intellectual problems.
This thesis is intended to both construct a reading o f John Dewey’s philosophy and to solve 
a problem. The problem is concerned with defining a contemporary and viable concept of 
rationality -  a concept that does not merely withstand philosophical critique but also 
corresponds to our empirical deliberative capacities and can provide orientation in contexts 
of planning and policy design.
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I believe that approaching Dewey’s philosophy as a resource to be extracted, refined and 
employed rather than a self-sufficient hermeneutic exercise does justice to Dewey’s own 
understanding of philosophy as a process of living inquiry.
Reading Dewey
Dewey is one of the most prolific philosophers o f all time. His collected works comprise 37 
volumes which contain over 40 published books and ca. 700 articles (Dewey and Boydston 
(ed.) 1969 [1882-1898]; 1969 [1899-1924]; 1969 [1925-1953]; 1996 [1882-1953]).2
There is no individual book that can be singled out as Dewey’s main work, nor would any 
of his publications, taken on its own own, fully licence Rorty’s judgement, which 
pronounces Dewey as one amongst four of the most eminent philosophers o f the 20th 
Century (the others being Wittgenstein, Russell and Heidegger).
Many scholars have rightly complained about Dewey’s drawn out style, crowded with 
anecdotal details, and his tendency to repeat ideas. His writings are not philosophically dark 
or convoluted; mostly they are conversional and contain a lot o f commentary knick-knack. 
It is often difficult to find orientation in Dewey’s works: he rarely provides chapter 
headings and stints with guiding or summarising comments about his intentions and the 
structure of his argumentation. Thomas Alexander concluded that reading Dewey is “like 
swimming through oatmeal,” (Alexander according to Festenstein 1997 p.23), but I believe 
this goes too far. It is a pleasure to watch Dewey unfold his complex and subtle arguments. 
His ideas are carefully thought through and are expressed clearly.
The quality and depth o f Dewey’s contribution can only be measured if one is willing to 
follow his thoughts for some while. It is easy to underestimate the explosive power of 
Dewey’s philosophical work after reading a small portion o f it. Nothing in his 
conversational style suggests how much Dewey demands from his reader in terms of
2Unless otherwise indicated, all Dewey citations refer to the collected works electronic edition.
References will use the standard format e.g. LW.12.130, which translates to ‘Later Works -  Volume 12 -  
Page 130’.
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sacrificing fundamentals beliefs and revising basic concepts. Heidegger signalled his 
intention to shake the foundations o f philosophy with a hermetic style and a language of 
neologisms. Dewey refused to build such a hermeneutic fortress around his project and 
preferred to reconstruct concepts within common language. Only where he felt that our 
common language relied too strongly on received philosophical dualisms did he propose 
such hyphenated expressions as “symbol-meanings,” “problem-solutions,” “facts-values,” 
and “organism-environments,” and not without calculating the unease and the cognitive 
dissonance they are bound to cause.
Alan Ryan (1995) saw Dewey as a “visionary of the here and now” (p.369). He argued that 
Dewey concerned himself with ideas and concepts not because he was seeking timeless 
truths, but on the contrary because he understood “.. .philosophy not as an isolated thing but 
as a chapter in the development o f civilisation and culture.” (MW 12.93). The contribution 
that philosophers had to make to human destiny was to ask the right questions at the right 
time and to provide answers that would help human beings gain orientation and enrich their 
activity. His philosophy is forward-looking and his questions are less directed at how things 
are than at how things could be and what we could do (LW2xiv original quote in “Events 
and the future”):
“Pragmatism... does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon consequent
phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the possibilities o f action.”
Olson observes that often, “critics accuse Dewey o f holding ideas that he was adamantly 
opposed to. At other times, people who seem to hold views that are strongly Deweyan 
indict Dewey” (Olson 2002). Snider cautions against a piecemeal approach to 
understanding and applying pragmatist philosophy and observes that “Peirce, James, and 
Dewey were not satisfied with proclaiming only a few o f pragmatism’s points. Rather, they 
went to great lengths to develop pragmatism as a comprehensive and integrated theory of 
thought” (Snider 2000b). However, Dewey explicitly saw himself as laying the groundwork
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for a continuing philosophical project and might have even advocated close scrutiny o f the 
interpretation and application o f his work in current contexts (Blake 2005).
Many analytically-minded critics misinterpreted Dewey’s work because they sought to 
address weaknesses in individual claims and arguments in isolation from other parts of his 
work. E.g. it is easy to characterise Dewey as a naive positivist by looking at his 
endorsement o f the scientific method in resolving social ills and moral puzzles. But this 
does no justice to Dewey’s particular notion o f scientific inquiry, which cuts across a 
cascade of dualisms such as: subjective/objective, ontic/epistemic, causal/teleological, 
factual/evaluative, mental/material, and individual/social.
Dewey’s critics charge from all sides: the religious right, the Marxist left, liberals, 
positivists, relativists, educators, policy analysts, and philosophers. The conservative think 
tank “Human Events” has published a list o f  the most dangerous books o f the 19th and 20th 
century -  Dewey’s “Democracy and Education” made it into the top 5 (surpassing even 
Marx’ “Das Kapital,” Lenin’s “What is to be done,” and Darwin’s “Origin o f Species”).3
Dewey wasn’t without wit in fending off even slightly unfair criticism. In response to 
Bertrand Russell’s observation that the “love of truth [was] obscured in America by 
commercialization o f which pragmatism is the philosophical expression,” Dewey remarked 
that “the statement to me seemed to be of that order o f interpretation which would say that 
English neo-realism is a reflection o f the snobbish aristocracy o f the English and the 
tendency of French thought to dualism an expression of an alleged Gallic disposition to 
keep a mistress in addition to a wife.” (Quoted in Dewey: Rejoinder, LW14.13-14 [original 
publication 527])
3 The reason quoted is that Dewey would have championed a model of “progressive” (or child-centred) 
education, which weakened the call for discipline in schools. The quote reads, “In Democracy and Education, 
in pompous and opaque prose, he disparaged schooling that focused on traditional character development and 
endowing children with hard knowledge, and encouraged the teaching of thinking ‘skills’ instead. His views 
had great influence on the direction of American education—particularly in public schools—and helped nurture 
the Clinton generation...”.
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Scope, Limits and Ambitions
I am aware that my undertaking is highly ambitious; perhaps it exceeds the ideal scope of a 
PhD-thesis. The aim can therefore not be to devise a string of watertight arguments that 
deal in detail with all possible objections. Instead the argument has a more strategic layout. 
It is my intent to show the feasibility of a pragmatist reconstruction o f rationality in 
planning in principle. The arch o f my discussion has a far stretch, reaching from historical 
problems in planning theory through a revised notion o f human agency theory and inquiry, 
back to applied contexts of urban planning. It needs the benevolent support o f the reader.
Below I name a list o f 9 criteria and demands that a reconstructed concept o f planning 
rationality should fulfil. These will be developed and explained at later stages. Here they 
serve to give a taste of the direction that the current project is about to take:
1. Rational planning should not be understood as a linear progression o f stages. It must 
not prescribe rigid procedures. It should be flexible with regard to rapid changes 
between behaviour modes (e.g. from implementation to inquiry or conceptualisation 
phases).
2. A new rationality should do justice to the fact that problems are not given. It must 
be able to work in messy, confusing, problematic situations, and acknowledge that 
the definition of problems, ends, and purposes is a process which extends over the 
entire planning process. Understanding and goal-orientation cannot be preconditions 
for rational planning and are treated as the product of rational planning agency.
3. A contemporary definition of rationality should model decision-making as a process 
not as a point or instance in time. Decisions are formed rather than ‘drawn’ or 
‘deduced.’ Decision-making extends across all phases of the planning process and 
should ideally involve all participants and group.
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4. A contemporary concept of rationality should not insist on a sharp distinction 
between planning and implementation. It should acknowledge and foster the 
creative potential o f realisation-stages.
5. Rationality should not be elitist and undemocratic. At heart it should be should be a 
pluralistic concept. Only then rational deliberation can sensibly involve a large 
variety of participants and groups. If intelligence and excellence can be defined as 
products of collaboration rather than as experts’ privileged knowledge, we can hope 
to resolve the implicit contradictions between democratic pluralistic demands for 
participation and the experts’ technocratic excellence.
6. On empirical grounds, a revised notion has to reconsider the relationship between 
means and ends in agency theory. It has to account for the intimate relationship 
holding between instrumental concerns and the tasks o f defining ultimate purposes. 
It thereby has to precisely locate ends and purposes within unfolding human agency.
7. Also on normative grounds rationality may have to bridge the gap between facts and 
values in planning, which is closely connected to the dichotomy between means and 
ends. It has to show that deliberation over purposes cannot and should not be 
separated from instrumental inquiry.
8. The concept of rationality should accommodate and promote non-deductive forms 
of reasoning which involve the human capacity to appreciate situations as 
qualitative wholes. It has to provide a theory of human deliberation that draws on all 
intellectual and emotional capacities. In particular it has to emancipate these 
capacities from the hegemony of analytic and deductive reasoning.
9. Rationality should be defined as “learning” rather than as “instrumental achieving.” 
The first step is to overcome the dichotomy between implementing change and 
learning. It has to integrate the categories of inquiry and planning with those of 
action and implementation. It should not define learning as a secondary, optional
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consequence of information-feedback from implementation stages, but must 
integrate learning as a constitutive aspect o f all planning processes. Rational 
planning should be organised as inquiry, which should in turn be tailored to a 
particular problematic situation.
These criteria and demands for a new concept o f rational planning will guide and inspire 
the further discussion, but they will not be taken for granted as laid down here. In the 
following chapters I will explain the need for these demands and criteria with reference to 
both, philosophical arguments and recent developments in planning theory.
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Chapter 2: Rational Planning -  Some Theory and History
There is an old saying that a problem well put is half solved. This much is obvious. What is
not so obvious is how to put a problem well 
(Churchman, Ackoff et al. 1957)
Introduction
Planning is the practice o f looking ahead. It is not a patient process of anticipating or 
surrendering to the inevitable, but envisions our destiny as something we have the power to 
shape. Planning is about using our intelligence to coordinate efforts in order to improve the 
human condition.
Many definitions of deliberative rationality have used very similar vocabulary. They refer 
to notions like forward-looking and action guiding principles that are oriented toward 
improving our living conditions.
Is the concept o f a “rationality o f planning” or a “planning rationality” merely a pleonasm? 
Do the two concepts of “planning” and “rationality” really mean the same thing? We might 
say that not all planning is rational, but this is merely saying that not all planning efforts 
conform to some stated criteria of “good planning.” Of course we could object by saying 
that rational planning means conforming to timeless normative standards (e.g. consistency, 
efficiency or justification), whereas planning has been an evolving practice. However, if we 
cast a sharp eye on this unfolding story we find that not only planning practices, but also 
the normative standards used to evaluate them, have undergone fundamental changes. From 
the construction o f Mediaeval Cathedrals to the erection o f Chicago City, from Le 
Corbusier’s Unite d’Habilitation in Marseilles to Rem Koolhaas’ CCTV Headquarters in 
Beijing, planning styles and practices have changed together with planning methods, norms 
and standards.
I interpret the difference between planning and rationality as one between a practice and its 
methods, norms and standards or between the “what” and the “how” of a developing 
practice. A history o f planning must be a history o f planning-rationality or it will be limited 
to a recounting of anecdotal evidence.
This chapter examines the concept of rationality in several applied planning and policy 
contexts. I begin by tracing ideas and movements in the history o f planning that prepared 
the formulation of a “received” or “traditionalist” conception, which I call the “Linear 
Instrumental” model o f rationality (LIR).
The LIR model conceives o f rational planning as a logical process that starts with a 
definition o f a set of goals, leads to the formulation o f efficient strategies, and ends with the 
implementation of changes that realise given ends. I will discuss the implications and 
critiques o f the LIR model, concluding that rationality is in urgent need o f reconstruction 
where cosmetic changes will not do. Existing critiques o f  linear instrumental rationality 
models yield a catalogue of requirements for contemporary conceptions of rational 
planning. Later in this chapter I discuss certain debates in the field which point at the 
relevance o f my project and give it direction.
This first main chapter of my thesis frames the subsequent parts that explore Dewey’s 
pragmatist theory in the search for a new model o f deliberative rationality. Together with 
the concluding chapters it frames the conceptual middle part o f Dewey-scholarship as a 
systematic and applied investigation of the concept o f rationality in planning.
As an academic discipline, Planning has emerged from the contexts o f urban design, 
architecture, and land-use planning. Today planning theory stretches across fields as 
diverse as national security planning, social welfare services and transfer payments, water 
resources management, conservation and heritage protection, education and health services, 
land use zoning, transport, and environmental protection (cf. Friedman 1987 pp.26-27). 
Planning has expanded beyond the public domain into business schools, where it is used to
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address problems o f strategic management, personnel and financial planning, process 
optimisation (OR) and sustainability strategies.
I treat planning as a generic concept, and my discussion o f rationality does not apply 
exclusively to these contexts and disciplines. The realm of urban planning is used in order 
to put certain core ideas in context. At the end of this thesis I introduce two case studies 
from urban land use projects in the German Ruhr region, hence the attention given to the 
urban roots of planning theory.
Gardens, Blueprints and Utopias
Architects and visions
When Le Corbusier revealed his project “radiant city” (Le Corbusier 1933 p. 14), he proved 
to be more than an aesthetic visionary. This intellectual avant-garde project embodied the 
planning philosophy o f his era. His comprehensive projection o f a modernist city embodied 
a conclusive functional idea o f urban life in an optimal physical environment. The radiant 
city is part o f a long tradition of enlightenment urban utopias that stretch from Thomas 
More’s “Utopia” (1516) or Tommaso Campanella’s “City o f the Sun” (1602) to Ebenezer 
Howard’s “Garden-City” (1902). The common thread o f these visionaries was that they 
designed local and physical space as material environments in which humans could 
flourish. The promise of scientific progress and technical advance made it seem possible to 
erect in brick and mortar the solution to people’s most pressing problems. Cities were often 
described as teeming and clogged places, allowing only for chaotic and uncoordinated 
movements. This meant an unorganised life for most citizens and poor provision and 
accessibility of the basic means of life in rapidly and randomly growing metropolitan areas. 
The ideal was often o f a functional society.
Knowledge o f basic human needs and anticipation of industrial developments allowed pre­
war planning projects to combine the efficient processes provided by a powerful 
infrastructure with the psychosocial comforts of a quiet, low-stress environment.
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“...the form of the modem city was one o f plain, geometrical, ‘functional’ buildings 
standing at regular intervals in a sea of ‘free-flowing’ space.” This modernist vision o f a 
city “was ordered into great blocks or zones o f single uses, with fast motorways like 
great arteries connecting up the different districts.” (Taylor 1980 p.24)
In such places houses were, in the famous words of Le Corbusier, “machines for living.”
What I will later define as the traditional standard model of planning rationality (or the 
model o f linear instrumental rationality) is markedly different from this Utopian model. 
Nevertheless it can be only adequately understood in front o f the background of this earlier 
approach.
Nine characteristics define the Utopian model:
1. Architects are the leading figures in the design process;
2. The description of end-states makes for the chief substance of a plan;
3. Aesthetic aspects take precedence over technical or economic concerns;
4. Envisioned end-states describe a physical or material environment;
5. These visions are spelled out in high resolution and minute detail;
6. Life in such designed environments is imagined as functioning in a static and 
habitual way;
7. Human needs are imagined as constant and statistically predictable;
8. Plans were made for large areas, which could extend over entire city quarters, or 
even form the foundation for entirely new cities;
9. Plans were usually made “from scratch” for empty sites, without prior construction 
or continuing use.
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Rationality in utopian planning
Rational end-states
Kumar defines the underlying enlightenment idea of the rationality o f a design or end-state 
by using the example of Campanella’s “City of the Sun” (Campanella 1602). He calls it a 
“...physical embodiment o f all the arts and sciences known to man. It is a compendium of 
all knowledge, all that is needed for the cultivation of the good life.” (Kumar 1991)
Le Corbusier’s radiant city was also more than a sublime piece o f aesthetic megalomania. It 
incorporated a vision o f human destiny in the age o f technology, and embodied a measure 
of human flourishing. We must understand life in such rationally conceived environments 
as a static ideal image: a repetitive functional routine, which follows the anticipated paths 
of daily accomplishments between work, commuting, domestic life, and recreation.
Rationality and implementation
The utopian and modernist idea of rationality was not concerned with the means, 
procedures and methods for realising grand designs. It widely excluded the anticipation of  
obstacles in the path o f blueprint to realisation. Budget constraints, time-limits, and 
obstacles were all referred to a technical administrative process that would take place, if 
ever, after the design-process, with its table-sized model, was complete. Practical 
dimensions o f the realisability (financial expedience, political consensus, and socio­
economic conditions) were not considered relevant to the intrinsic quality of an 
architectural scheme. The lack o f concern for these challenges might be attributable to a 
belief in the advancement of technology, which would make such projects possible and 
affordable. There was also a simplistic model o f administrative and political processes 
according to which the rational quality o f a planned design would alone decide which plan 
was to be realised.
Fischerman (1996) describes the detached nature of these early urban plans in the following 
way (p.21):
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“The cities were never conceived o f as blueprints for any actual project. They were 
‘ideal types’ of cities for the future, elaborate models rigorously designed to illustrate 
the general principles that each man advocated. ... The setting where these ideal cities 
existed was never any real location, but an empty, abstract plane where no 
contingencies existed.”
Ebenezer Howard’s work is an exception to the trend o f his era in which plans were 
founded on aesthetic or social vision while neglecting concern for practical constraints and 
economic realities. Howard explicitly premised his idea o f a “Garden City” on an economic 
model. His idea was that the creation o f new and superior satellite cities in the vicinity of 
overcrowded metropolitan areas would yield gains through rising property values, which 
would in turn offset initial investments. Max Steuer (2000) criticised this as naive in that it 
fails to account for income and productivity in the new satellites. He recounts Howard’s 
failures in financial management when his ideas were put into practice. Nevertheless 
Howard remains quite unique amongst those visionary urban planners of his period in 
attempting to ground his model on economic mechanisms.
Rationality in the development o f designs
In addition to a general lack o f interest in the instrumental means to realise their designs, 
utopian planners also saw little occasion to justify the origins o f their plans according to 
standards of rational criticism. An architect’s creative inspiration and ability to synthesize 
aesthetic and practical demands were the sole guarantors of his design’s rational quality.
No specific demands on the systematic gathering o f information or prescriptions of a 
planning procedure governed these designs. Interest groups were not involved in the 
formulation o f plans. Public approval was considered irrelevant in judging the intrinsic 
rational properties of a design.
To be fair, both Howard and Le Corbusier supported their arguments with some 
calculations o f revenue-streams in the case o f the garden-city (Howard 1902 Chapter II)
43
and statistics on population growth in that o f La Ville Radieuse (Le Corbusier 1929 p. 113). 
However, presumably Le Corbusier would have had little patience for requests to 
subordinate the architect’s contribution to the purvey o f social and economic planning 
experts.
Interestingly, it was not alone the pressure o f a technocratic age, which demoted 
architecture to a service within the larger contexts of socio-economic planning projects. For 
aesthetic reasons, architects began to subordinate their work to the functionality of 
technical processes. Le Corbusier was an avant-gardist in this respect and inspired many 
Bauhaus architects after him. We can clearly the see the tension between his prioritising of 
an aesthetical ideal and his wholehearted subscription to functionality in view of 
demographic and logistic problems. The genius o f Le Corbusier and other great architects 
of the Bauhaus period was that they managed to synthesise these imperatives convincingly. 
Urban planning in later generations often failed not only by giving primacy to technical and 
economic criteria over aesthetic demands, but rather by disconnecting functional from 
aesthetic aspects.
Critique o f Utopian Rationality
The following static idea o f an urban structure is expressed in Le Corbusier’s chapter on 
“Order” (Le Corbusier 1929 Chapter II p. 15):
“The house, the street, the town, are points to which human energy is directed: they 
should be ordered, otherwise they counteract the fundamental principles round which 
we revolve.”
A defining feature o f the utopian planning model is the passive and idealised nature of its 
designs. The task o f planning is more like an inspired seeing than a material interaction 
with life in an urban reality. In pointing out the need to reform this model, Jane Jacobs 
launched a scathing critique (Jacobs 1961 p. 33):
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“Le Corbusier’s dream city has had an immense impact on our cities. It was hailed 
deliriously by architects, as has gradually been embodied in scores o f projects ... His 
city was like a wonderful mechanical toy. ... It was so orderly, so visible, so easy to 
understand. It said everything in a flash, like a good advertisement. ... But as to how 
the city works, it tells ... nothing but lies.”
Le Corbusier’s visions o f urban life appear outdated today, when an element o f creative 
mess and dynamic evolution is viewed as essential to urban life. That the utopian model is 
outdated may be only apparently true. At the end o f this thesis I discuss several 
contemporary urban planning cases, one o f which demonstrates that planning 
comprehensive environments is still very much in fashion: Between 1996 and 2004 plans 
were made to erect a grand style shopping centre in the heart o f the German city o f  
Duisburg. “MulitCasa,” was the name for a project to create an entire world o f shopping 
and leisure experience, from flagship stores to bars, restaurants, sport facilities and 
recreation areas. The guiding idea was the creation o f a seductive environment that would 
attract customers with more than just shopping. The centre would offer all the aspects of an 
urban centre by catering to the needs o f a population that was leisurely strolling while 
shopping. This world was designed to efficiently satisfy these demands by providing 
optimal access to traffic systems, parking places, guidance and orientation systems and a 
clearly arranged shopping environment with many leisurely spots and non teeming 
esplanades. “Multi-Casa,” which was overturned at the last minute by a city council 
resolution, embodied the idea o f a comprehensive environment, providing for a pre­
calculated urban lifestyle under one roof. The project also made a strong aesthetic claim, 
(although less appealing than Le Corbusier’s visionary projections): Duisburg town 
planners clearly intended to use the outreaching and skyward peaking design as a 
demonstration of its status, modernity and economic dynamism. Although the “Multi-Casa” 
project ultimately failed, many similar projects o f comprehensive, functional and 
aesthetically unified urban retail environments have been realised or are currently being 
planned, (e.g. the famous “CentrO” in Oberhausen, or the Ostbahnhof Berlin). Many o f  
them occupy space comparable to city quarters rather than individual buildings. The 
modernist comprehensive spirit is thus alive and increasingly visible. Later I will discuss
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the “Multi-Casa” not primarily as a Utopian, comprehensive, end-state oriented approach, 
but as a case of “linear instrumental” planning.
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The Model of Linear Instrumental Rationality
From aesthetic visions to strategies and solutions
The linear instrumental model o f rationality (LIR), as introduced here breaks only partly 
with the Utopian tradition. It is not principally opposed to comprehensive Blueprint 
planning, but rather a further development o f it. Most importantly LIR adds the dimension 
of a procedure: LIR planning typically reaches from the definition of a plan to its 
realisation.
The utopian and architectural planning ideals are “comprehensive” in that they (1) provide 
fully detailed designs o f a physical environment, often right down to the shape of 
doorknobs, and (2) they comprehensively envisage a way o f life, determined by their 
material environments.
In some respects these early planners were challenged for not being comprehensive enough 
(Taylor 1998 p.41):
“Because they were bound to an essentially physicalist conception o f town planning, 
planners tended to view towns and their problems only in physical (and aesthetic) 
terms. Because of this they simply did not pay attention to social matters', their theory 
of planning prevented them from really seeing social issues.”
This critique spawned a series of reform ideas, which addressed the theoretical foundations 
of urban planning.
These new ideas can be grouped into the two provinces o f expertise and rational 
procedures. On the one hand, the object of planning changed from architectural 
constructions to solutions for socio-economic problems and infrastructural needs in 
growing urban areas. On the other hand, in realising projects and solving societal problems,
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rationalist enlightenment visions of a grand design had to give way to questions about 
rational actions, resources and procedures.
Regional employment, access to healthcare, availability o f day-care centres, public 
transport systems, and educational infrastructure began to receive more attention than the 
aesthetics of new environments. This coincided with a growing disregard for existing urban 
contexts. Roads were built according to anticipated traffic figures even if this meant 
dissecting urban centres and separating communities. Precious sites that would today be 
protected by cultural heritage laws were often sacrificed. In the German town o f Hattingen, 
half of the historical timber frame centre was replaced by a concrete complex that houses a 
department store and a parking garage. This trend put a hold on the genre of urban planning 
that concerns itself with specific locations and contexts rather than general infrastructural 
policies.
The complexity o f problems seemed to demand the separation o f  offices and competences 
along the lines of policy sectors (healthcare, schooling, waste-treatment, etc.). These 
functionally distinguished sectors could employ domain-specific experts, partly explaining 
the wide replacement of architects with engineers, sociologists, economists and 
geographers. (Taylor 1998)
Rationality as linear procedure
Yezekhel Dror defines planning as “the process of preparing a set of decisions for action in 
the future, directed at achieving goals by preferable means” (Dror 1973 emphasis added). 
This definition summarises an important step toward the LIR model. Physical planners of 
the earlier utopian brands did not make plans for concerted intervention. Only a new 
generation o f expert- engineer planners, (who must at this point be called “traditionalists”), 
recognised the need for anticipating and coordinating various stages o f implementation. 
Planning became a multi-dimensional coordination task that comprises actions, resources, 
ends, targets and timeframes.
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This meant an important alteration o f the rationale o f planning. Planners were no longer 
artists and visionaries, but people who identified efficient means and well timed processes 
in order to realise a weighted set of goals.
Procedural models are often contrasted with end-state oriented models. To avoid 
confusion, I write about the linear instrumental model o f rational planning as one that 
combines elements of both procedural and goal-oriented approaches. The linear 
instrumental model sees rational planning as a well-ordered progression of steps leading to 
an end, which can be alternatively defined as improving a situation, obtaining a goal or 
solving a problem.
Some characteristics and implications of the LIR model are worth considering individually:
• LIR relies on a linear progression of stages.
• It tends to ignore or trivialise deeply perplexing and messy situations.
• It assumes distinct and authoritative decision points.
• LIR introduces a rigid separation between the planning and implementation phases.
These are some critical aspects of the LIR model, that are o f particular interest for the here 
attempted reconstruction of the concept o f rationality planning. Each o f the following 
sections consists of a characterisation and a subsequent critique.
Linear progression of stages
Structuring the planning process into a succession of phases or stages is perhaps the most 
characteristic mark of LIR models. With a few exceptions, these stages read like direct 
translations o f the Humean means-ends-action scheme (see previous chapter Fig. 1.1). 
Usually they include detailed specifications and a number of feedback relations, yet in 
substance they describe or prescribe a progression from formulating ends and defining 
means or alternative strategies to the implementation of actions.
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The planning model which Landon Winner calls “straight-line” instrumentalism (Winner 
1977; quoted after Hickman 1995 p.28)
“...begins with a preconceived end in mind. Then one decides upon an appropriate 
instrument or organization o f instruments to achieve that end, usually weighing the 
advantages o f two or more alternative instruments. Next comes the actual use o f the 
instrument in the way established for its successful exercise. Finally, one achieves 
certain results which are judged according to the original end.”
Davidoff and Rainer speak o f three levels of the planning process (Davidoff and Reiner 
1973 pp.11-12):
“... first the selection of ends and criteria; second, the identification of a set of 
alternatives consistent with these general prescriptives, and the selection o f  a desired 
alternative; and, third, guidance o f action toward determined ends.”
Much of the body o f planning literature is little more than an attempt to differentiate the 
relevance of new stages in this basic model.
John Friedman extracts a 7-stage scheme to capture much o f the received commonsense in 
planning literature (Friedman 1996 p.22):
“The ideal-typical decision model applied by authors in the policy analysis tradition has 
the following identifiable ‘stages’:
• Formulation of goals and objectives;
• Identification and design o f major alternatives for reaching the goals identified 
within the given decision-making situation;
• Prediction of major sets o f consequences that would be expected to follow upon 
adoption o f each alternative;
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• Evaluation o f consequences in relation to desired objectives and other important 
values;
• Decision based on information provided in the preceding steps;
• Implementation o f this decision through appropriate institutions;
• Feedback o f actual program results and their assessment in light of the new 
decision-situation.”
Chadwick concentrates on the prevalence o f complexity in planning contexts and stresses 
the importance o f model building in the planning process. His idea of a rational planning 
procedure and its sequence of logical steps, however, is tully compatible with the LIR 
model (Chadwick 1970 p.67):
“Formulation o f the problem
4
Formulation of criteria, which the problem solution must satisfy
I
Modelling the problem
I
Testing the model against the criteria
4
Deriving a solution from the model
i
Testing the solution against the criteria
I
Implementing the solution.”
The kinship of all the linear rational stages models with the Humean means-ends-action 
scheme (c.f. Fig 1.1) is most evident in Davidoff and Reiner’s (1973) version, which 
reduces the structure of the planning process to three chief stages that read (p. 18): “value 
formulation,” “means identification,” and “effectuation.”
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Although there are many such multiple stages models, (cf. Dror 1968; Chadwick 1970; 
Banfield 1973; Davidoff and Reiner 1973; Lindblom 1973; Camhis 1979; Friedman 1996) 
no two o f these agree exactly on the number o f stages or their exact taxonomy.
One important notion in all these models is that stages occur in an order o f unilateral 
dependence (or lexical order). It is assumed that fulfilling early stages is a necessary 
prerequisite for moving on to subsequent ones, and that we cannot rationally proceed before 
the previous stage had been successfully concluded. It is fruitless to attempt to define a 
solution before knowing the precise problem or to rush into the execution o f a plan before 
reaching a formal decision on it.
Together with Shyama Kuruvilla I have developed a standard model o f “linear instrumental 
rationality” as represented in the following scheme (Dorstewitz and Kuruvilla 2007):
Decision making
Final purposes 
and values
Action/
Implementation
Resources
Guides
Figure 2.1 The Linear Instrumental Model of Rationality (LIR)
Later references to the LIR (or traditional) model will refer to the idea expressed in this 
graph.
The graph interprets the logical relations of the basic Humean model of rational agency as a 
temporal flow chart o f stages in a planning process. The Folk-model o f agency (cf. Fig 1.1) 
defined ends and means (or in an alternative conception ‘desires’ and ‘cognitions’) as 
prerequisites o f decision-making and action. This model adds the idea that meaningful 
determination o f instrumental strategies (resources and guides) requires prior definition o f 
ultimate ends (purposes and values). The internal structure o f the “resources and guides”
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field follows Hume’s requirement that “passions” (desires) should not directly influence 
“reasons” (cognitions): this particular idea is also signalised by only a dotted line leading 
from “purposes and values” to “resources.” Cognitions that the model represents as 
“resources” refer to instrumental conditions. “Guides” on the other hand are those active 
elements in our reasoning that give orientation to our instrumental cognition: rules, norms, 
methods, evidence, performance measures and criteria are examples of the support our 
instrumental reasoning requires to proceed and focus on a target. E.g. concrete performance 
measures (which directly refer to the preceding field o f “purposes and values”) are 
necessary for giving direction to instrumental strategies, and so are methods like 
formulating deductive models o f circumstances, or consulting available evidence. If we 
apply this distinction o f our LIR standard model to Chadwick’s scheme above, we can see 
clearly that step 1, “Formulation o f the problem” is an instance of defining “final purposes 
and value.” Step 2, “Formulation o f criteria, which a problem solution must satisfy” would 
fall into the category o f “guides,” whereas step 3, “modelling the problem” would involve 
instrumental cognitions o f the category “resources.” The following steps like “testing the 
model against the criteria” and “testing solutions against criteria” would describe 
comparison stages involving both resources and guides and lead on to decision-making and 
implementation in the standard model.
This ‘linear instrumental’ model o f rationality (LIR) will provide the backdrop for 
developing a revised ‘situational transactive’ model o f rationality (STR). ‘Instrumental’1 
here means ‘action directed toward a predefined end.’ The attribute ‘linear’ refers to the 
sequential logic o f this planning model. These aspects shall be discussed in more detail 
below.
Practitioners and analysts would agree that linear stages models do not adequately capture 
the realities o f planning and policy-making. However, central aspects of this linear-
1 Dewey’s pragmatism is also referred to as “instrumentalism,” which does not correspond to my use of 
‘instrumental.’ Dewey’s “instrumentalism” includes concerns and methods of developing ends and purposes. 
It thereby denotes the exact opposite of ‘instrumental,’ which assumes purposes and ends to be externally 
fixed.
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instrumental model have great appeal for theorists and practitioners because of their 
purported heuristic and normative value:
(1) Bureaucrats and politicians tend to like the sense of orderliness that this scheme bestows 
on the ‘messy’ realities o f policy-making. For policy analysts the stages heuristic provides a 
simple way o f studying and explaining complex policy processes. Additionally, the media 
looks for discrete policy events. The public demands concrete goal directed policy 
interventions as promised by the linear stages model (John 1998; Howlett and Ramesh 
2003). Although actual planning processes do not usually conform to the order envisioned 
by the LIR scheme, this model is still empirically a potent device for capturing intentions 
and mental models o f involved planners. At the end o f this thesis I introduce a case study of 
a planning process where involved planners clearly employed a model of rational planning 
akin to linear instrumental rationality.
(2) Banfield (1973) defends the applicability o f linear instrumental rationality while still 
acknowledging that most empirical situations are marked by complexity and demand quick 
reactions and improvisation rather than rigid planning stages. He refers to the normative 
and informative role o f rational stages models. The strategy o f immunising a linear 
instrumental rationality against empirical refutation by defining it as a purely normative 
theory is a common one (Simon 1966; Banfield 1973), and has been partly addressed in the 
first chapter.
It is difficult to overlook the limitations o f such a normative theory of rational planning, 
which not only ignores but quite flagrantly contradicts experience. Nevertheless, we have to 
give it the benefit o f the doubt and ask whether the empirical inadequacy of the LIR model 
has any bearing on its normative import. E.g. one could object, the empirical fact that 
people fail to get regular health-checks has no normative implication to the effect that they 
should not get health checks.2 However, this analogy has a limb.
2 1 am indebted to my supervisor, Richard Bradley, for drawing my attention to this example.
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First, the empirical point about the LIR model is not merely that actual planning processes 
do lack procedural organisation. The conclusion of many decades o f planning practice is 
that most actual planning processes resist any attempt of superimposing this linear 
structure. The latter provides a much stronger reason for changing the theory in use. We 
certainly cannot conclude that people should not have check-ups from the fact that they do 
not have them. But this is far from saying that nothing normative would follow from this 
empirical point. A national health program would be ill advised to bet on people’s 
voluntary initiative even if this would yield the optimal or most rational policy in theory. 
Using the ideal best as a normative guide easily prevents more practicable or effective 
solutions. Where we manage to adapt our guiding norms to experience the benefits can be 
great. The German broadsheet Die Zeit has just reported on the success o f a healthcare 
program tailored for the needs and behavioural patterns of male professionals, where 
doctors visit employees in their companies for checks on skin- and prostate cancer 
(Albrecht 2008).
Second, the normative conclusion drawn from this empirical point is not that planning 
projects should proceed in a more or less random and disorganised fashion. A legitimate 
normative conclusion from the empirical insight that LIR does not work is simply that we 
need another rationality conception that does work for the material at hand. I shall later 
argue that a more flexible approach which permits freely moving back and forth between 
stages is a defensible methodological approach. But, of course, this requires further 
arguments. It may turn out that the bulk of these further arguments in support o f a new 
normative conception are themselves chiefly empirical: e.g. they could claim that a more 
flexible approach is also more feasible, that it enables the development complex projects, or 
that it spawns human creativity. However, I do not intend to solve the problem of the 
entanglement between empirical facts and norms here. Very illuminating arguments on this 
topic have been forwarded by Charles Taylor (1994) and Hilary Putnam (1981; 2002), and 
rely on them in many parts o f my argument.
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Some classical critiques of the linear progression model
In policy science many models reject the linear stages idea. Some suggest instead that 
social change and policy formation happen greatly by chance, or follow patterns which 
have little to do with intentionally planned coordination.
The famous “garbage can” metaphor (Cohen, March et al. 1972) claims that participants 
define problems where they occur, whereas solutions are generated independently and left 
on stock-pile in “garbage cans” until, more or less by chance, matching pairs o f problems 
and solutions couple up and initiate change processes.
Kingdon (1995) speaks o f three policy streams, “Problems,” “Policies,” and “Politics,” that 
develop quite autonomously and only occasionally interact. “Problems,” such as the cost of 
goods and services, epidemics, or disturbing results from scientific research, are discussed 
but do not necessarily lead to immediate political action. “Policies” are proposals, action 
plans, and technical solutions devised by specialists and political agencies that do not 
necessarily expend resources and political clout to implement change. “Politics” reflects 
shifting majorities, public mood and opinion, lobby-pressures and voiced interest. 
Problems, policies, and politics develop in remarkable independence from one another. 
Policies are not the direct responses to developments in the “problems” stream, and 
“political” decisions are not the direct products of those policies. Nevertheless, these 
streams are not altogether independent from one another, and social change relies on all 
three. At times “windows” open in which an ongoing activity in one stream influences an 
initiative in another. Change depends on such “windows o f opportunity,” i.e. a particular 
constellation o f political majorities or advocated policy suggestions that make action along 
defined agendas possible. This model directly contradicts the linear instrumental reading, 
according to which problem definition, policy design and political decision-making are 
logically subsequent procedural phases, (cf. John 1998)
Many contemporary critiques indicate that a new rationality conception should avoid 
defining logical successions of stages as operational standards for rational planning.
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Perplexed messy situations
All of the above linear conceptions o f planning procedures begin with somewhat similar 
stages: “formulation o f goals and objectives,” “value formulation,” “definition o f the 
problem,” “clarification of needs and demands,” or “definition of performance measures ” 
In his book System Thinking System Practice, Checkland lists another 12 examples of 
methodological schemes that refer to the clarification o f ends, values, goals, problems or 
visions as initial stages in rational deliberation processes (cf. Checkland 1981 p. 140). All of 
these methodologies, Checkland states, instruct planners to proceed by engineering 
solutions to given problems.
According to LIR models, planning really begins after problems, goals, and ultimate 
purposes have been clarified, i.e. when planners know what they are designing for.
This linear notion o f planning has received much criticism in recent years, not only for 
isolating substantial ethical questions from rational planning but also on empirical grounds. 
Many theorists found that the demand for an early stage definition o f problems and 
purposes contradicted basic experiences in most social planning theatres. Planners cannot 
presuppose that the definition o f “a problem” should be a trivial or preliminary matter 
(Ackoff 1979):
“[They] are not confronted with problems that are independent o f each other, but with 
dynamic situations that consists of system o f changing problems that interact with each 
other. I call such situations messes. Problems are abstractions extracted from messes by 
analysis...”
The linear instrumental model disregards the fact that the task of finding solutions for 
problems “... constitutes only a small part of managerial decision-making” (Checkland 
1981 p. 144). The chief challenge to planners is to give definition and structure to an 
indeterminate, messy, and perplexed problematic situation.
From his experience Checkland relates (Checkland 1981 p.155):
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“It became clear that the present research was to be concerned not with problems as 
such but with problem-situations in which there are felt to be unstructured problems, 
ones in which the designation o f objectives is itself problematic.”
Linear, or in Checkland’s diction “hard” approaches, see social situations as systems to be 
engineered and channelled toward the achievement of prior given ends. In contrast, 
Checkland defines “soft systems thinking” as the attempt to develop problem definitions 
and goals throughout the process o f planning. He speaks o f “human activity systems” as 
different in principle from natural or mechanical systems. Human activity systems cannot 
be designed and optimised to fit purposes because they are themselves the sources of  
purposes and visions. It is more than a humanistic commitment to freedom and the 
autonomy of human agents that leads Checkland to this conclusion. He is concerned with 
the complex nature of problem situations that makes it impossible to decide in advance 
what the problem is and what solution would fit. Policy situations involve a plethora of  
viewpoints, motives and mental models. These make not only prediction and control 
difficult but defy any antecedent definition of an objective function.
In a similar vein Rosenhead argues that “The clarity o f a well-structured problem is simply 
unavailable, and [that] an ... approach which asserts otherwise does violence to the nature 
of the situation” (Rosenhead 1989 p.6). Rosenhead includes several articles that represent 
“Problem Structuring Methods” in his book. These are designed to meet the challenge that 
the precise formulation o f a problem is the product rather than the antecedent o f decision 
processes. Friend’s strategic choice models and Checkland’s “soft systems methodology” 
are important contributions in his collection. Both combine the rejection o f pre-ordained 
ends with scepticism against any linear ordering o f planning or design stages. These two 
models provide important inspirations for the ‘decision-cell model’ that I will introduce in a 
later chapter.
Again, these are mainly empirical reports, yet they are strong enough to show the 
inadequacy of the linear instrumental model in most planning contexts. And more than that, 
they also set minimal standards for any concept of rationality that will supersede LIR. A
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concept of planning rationality must extend to tasks of structuring messy and insufficiently 
understood situations; it cannot merely apply to situations with well defined problems.
Decision points
The act of decision-making occupies a focal position in the linear instrumental model (cf. 
fig 2.1). The point at which a decision is made could be understood as the ideal transition 
point from planning to implementation. Decision-making can be seen as the culmination of 
the planning process that involves a synthesis o f the results of earlier inquiry and 
deliberation stages. It is then a small step to construe “rationality o f planning” as a 
rationality o f  choice and decision making.
Many theorists have argued that a focus on decision-points would imply the rejection of  
comprehensive, end-state-oriented planning models. The IOR School3 for example claimed 
that good planning should be measured by the rationality o f the decisions generated and not 
by the quality o f a design or by comprehensive visions (Faludi 1985 p.38):
“Defining the planning situation must be done with a view to its translation into 
operational decisions.”
Members o f the IOR School understood this premise as a first step toward an incrementalist 
understanding o f planning situations. They saw as decisive for the rational quality o f a 
planning project the ability o f a planner to reach the right decisions at any moment o f this 
process. They believed that focusing on rational decision-making would guarantee 
flexibility in the light of changing situations and new information.
However, two reasons could undermine this faith in flexibility and in an anti-authoritarian 
commitment o f the incrementalist approach: 1. Decision-centred and end-state oriented 
planning models are not naturally opposed conceptions. Faludi identifies his decision- 
centred model with a rejection o f comprehensive planning by means o f relying on a
3 Originating at the Tavistock Institute of Operations Research.
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Popperian epistemology and social theory (Faludi 1985). This commitment demands that 
decision situations should be continuously re-evaluated and decision-making constantly 
repeated. Otherwise, a decision centred view can very well be compatible with a more 
comprehensive planning model: the LIR model itself pivots around a single central 
decision-point (cf. fig. 2.1). 2. Any model that focuses on decision-points easily lends itself 
to the view that rationality rests with the relatively highest hierarchical level o f  
administrative authority involved in the planning process. Traditionally, decisions are 
prepared and executed by lower ranking technical and administrative staff. The final 
ratification, i.e. the crucial moment of decision-making, rests with boards of directors, 
general assemblies, minister cabinets, city councils or headmasters. The decision-centred 
view can thus easily be turned against the incrementalist commitment o f those who first 
championed it: it can be used to justify any more centralist model o f planning.
When compared with its predecessors of utopian and blue-print planning, the LIR model 
makes decisive progress by acknowledging the centrality o f rational decision-making, and 
is thereby less detached from the instrumental conditions than its predecessor. Nevertheless 
the narrow focus on moments of rational decision-making has been criticised, both on 
normative and on empirical grounds. Some have complained that LIR fails to connect with 
the actual demands of planning situations. Decision-making can be schematic and decision- 
criteria abstract to the point that criteria for ideally optimal decisions fail to do justice to 
actions that take place in problematic contexts. Friedman therefore objected (Friedman 
1969 p.311):
“The problem is no longer to make decisions ‘more rational,’ but to improve the quality
o f  action.”
Friedman’s concern is that the normative commitment to a pure rationality o f choice might 
not suffice to inform the messy reality o f action.
Moreover, the decision-centred notion o f the LIR model was criticised by policy theorists 
on empirical grounds. Many claimed that chance or political opportunity determine the
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adoption o f a strategy, not the rational calculus o f a best possible strategy. In his model of 
policy streams, Kingdon explores the idea that policies move from conception stages into 
the arena o f political action through “windows o f opportunity” which often open 
spontaneously and in unpredictable places. Even where such “windows” depend on 
institutional routines, they appear to be widely beyond rational control.
This notion of contingency is even stronger in Cohen, March and Olsen’s “garbage can 
model,” where decisions on strategies depend on the chance meeting o f a pair o f problems 
and solutions that are previously and independently defined (Cohen, March et al. 1972). Lai 
adds that decision-making relies on the random meeting o f five elements, (rather than 
Cohen, March and Olsen’s two): “decision-makers, choice opportunities, problems, 
solutions and locations” (Lai 2006).
The idea that decision-making should be a matter o f a distinct instance or an emphatic 
moment in the policy process was questioned by Carol Weiss, who pointed out that 
decisions are not made by individuals or organisations at distinct moments, but grow over 
an extended period and through the participation of many individuals and groups. Weiss 
uses the metaphor of a pearl that grows in an oyster, layer by layer. Decisions thus grow 
slowly and sometimes unnoticed, so that participants cannot always tell that a debated idea 
has already been established as a plan (Weiss 1980).
All these contributions reject the idea that policy and planning processes pivot around a 
rational decision point, preceded by a stage of inquiry and followed by a phase of 
implementation. Carol Weiss’ “pearl” metaphor further suggests that it may be hard to 
separate the categories o f policy formulation, policy implementation and decision-making.
A revised rationality model o f planning has to account for the gradual process of decision 
formation within unfolding situations. It must treat decision-making as an emergent 
phenomenon and cannot rely on a given category o f “decision-making” as separate from 
inquiry and implementation processes.
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Separation between planning and implementation
In the linear instrumental model planning is an intellectual process, i.e. ‘planning in the 
strict sense’ is taken separately from later implementation phases. This implies an implicit 
(Taylor 1998 p. 113)
“...dichotomy between rationality and action ... [PJlan-making [is] shown as a separate 
stage of the process, and one which came before that o f implementation. Planners ... 
therefore attend first to the task of making plans and only later and separately to the 
problem o f how to put those plans into effect.”
This separation between planning and implementation, and the underlying division between 
intellectual and practical phases, has not remained unchallenged.
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) tried to disprove this notion o f a linear instrumental model 
on formal grounds. They claimed that in complex environments with many interacting 
implementation-agencies and numerous subsequent decision-points, the chances for 
successful implementation and coordination would be very low -  so low, in fact, that top 
down implementation o f strategic plans would be next to impossible. In order to account 
for successful implementation one would have to introduce a bottom up approach (John 
1998 p.29):
“Policy decisions can move ‘backwards’ from implementing organizations, such as 
local authorities and government agencies, to the policy formulators, the politicians and 
top bureaucrats. The latter often make decisions just to legitimize policy choices that 
have already been made or to acknowledge the fact o f administrative discretion.”
According to this model, implementation agents on the ground communicate the need for 
policies upward, thereby becoming co-authors and owners of their strategies.
What Pressman and Wildavsky reached by means o f a formal argument was widely echoed 
by practitioners. From experience with implementation agencies, theorists pointed out that
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much of policy design had to be done “on the ground,” or at the “street-level,” (Lipsky 
1976) where practitioners possess sufficient knowledge and experience to make educated 
design decisions. These often go far beyond the mere specification o f abstract directives.
In this reversal o f the logical order between planning and implementation stages, some saw 
the turn from a “sequence o f intended actions, that is followed by success or failure, ... [to] 
decision-making [as] learning, adaptation and reformulation” (John 1998 p.30). In any case 
it no longer seemed possible “to separate the stages of policy formulation and policy 
implementation” (John 1998 p.30).
The upshot o f these formal and empirical arguments is that it appears infeasible to insist on 
a sharp separation between a cognitive planning process and a subsequent practical 
implementation as LIR envisages. This certainly holds in a descriptive reading o f LIR as a 
typical planning process. When we make the step to a normative reading we must be more 
careful, though. Separating between earlier intellectual planning efforts and later executive 
phases may still prove a helpful method or a success-promoting normative demand. As a 
normative demand the successive ordering o f planning and implementation may be little 
more than the reasonable request to “look before you leap.” On the other hand, a normative 
rationality concept cannot ignore the equally strong normative demand implicit in above 
arguments. The claim is that a bottom up direction (from implementation to the 
conceptualisation o f plans) should remain open. For one thing, this claim can be rested on a 
democratic commitment to invite participation in the planning process by those directly 
involved and affected, and at the time when they are affected.
Lipsky’s (1976) argument may prove even stronger because it reveals the insufficiency of 
LIR as an instrumental norm. Contrary to LIR’s direction arrows it claims that street-level 
experience yields better plans.
Hence there are strong normative reasons both in favour and against the LIR’s temporal 
ordering of planning and implementation phases. All we can say at this point is that we 
should start watching out for an alternative to the LIR model; one that would resolve this
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contradiction and reap the benefits from both sides. A more adequate normative 
understanding o f rationality should require from planners both to plan ahead carefully and 
to make use of the experience and creativity of implementation stages in formulating a 
plan.
I shall devote a large part o f my thesis to this question. The answer will take me to address 
the epistemic relation between planning and implementation and between cognition and 
action in general. I will further address Dewey’s notion of imagination as a naturalist notion 
of employing foresight in deliberation.
At this point we can only draw two conclusions regarding LIR and its instance of a 
temporal order of plan formulation and implementation: 1. As an empirical theory LIR 
seems to fail. Both theoretical arguments and practical reports contradict it. 2. As a 
normative model we have good reason to feel discomfort. If not outright disproved, LIR 
still contradicts important normative demands.
Instrumentalism as technocracy
Planning and positive science
Common usage attributes “rationality” either to beliefs and reasons or to decisions and 
actions. This is no mere coincidence. It is commonly understood that the rationality o f a 
decision depends directly on the quality o f the beliefs that inform it. Some have searched 
for this relation in a direct link between rational planning and the scientific formation o f  
knowledge. Faludi for example saw rationality as “the application o f scientific methods ... 
to policy making” (Faludi 1973a p.l).
Van Houten summarises a positivistic conception o f rational planning in the following way 
(Houten 1992 p.210):
“Rationality means a scientific foundation for action and better action through more 
knowledge...”
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Nigel Taylor establishes the relationship between the method o f scientific research and the 
technocratic model o f experts’ rationality in planning as follows (Taylor 1998 p. 16):
“The Ecole Polytechnique may be seen as the prototypical institution of the new 
Industrial Age and the source of its managerial ideology. Engineering applied the 
knowledge of natural science to the construction o f bridges, tunnels, and canals. By the 
same logic, why should not a new breed o f ‘social engineers’ apply their knowledge to 
the task o f reconstructing society?”
Accordingly, an “expert” planner is one who has technical knowledge of what 
consequences will follow after which interventions. Planners do not necessarily engage in 
primary scientific research, but they are seen as a bridge between empirical science and 
situated decision-making (Yewlett 1985):
“The essential professional task is that of synthesis in the production of plans...”
The notion o f  “Synthesis” can be translated as a “practical inference” (cf. Wright 1971; 
Camhis 1979 p.24fl):
Knowledge o f circumstances and antecedent conditions
+
Knowledge o f relevant regularities
Allows: defining o f possible action alternatives or strategies
+
A defined set of weighed ends and purposes 
Yields: Decision between strategies
Decisions, according to this ideal-typical model, are the result o f logical deduction. Van 
Houten concludes that on this account “tradition, intuition, beliefs, [would be] useless as 
guides to collective action” (Houten 1992 p.210).
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For a number of reasons, planners have rejected this definition of their role as experts:
• Unlike the practice of scientific research, planning is marked by a relatively high 
degree of urgency (Yewlett 1985 quoting Simmonds). Decision-makers are forced 
to make quick decisions which involve different abilities than those taught at the 
“Ecole Polytechnique.”
•  Many o f a planner’s competencies rely on experience, routines, detailed knowledge 
of specific contexts. Planning should do justice to the qualitative dimension of 
situations and professional planners must be allowed to make ‘educated guesses’ 
rather than water tight deductions.
• A planning expert will always be measured by his or her ability to estimate political 
interests, social dynamics and human relations. Such soft data can rarely be 
formalised.
•  Strategies and solutions involve creativity.
So far these thoughts do not directly contradict the Linear Instrumental Model. It is not 
implied that LIR is the application o f an instrumental algorithm (Schipper 2001) that would 
leave no room for a planner’s “soft-skills” and experience. However, the linear instrumental 
approach would hold that experience, routine, and educated guesses are only second best 
methods to be used where exact, scientific and deductive methods of decision-making are 
not feasible.
Recent movements in Management Science and Operational Research more radically take 
human capacities such as emotions or imagination seriously (Goldberg 1985; Weaver, 
Jessop et al. 1985; Yewlett 1985; Schipper 1996). This goes beyond the acknowledgment 
that imagination and intuition can improve, correct or supplement deductive forms of 
reasoning. It was felt that the basic model of deliberation had to change, in so far that
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analytic and deductive methods, such as computer based optimising algorithms, should be 
used as only one tool in the tool box (Yewlett 1985).4
The very idea of what deliberation means, how it proceeds and what its aim should be has 
begun to change significantly. Theorists have found that the complexity o f planning 
situations is not made up solely o f a large number of influences and causes that make 
optimisation difficult. Social situations depend on multiple perspectives and viewpoints that 
can diverge significantly (Teitz 1985, Weaver et al. 1985).
The faith in expert planners’ privileged scientific or technological knowledge dwindled as 
more theorists absorbed streams of post-positivist philosophical and social scientific 
thought. Phenomenological, hermeneutic, and constructivist ideas convinced many that 
objective truth, beyond the subjective (or inter-subjective) perspectives o f the participants, 
would be unattainable. The aim of management and planning became more defined as 
mediating between conflicting perspectives (Teitz 1985), and to facilitate discourse with the 
aim of “sharing mental models” (Checkland 1981; Vennix 1996). The task o f deliberation 
came to be defined as a collective search for orientation and a shared learning process 
instead o f achieving given goals in given circumstances. It is now popular to define 
planners as mediators, facilitators, or as advocates (Davidoff 1965; Checkland 1981; 
Shields 2003).
Some constructivists insisted that it was not merely an epistemic problem of knowledge or 
access to reality that makes it impossible to go beyond the multiple perspectives of 
participants. What a given policy intervention in a particular context can achieve in reality 
would also depend significantly on the beliefs and understanding of the individuals 
involved, and on their attitudes and emotional dispositions. Social reality itself changes and 
reacts to the narrative we use in order to describe and explain it. It has been argued that
4 I will devote an entire chapter to the concept of “imagination,” in which I shall argue that this multifaceted 
concept captures the core abilities of human intelligence that should be included in any definition of 
deliberative rational.
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thought and description do not represent what exists, but often “make it so” (Hacking 
2000).
This line o f critique o f the positivist and technocratic model o f planning as applied science 
was strengthened by scholars who invoked critical, post-modern or deconstructivist modes 
of thought. These accounts not only rejected the attainability o f positive and privileged 
knowledge (Weaver, Jessop et al. 1985), they saw in the proclamation of technical expertise 
and in the postulation o f  “inherent necessities” (“Sachzwang”) the expression o f power- 
relations and their historical proliferation. Only power structures could yield dominant 
discourses in which unitary versions o f an objective reality could be presented as given. 
Theorists in this camp defined planning as exploring, criticising and unmasking un­
reflected power relations to emancipate participant groups from seemingly inescapable 
certainties.
Scepticism about objective knowledge and general suspicion o f the abuse o f  power led 
some to reject planning as a means of social coordination: Anarchic Schools enjoyed some 
popularity in the 1970s and ’80s (cf. Klosterman 1978).
LIR has a sequential and hierarchical structure which interprets the definition o f resources 
and guides as logical preconditions for decision-making and implementation. This structure 
resembles the deductive model (above) to some degree. Good decisions are prepared (even 
implied) by a well researched definition of “resources” and a correct employment of 
“guides.” Decisions are authoritative and determine further courses of implementation (cf. 
Shields 2003). We can see why this model is incompatible with demands for more 
participative processes in which world views are negotiated and where planning means 
mediation between divergent perspectives. Decision-makers in LIR have to assume the 
position of a highest judge on the right framing o f problems and goals and the adequate 
definition o f alternative instrumental strategies.
I have not delved deep into recent critiques of the hierarchical technocratic planning model, 
nor have I explored underlying philosophical reasons for endorsing epistemic and political
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pluralism. This prevents me from drawing sweeping conclusions on the LIR model and its 
underlying assumptions. However, it appears that LIR is in no way cut out to answer the 
demands for a polycentric and participative planning style. Since these concerns have 
occupied planning theorists over the last 40 years, it is safe to say that any contemporary 
conception of planning rationality should provide some convincing answers.
Prima facie a pluralist definition o f rational deliberation which does not rely on the 
availability of a single privileged perspective and a unified authoritative decision-process 
seems attractive. It appears better compatible with democratic commitments and it promises 
the chance o f benefiting from a diversity o f ideas and points o f view. However, first it 
must be shown that a pluralist model can still be a conception o f rational planning and is 
not merely a mode of apathy and ad hoc improvisation.
These questions I shall address in chapter 7 when I discuss how Dewey’s inquiry-centred 
view of rational deliberation translates into a pluralist model o f collective deliberation.
Means and ends
The linear instrumental model requires isolating instrumental considerations from the 
determination o f substantial purposes. This follows a division o f labour as laid out by the 
Humean model o f rational agency (cf. Fig. 1.1), in which the two legs (“passions” and 
“reasons”) make independent contributions to the deliberation process. Hume claims that 
reason could only serve our ends if  it were left to operate unhampered by the push and pull 
of our passions. This notion has yielded a definition o f rationality as a purely instrumental 
concept (cf. Elster 1991; 1996; 2006).
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Action
Cognitions .4 . Desires
Evidence
Figure 2.2 Humean rationality according to Elster
The idea o f rationality as a neutral template for decision making which functions 
independently o f any particular definition o f ends is best captured by the notion of 
efficiency (Davidoff and Reiner 1973 p.14-15):
“In a world of scarcity there is a need to conserve resources and also to allocate them in 
an efficient manner. Planning is seen as a means of reducing waste or producing the 
greatest return from employment of resources...”
Classical models o f rational planning demand that ultimate purposes and instrumental 
deliberations remain mutually independent. This demand goes somewhat beyond Elster’s 
model (cf. Fig. 2.2), which only rules out one direction o f interference: it prohibits our 
purposes from influencing our judgement on instruments. However, traditional planning 
theorists also emphasised that instrumental considerations should play no role in the 
definition of our ultimate purposes (Davidoff and Reiner 1973 p. 14):
“Ultimate purposes cannot be appraised from within a system: there is need to rely on 
outside criteria to evaluate [concrete] ends.”
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These authors declared it an outright defect for instrumental or circumstantial 
considerations to influence ultimate purposes (Davidoff and Reiner 1973 p.21):
“Constraints should be imposed only after choices are expressed. All too often planners 
first predict the nature o f the future, then help set in motion programs that fulfil this 
prophecy, and thus limit men’s aspirations. Planners should not let such predictions 
about the future limit the range of choice...”
Purposes become curiously removed from the actual planning and deliberation process. 
They are established prior to the design process from sources beyond the planner’s reach; 
and they refer to an idealised future that can become a reality only once a plan has been 
realised. This is a direct consequence of applying the Humean model to rational planning. 
The present thesis will interrogate this consequence with the help o f Dewey’s philosophy 
(see chapter 4 in particular).
Some may see this model as a useful devise for justifying expert planners’ reluctance to 
engage in tasks of substantial ethical reflection. However, it does not explain who, in their 
place, has the capacity and authority to establish fundamental moral orientations. Theorists 
have tried to define groups and offices that would logically correspond to the divisions 
expressed in the stages of LIR. Friedman (1973) distinguishes between three main stages 
or tasks in his account o f the “allocative” planning model: 1. “diagnosis & study of 
alternatives and consequence”, 2. “decision”, and 3. “implementation.” He indicates how 
these are traditionally attributed to three respective institutionalised agencies: 1. 
“Planning”, 2. “Politics”, and 3. “Administration” (Friedman 1973 p.68). “Planners” have 
to rely on purpose-statements revealed in acts o f decision-making provided by “political” 
agents. In this model expert planners can appeal to established democratic institutions and 
are thereby to a large extent exonerated from the duty o f deliberating over the content of 
their missions. Sources that reveal the ultima ratio o f the clients’ interests to a planner 
include direct referendums, decisions by elected representatives, or, in corporate planning 
contexts customer, behaviour.
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Alexander Otto is the CEO of ECE (a company that has planned and erected more than 90 
shopping centres in a number of different countries). When confronted with the challenge 
by architects and urban planners that these malls would disfigure the face o f  the city centres 
and destroy their urban flair, his answer usually is: “Two million customers visit our houses 
each day - they vote with their feet. The people love us” (Alexander Otto, quoted by Die 
Zeit, 26.April 2007, my translation).
It remains questionable whether planners can rely on election results or market data for 
answers to questions like: Who are the clients that planning should serve? How are the 
interests of individual clients to be aggregated? How should conflicts be dealt with? What 
should be the relationship between individual rights and social good?
Moreover, to set priorities in budgeting and social planning, planners with a detailed 
knowledge of their fields are needed just as much as elected representatives of the public. 
In prioritising their projects, planners are expected to make use o f “market analyses, public 
opinion polls, anthropological surveys, public hearings, interviews with informed leaders, 
press-content analyses, and studies o f current and past laws...” (Davidoff and Reiner 1973 
p.29).
The neat separation between “politics” and “planning” also breaks down where the political 
process does more than weigh public good and order social preferences. Strong popular 
feelings regarding technologies (i.e. ‘means’ or ‘instruments’) often occupy the political 
arena (e.g. nuclear power, GM-food or stem-cell research). If the separated stages in the 
LIR scheme were read in terms of a separation between political and planning offices, the 
public should be allowed to vote only on issues concerning public ends (e.g. clean 
environment and defined limits to socially tolerable risk levels). It should have no say on 
the desirability o f a specific technology within these limits. However, planners cannot 
expect political power to be “disciplined” and to fit into its assigned role. After entrusting 
planning-departments with the task of realising a set of ends, LIR requires political 
influence to adjourn until end-results o f planning projects materialise. Yet, political 
interests exert influence throughout the process o f planning and the execution o f plans.
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Planners often see that “best” strategies for the realisation o f agreed social ends are 
thwarted because o f changes in the political mood (compare the case study “Multi-Casa” in 
Chapter 8).
By LIR’s standards, political agency is a source of irrationality and a potentially disruptive 
influence. Reade states this belief ironically: “...planning is rational...”, and “...politicians 
are ‘irrational’...” (Reade 1985 pp.82/81). In the same spirit Klosterman characterises 
“...planning as an independent ‘fourth power’” (Klosterman 1978 p.93) to promote public 
interest against conflicting political interests.
All these concerns only hint at the difficulties o f disentangling instrumental and value 
questions in planning. But at this point we can see clearly only how LIR fails on empirical 
grounds (Chadwick 1970 p. 120-1):
“The clients o f planners have never given the professionals in their employ any but the 
vaguest kind o f goals... This throws a considerable responsibility upon the planner: he 
largely has to determine the goals o f planning because his clients do not give them to 
him... [0]ne of the most forceful arguments for placing primary responsibility for goal 
formulation on the planner ... [is] ... the assumption ... that... they ‘know more’ about 
the situations on which they advise than do their clients.”
In recent history many planning theorists have made the claim that evaluation cannot be 
divorced from the planning process. Many added that rational design processes should 
actively and continuously engage with value questions (Hill 1985).
Again, here we can somewhat safely conclude only that the clean separation of instrumental 
reasoning from normative and political value considerations contradicts experience. 
However, saying that a rationality conception should not insist on this separation and that it 
should instead encourage substantial value-consideration to play an active role in 
instrumental reasoning requires further arguments. In particular we need to offer an 
elaborated philosophical conception o f the relation between instruments and values and
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between categories o f means and ends in planning. In order to reject LIR we must 
conclusively argue that value concerns cannot be separated from instrumental deliberations. 
This has two aspects: we must show that instrumental reasoning is not neutral to 
evaluations, i.e. that instrumental reasoning directly impacts final purposes. We must also 
show how our purposes, motivations and value commitments play a constitutive role in any 
process of (instrumental) deliberation. Chapter 4 will tackle the first aspect by showing how 
instrumental reflections play a formative role in evaluative projects. Chapter 5, in turn, 
argues that our substantial motivations cannot be reduced to a hypothetical premise, and 
that they always play an active material part in (instrumental) deliberation.
These arguments seem to be required before we conclude that LIR poses an impossible 
demand. We can say that LIR fails on normative grounds only when we have worked out 
how an alternative rationality conception can avoid the separation between purposes and 
instruments.
When developing a new rationality conception we must reconsider the role that value- 
intuitions and commitments have in our deliberative reasoning; and also we must address 
the role instrumental deliberations on the formation o f our purposes and values.
Rediscovering pragmatism
Harold Laswell, the founding father o f policy analysis, states that Dewey greatly influenced 
his conception of the new discipline (Laswell after Farr 1999):
“The policy sciences are a contemporary adaptation o f the general approach to public 
policy that was recommended by John Dewey and his colleagues in the development of 
American pragmatism.”
According to James Farr, seminal theorists like Simon, Braybrooke and Lindblohm, who 
concerned themselves with questions about rational, social and collective deliberation, paid
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tribute to Dewey’s work without appreciating the central claims o f his contribution (James 
Farr 1999). The influence o f Pragmatism as a philosophical and methodological movement 
arguably eclipsed over several decades following Dewey’s death. Dewey was mainly 
identified with progressive education. His theory o f social deliberation was reduced to a 
romanticising notion under the label o f “experiential holism” (Weaver, Jessop et al. 1985). 
Dewey’s political thought was regarded the futile attempt to transpose the model o f small 
scale, face to face communities to the level o f complex societies.
In recent years classical pragmatism has enjoyed a renaissance, which extends to fields like 
planning and policy theory.
Transactive planning: a new interest in pragmatism
Since the late 90’s a whole body o f literature has cropped up that shows a keen interest in 
John Dewey’s philosophy from the sides o f policy- and public administration scholars. 
Classical American Pragmatism has been amply discussed in journals like Administration 
and Society and Administrative Theory & Practice (Shields 1996; Morris 1999; Garrison 
2000; Snider 2000; Stever 2000; Zanetti and Carr 2000; Evans 2000a; 2000b; Miller 2002a; 
2002b; Shields 2003; Hickman 2004; Miller 2004; Shields 2004; Stolcis 2004).
These articles outline a programme to import Dewey’s thought into their disciplines (Stever 
2000; Evans 2000a; Evans 2000b). Many o f the above named articles discuss important 
aspects of Dewey’s philosophy and their relevance. However, they rarely say specifically 
how Dewey’s theory should be employed in casting out a new theory o f policy processes or 
give a detailed account of the inner structure of a new rationality conception for policy and 
planning. My own contribution intends to help closing this gap. For this I shall construct 
my own reading o f Dewey’s project, and therefore I shall refrain from discussing this body 
of literature in great detail. I will only recall a few themes that the above articles from 
Administration and Society and Administrative Theory & Practice address in order to 
demonstrate the current interest in the field and show the of direction current trends.
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•  Situated inquiry vs. universal procedure: Many of these contributions complain that 
traditional policy theory relied too heavily on theoretical fix points, such as stages in 
the planning process, ready made definition of ultimate purposes or fixed categories 
of participant groups. Moreover, received policy theory has tried too hard to 
construct universal and ‘true’ models of the policy process. These critical authors 
welcomed Dewey as an antidote. Focussing on “problems,” “consequences,” 
“experience,” and “contexts” (Shields 1996), Dewey’s method does not rely on 
fixed agendas and rigid methodologies. Instead it invites evolving sets o f rules, 
formed through ongoing inquiry and practical experience. Dewey provides a 
detailed account o f the logic o f problem solving inquiry, but this framework is not 
associated with any particular procedural logic. It serves as a warrant against relying 
on a priori standards and permanent procedural methods (Evans 2000a p.314):
“...inquiry is not a means to find the truth; it is the means or method to reduce
doubt and to restore balance to a problematic situation...”
I will explore this conception o f rationality as situated inquiry in chapter 6, below.
Similar to the discussion in my introductory chapter, Garrison and Mousavi (2003) 
understand rationality not as an abstract and formal concept but as a methodology 
that must be allowed to evolve in the light o f  practical experience.
• Bridging dichotomies: Garrison (2000) claims that, traditionally, public 
administration is burdened with implicit dichotomies between theory and practice, 
intellect and emotion, belief and action, and fact and value. These need to be 
overcome in order to find entirely new methods and solutions to bridge the gap 
between experts and practitioners, planners and clients, and general methods and 
situational particularities. Several authors see Dewey’s foremost contribution to 
their field in bridging the gap between theory and practice (Shields 2004; Stolcis 
2004).
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Dewey’s idea of linking instrumental considerations with substantial evaluations o f  
goals and ends appealed to this group of theorists, who also tried to overcome a 
technocratic and compartmentalised image o f policy processes. Some envisaged a 
stronger participation from client groups and for that reason welcomed Dewey’s 
attempt at reconciling instrumental and substantial forms of reasoning (Evans 2000a 
p.482):
“Although the field o f public administration has built itself on the foundation o f  
perfecting means, it has largely forgotten that means and ends are inextricably 
entwined.”
• Planning as participative community o f inquirers: In her article “community o f  
inquiry”, Shields (2003) advertises the great value o f Dewey’s participative inquiry 
for public administration. Dewey claims we should foster the “scientific attitude,” 
yet not as a personal property o f  technocratic experts; it must be as the mode o f  
inquiry o f a deliberating community. Experts and technicians should contribute their 
knowledge and skills, but this does not licence their claim for leadership. Quoting 
Paul Appleby, Shields states that “experts should be on tap and not on top.” Also 
Garrison sees the model o f “expertise” as one of the great ills in public 
administration that pragmatism can cure (Garrison 2000). He advocates pragmatism 
as being able to foster democracy without falling prey to the problems o f critical 
schools that would call for participation regardless the nature of debate.
Critical Pragmatism
Other authors saw in pragmatist thought foremost the spark o f social critique. Dewey’s 
work lends itself to a reading that interprets democratic pluralism as a warrant against 
oppressive power-relations (Friedman 1973; Forester 1985; Friedman 1987; Forester 1993; 
Friedman 1996; Hoch 1996a; Hoch 1996b). In this role some saw Dewey as more potent 
than the popular post-modern schools (Rorty after Hoch 1996a p.36):
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“Planners as public servants would do well to leave Foucault at home and to carry 
Dewey with them.”
Knowledge Management and Organisational Learning
Pragmatism had a great impact on Organisational Learning (OL), with wide ramifications 
for fields like new public management, soft OR, and contemporary streams in planning 
theory and management studies. Some central questions that occupied scholars o f  OL and 
Knowledge Management were:
1. Can we actively organise “learning” in organisational (and planning) environments?
2. What exactly do learning processes look like?
1 Inquiry systems or the idea that learning can be designed
Churchman has provided a philosophical foundation for answering the first question in his 
book, “The Design of Inquiring Systems” (Churchman 1971). Its main crux is to make 
inquiry and learning integral parts of the planning processes. Churchman insists planning 
could be designed as an inquiry process. He understands planning (design) itself as a 
process o f inquiry. In traditional planning models inquiry is reduced to a prior function of 
collecting information that can be utilised in a subsequent design process. Churchman 
cautions against the common mistake of separating design and inquiry processes. 
According to him, design is not merely concerned with products or solutions but it is design 
of inquiry, and these two dimensions often coincide in his work.
The proximity o f Churchman’s position to classical American pragmatism is no 
coincidence. Many o f his ideas have a traceable pedigree: his teacher was the pragmatist 
philosopher E. A. Singer, Jr., himself a student o f William James. His positions regarding 
the practical import of inquiry, the rejection o f the fact-value dichotomy and his attempts to 
resolve these philosophical problems within a holistic systems-approach are reminiscent o f  
classical pragmatism. Churchman’s perspective from which he analyses Libnizean, 
Lockean, Hegelian and other styles o f philosophising bears a strong resemblance to
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William James’ approach: he treats all these philosophical projects not as competing but as 
complementary systems inquiry. Instead o f being “right” or “wrong” Churchman takes 
these philosophical systems to represent methods that can be employed, depending on the 
situation at hand. James himself used the metaphor o f a hotel corridor to describe 
pragmatism as a platform that lies between historical philosophical systems and connects 
them, making them available subject to the demands of a given situation.
The centre piece of Churchman’s work is an “inquiry-system” that he deems most apt for 
complex or “wicked” problem situations (the type that planners face most frequently). 
What he calls “Singerian inquiry” allows “the direction and style of management [to] 
change rapidly and dramatically.” This is to be achieved by simultaneously attending to the 
tasks of designing, measuring performance, and refining the involved standards of 
measurement. A planner should not be chiefly concerned with how well his design 
performs with respect to given criteria. As a Singerian inquirer, a planner is asked to 
reconsider, throughout the entire planning process, the boundaries between what matters 
and what remains beyond practical and ethical concern (Churchman 1979).
Churchman’s critique hits traditional (linear instrumental) rationality models in a two ways. 
First, he opposes their assumption that knowledge would be an external resource and that 
we could separate inquiry from design tasks. Second, the “Singerian inquiry” model 
directly contradicts the linear notion o f ‘starting with problems and ending with solutions.’ 
My own project will address both o f these complex issues. Chapter 3 challenges the idea 
that we could separate between cognition and coordination o f  behaviour. This provides 
grounds for confronting the distinction between inquiry-, design- and implementation 
stages (Chapters 6&8). I will also address questions related to the second aspect of 
Churchman’s work that I had singled out above. In chapter 6 I will develop an inquiry 
based conception o f rationality for dealing with messy and insufficiently understood 
situations. This intends to counterbalance the linear instrumental notion which reduced 
rationality to an efficient path, leading from well-understood problems to their solutions.
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Again, my ambition here is not to prove a case o f Churchman’s model against the 
traditional LIR model. This would require a much more thorough investigation into 
Churchman’s philosophical management theory. Here I intend to show that my later project 
does not fall on unprepared ground. The core-questions that I will raise have been discussed 
in planning and related disciplines.
2 Learning as changing theory-in-use
Many Organisational Learning (OL) theorists have called for a revision o f our concept of 
learning. They tried to overcome the old cognitive model, which defines learning collecting 
and storing information. Instead they developed an alternative learning model that involves 
deep-seated structural changes within agents’ orientations, dispositions and values. Many 
conceptual distinctions resulted from this line o f questioning, among these: “Second-order 
Learning” (Fiol 1985), “Unlearning and Relearning” (Nystrom 1984), “Generative 
Learning” (Senge 1990), “Turnover and Turnaround learning” (Hedberg 1981).
Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, who often cited Dewey as their chief influence, made 
some of the most seminal contributions in this field (Argyris and Schon 1978; Argyris and 
Schon 1996). They introduced the distinction between two learning types or “loops.” In 
both “single” and “double loop learning,” the agent receives information which requires her 
to adjust her behaviour. “Single loop learning” can be interpreted as a mere change in 
parameter-values that allows the agent to leave her basic action guiding principles 
unperturbed, “double loop learning,” in contrast, involves experience that alters the 
structure of agency on a deeper level. E.g. if  a driver suddenly brakes because the traffic 
light has turned red, all behavioural changes remain within the parametric limits of the 
practice of driving. This could be interpreted as a single loop learning process. A person 
who gives up driving after reflecting upon the consequences o f climate change alters her 
values; she thereby enters a process of double-loop learning.
Double-loop learning affects the “theories-in-use” and ultimately amounts to changes in the 
agent’s character. Alterations that affect “theory-in-use” will often demand some 
anticipation o f the future rather than a mere reaction to given stimuli. This suggests that
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double-loop learning is most urgently required when faced with an uncertain and changing 
future.
An ethical dimension o f double-loop learning episodes is explicitly acknowledged by the 
authors in the following passage (Argyris and Schon 1996 p.22):
[I]t is through double-loop learning alone that individuals and organizations can 
address the desirability o f the values and norms that govern their theories-in-use.”
Difficulties in telling whether a particular behavioural adaptation is a case o f first- or 
second order learning makes us suspect that this distinction could be one o f degree rather 
than kind. The next chapter will show how Dewey defines processes akin to double-loop 
learning as the basic model o f all experience-generating knowledge.
Argyris’ and Schon’s theory o f learning is highly compatible with the pragmatist departure 
from spectator theories of knowledge. They embraced the idea that learning represents an 
“inherently open-ended ... transaction between inquirer and situation” (Argyris and Schon 
1996 p.31) through which the agent not only changes her strategy within a situation, but 
alters constitutive practical orientations.
If we apply these ideas to the project of revising our concept of rationality we first have to 
say that LIR does not admit room for such subtle differences as between reacting with 
given means to changes in a situation and alteration to the structure of planning methods 
and values. LIR identifies information as a “resource” (cf. Fig. 2.1) that we acquire and 
employ as required. The category I defined as “guides” comprises values, action-principles 
and methods of the kind that Argyris and Schon saw involved in “double loop learning.” 
However, the learning aspect has not systematic place in this model. Arrows point in one 
direction, from resources and guides to decision-making and implementation. The planning 
process makes use o f value orientations, methods and information, but the planning process 
as a whole is not in any way designed so as to improve the theories in use and value
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intuitions. On the contrary, value-premises as defined used in “guides” are explicitly 
furnished by an external premise (“ultimate purposes and values”).
Some classical models introduced information feedback loops, leading from experiences 
made during implementation stages back to the information resources (Chadwick 1970; 
Dror 1973), but these normally appear contingent and optional. Also they can facilitate 
systematically rather “single loop learning” than more structural adaptations. If we took 
Argyris & Schon’s theory seriously we would have to reconsider the direction o f arrows; 
and more we might change the entire internal structure of the LIR model. If we try to 
represent planning as a learning enterprise that includes “second loop learning” then it 
becomes a process of self-forming agency. A linear sequential structure will have great 
problems in showing that the entire process is constantly concerned with its own premises. 
In chapter 8 I will present an alternative model that intends to capture the planning process 
as a creative and self-forming process of learning.
Taking the tradition o f organizational learning seriously, would mean that we have to revise 
our traditional linear instrumental conception o f rational planning to the effect that it will be 
a ‘rationality o f learning’ rather than a ‘rationality o f achieving.’ For this it is crucial to 
overcome the dichotomy between the notions of realising change (implementation) and 
learning by means of philosophical arguments. In the context of my revision o f agency 
theory and the discussion Dewey’s contribution, I will ask whether it makes sense to 
separate sharply between the execution o f intentional actions and processes o f learning5 
(the latter understood as changing the “transactive” pattern of an agent within her situation).
5 Understood as changing the “transactive” pattern of an agent within her situation. This idea will be 
explained in the following chapters.
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Conclusion
The aim o f this chapter was threefold: 1. to introduce a received model o f  Linear 
Instrumental Rationality by tracing its roots in planning history, 2. to discuss the logical 
and practical implications o f this LIR model critically, and 3. to introduce more recent 
streams of theory which provide key ingredients for a conceptual reconstruction o f planning 
rationality.
I constructed LIR as the ideal type o f traditional rationality model that can serve as a 
comparison to my “situational transactive” model of rational planning (STR). By 
introducing a number of contemporary approaches, I meant to demonstrate my critique and 
reconstruction o f concept o f planning rationality falls on prepared grounds and is supported 
by ample resources.
I do not say that the LIR model was defeated by above discussions, but a long list of 
complaints and high profile critiques have cast their shadow over it, so that it is time to 
reconsider this planning model and its underlying concepts. My strategy will be to reflect 
on the agency theoretic roots o f LIR. A fundamental critique o f the Folk-model will not 
only weaken the LIR approach further, it also helps developing the crystallising point o f an 
alternative rationality conception which, I believe, is better equipped to answer demands of 
recent planning theorists and practitioners.
There are two lines of retreat for the embattled concept of linear instrumental rationality, 
after admitting that it is likely to fail on empirical grounds as a descriptive model of 
planning processes. For one, supporters can claim that LIR’s normative value lies in its 
ability to give sound advice and provide qualified orientation in messy real world contexts. 
My discussion above intended to show that LIR cannot hold this promise. I introduced a 
number of recent planning approaches which demand thorough revisions of basic concepts, 
including ‘decision-making,’ ‘evaluation,’ ‘inquiry’ and ‘learning’. These new concepts are 
often incompatible with those used by LIR. The guidance that some new approaches
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provide directly contradicts advice that we derive from the LIR model. If we take only a 
few o f these new planning theories and approaches seriously, we must question the 
fundamentals of LIR as a normative guide.
The last line of retreat for the LIR model would be the insistence that it still represents the 
best model from a logical point of view. This would amount to saying that it is the optimal 
model for an ideal world. I do not claim that LIR would seize to be interesting or useful in 
this position. However, it would no longer be a model of planning-idXiondXity. LIR should 
consequently dispense with its procedural from in terms of planning stages and assume its 
original form o f the Humean rationality model. As a purely logical theory o f rational 
deliberation the Humean model has been highly successful in recent years, considering e.g. 
advances in Rational Choice- and Game Theory. In this form the Humean model remains 
largely beyond the scope of my present critique. The following chapters contain a critique 
of the Humean model as a philosophical psychology, i.e. as a conception of the 
fundamental categories o f human conduct and the nature of our deliberation processes. I 
believe this route is necessary for reconstructing a rationality concept that is able to 
understand and guide planning processes.
A note to the reader:
Before embarking on a long journey through Dewey’s philosophy and a conceptual revision 
of rational planning, I recommend taking a sneak preview at chapter 9. There I illustrate the 
difference between the LIR and STR models of rational planning in two case studies. This 
may provide a useful background for understanding the project and the practical relevance 
of my theoretical explorations.
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Part II
Agency: Dewey’s Critique of the Folk-Model
Chapter 3: Knowledge, Belief and the Primacy of Action
Perception or knowledge o f  particular things is not 
a passive operation o f impression, but involves 
the active integration o f various experiences.
It is a process o f reaching out after 
the fullest and richest experience possible.
John Dewey1
Knowing is one kind o f  interaction which goes on within the world.
John Dewey2
Introduction
Many critiques o f the linear-instrumental model o f rational planning (LIR) were discussed 
in the previous chapter. I also introduced a number of new approaches which sought to 
avoid some of LIR’s weaknesses. At this point it would be tempting to present a new, 
integrated model o f rational planning that avoids all the shortcomings of linear-instrumental 
approaches. I will indeed follow up on this idea in later parts (particularly in chapter 8), but 
here it would fall on unprepared ground. I have already laid out the intimate connection 
between the idea of linear-instrumental rationality and a Humean agency model (folk- 
theory), and now with the help o f Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy I set out to revise this 
folk-model o f agency.
Traditional agency models, based on the means-ends scheme, have a proclivity to prioritise 
epistemic and deliberative processes over action itself. Taken as a psychological account
1 Psychology EW2.138
2 Quest for Certainty LW4.63
86
and not merely an explanatory or justificatory scheme, the folk-model presents action as the 
product of beliefs, valuative attitudes and deliberation processes.
Dewey’s criticism of this linear relation between cognition and action is the focus of this 
chapter. In a nutshell, my argument will show how belief or knoweldge o f a situation 
cannot be understood as antecedents of rational deliberation processes, as declared by the 
Humean model (cf. Fig. 1.1 and Fig. 2.1). This will follow from Dewey’s notion that 
beliefs and cognitions are irreducible parts of an unfolding agency process and not its 
antecedents. Beliefs and cognitions are ways of structuring transactions in a situation.
If we succeed in arguing that beliefs, cognitions and knowledge are part of the very fabric 
of agency, we would have one good reason for rejecting the Folk-Model as a psychological 
or procedural account of the structure o f our agency: beliefs and cognitions should no 
longer be seen as input but rather as the products of deliberative agency.
Sources
I base my argument on Dewey’s primary text, as well as on a number o f Dewey- 
interpretations. In redifming the relation beteen perceptive and (re-) active phases in 
organic behaviour, and critiquing behaviourism as a way o f escaping from metaphysical 
and epistemological dilemmas, I use Dewey’s seminal article on the “Unit o f behaviour” 
(or “the reflex arc concept of philosophy,” EW5), and his work on the concept o f will in his 
“Psychology” (EW2). The epistemological and metaphyscial dimensions o f what I seek to 
analyse as Dewey’s reconstruction o f agency theory are most systematically treated in his 
works “Experience and Nature” (LW1), “Quest for Certainty” (LW4), “Reconstruction in 
Philosophy” (MW12) and his last major work, “Knowing and the Known” (in collaboration 
with Bentley, LW16). “Experience, Knoweldge and Value: A Rejoinder,” (LW14) 
originally in Schilpps’ (1939) compendium on Dewey’s Philosophy, also provides some 
useful overview of Dewey’s philosophical programme.
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Amongst secondary readings and Dewey interpretations, there are two that can be 
highlighted. Richard Bernstein (1961; 1965; 1971; 1986; 2004) provides several 
explanatory and interpretative accounts o f Dewey’s framework and concepts, in particular 
on the immediacy o f experience and quality as transactive concepts. I also worked with 
John Shook’s (2000) outstanding work on “Dewey’s Empirical Theory o f  Knowledge and 
Reality.” In a chronological walk through Dewey’s writings, Shook traces the development 
o f Deweys thinking an clarifies the relation between his meatphyiscs and epistemology in 
his work.
Background
The agency model that Folk psychology suggests is deeply interwoven with modern 
epistemology and metaphysics. The classical British empiricists John Locke (1989 [1690]) 
and David Hume (2007) introduce a sharp separation between epistemic processes and 
intentional activity. Modem empiricism, refined by some Kantian concepts, can be 
described as a linear process, as in the scheme below.
NatureNature
Subject/Mind
Fig. 3.1: Linear model of epistemic processes and action
This linear process model incorporates six hypotheses:
1. The world (nature) makes impressions upon our senses that are perceived 
subjectively. These sense impressions are qualitative states within consciousness. 
John Locke (1989 [1690]) added that there is a strict division between “primary 
qualities” (qualities pertaining to natural existences and independent of experience -  
like extension, mass, surface structure) and “secondary qualities” (which are 
constituted by experience, such as colour, smell). Sense impressions are mental 
phenomena. The objects in our perception (phenomena) are distinct from the objects 
perceived (“thing itself’).3
2. Experience is a cognitive product that involves organising individual episodes of 
sensational attention (perceptions) into concrete objects and processes o f 
recognition. We have perceptions simpliciter, consisting of mere sensual 
impressions. These cannot be called “experiences” or “experienced objects.” They 
are at best unorganised perceptions (e.g. shapes or shades of light, darkness or 
colour). The principles and resources that help to organise such perceptual raw 
material into experiences (e.g. of objects) have been variously identified as 
“categories,” “concepts,” “hermeneutic horizons” and “background theories.” The 
question o f the origin of such concepts and the ordering of principles parted early 
modern empiricists from their rationalist antagonists. However, most early 
empiricists and rationalists agreed that such “synthetic” epistemic processes take 
place within the cognitive realm of a mind and are therefore separated from nature. 
They also agreed that these epistemic processes must be well separated from 
intentional human agency.
3. Beliefs are states o f mind that we form from experience and judgement.
3 The relationship between objects of nature and sense perceptions has often been described as a causal one in 
which (nature causes sense perceptions). However, Hume and Kant have confronted this model with the idea 
that the category of causality must be regarded as contributed by the epistemic subject rather than the object.
89
4. Deliberation employs our knowledge/beliefs and statements of purpose in order to 
arrive at decisions.
5. Decisions mark the conclusion of deliberation and the beginning o f an initiative that 
manifests itself in subsequent overt action. Thus a decision is ideally a point-like 
occurrence.
6. Whereas deliberation is conceived of as an intellectual or mental process, actions 
involve observable behaviour.
Five postulates about the nature of epistemic processes underlie these procedural ideas:
1. Epistemic processes are of an intellectual nature and take place within the realm of 
the mind or subject. A subject’s mind is ontologically separated from its natural 
environment.
2. Epistemic processes are preconditions for the formation of plans and decisions. This 
means that they take place prior to the subject’s execution o f intentional deliberated 
acts (i.e. the practical involvement with one’s environment).
3. The same applies to deliberation processes, where strategies and plans are 
formulated and explored before they are exercised.
4. Epistemic and value judgements are separate intellectual exercises.
5. Decisions are emphatic junction points.
Underlying each of these five epistemological hypotheses are two pairs of dualistic 
distinctions, which Dewey criticises as fundamental flaws of the modem (empiricist) 
epistemology:
1. The model relies on a separation between mind and nature.
2. It proposes a sequential separation of earlier passive (epistemic) and later active 
(productive) phases.
90
The intellectual efforts involved in stages of understanding and deliberating have a hybrid 
existence between these active and passive categories. The entire model can therefore be 
summarised by a linear sequence of three phases:
1. a passive/receptive stage (experienced sense purturbations),
2. intellectual (internal) activities (synthesis, deliberation, and judgements), and
3. executive (external) action.
We can see how the linear instrumental model in its most simple formulation of a three step 
progression scheme incorporates this idea:
1. research stages,
2. deliberation/decision making, and
3. implementation.
However, the description as “research” and “decision-making” gives the impression that 
these stages are also active. Defining each o f these stages as occupations where paid 
specialists work does little to mend the epistemic separation between “research” as the 
collection o f information and the more formative or productive act o f “implementation.” 
The above categories o f active and passive distinguish between the direction of the 
intended effects in respective stages and not the state of the agency system. I.e. research is 
done in order to improve the planner’s information (or ‘in-formation’) base, whereas 
implementation changes the environment and might therefore be called ‘ex-formation.’
The two dichotomies of nature-mind and passive-active are the first in Dewey’s crosshair, 
together with a number o f subsequent or related dualisms (e.g. meaning-symbol, fact-value, 
and subject-object). According to Dewey, these are the root causes o f the larger part o f  
traditional philosophical problems, such as the problem o f mind-body, freedom of will, 
knowledge and our epistemic access to the world.
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Structure of the Argument
This chapter investigates the epistemic branch in the Folk-Model (the one leading from 
beliefs to action). It asks what relation holds between epistemic categories (perception, 
experience, belief, cognition and knowledge) and action. I will trace Dewey’s arguments in 
order to reverse the linear relation model described above. I intend to show that all 
epistemic processes are part o f formative or productive courses of agency. Moreover, 
epistemic categories like knowledge, information, or belief refer to products rather than 
antecedents of action. The argument will take two steps:
1. In the section titled “Primacy o f Action,” I will discuss two related claims that 
Dewey developed in his seminal article “The Reflex- Arch Concept in Psychology” 
(EW5):
a. The nature of basic epistemic material (stimuli/preceptions) is irreducibly active.
b. Our epistemic processes are integrated into our efforts at coordinating behaviour.
This first step only sets up the inversion o f the traditional linear relationship 
between epistemic processes and agency. It does not affect the Folk-Model directly 
in that it does not permit a conclusion regarding the relationship between beliefs and 
action. This is because until the the second part, the arguments will not directly 
address action as a category distinct from behaviour. Action is intentional and needs 
to be defined in its relative position to intentional concepts like knowledge, belief, 
purpose and cognition.
2. The part entitled “Cognition, Belief and Knowedge” deals with Dewey’s account o f  
the origin and role of these agewcy-categories (beliefrcognition/ knowledge) and 
their role in action. This part provides a pragmatist account of the epistemic 
componenents of an agency theory and their respective relations.
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The Unity of Behaviour
The passive-active separation: a root problem
I believe that Dewey found the separation between passive and active (or epistemic and 
formative) phases in human conduct even more bothersome than the much discussed 
dichotomy between subject and object. Certainly on this question he made the most 
decisive advance beyond the German idealist philosophers who had been a leading 
influence on his thinking (Shook 2000).
Dewey argued that the relation o f an epistemic subject to its object is already active when 
processes of perceiving and collecting information dominate. In his first major work on 
“Psychology,” Dewey pointed at the active nature o f even our most basic sense impressions 
(P, EW 2.47):
“No special organ can be purely passive, even physically speaking, in sensation. It must 
adjust itself to the stimulus. ... We must sniff with our nostrils. The tympanum o f the 
ear must be stretched, the eye-lenses must be accommodated, and the two eyes 
converged, and each must have muscular connections. ... Thus the activities o f our own 
body and those of external bodies are indissolubly associated from the first.”
Dewey’s argument does not follow the path o f traditional epistemo logical marvelling about 
our limited ability to gain objective acquaintance with reality, a limit supposedly set by the 
shape and functioning o f our sense organs. His naturalist programme tries to remedy 
epistemological problems of the right access to reality by denying the initial separation of 
mind and nature. At the same time he is aware that a naturalist monism does not solve all 
problems associated with the objectivity o f our experiences and beliefs. Dewey senses a 
deeper-seated problem in separating passive (perceptive) and active (reactive) episodes 
within a process that should be seen as a single epistemic, cognitive-behavioural 
continuum. Dewey identifies this continuum with an organism’s course o f coordination.
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The trouble with behaviourism
The language of “stimulus -  response” and “organism -  medium” follows a project of  
naturalising the relationship between epistemic subject and object. During Dewey’s time 
behaviourist theories became increasingly fashionable alternatives to Cartesian models o f  
separate substances. Behaviourism was embraced as a form of a naturalistic monism 
committed to overcoming epistemological and agency theoretical problems by denying the 
hiatus between mental and physical processes. Behaviourists deny the separation between 
mental processes and causal events. They hold that the categories o f stimulus and response4 
can fully account for all interactions of life forms with their environments.
Dewey saw this declaration as an inadmissible shortcut solution to the epistemological 
problems resulting from separating the subject from nature. The problem is that 
behaviourist approaches still firmly rely on the passive-active divide. A stimulus affects the 
passive organism and first initiates the need for an adaptive behavioural reaction. The 
organism remains passive until the stimulus provokes a reaction, which is for a behaviourist 
determined by hard-wired neuro-muscular pathways. The knee reflex is a paradigm 
example: nerve endings receive the impulse from the slight hit of a reflex-hammer. This 
signal is processed along defined nerve-channels and triggers a behavioural pattern in 
response.
In his article “The Unit of Behaviour” (which later appeared under the title “The Reflex 
Arc Concept o f Behaviour,” EW 5), Dewey discusses various problems with this 
behaviourist model; (RA, EW5.99-100):
“... [F]ailing to see the unity o f activity, no matter how much it may prate of unity, still 
leaves us with sensation or peripheral stimulus; idea, or central process (the equivalent 
of attention)151; and motor response, or act, as three disconnected existences, having to
4 B.F. Skinner later extended this by the notion of "operant behaviour. ”
5 Perhaps Dewey anticipates something like the idea of operant behaviour here.
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be somehow adjusted to each other, whether through the intervention of an extra 
experimental soul, or by mechanical push and pull.”
He argues that the separation of receptive (stimulus) and reactive (response) phases is by no 
means a stringent one. The implied divide between passive-active phases re-introduces 
precisely what behaviourists set out to overcome: a teleological perspective on behavioural 
coordination. Such a perspective is necessary in order to distinguish between stimulus and 
response as two fundamentally different categories. The behaviourist model is therefore 
bound to reintroduce some version o f a Cartesian subject-object dualism by the backdoor, 
which is a claim I will explain below.
It seems that behaviourists ignore the fact that stimulus and response are two aspects o f a 
single behavioural “cycle.” This cycle describes how an organism coordinates its behaviour 
within its medium. In contrast to conventional impulse- or desire-based psychology, Dewey 
takes “activity rather than rest as the default state o f human beings” (Anderson 2005). What 
we call “stimulus,” or “perception,” is not an excitement that incites a passively awaiting 
organism to react. “Stimulus” is itself a highly active productive process. The organism 
participates as an equitable partner in the production o f the stimulus. A perception is not 
merely had, but actively made', (RA, EW5:97):
“We find that we begin, not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensory-motor 
coordination ... the sensation ... is secondary, the movement o f body, head, and eye 
muscles [determine] the quality o f  what is experienced.”
The role of an active contribution to the creation o f what may be distinguished as a stimulus 
not only reverses the relation between the poles o f “passive” and “active” or “perceptive” 
and “behavioural,” it also prepares an integrated and holistic picture of an epistemic- 
behavioural continuum; (RA, EW5:98):
“Both sensation and movement lie inside, not outside the act.”
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Dewey further explicates (RA, EW.5.105, my italics):
“It is an act, a sensory-motor coordination, which stimulates the response, itself in turn 
sensory-motor, not a sensation which stimulates a movement.”
Here we have arrived at a decisive, albeit problematic, conclusion: it suggests that activity 
is prior to all epistemic processes. Perceptions and experience thus become phases or 
distinctions within courses of action (NRP, MW10.9):
“The most patient patient is more than a receptor. He is also an agent—a reactor, one 
trying experiments, one concerned with undergoing in a way which may influence what 
is still to happen. ... Even if we shut ourselves up in the most clam-like fashion, we are 
doing something; our passivity is an active attitude, not an extinction of response. 
Experience, in other words, is a matter o f simultaneous doings and sufferings. Our 
undergoings are experiments.”
Doing and undergoing
The claim that every phase o f coordination has its place within action does not mean that 
Dewey embraces a philosophy o f uninterrupted activism. He insists on the distinction 
between “doing” and “undergoing” as two poles that define interaction o f an organism and 
its medium. However, Dewey’s distinction between undergoing and doing cannot be 
paralleled with stimulus and response. Doing and undergoing are present in all phases of 
experience and action. This also means that no chronological separation is possible between 
events that Dewey calls “doings” and “undergoings.” They function more like pressure and 
counter-pressure in a mechanical transaction than like two subsequent episodes where the 
first initiates the second.
For Dewey all experience is the product o f an interaction between “doings” and 
“undergoings.” The concept of experience shall be more thoroughly discussed in later
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sections. At this point it is important to see the constitutive role o f activity in experience. 
We experience things not merely by being exposed to them; (RP, MW 12.128):
“The living creature undergoes, suffers, the consequences o f its own behavior. This 
close connection between doing and suffering or undergoing forms what we call 
experience. Disconnected doing and disconnected suffering are neither of them 
experiences.”
Behaviourism’s inherent teleology
The behaviourist cannot translate ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ as ‘cause’ and ‘effect,’ at least 
not as long as he is speaking about types of stimuli causing types o f  responses. Rosenberg 
(1995) demonstrates how behaviourist scientific programmes rely on intentional and 
teleological notions in their experiments and descriptions. For a rat, the ringing of a bell 
may be a stimulus for a learned behavioural pattern leading to a series o f reactions (e.g. 
pushing a pall though a maze) that will be gratified with a nutrition pill. The three elements, 
‘stimulus,’ ‘ballgame’ and ‘gratification,’ are by no means purely behavioural categories. 
None of these terms can be defined strictly in an extensional language. What scientists 
would classify as “a stimulus” can have many minutely different physical realisations. In a 
successfully repeated experiment no two realisations will be physically identical. The bell 
will emit different wave-pattems, the ball will follow a different path into the goal, and the 
gratification may vary. Experiments with monkeys have shown that treats as different as 
food, grooming, or the permission to look out o f the window for a while are all powerful 
behavioural enforcers, yet they are collectively called “gratification.” A rat is expected to 
interpret different manifestations o f a ringing sound as stimuli. For a strict behaviourist this 
is a problem, because the interpretation o f token events as types (stimulus, response and 
gratification) involves an intentional (and hence teleological) perspective. Of course one 
can exchange intentional words like “aim” or “gratification” for concepts like positive or 
negative “reinforcement,” but this will not exorcise the “ghost in behaviourism’s machine” 
(Rosenberg 1995). This Cartesian phantom separates an internal, subjective dimension of 
intentionality from a naturalistic causal account of behavioural phenomena, and it enters
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precisely at the moment when the behaviourist divorces the stimulus as a receptive phase 
from the response as an active behavioural manifestation.
At this point the two problems o f ‘subject-object-dualism’ (A) and ‘passive-active-divide’ 
(B) appear connected. The behaviourist project shows that we cannot endorse B without 
falling back into some version of A.
Integrated coordination
Dewey intends to overcome both dualisms by integrating stimulus and response within a 
continuum of coordinating behaviour. Epistemic raw materials, such as stimuli or 
perceptions, are not, however, the only things best defined as active processes. This idea 
must be extended to all epistemic phases and dimensions. We will investigate the roles that 
experience, beliefs, and knowledge play in the formation of agency.
Establishing the active nature of all epistemic processes is not sufficient to break with linear 
model o f agency. We could simply assume a linear succession o f two types o f activities: 1. 
epistemic/perceptual activity, and 2. adaptive or executive behaviour. These could be seen 
as two separate events with the former causing the latter.
How then does Dewey establish “that sensory stimulus, central connections and motor 
responses shall be viewed, not as separate and complete entities in themselves, but as 
divisions of labor, functioning factors, within a single concrete whole”(RA, EW5.97, 
emphasis added)?
The answer can be found in Dewey’s organic conception o f the transaction, which 
encompasses agent and environment. Dewey is careful to avoid the mechanical language of  
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ in the context of environmental stimuli and behavioural coordination. 
Instead he uses “cause” and “consequence.” Dewey qualifies effects as “consequences ” in 
order to embed causes in an instrumental context. Consequences are matters of interest and 
they are events that can be anticipated and to some degree influenced. A living organism is
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not subject to causes in that the same a car engine is subject to an ignition because a 
stimulus cannot be said to necessitate the uniform response. Most organisms have the 
capacity to adjust the pattern o f their behavioural reactions to a stimulus at least to a degree,
i.e. they can change the causal efficacy of a stimulus. This means that the cause or stimulus, 
in its power to trigger behavioural reactions, is itself a product o f functional adjustments 
and organic coordination (this may be called learning). A stimulus, in organic contexts, has 
no independent determining power. Its power to stimulate is a function of organic 
behavioural coordination. John Stuart Mill had developed the idea that causes must not be 
understood as necessitating a consequence, but only as influencing a system. He also 
introduced the subsequent idea that human beings can actively take charge o f the effects 
produced by stimuli and causes through forming a character. This served J.S. Mill as the 
base for his metaphysical conception o f human freedom and as the foundation o f his social 
theory (Mill and Robson 1974).
William James discussed the role that response behaviour plays in the formation o f a 
stimulus in his “Principles of Psychology.” A child, lured by the light o f a candle, reaches 
with its hand into the flame and gets burned. We may interpret the perception o f light as a 
stimulus to the curiosity o f the child, and the reaching out as a response. The quality of  
perception however, i.e. the attraction to the light, rapidly changes after the burning occurs. 
What behavioural psychologists call negative enforcement, could also be described as 
giving stimuli such as a flickering candle a different place within organic coordination. 
Dewey comments (RA, EW5.98):
“... [T]he so called response is not merely to the stimulus, it is into it. The bum is the 
original seeing, the original optical-ocular experience enlarged and transformed in its 
value. It is no longer mere seeing, it is seeing-of a light-that-means-pain-when-contact- 
occurs.”
Metaphorically speaking, the relation between stimulus and response is like a key and a 
keyhole in the act of opening a door. Keys and keyholes are designed to fit together and 
allow a complete course of action (the opening o f a door). The causal metaphor of a billiard
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ball communicating its impulse to another ball seems inadequate in this case o f stimulus 
and response. The agent or organism produces a stimulus. The causal power o f a stimulus 
to affect a response is not native to the stimulus/cause; it is the product o f a learning 
process. The causal power o f a stimulus is therefore an organic life function not a mere 
trigger for behaviour (cf. Shook 2003).
Intermediate summary of results and problems
Dewey makes a convincing argument for acknowledging the active nature o f all epistemic 
material, right down to the reception o f stimuli and sense-perceptions. He also integrates 
episodes of epistemic attention and phases o f behavioural expression into a full cycle o f  
coordination, rather than a reflex “arc ” that reaches only in one direction from stimulus to 
response.
Dewey states that (RA, EW5.109)
“...the stimulus is that phase o f the forming coordination which represents the 
conditions which have to be met in bringing it to a successful issue; the response is that 
phase o f one and the same forming coordination which gives the key to meeting these 
conditions, which serves as instrument in effecting the successful coordination. They 
are therefore strictly correlative and contemporaneous.”
However, this result still speaks the (extensional) language o f stimulus and behaviour. 
These cannot simply be translated into an intensional language of knowledge/beliefs/ 
cognitions and action, which would be necessary in order to criticise the Humean Folk- 
model.
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Cognition, Belief and Knowledge
The previous debate successfully challenged the active-passive divide between epistemic 
episodes and behavioural reactions, and integrated both within the single concept of 
coordination, which also confronted any sharp separation between organism and 
environment as subject and object.
To understand the role o f beliefs and knowledge with regard to action, we must ask some 
basic epistemological questions from a pragmatist perspective:
What is our relationship as “agent-patients” (HT, MW6.120) with the world? By what 
means and to what extent can we be acquainted with nature? And what exactly is the 
relationship between our knowledge/beliefs and reality?
I will argue that Dewey’s view as to the relationship between epistemic subject and nature 
falls within agency theory rather than in the fields of epistemology or ontology. His answer 
implies a reversal of the Humean Folk-Model.
Dewey spent much of his life arguing that epistemic categories such as beliefs and 
knowledge have meaning only by virtue of the functional role they play as organising 
factors in the formation o f our human action.
In order to tailor these questions to the present context, we will ask whether knowledge and 
belief can ever be understood as antecedents to our deliberation processes and action. This 
seems like a necessary condition for the Folk-Model in which beliefs and knowledge 
inform or even cause our action. In other words, is knowledge something we have, and is 
belief something we hold before we start acting or deliberating over our actions?
If we came to a negative answer to these questions, i.e. if knowledge and belief could only 
be understood as the products of transaction and deliberation, then the Humean model 
might still be defended. The model does not claim that the historic process of gaining our
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knowledge and beliefs must be independent from action and coordination. It only insists 
that once adopted, beliefs can serve as antecedents for (rational) deliberation processes and 
actions.
Only if  we successfully establish that knowledge and beliefs can never be brought into a 
form that could serve as antecedents for Humean rationality can we successfully challenge 
the Folk-Model o f agency.
In the following sections I will therefore argue that in deliberation contexts, knowledge is 
always a goal within inquiry, and belief is the end, never the beginning, of deliberation.
The nature of experience
Dewey and empiricism
Despite making experience the central concept in all his naturalist philosophy, Dewey has 
little in common with modern empiricism and positivism. In a few instances Dewey uses 
“empiricism” to label his own work, but his leanings towards Hegelian objective idealism 
are stronger than his communalities with Locke or Hume. For Locke, and largely also for 
Hume, “empiricism” means a philosophical commitment to sensual impressions as the 
source of all knowledge, beliefs and judgement. Dewey describes an implicit alliance 
between early modem empiricists and rationalists on the grounds that both separate the 
realm o f perception, experience and cognition from an external world o f matter and causes.
Empiricists often proclaim nature as the ultimate source of all our cognitive images or 
ideas, however our access to nature seems strangely reduced to the two dimensional surface 
of sense organs. Thus our sense organs do not only give us access to nature, they more 
effectively separate us from the world. Dewey’s concept o f experience, on the other hand, 
is three-dimensional. It comprises interactions beyond the surface o f sense organs. Hence, 
experience is not a private or mental event, but a process o f interaction which equally 
engulfs the “agent-patient” and the objects of her perception. Dewey sees the epistemic 
subject embedded within a continuum o f natural processes.
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The transactive nature o f experience
The central feat o f Dewey’s philosophy is that there is no ontological gap between 
experience and nature. Experience is not nature’s imprint in another medium; it is the 
process of interaction between the two poles of subject and object, or organism and 
environment. However, for Dewey the term “interaction” was still too dualistic because it 
presupposed two given elements (subject and object), entering an intercourse as predefined 
entities. If Dewey had ever developed an ontology, it would be one o f process rather than 
substance6. He calls nature an “affair of affairs” in which (Bernstein 1961 p.83)
“...transaction does not occur with an aggregate or combination of elements that have 
an independent existence. On the contrary, what counts as an ‘element’ is dependent on 
its function within a transaction.”
Immediacy
This transactive view o f experience enables Dewey to bridge the gap between the 
experiencing subject and the world of experienced objects. Experience as “transaction,” 
makes no difference between subjects and objects. In a transactive perspective on 
experience our access to nature and our environment is immediate. (EN, LW1.12-13):
“[Experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but 
nature -  stones, plants diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things 
interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in 
certain other ways with another natural object -  the human object -  they are how things 
are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature, it has depth. It also 
has breadth and indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes 
inference.”
6 I am using the conditional form to support my thesis that even Dewey’s metaphysical work should be 
understood as a contribution to agency theory.
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This quote entails a number of important ideas. It speaks about the qualitative immediacy 
of our experience, saying that our acquaintance with the world is direct though interaction 
and not indirect via sense perceptions. Contradicting Hume, it says we have direct access 
not only to things as objects but also to some o f their relations (or connections). The quote 
introduces Dewey’s particular concept of meaning as a property in experience that extends 
(“stretches”) beyond the immediacy o f perception. Experience reaches out toward future 
transactions -  it is not exhausted by momentary sensual awareness. Finally, in stating “that 
stretch constitutes inference,” Dewey indicates that deliberation is not separate from 
experience.
Connections and qualities
In response to Hume and Locke, Dewey jettisons the proposition that experience needs the 
synthetic power of ideas (whether won from induction or from transcendental meditation) 
in order to produce objects, qualities, and connections from the raw material o f  
accumulated atomic sense impressions. Hume had argued that our knowledge o f causal 
relations remains restricted to the (mental) association o f intrinsically unconnected 
observation points (sensory data). If connections are irreducibly part of our experiential 
transactions, we do not rely on the presence o f atomistic sense affections in constructing a 
complex and coherent understanding of our world. This idea will be discussed in chapter 6.
Experience and meaning
“Immediacy” does not confine experience to a state or a singular moment. The distinctions 
and discriminations that we make in our experiences are related to other experiences, future 
objects and consequences. Connections, relations, and meanings point toward subsequent 
transactions.
“Meaning” is for Dewey “... an experience of a thing which refers to another thing” (Shook 
2000 p.69). In fact, meaning is defined as an element in experience (transaction) that leads 
or refers to further actions and co-ordinations. The meaning o f a symbol like “emergency
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exit,” for example, refers to measures taken in a disaster scenario. The word “refer” can be 
read quite like the quasi causal relation between stimulus and response, as discussed above. 
A meaningful object (or symbol) in experience can evoke certain actions. How and when it 
exercises such causal powers depends on the meaning it has been given in previous courses 
of coordination. In this vein Dewey seeks to overcome the dualism between “symbol” and 
“meaning.”
Ideas play a constitutive part in extending experience to further objects and transactions. An 
idea is a “...mentally active inference or suggestion relating one experience to others” 
(Shook 2000 p.69).
Why should one occupy oneself with such slightly esoteric internalist conceptions o f  
meaning? Why can we not stay with an account of meaning as representations or 
propositional attitudes? The answer is that the tight connection o f meaning and experience 
is necessary in order to show the intimate relationship between beliefs, knowledge and 
action. But this requires some further steps.
Belief and knowledge
The above arguments about the immediacy o f experience, which includes meanings, 
connections and ideas, suggest that nature would directly reveal itself to us in any 
experienced situation. Knowing would then be a matter o f attending to the immediacy o f  
experience. This is not what Dewey intended, and Bernstein (1966) gives us the following 
slogan (p.92):
“Qualitative immediacy -  Yes! Immediate knowledge -  No!”
He adds (Bernstein 1966 p.6):
“To know we must go beyond what is immediately present, and classify and 
discriminate it.”
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Knowledge then is for Dewey the act of extending the boundaries of experience beyond 
those meanings and connections that are already part of its immediate quality. It means 
learning about the causes and consequences of further possible courses of action.
Why can these meanings and insights into causal relations not serve as relatively stable 
epistemic antecedents in a Humean action model?
The answer is, in brief, that knowledge is never merely the end-product of a previously 
successful inquiry. Knowledge cannot act as a stable premise in a practical inference. This 
has two reasons which I will discuss below:
Knowledge does not represent its object. Its object is not indifferent to the process of 
knowing. Knowing is part of a transactive process in which its object is constituted. I.e. the 
object known and the process of knowing are not two independent things.
New relations and connections that are discovered (in knowledge) become incorporated in 
experiential transactions: these are new meanings that become part o f the qualitative 
immediacy of experience. Since Dewey had claimed that we have no immediate knowledge 
(only immediate experience), knowledge ceases to be what it is as soon as it becomes an 
established product. I.e. knowing is never a product. I will explain this argument in some 
more detail below.
Knowing and transforming
The view that knowledge takes part in natural transactions (of inquiry and knowing) leads 
Dewey to the notion that reality is not “without loose ends” (MW4 p. 127). A nature without 
loose ends would be complete and self-sufficient. Knowing such a world would not add or 
subtract anything to its objects.
Against this epistemic model Dewey insists that (QC, LW4.160)
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"... known objects exist as consequences of directed operations, not because of  
conformity o f thought or observation with something antecedent.”
Understanding something must always be translated as entering a new form o f interaction 
with the world. As per the definitions o f doing and undergoing, any object we could ever 
know can only be understood as an aspect within interactions. If knowing were translated 
as doing then the object would be undergoing. We have seen earlier that neither of these 
two aspects has any meaning in isolation -  as little as there can be pressure without counter 
pressure; (HNC, MW14.33):
“... [T]he object is that which objects.”
However, Dewey remains a naturalist and does not succumb to the temptation o f regarding 
reality as a mere construction o f human epistemic and scientific practices. He concedes that 
natural transactions took place before humans began experiencing or inquiring into them. 
However, he swiftly adds (Rejoinder, LW14.31):
“What things were like before the time in which ... inquiry was undertaken ... I can 
only say that this sort of telling is the specific business of the inquiries themselves.”
Reality that can ever be the material o f inquiry and knowledge is constituted and co­
authored by our knowing and inquiring transactions. Knowledge itself is defined as a way 
of changing and enriching the transactions that produce experience and constitute nature.
Shook sees the solution to this dilemma between Dewey’s naturalist ontology and his 
constructivist epistemology in his turning away from any definite answer (ontological or 
epistemological). He views Dewey’s third alternative route as a form of functionalism 
wherein (QC, LW4.160):
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the worth o f any object that lays claim to being an object o f knowledge is
dependent upon the intelligence employed in reaching it.”
At this point it becomes clearer that Dewey’s epistemological and metaphysical reflections 
yield a new agency theory rather than new ontology. Seen in the right light, Dewey bids 
farewell to both metaphysics and epistemology as autonomous philosophical enterprises. 
What replaces these are functional distinctions within an account o f how human agents 
structure and coordinate their transactions, in other words: agency theory.
Knowing as learning
We may be persuaded that knowledge is not a representation of a ready-made inquiry but
the outcome o f inquiry which transforms both knowing and its object. Nevertheless, we
may hold that this process o f mutual adaptation of knowing and object may come to some 
resting point, or to a cognitive-transactive equilibrium. At this point we would have 
obtained some temporarily stable orientation -  some reliable knowledge o f relations. Why 
can such a trusted outcome not serve as the antecedent to a Humean agency model?
The aim here is to show how Dewey would ascertain that knowledge can never serve in the 
role assigned to it by the Humean model, because it can never be treated as an established 
outcome of inquiry.
Dewey quite purposefully avoids the word “knowledge” as a reified result o f inquiry. He 
speaks instead about “knowing,” as a verb-derived-noun. Where he still employs the word 
“knowledge” he gives it a procedural interpretation (KK LW16.4):
“The transactional... installs openness and flexibility in the very process o f knowing. It 
treats knowledge as itself inquiry — as a goal within inquiry, not as a terminus outside 
or beyond inquiry.”
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This definition finally yields the answer to why knowledge cannot serve as an antecedent in 
the formation o f a course of deliberate action as the Folk-Model suggests: knowledge is 
always necessarily in deliberation and never simply a result of it. (Rejoinder, LW14.559):
“Knowledge as attained in distinction from knowing in process, is a flat 
contradiction...”
But how does Dewey arrive at this notion o f “knowing as inquiry in progress” (Rejoinder, 
LW14.562)? How does he establish that “knowledge” is really “learning”? These questions 
will occupy us in the remaining sections and also in several subsequent chapters. Chapter 6 
in particular will take a closer look at Dewey’s concept o f inquiry.
Belief
Dewey holds that knowledge as “attained” is a contradiction, but why? What happens to 
knowledge when we leave the context o f learning and inquiry?
Inquiry for Dewey is the systematic attempt at settling a problematic situation. A situation 
becomes problematic if  the equilibrium of “habitual” transactions is challenged or upset. 
Like Peirce, Dewey defines “belief’ as a habitual state o f equilibrium, and “doubt” as a 
challenged “problematic situation.” Inquiry is by definition restricted to states of doubt. If 
knowledge is a “goal within inquiry” and not “a terminus outside and beyond inquiry” (see 
above quote), then knowledge can never be part of a settled situation (belief).
Our main aim here is not to trace Dewey’s specific definition o f  knowing as learning, but to 
ask whether the outcome of inquiry is not some result that could be used as a logical or 
causal antecedent in the Folk-Model o f agency. If “knowledge” remains irredeemably 
restricted to contexts of inquiry, “belief’ could still be seen as a result o f successful inquiry, 
and may serve as an antecedent for deliberations in the Folk-Model. Formulations o f the 
Folk-Model usually refer to “belief’ or “cognition” rather than “knowledge” (perhaps to 
emphasise the private and subjective character o f deliberation).
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However, “belief’ cannot occupy the position o f an antecedent in deliberation either, at 
least not in Dewey’s definition.
What exactly is belief if  called an outcome or “terminus” o f inquiry?
If inquiry successfully obtains its goal, it resolves a problematic situation by augmenting 
understanding. This is equivalent to saying that inquiry integrates new connections and 
meanings within experience, and as a consequence a new equilibrium in our transactions 
becomes possible; i.e. we have learned to deal with a problematic situation. The result of 
successful inquiry (“belief’) amounts to a new form o f habitual equilibrium. Dewey rejects 
any cognitive interpretation of beliefs as storable information that could be summarised or 
stated in the form of results and that would have propositional content independent of 
embodiments in our habits and dispositions. “Meanings” and “connections” are 
dispositions and forms of transaction for Dewey. By this definition beliefs, as results from 
successful inquiry, would be “obtained” only in the form of a transactive equilibrium or 
“habit.” This idea will be clearer after reading chapter 6 on Dewey’s concept of inquiry.
Consequences for the Folk-Model
The Humean model addresses situations in which belief is employed in forming deliberate 
agency. However, these are not situations o f an un-challenged “habitual equilibrium.” 
Deliberate action, i.e. the active reorganisation o f coordination is necessary in 
“indeterminate” or “problematic” situations. And these are situations where “belief’ had to 
give way to “doubt.”
Habitual transactions are not those where deliberate action in view o f means and ends 
(Folk-Model) applies. Habits proceed without deliberate decision-making and without 
being instrumentally motivated to achieve a goal. It follows that if we have a situation of 
stable beliefs we do not need to deliberate: The Folk-Model of agency has no application 
because habitual co-ordinations suffice to maintain our transactive equilibrium. If, on the
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other hand, our situation demands explicit and deliberate action such as the Folk-Model 
envisages, it is characterised by a loss of a habitual equilibrium o f “belief.”
In cases where we have stable belief, Humean agency is not an apposite way o f conduct, 
and in cases were the Folk-Model should be applicable, we cannot rely on “belief’ as a 
given premise.
In contrast, Dewey’s category o f “knowing” as defined above is applicable in contexts of 
deliberation. However, knowing does not have a character that would allow it to be used as 
a premise in the Folk-Model. Since knowledge is always a product in the making, it is 
meaningful only within processes of learning. Thus, a new theory o f agency would have to 
integrate learning and inquiry within the processes o f deliberation and the formation o f  
agency.
Conclusion
The argument, here presented, indicates why the Folk-model cannot stand on its epistemic 
‘leg.’ The relation between beliefknowledge decision-making and action can be 
understood neither logically nor causally as a linear sequence (cf. the first and the second 
part of this chapter respectively). In consequence, a new model o f agency must integrate the 
search for knowledge and orientation within an unfolding process of agency.
Two important steps have been taken thus far:
Firstly, I have discussed on what ground Dewey rejects the strict separation between 
epistemic processes and active behavioural coordination. This suggests that the relation 
between studying circumstances and actively engaging and changing them might not be 
best described as a succession o f stages. I.e. any agency model, fit to account for the 
intentional human behaviour, should try to integrate epistemic processes and action. An 
optimal theory would define all epistemic processes as functions within unfolding human 
agency.
I l l
Secondly, I have used Dewey to challenge directly the Folk-Model’s presupposition that 
beliefs or knowledge are input factors for deliberate, rational action. The Folk-Model holds 
that we form action in view o f our beliefs and desires, or that our action employs our 
knowledge to achieve certain ends. For this purpose beliefs or knowledge should be 
reasonably stable in the context of deliberation: They can, according to the Folk-Model, not 
be themselves subject to deliberation. As I have discussed, neither belief nor knowledge, in 
the Deweyan understanding, can serve in this capacity. Contexts o f deliberate action are 
always epistemic contexts of forming our knowledge and changing beliefs.
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Chapter 4: Purposes in View of Instruments -  
Defining and Using Ends
I despise everything that merely instructs me without increasing or immediately enlivening
my activity. 
Johann W. v. Goethe1
When a man finds himself in movement, he always invents a goal o f that movement. In 
order to walk 1,000 versts he must believe that there is a good beyond those 1,000 versts. 
He needs a vision o f a promised land in order to have the strength to go on moving...
Leo Tolstoy2
Introduction
We are the heirs o f an ambivalent philosophical fortune. Our legacy is a sophisticated 
conception of two segregated realms o f rational inquiry. These trade under names like 
substantial, practical or value-rationality on one side, and formal, instrumental or “Zweck” 
rationality on the other.
The analytic parsimony in the idea o f a purely instrumental rationality, stripped o f all 
conflicts and vagueness in the justification of goods and purposes, is often irresistible to 
both theorists and practitioners.
Previous chapters have dealt with a model that I described earlier as “linear instrumental 
rationality.” This LIR model had been pointedly summarised by Landron Winner as 
“straight-line instrumentalism” (Winner 1977 p.28), which
1 From a letter to Schiller (19/12/1798). Quoted in the introduction of Nietzsche (1874).
2 War and Peace, Beginning Ch. 19
“...begins with a preconceived end in mind. Then one decides upon an appropriate 
instrument or organization o f instruments to achieve that end, usually weighing the 
advantages o f  two or more alternative instruments. Next comes the actual use o f the 
instrument in the way established for its successful exercise. Finally, one achieves 
certain results which are judged according to the original end.”
This model describes a neat separation and a temporal ordering of instrumental deliberation 
after the determination of ends.
How good is the idea of having two rationalities instead of one -  o f dividing the labour 
between technical and ethical questions, or between administration and life choices?
In both his ethical and his epistemological work, John Dewey seeks to overcome the 
divorce of rationality into two different projects. He claims that defining purposes and 
devising instruments are in fact two aspects of the same practice o f inquiry. I will explore 
some promising aspects of Dewey’s ethical theory that help to overcome the segregation 
between means and ends, a dualism that is related though not identical with the fact-value 
divide?
In my current agency theory project I am particularly interested in the role o f purposes and 
ultimate moral orientations in the formation o f human agency. In particular I look at the 
relation between instrumental forms o f reasoning and the formation o f our ends and value 
orientations. I will also try to determine the exact position of ends and purposes in 
deliberate courses of action.
Traditional Humean theories o f rational deliberation have purged instrumental forms o f  
deliberation of moral quests for substantial purposes. The sole purpose of instrumental 
reasoning was seen in defining feasible strategies for independently set ends and purposes.
3 One could think of both means and ends as factual premises. This however would not be compatible with an 
agency theory that includes the perspective of the agent herself. For the Humean agent, “ends” must always 
refer to some subjective or objective value premise.
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The search for ultimate ends and values has been referred to private, philosophical or 
religious forms of deliberation or in western liberal politics to democratic procedures, 
market laws or customer behaviour.
Three postulates characterise the Humean linear instrumental model o f rational agency 
with regard to the dimension of ultimate ends and purposes:
• Instrumental rationality operates independently from a commitment to substantial 
ends and value-orientations;
• Instrumental reason does not help us in determining our ends; it only tells us how to 
achieve given ends under instrumental constraints. It provides only hypothetical 
imperatives which rely on an external input o f motives and purposes;
• The definition of purposes and ends logically predates instrumental forms of 
deliberation and the execution o f deliberate acts.
The first of these conditions follows a normative intuition: it reflects Hume’s “ancilla” 
argument, according to which our instrumental reason can serve our ends only if  it is 
allowed to operate independently from the direct impact o f our passions. Criticising this 
proposition by showing how our motivations directly partake in all forms o f instrumental 
deliberation will not be the main focus o f this chapter, but will be explored in the following 
chapter on “imagination in deliberation.”
The second point follows a more descriptive intuition: Hume claims that “reason” has no 
power to stir our passions. Mere reason (and a forteriori mere instrumental reason) does not 
influence our preferences or moral commitments. This second condition may seem too 
strong. A defender o f a traditional rationality theory could argue that the Humean model 
works only if  reason remains indifferent to the influence o f passions, but it would be 
indifferent to how or where our passions, ends or purposes originate. We therefore do not 
need a proviso that excludes a direct link between instrumental considerations and the 
formation o f ends. However, it is quite clear that the second condition is equally vital to the 
functioning o f a purely instrumental Humean rationality. If we relaxed the second
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condition, there would no longer be a strictly formal instrumental rationality because any 
reflection on means and instruments would immediately turn into a deliberation on 
purposes and value-orientation. This would make the notion o f a dispassionate formal 
reason impossible: it claims that instrumental considerations only determine how to attain a 
given end -  not what end is worth pursuing (Simon 1983 pp.7-8).
“Reason is wholly instrumental. It cannot tell us where to go; at best it can tell us how 
to get there. It is a gun for hire that can be employed in the service o f any goals we 
have, good or bad.”
Showing that instrumental rationality is not a “gun for hire,” but that instrumental 
deliberation is always also a value quest is one purpose o f the present argument. By looking 
at the origins of preferences and our rational means o f their moral appraisal, it tries to 
overcome the view that instrumental reasoning would be a morally neutral exercise. By the 
same token it argues that “guides” (ends, purposes, values, norms) are not separate or 
external categories from “resources” (means, instruments, cognitions, information).
The second part o f this chapter (“Ends in Action”) takes a fresh look at the role that ends 
and purposes play within unfolding processes o f action. It will challenge the view 
expressed in the third condition above. As if replying to Simon’s “gun for hire,” Dewey 
writes (HNC MW14.159)
“...men did not begin to shoot because there were ready-made targets to aim at. They 
made thing into targets by shooting at them...”
In this part I will show ends as evolving functional elements within coordinated activity.
On the whole, this chapter argues that value quests and deliberation over purposes must not 
be externalised from technical instrumental questions. By extension, defining and refining 
ends and purposes is part of the job description o f any technician, executive and planner.
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Morals and ethics are more than a garnish. They are the bread and butter o f all who 
professionally employ instrumental rationality.
Instruments and Purposes
This section will explore two questions:
1. Must we rely on sources external to instrumental reasoning in determining 
substantial ends and purposes?
2. Is instrumental rationality purely formal? Can it be sharply separated from 
substantial ethical reflection?
The Folk-Model distinguishes “means” and “ends” (or “cognitions” and “purposes”) as 
separate categories. The two questions above imply that this separation might not be as 
sharp as is often assumed.
Means and ends -  a blurred distinction?
However unambiguous the divide between objects of moral and instrumental reasoning 
may appear in theory, concrete contexts have the tendency to blur the distinction. A new 
car, the delivery o f a long expected and urgently needed module in a construction project, 
and the qualification for the next round in a sports tournament are all cases where the line 
between an intermediary means and a final end becomes fuzzy. In the wee hours o f the 
morning it may be difficult to answer whether finishing a research proposal on time 
constitutes only a means or a separate final end.
Surely in some of these cases we could speak about a mixture o f instrumental and final 
components o f the same outcome -  opportunities for further action and self sufficient 
purposes like enjoyment, excitement or relief.
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There are however obvious limits to just how lenient traditional Humean theories of 
rational action can be about the direct intercourse between the categories o f means and 
ends.
Permissible anomalies in traditional theory and their remedies
Empirically we do observe a substantial number o f cases that challenge the strict 
independence o f means and ends. Often the knowledge o f means or acquaintance with 
instrumental conditions (resources and constraints) directly influences our pursued goals. 
Not all of these cases imply violations o f the Humean rationality model, however. What 
anomalies can the Humean model cope with without abandoning the premise that means 
and ends remain matters of two distinct and independent domains of deliberation?
Strategic compromise
When we choose “a bird in the hand over two in the bush,” e.g. when we walk the long and 
easy path instead of the vaguely remembered shortcut, it does not mean that the better 
knowledge o f the former made us like the detour more. Our knowledge o f circumstances 
changes our pursued goals, but not necessarily the structure o f our real preferences. We 
strategically adapt goals in order to maximise our preferences in view of instrumental 
constraints and uncertainties. What we value as goods and their relative weights seems 
independent from such instrumental calculations.
Concretisation
Cases in which our wants and desires directly respond to perceived circumstances are more 
difficult. ‘I must have this pair o f shoes,’ states a sudden rise o f desire for an object that has 
not been known before. The advertising industry has a professional interest in the 
suggestive power of presentation on our interests and desires.
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However, one must not necessarily interpret this case as ‘instrumental conditions creating 
ends,’ or as ultimate ends being the products o f instrumental reflections. One may instead 
say that instrumental opportunities only shape and concretise desires that were latently 
given beforehand. It is often claimed that advertisement only adds a brand-image to already 
existing, diffuse desires for health, youth, beauty, popularity etc.
Sequential hierarchy
The logical independence o f means and ends has often been challenged because ends shift 
in their status and appear as intermediary stages or “means” when we widen our 
perspective. A university degree is an end only for the student. It becomes a means for a 
better career as soon as she has graduated and entered the job market. A number of 
planning theorists have addressed the sensitivity o f our classifications o f “means” 
(intermediary) and “ends” (final) to changing perspectives. Some doubt that it will ever be 
possible to define a final purpose in planning because “the system o f means and ends is 
always expanding as the planner examines the second at subsequent stages” (Churchman 
1971 p.63). Werner Ulrich argues that in the reality o f planning the notion o f a “final 
purpose” appears spurious. There may always be a change o f perspective by which a goal 
that seemed like an “end from below” may appear as a “means from above.” (Ulrich 1975 
p.74)
Proponents o f a pure instrumental rationality will not accept this as a challenge to their 
position. They admit that (Simon 1945 p.62, emphasis added)
“[e]nds themselves ... are often merely instrumental to more final objectives. We are 
thus led to the conception of a series, or hierarchy, o f  ends. Rationality has to do with 
the construction of means-ends chains o f this kind.”
This could be dubbed a “hierarchical chain model” o f instrumental reasoning. It warrants 
that ends can be interpreted as “instruments” only if they serve higher or “ultimate” 
purposes which go beyond instrumental determinations. Rational reasons may lead us to 
adapt ends strategically in view of instrumental possibilities. But instrumental concerns
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pose no rational necessity for changing the weighed hierarchy o f our ultimate purposes or 
preferences. The fiction o f this model is that even long chains o f intermediary means and 
ends relations hinge upon some ultimate value premises, from which each link can be 
rationally deduced: e.g. we shave in order to look good, in order to make a smart 
impression in an interview, in order to get a job, in order to make money, in order to pay for 
things, in order to realise our idea of a good life. Without the last link to this ultimate 
purpose o f a good life, it is believed that any instrumental chain o f activity would collapse 
into meaninglessness.
On this account instrumental reasoning only influences how we strategically set lower 
ranking intermediary ends but it does not affect the weighted structure of ultimate 
preferences and values.
Two Fallacies
Dewey opposes the idea that we could ever find, or that we should even search for, an 
independent value-premise that would underlie all our instrumental deliberations. His 
critique follows a two-pronged approach. He claims that this model must rely on either o f  
two fallacies: one he names the “philosophical fallacy;” the other I interpret as a version o f  
the “naturalistic fallacy.” The two fallacies are committed by moral rationalists or 
transcendentalists and by modem empiricists, respectively.
Dewey characterises these fallacies by speaking about a moral tension “.. .between a theory 
that, in order to save the objectivity of judgements o f values, isolates them from experience 
and nature [philosophical fallacy], and theory that, in order to save their concrete and 
human significance, reduces them to mere statements about our own feelings [naturalistic 
fallacy].” (QC, LW4:210)
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The philosophical fallacy
For Dewey, practical reasoning is inquiry. All its products (values, norms and purposes) 
should never be taken for granted outside the contexts of the inquiry process that led to 
their formulation.
He debunks all attempts to reify the results of ethical investigation. By the “philosophical 
fallacy” Dewey means any hypostatisation o f mere functions of agency into independent 
entities. An example would be turning our capacity to think and engage with problems 
through reasoning into “Reason” as an independent authority (nowadays often indicated by 
a capital “R”).
Analogously the philosophical fallacy turns the products of moral reasoning (ends values 
and norms) into unconditional imperatives. It overemphasises the outcome o f practical 
inquiry and forgets its particular problematic context.
Results of inquiry often become theoretical fix-points. They leave their original context o f  
inquiry. Philosophers produce tables of categories, erect ontological systems that juxtapose 
subjects and objects, define rules for truth-preserving inferences, and identify warrants for 
our moral judgements. We often observe that these results o f inquiry take on a life of their 
own. Dewey claims that philosophers themselves did all they could to cement their 
conceptions and install them as lasting authorities. Kant formulated valuable ethical 
insights in the form of categorical imperatives, Descartes made the distinction between 
knower and the known a matter o f metaphysical rift between substances, and Leibniz saw 
in our ability to think and reason the “intellectus ipse. ”
Dewey is very cautious about rejecting frameworks of ethical thinking that his predecessors 
have developed. He never uses his sharp criticism against the architectonic sketch of their 
philosophical edifices. He targets only the wrong building sites for their erection or 
attempts at universalising claims in a “one size fits all” fashion. The charge against the 
philosophical fallacy is not that we rely on concepts, norms and distinctions as reference 
points in our thinking. Dewey admonishes that we forget how these came about through
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inquiry, and how they function in practice. He criticises us for throwing the ladder away 
after climbing the roof: we tend to disregard the process of inquiry that we used for 
reaching our conclusions. In particular we forget that this process was bound up with a 
situational context. As a result we tend to set an end to inquiry where in fact more inquiry 
would be needed. Once creative achievements o f moral imagination become 
institutionalised and ossified, they sometimes stand in the way o f finding solutions to new 
ills.
Let us consider the value of academic freedom as one example. The common understanding 
of this value follows a Humboldian ideal of “Einsamkeit und Freiheit” (solitude and 
freedom), which is to some degree the product of an active struggle for intellectual 
emancipation from a Prussian bureaucratic absolutism (“Obrigkeitsstaat”). I.e. in its 
original formulation it was an instrument meant to liberate scientists from the grip o f 
Prussian princes and their bureaucracies. Unfortunately this ideal has not been consciously 
adapted to new contexts where there are no longer absolute rulers in Europe. In 
contemporary contexts the threats to the independence o f science are much more diffuse. 
Political lobbies manipulate the scientific community as a whole by artificially 
manufacturing dissent on issues like anthropogenic climate change or the harmful 
consequences o f secondary smoking in order to undermine the political power o f  a unified 
scientific commonsense (cf. Oreskes 2004; Oreskes and Conway 2008). Creationists abuse 
critical epistemic standards of scientific caution against final judgements to promote 
ideological agendas proclaiming that “the jury is still out” (G.W. Bush) on whether the 
world was created at a time well after the domestication of the dog (Dawkins 2006). In 
conditions like these the value o f academic freedom is more relevant than ever, but in its 
traditional formulation as the ‘solitary freedom’ of an isolated academic in an ivory tower, 
it could be ill-adapted to the current world. The academic community might consider new 
institutions that interpret and actively protect academic freedom as a multi-tiered system 
that comprises the autonomy o f individual researchers as much as that o f groups, 
departments, educational institutions and the academic community as a whole. The 
Humboldian link to “solitude” may be abandoned in contemporary settings.
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For Dewey, norms and values and all meta-ethical distinctions are possibilities, not 
necessities. They are to be treated as highly elaborated instruments or resources that we 
must employ and adapt to particular problematic situations.
A kind of naturalistic fallacy
Utilitarianism
In the beginning o f “An Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation, ” 
Bentham (1996 [1780]) makes the famous claim:
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine 
what we shall do.”
Nietzsche laconically answered him in “Twilight of Idols”:
“Man does not strive for pleasure; only the Englishman does.”
Utilitarians take individual desires or preferences to be original and given premises in any 
public deliberation over value-judgements. In contradiction to Kant, they claim that reason 
itself cannot establish the ultimate grounds for any moral judgement. Public reasoning on 
value-judgements must always refer to directly witnessed private intuitions and preferences 
as their final arbiter. With regard to individual agency, decisionists hold that “values or 
norms guiding practical action cannot be justified with reason, i.e. through rational 
discourse and reflection, they represent, rather, subjective ‘decisions’ prior to rational 
activity” (Ulrich 1983 p.29, emphasis added).
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Hume
In an often quoted passage from his Treatise, Hume reasons that the subject matter of 
ethical judgements cannot be found in matters of fact. The wickedness o f a deed is always a 
property attached to a sentiment of the observer (Hume 2000 [1739/40]). Hume claims that 
“actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a 
contrariety to it” (Hume 2000 [1739/40] p.458). He thereby erects a high fence between 
moral premises and rational inquiry -  an obstacle Hume himself has difficulty overcoming 
in several later attempts.
Hume declares that reason cannot excrete imperatives or motivations to compete with our 
desires and passions. As far as this goes, Dewey agrees with him.
Hume goes further and says that passions will change in view of better judgement, by 
which he means that insight into the expected consequences of an activity redirects our 
passions. This sounds unexpectedly Deweyan, but misleadingly so. Hume is far from 
claiming that in reflecting upon the consequences of our actions, we would intelligently 
adapt our deepest dispositions or tastes. A rational critique o f our passions remains futile 
and impossible for Hume and the claim that judgement influences passion is limited to 
operative ends. It is merely another way o f saying that “who wants an end will also want 
the efficacious means to it” (Cohon 2004). Hume maintains that we can decide in favour of 
the destruction o f the world in order to avoid the scratching o f a finger (Hume 2000 
[1739/40] section 2.3.3.6). The faculty o f reason will stand by and watch without 
intervening.
“Hume’s law” prohibits inferring an imperative “ought” from a factual observational “is,” 
an inference that G.E. Moore later called the “naturalist fallacy.” In spite of that, Hume is 
an important precursor to naturalistic theories o f value. When Hume declared our 
experienced sentiments the sole evidential bases o f value-judgements, he was but a small 
step away from locating the root o f all value in observable natural phenomena. Only his 
subjectivist interpretation o f experienced sentiments as mental separates him from a 
naturalist conception o f value. ‘Tassions” are directly present in the inner senses o f each
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sentient agent. They are at least as real as the impressions we receive from the world 
around us in the form of perceptual raw material. By denying passions the status of “ideas” 
or representations, which we could use as material for reasonable arguments, Hume says 
we must think o f passion as an “original existence.” I.e. passions are “original facts and 
realities” (T3.1.1.9). Several o f above interpretations o f Hume’s ideas can be found in 
Cohon (2004).
The fallacy o f naturalism
Rationalists and transcendentalists tend to hypostasise the results or outcomes o f ethical 
inquiry. Utilitarians, on the other hand, give too much weight to the raw material o f moral 
inquiry: sensations o f desire, value-intuitions or the expressed prevalence of preferences. 
They prematurely declare sensations and attitudes as the rock bottom o f moral reasoning. 
(QC, Construction o f Good, LW4.206):
“The objection is that [utilitarianism] holds down value to objects antecedently enjoyed, 
apart from reference to the method by which they come into existence, it takes 
enjoyments which are causal because unregulated by intelligent operations to be values 
in and of themselves.”
What I call Dewey’s ‘kind o f naturalistic fallacy’ argument says that the mere presence o f a 
desire for an object allows no judgement as to the “desirability” o f the object; the mere 
experience o f satisfaction does not itself imply the “satisfactory” nature of a state (QC 
LW4.207):
“To say that something is enjoyed is to make a statement about a fact, something 
already in existence; it is not to judge the value of the fact.”
Dewey is far from re-erecting a fact-value dualism. The above quote does not present 
judgement as attributing value to independent realm o f facts, or facts as inherently value- 
neutral in the absence of such value judgements. Judgement is indeed constitutive for value, 
but the raw material o f “fact” is not value-neutral prior to an explicit value judgement; and,
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more importantly, a value judgement is not an external attribution that leaves matters o f  
fact aside. Value judgements are reflections on facts.
Dewey does not even leave it there: value judgements directly affect facts. We must 
remember Dewey’s transactional understanding o f nature to see how a value judgement 
establishes new meanings and constitutive relations within natural objects by altering 
experience. From a transactional perspective it would make no sense to distinguish between 
objects in experience and natural objects (see chapter 3). Therefore, adding meaning to a 
fact (as a value judgement does) means changing the fact because value judgements are not 
only about facts but are themselves transactions of nature.
How exactly we arrive at value judgements and what they mean within the context of our 
transactions will be discussed in the following sections.
Dewey critiques Bentham on the premise that pleasure and pain do not provide a strong 
enough basis on their own to support final moral judgements (Outlines of a Critical Theory 
of Ethics, EW3.251). Installed as “sovereigns” over our actions these hedonistic categories 
would yield only uneducated, impulsive, and ultimately detrimental behaviour.
In a modified way this criticism also applies to more contemporary micro-economic value 
theories that proclaim to rely on “revealed preferences” instead o f hedonistic categories like 
pleasure and pain. Also there preferences are treated as independent data. They are revealed 
through rational choice behaviour, but not understood as subject to the very same 
deliberative rationality that is supposed to reveal them.
Bernstein summarises Dewey’s critique o f a misguided moral empiricism as follows 
(Bernstein 1966 p.72):
“We don’t discover what we ought to do by merely gazing at things [intuitions or 
revealed preferences]. But critical examination o f experience is precisely the basis for
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articulating and justifying our obligations and intelligently deciding what we ought to 
do in specific situations.”
In fact, Dewey credits those very same rationalists that he had accused o f committing the 
“philosophical fallacy” with engaging in the necessary and painstaking task of moral 
inquiry. Our practical reasoning needs to secure the possibility of discriminating between 
praiseworthy and deplorable desires, pleasures and preferences. We need to be able to take 
a critical attitude towards our employed ends and purposes.
Value and “Valuation”
The distinction between the “enjoyed” and the “enjoyable,” the “desired” and the 
“desirable,” or the “satisfying” and the “satisfactory” seems to commit Dewey to a 
rationalist notion of value judgements because it requires some criteria beyond immediately 
experienced affection (cf. Joas 2000). How does Dewey harmonise this with his declared 
naturalist instrumentalism?
Dewey answers that we have no criteria for discriminating between “desired” and 
“desirable” which have their origin beyond experience, and more precisely beyond our 
instrumental efforts within problematic transactions. In the following section I will 
characterise how Dewey envisages an intelligent critique o f immediately present value 
intuitions without falling prey to those rationalist dreams that he disowned as 
“philosophical fallacies.”
How can we rationally define ends and purposes? Dewey seems to argue that all we need 
for forming value-judgements are the means provided by instrumental reason. How is this 
possible?
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The sensitivity of ends to instruments -  from prizing to appraisal
Enjoyment and value
Even though we cannot reduce value questions to maximising enjoyment or pleasure, 
Dewey takes the utilitarian view that enjoyment and fulfilment are indispensable reference 
points for all judgements of value (QC LW 4.213-14):
“There is no value except where there is satisfaction, but there have to be certain 
conditions fulfilled to transform a satisfaction into a value.”
He uses an analogy to explain why value does not equal felt enjoyment (QC, LW4.213- 
214):
“...[T]he notion that every object that happens to satisfy has an equal claim with every 
other to be a value is like supposing that every object o f perception has the same 
cognitive force as every other. There is no knowledge without perception; but objects 
perceived are known only when they are determined as consequences o f connective 
operations.”
The decision whether a stick in water is straight or bent must be placed in the context of 
general principles of light transmission in media of varying density. The decision whether 
an end is worth pursuing should be seen in the context o f ramified consequences, budget 
constraints and moral principles. Directly witnessed appetites, desires or preferences cannot 
serve as a bottom line for instrumental reasoning, just as direct perception cannot serve as a 
warrant for theoretical judgement.
Dewey claims that the critical process o f evaluating whether a desire is worth pursuing 
(value-judgement) is equivalent to estimating the consequences of acting upon it 
(instrumental-judgement).
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Utilitarians have rarely doubted that it is possible to establish subjectively how much we 
appreciate a good or a state of affairs quite independently from instrumental costs and the 
side-effects of their realisation. The very idea o f a “utility calculus” suggests that that our 
decisions depend on some expected balance o f pleasure and pain, which we establish by 
adding benefits and subtracting costs. Dewey opposes treating our original desires or 
“basic” inclinations as “lump forces, like the combustion or gravity o f old fashioned 
physical science...” (HNC MW14.104). For him, establishing the value of an option is not 
a matter of a vector addition, but involves an intelligent transformation o f the basic material 
(costs and benefits) that utilitarians want to sum up.
From impulses to desires
The first mistake utilitarians make is to identify the content of desire with some 
immediately given appetite, thereby neglecting the fact that forming a basic desire is a 
complicated process involving some degree o f instrumental intelligence. We are bom, 
according to Dewey, with vital impulses. When a toddler screams or stretches out for an 
object in its field o f vision it expresses an impulse, a feeling o f lack or an organic 
imbalance, but not a desire. To form a desire the child must have some notion o f the object 
as a means of reaching satisfaction. This translates as having a grasp o f the consequences 
that follow from obtaining and using the object.
Desires and beliefs as distinguished in the Folk-Model are not two disparate categories: 
even in its most primitive form a desire embodies instrumental beliefs.
From basic desires to mature preferences
Mature agents do not act immediately upon desires or impulses. They form ends or 
preferences over action strategies that may even frustrate some o f their immediate 
appetites. The formation o f such mature desires or preferences takes account o f three facts:
1. The agent meets resistance and inhibitions when she directly pursues her desires;
2. Conflicting dispositions and budget constraints restrict the agent’s possibilities;
3. The realisation of desired states may cause significant side-effects.
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Informed and matured ends may not be strategic concessions made in the light of 
constraints. When forming desires and purposes o f our action we can internalise these 
limitations. Only this idea is capable o f linking instrumental rationality to comprehensive 
forms of practical reasoning; (Theory o f Valuation p. 213):
“The object finally valued as an end to be reached is determined in its concrete makeup 
by appraisal o f existing conditions as means.”
By extension, the costs, sacrifices and the negative side-effects that occur when we pursue 
our ends do not remain external or juxtaposed to the expected value o f reaching those ends. 
We cannot separate the content o f our desires from the instrumental costs o f their 
realisation. (Anderson 2005):
“Practical reasoning does not merely generate new appraisals [judgements on what 
should be valued]; it transforms our prizings [our immediately experienced value- 
intuitions].”
However, instrumental considerations do not automatically lead to re-evaluations o f our 
ends or desires. E.g. if a waiter tells us that our favourite steak has run out we may order a 
pie instead, but may do so rather grudgingly, and without adapting our preferences to the 
new situation.
This observation normally holds only in the short run. Traditional decision-theory can 
neglect the impact of instrumental conditions on the formation o f our purposes only as long 
as it deals with reasonably small scale and short term decisions of individuals. However, 
before attempting to disprove this objection, we should ask whether it really casts any 
doubt on the position defended here. For this we must state more clearly what the purpose 
of this instrumental theory o f valuation is in the present context.
I would first like to state two caveats:
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1. I do not argue that we necessarily or always adapt our preferences in the light of 
instrumental conditions. Indeed, we often make compromises and adapt our 
instrumental strategies without significantly changing our preference structure.
2. As yet, the discussion says little about how we incorporate instrumental constraints 
into the formation of our preferences. In particular it does not imply that we would 
necessarily reduce our desire for things that are more costly or hard to reach.
Instead, my argument claims that preferences are formed in the context of 
instrumental constraints, and that “[ejffort, instead o f  something that comes after 
desire, is seen to be of the very essence of the tension involved in desire” (TV 
LW13.205).
The purpose of the discussion so far is the following: I intended to show that instrumental 
rationality functions as a form of substantial reason because it has the power to produce 
value judgements. By implication the notion of a purely formal instrumental rationality 
appears quite untenable. I make the modest claim that instrumental constraints and 
experience can provide material for the intelligent adaptations o f our preferences. 
Instrumental reason plays the role o f pointing at ramified consequences o f  possible 
conduct, thereby providing a measure for judging our ambitions in a particular context as 
good or poor.
Value
How can we be sure that instrumental considerations not only influence but also improve 
our preferences? And, subsequently, what makes us sure that an improvement in 
instrumental terms is equivalent to a moral achievement?
Dewey’s Theory of Valuation suggests that instrumental considerations o f costs and 
consequences are the measure for the value of our ends. How could Dewey be defended 
against the challenge that practical judgements based on instrumental reason are either 
immorally opportunistic or at best haphazard? If the only foundation for an intelligent 
adaptation o f ends is the reflection on possible consequences, what will prevent us from 
changing our ends and values according to the apparent possibilities o f making a gain or
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simply avoiding resistance? Evaluation o f preferences in terms of costs and consequences 
could soon become a matter of convenience. Dewey’s own writings seem to suggest the 
latter possibility at times (p.212):
. [E]nds are appraised in the same evaluations in which things as means are weighed. 
... But, when things are weighed as means toward that end, it is found that it will take 
too much time or too great expenditure o f energy to achieve it, or that, if it were 
attained, it would bring with it certain accompanying inconveniences and the promise 
of future troubles. It is then appraised and rejected as ‘bad’ end.”
A direct dependence of value-judgements on instrumental possibilities could make an agent 
vulnerable to a particular form of defeatism. In his famous work “The Fifth Discipline,” 
Peter Senge (1990) introduces an “archetype” entitled “eroding goals:” an agent, facing 
resistance to her plans and under-performing on her ambitions, starts setting more modest 
goals, which, in turn, has a corrosive impact on her performance. “Eroding goals” describes 
a downward spiral resulting from adjusting goals to the actual performance of our 
instrumental efforts. Dewey certainly did not have anything like this in mind when he made 
the process of setting and adjusting ends a function o f instrumental considerations. Instead 
he understood the adaptation o f ends with respect to instrumental conditions as an 
intelligent process. Thought experiments, like the one introduced by Senge, would play an 
important part in prudential instrumental reflections on our strategies and their 
consequences. Senge’s very contribution can function to guard a Deweyan inquirer against 
reducing ambitions in cases of underperformance.
The question of how exactly Dewey envisages employing instrumental reasoning 
intelligently cannot satisfactorily be answered here: the following two chapters on Dewey’s 
concepts of “imagination” and “inquiry” will clarify how instrumental reasoning allows 
incorporating the possibilities and expected consequences into present orientations, and 
how this method promises to improve our orientations and actions.
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A note on ends and instrumental reasons in planning
In traditional planning theory incrementalist schools came closest to acknowledging the 
plasticity and adaptiveness o f social preferences and common goals in view of instrumental 
conditions. However, they refused to challenge the traditional understanding o f  
instrumental rationality as a purely formal and insufficiently practical (substantial) method 
(Ulrich 1983). Instead o f demanding that a new conception o f rationality should integrate 
instrumental and normative inquiries, they interpreted the planning process as sequences of 
small-scale instrumental deliberations with subsequent phases o f re-evaluation o f purposes. 
This poses two problems:
1. Incrementalists do not satisfactorily explain on what rational grounds we should 
make adaptations o f purposes that will inform the next round of incremental 
deliberation (or they reject any rational basis for value judgements).
2. The incrementalist model leaves no room for more comprehensive public 
deliberations on common goods and on complex long term projects. Besides piece­
meal adaptations it permits no form of public rationality to establish shared value 
orientations and common goods. Incrementalists replace the hierarchical chain 
model4 with a one-link-at-a-time instrumental rationality, which (intentionally) 
prevents the formulation o f higher ranking goods and the formation o f projects to 
tackle social problems in a comprehensive manner.
Dewey rejects only the top-down structure o f the hierarchical chain model that takes high 
ranking ends as starting points and from there deduces intermediary ends and instrumental 
strategies. According to Dewey the formulation o f higher ranking value conceptions 
follows a bottom-up inquiry process. This process is not a separate value inquiry but a 
product of intelligent instrumental attempts to deal with a problematic situation.
4 See above in this chapter under the heading “Sequential hierarchy”.
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This approach resonates well with the frequently expressed intuition that planning starts 
with messy and insufficiently understood problematic situations rather than with clearly 
defined problems (cf. discussions of Checkland, Rosenhead and others in chapter 2).
Joas recounts Dewey understanding o f a reciprocal relationship between an action’s 
end and the means involved” (Joas 1996 p. 154):
“In other words, [Dewey] does not presuppose that the actor generally has a clear goal, 
and that it only remains to make the appropriate choice o f means. On the contrary, the 
goals of actions are usually relatively undefined, and only become more specific as a 
consequence of the decision to use particular means. Reciprocity o f goals and means 
therefore signifies the interaction of the choice o f means and the definition of goals.”
Normative principles and faithful pursuit
Instrumental morality
The reference to instrumental intelligence alone does not answer how Dewey copes with 
the challenge that suspects he opens the floodgates to moral arbitrariness, opportunism, and 
the degenerative tendencies of instrumental values and ambitions.
Dewey’s position regarding these challenges is complex: we do not have authoritative 
sources of moral laws or practical reason outside our practical experiences and instrumental 
efforts to solve problematic situations. However, we do not need such moral authorities in 
order to stop acting as egoists and adopt a socially conscious morality.
Two considerations suggest that moral and un-selfish dispositions can come to us quite 
naturally:
1. None of our preferences are originally given but instead require a formation process 
(e.g. though education or instrumental exploration o f our possibilities). Hence we 
cannot assume that we are egoists by default. In fact Dewey holds education, not
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natural human inclination, responsible for the level o f social and moral commitment 
we are willing to take. Dewey argues that our identity as individual selves is itself a 
function of a social formation process. In chapter 7, then, I will clarify that 
Deweyan rationality (intelligent inquiry into instrumental conditions) should be 
understood as a collective and communicative method of deliberation. This will 
help to rebut the common suspicion that pragmatist ethics would promote egoistic 
tendencies o f a capitalistic age, because they subordinate truth and moral values to 
instrumental and opportunistic possibilities (cf. Russell 1939; Ryan 1995 p. 175; see 
also critics discussed in Saito 2002)
2. Dewey understands moral principles not as constraints but as resources. Exploring 
the ramified consequences of our actions, and the principles we use to inform them, 
leads us to a deeper insight into the risks and benefits of responsible conduct. 
Transforming a narrow self-centred perspective into a disciplined and 
compassionate civic attitude can be the result of instrumental reflections. The 
individual knows that it depends on society for a context and condition for its self- 
realisation (“growth”). It therefore has a strong reason to consent to moral norms. 
How this consent actually translates into rational commitment will be discussed in 
the next two points.
Consequentialism and commitment
Even though the justification of moral imperatives gains considerable robustness through 
instrumental reflection, the application o f moral imperatives to concrete problematic 
situations remains always a matter of interpretation (cf. Ethics MW 5, and HNC MW14). 
The very gist of Dewey’s critique o f the “philosophical fallacy” was that no moral rule or 
imperative can be so general or categorical as to replace the need for a situated judgement 
of its applicability.
Does pragmatism advise to reconsider compliance to once accepted obligations and 
commitments whenever situations change? Why should agents stay faithful to moral norms 
and honour commitments? Take classical cooperation problems like contracts with 
subsequent compliance (cf. Hume 2000 [1739/40]). It is instrumentally expedient to agree
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that each party ought to contribute their share when their turn has come. But compliance 
after the other party had done their share is another question altogether. How paradoxical it 
seems to ground a norm on instrumental reasons alone and still demand compliance where 
this means violating instrumental intuitions. E.F. McClennen (2004) discussed this problem 
in his article “The rationality o f being guided by rules.” If we accepted the mere existence 
of a rule or a previous commitment to it as a sufficiently strong reason for our compliance, 
we may do little better than the famous Baron von Miinchhausen, who claimed that he had 
pulled himself out o f the mud by his own shock o f hair. (Bratman 1999 calls this fallacy 
"bootstrapping").
McClennen rejects such attempts in which the normative appeal o f a rule rests on the mere 
fact of a once taken commitment. He follows a strategy to secure the binding power o f  
norms and commitments that is highly compatible with my own project of a pragmatist 
revision o f rationality (McClennen 2004 p.232 italics added):
“... the rule counsels one to choose in a manner that will not always ensure that one 
chooses in accordance with the balance o f [instrumental] reasons that arise within the 
context o f a particular act o f choice. Thus accepting such a rule cannot be rationalized 
within the framework of a compatibilist position.... What drives the argument, then, is 
not the mere fact of making a commitment to the rule o f non-reconsideration, but the 
cost-saving consideration behind the making of that commitment.”
This is a claim in favour of a revised and holistic concept o f rationality: The moment we 
understand how normative decision-theory of individual act maximisation systematically 
leads us into strategic choice dilemmas that prevent us from reaping certain attainable fruits 
of cooperation, we do not simply change our strategy but our concept o f rational agency 
itself. Implicit in McClennen’s conclusion is the commitment that whatever definition we 
may find for instrumental rationality, it cannot compromise the idea that rationality is, at its 
best, a success promoting norm. In the case of resolute compliance, the “cost-saving 
consideration” suggests that people who have the ability to cooperate based on mutual trust 
and reciprocal compliance will systematically realise benefits that single act maximisers
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forfeit. This consideration on its own should be reason enough to attribute a higher level of 
rationality to rule-guided decision-procedures. McClennen would not go as far as Dewey 
did and claim that the body of norms that define rationality is itself a set o f methods or 
instruments that may be adapted as human environments and practices change. But for now 
his conclusion will suffice: Instrumental reason does not contradict the commitment to 
principles and resolute rule-guided choice. A forteriori, Dewey’s commitment to 
instrumentalism does not make him a solicitor of opportunism or moral myopia.
Norms and instruments
The cognitive scientist Francesco Varela (1999) claims that “...we acquire our ethical 
behaviour in much the same way we acquire all other modes o f behaviour” (p.24); a view 
also endorsed in Gigerenzer’s (2007) book “Gut Feelings.”
Dewey’s instrumental ethics does not yield a morality of cold calculations and it abhors 
rigid instrumental rules and procedures. Varela’s book, “Ethical Knowledge,” develops a 
concept o f “ethical expertise” that clarifies much of Dewey’s thinking without ever 
referring to his work. Commenting on the classical Chinese philosopher Mencius instead, 
he explains (p.31):
“... intelligence should guide our actions, but in harmony with the texture o f the 
situation at hand, not in accordance with a set of rules or procedures.”
This much I explained above in my discussion o f the “philosophical fallacy” already. 
Varela adds that a truly moral agent will not apply moral rules after calculating the total 
consequences o f acting according to them. Moral rules and norms do not remain external 
options. Ethical learning involves internalising moral precepts into our dispositions and 
habits (Varela 1999 p.30):
“...[L]ike an expert embodies his knowledge; the wise man is ethical ... his actions 
arise from inclinations that his disposition produces in response to specific situations.”
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Dewey sees the end o f ethical inquiry as the formation o f moral habits and dispositions, and 
not merely as finding instrumental fixes to individual situations (cf HNC, MW14).
One dilemma arises from this notion in conjunction with Dewey’s idea that the application 
o f a norm is never a matter o f course, but always demands a situated judgement. Either we 
apply normative rules habitually, in which case we do not inquire into the particular 
instrumental conditions o f a situation, or we deliberate consciously on the pros and cons 
and consequences of applying a rule, without following internalised habits.
Again Varela offers the best explanation of the Deweyan position. It follows from calling 
the moral agent an “ethical expert” rather than a creature of habit. He sees the “middle way 
between spontaneity and rational calculation” (p.31) as the ability to act spontaneously 
upon recognising or identifying a situation. Here identifying means more than judging its 
conformance with a list of criteria that make a rule applicable. We must grasp the particular 
quality and character o f a situation and its “correspondences and affinities” (Varela 1999 
p.28) in order to act spontaneously in the right way. Varela concludes (p.29):
“For the truly virtuous then, moral judgement that results in immediate and spontaneous 
moral action is not different from true description.”
This convergence between epistemic and ethical forms of orientation is an essential 
conclusion in my thesis. It first emerged in the previous chapter while discussing the 
practical character of all epistemic categories. I have pursued it throughout the present 
review of the idea that instrumental reasoning has an irreducibly ethical character.
How can we distinguish spontaneous acts that spring from moral dispositions and ethical 
expertise from a mechanical following of ossified rules? Varela answers that we are able to 
analyse and explain the instrumental point o f our decisions ex post actu, i.e. we can 
“reconstruct the intelligent awareness that justifies the action” (Varela 1999 p.32).
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Dewey does not spend much time arguing in favour o f particular items o f individual moral 
conduct or dispositions. Instead he emphasises the importance o f improving the social 
organisation o f moral inquiry. Crucial for this is the design o f education- and civil society 
institutions (Anderson 2005), which will be addressed in later chapters.
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Ends in Action
The question of whether Dewey’s reciprocal means-ends model allows for a committed 
pursuit o f strategies must not only concern ethicists. If ends are under constant revision, 
practitioners and planners face enormous problems, particularly in the realisation o f  very 
complicated technical projects.
The Scottish Parliament Building was inaugurated in October 2004, after seven years o f  
planning and construction. Its costs amounted to the famous sum of £430 million, still 
excluding an estimated £40 million to resolve subsequent problems. With this figure the 
Scottish Parliament exceeded its original budget o f £55 million (from July 1998) by 
approximately 415 million pounds.
The Guardian quotes David Lewis, an engineer and expert witness, as saying that “delays 
and price rises.. .were caused by a lack o f control over the design, late delivery o f drawings 
by the architects, the sheer complexity o f the building and ever-increasing anti-terrorist 
measures.” Lewis said that “it was not clear who was responsible for controlling the design 
process.” Enric Miralles, the architect in charge of the project, died during construction, but 
it is said that he added changes to the design right until his death (Glancey 2004). The 
contractors, the Scottish Parliament and the governing bodies in charge also requested 
changes in the original design. For example, the size o f the building was increased by 47% 
and expensive security measures were added. If we believe the Wikipedia entry from 28 
April 2006 entitled “Scottish Parliament Building,” then “by May 2004 the architects had 
issued around 18,000 orders for changes in the design.”
This public construction project may give a taste for just how awry planning can go if the 
definition of an end is kept free floating and adjustable during the planning process. 
Nevertheless it would be wrong to use this example against Dewey’s theory which allows 
ends to evolve during planning processes. It is evident that a very important precept of John 
Dewey’s theory on the revision o f ends had been flagrantly violated, namely that ends
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should be adapted in the light o f  instrumental conditions. The flaw was precisely that 
consideration o f  the means had either no or too little influence on adaptations o f the plan- 
design.
Moreover, according to Lord Fraser’s report, one of the main shortcomings in the planning 
process was “the insistence on a rigid programme. Officials decided that rapid delivery o f  
the new building was to be the priority, but that quality should be maintained. It was 
therefore inevitable that the cost would suffer” (Wikipedia 2006, as just quoted). This 
“rigid programme” is what Dewey specifically objects to because it fixes goal-dimensions, 
and thereby makes it impossible to make reasonable adjustments to a project in light of 
spiralling costs.
On the other hand there is surely a point to be made in favour o f some stamina in the 
persecution o f once adopted goals. Particularly in complicated long term planning 
enterprises like construction projects, many modular contributions have to be assembled 
and a large number of processes coordinated. If we think o f the example of building a 
bridge, all these processes and contributions can only be coordinated with reference to an 
envisaged and precisely defined end state. The goal (a serviceable suspension bridge) must 
be kept exactly the same in its design if  we want the ordered components and materials to 
fit together.
How then are ends affirmed and what role do they play in action other than rendering 
themselves flexible and adaptable to changing conditions?
Ends and ending points
Separating instrumental rationality from the ethical problem o f defining ends is an 
anathema for Dewey because it isolates one ultimate value premise from the creative 
process o f valuation that takes place within action and deliberation. For Dewey this idea 
makes sense neither as an empirical-explanatory tool nor as a logical demand. However, we 
do need a point at which to bring our deliberation to an end. Without this we would be
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trapped in infinite regresses, like children who rebel against a parental decree by requesting 
ever more teleological justifications: ‘Why must I go to school? Why do I have to learn 
something? Why do I have to cater for myself when I grow up?’
As Mitchell states, commenting on Dewey, “We bring deliberation to a stop by an 
impulsive, but enlightened, choice” (Mitchell 1945 p. 293). The question is therefore what 
role and status should we give those emphatic ending points of means-ends chains in our 
justifications?
Dewey himself states (TV LW13.231):
“... there is no end which is not in turn a means, foresight has no place at which it can 
stop, and no end-in-view can be formed except by the most arbitrary o f acts...”
He then explains (TV LW13.231):
“A value is final in the sense that it presents the conclusion of a process o f analytic 
appraisals of conditions operating in a concrete case, the conditions including impulses 
and desires on one side and external conditions on the other.. .value that is correlated 
with the last desire formed in the process o f valuation is, tautologically, ultimate for 
that particular situation... There is a fundamental difference between a final property or 
a quality o f finality.”
What Dewey offers is more than an arbitrary commitment to break the regress o f ever 
possible ends re-evaluation: we neither adopt nor adapt ends merely because it is possible 
to do so. As discussed earlier, deliberating over ends and purposes is embedded in the 
context o f particular problematic situations. Ends that we formulate are always meant to be 
steps toward the resolution of such problematic situations. Ends are only good in so far as 
they help to coordinate action. The criterion is therefore not whether an end will lead 
toward a defined sate of satisfaction, but whether the end is formed so as to deal with some 
imbalance or dissonance in our habitual coordination; (TV LW13.232):
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“The ‘value’ of different ends that suggest themselves is estimated or measured by the 
capacity they exhibit to guide action in making good, satisfying, in its literal sense, 
existing lacks.”
It is therefore o f great importance that Dewey’s categories of “lack,” “inhibition,” 
“indeterminate” or “problematic situation” cannot be translated into the positive 
formulation o f an end. This follows from the idea that ends are only the creative products 
o f deliberation and valuation processes. I will explore this idea more thoroughly in the 
chapter entitled “Situation and Inquiry.” We can say that defining a problem or an end is 
the same as “creating a problem,” which is far from “creating a problematic situation”! 
Ends are means that help define a predicament and coordinate steps toward its resolution by 
creating problems that can be dealt with out of “indeterminate situations.” The setting of 
ends thereby receive a distinctly functional interpretation.
Needs, growth and functions
Such a functional interpretation o f ends is quite problematic. A function is a trait that seems 
to presuppose a system with certain needs or requirements that the function serves to 
maintain. The question is therefore what are these system “purposes” or “needs” which 
ends are there to serve? N.B. we have just defended the claim that reflection on the way our 
ends and dispositions perform within the context o f a situation is all we have as a 
foundation for their normative appeal. This led to the conclusion that ends cannot have their 
normative appeal from goods or moral principles beyond their functioning in concrete 
situations. However, if ends function in some way as enabling conditions, what exactly do 
they enable? (RP MW 12.181):
“The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of 
transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring 
process o f perfection, maturing refining is the aim o f  living. Honesty, industry, 
temperance, justice, like health, wealth, and learning, are not goods to be possessed as
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they would be if  they expressed fixed ends to be attained. They are directions of change 
in the quality o f experience. Growth itself is the only moral ‘end.
Dewey’s concept of “growth” may sound like a placeholder for an ultimate purpose that 
allows us to distinguish good functional ends and purposes from bad ends and 
malfunctions. But it would be a mistake to use growth as a makeshift highest value 
principle compatible with a first premise in the hierarchical chain model of deductive 
instrumental reasoning. “Growth” for Dewey is not a purpose behind function o f ends. 
What defines “growth” as a purpose is itself the ability to adapt and adjust and coordinate 
“functionings”5 within changing situations. I.e. growth is not a purpose behind functions 
but is defined in terms of those functions themselves. (Psychology, EW 2.318):
“Each end is referable to a higher end, which, stated in most general form, is self- 
realisation [a term that Dewey later drops in favour of “growth”]. All acts are means to 
[the] self for its own realization; yet it must be remembered that this self-realization is 
not a last term over and beyond the means, but is only the organized harmonious system 
of means. It is means taken in their wholeness.”
Joas likens Dewey’s disavowal o f a means-ends scheme that leads up to ultimate purposes 
to a conceptual distinction that Heidegger introduced in his analysis o f our relationship to 
death (Joas 1996 p. 156):
“Heidegger argues that we do not rush from one action to the next in order to reach the 
goal we have been striving for at the end o f our lives. If we wish to understand our 
relationship to ourselves and to our lives as a whole we need to invoke categories of a 
totally different nature, categories which Heidegger defines as ‘for the sake o f ,  as 
opposed to ‘in order to’[6J. ..”
5 A Deweyan concept which A.K. Sen later uses and which already in Dewey’s work bears great similarity 
with Sen’s “capabilities.”
6 “\Jm-willen” rather than “um-zu..”
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This, however, does not answer a number o f questions: what exactly is the position o f  ends 
in action? Does Dewey’s theory not allow us to see ends as reached, fulfilled, achieved, or 
enjoyed end-states of our actions? People work assiduously hard to reach their goals, and it 
would be patronising to say that their goals have no meaning anymore once they are 
achieved. This would imply that the end states of people’s aspirations are illusory. A less 
patronising version o f this idea may be found in East Asian wisdom that “the way is the 
goal.”
At this point it is helpful to look at a conceptual distinction that Dewey introduces within 
our talk about ends. When we say “end” we can mean either of two things:
1. Ends as termini o f our action are states achieved and enjoyed.
2. Ends-in-view, in contrast, are aims and goals as we adopt them within the course of 
our actions.
This distinction is fundamental for understanding Dewey’s agency theory.
Ends as termini
“Consummatory experiences” are those phases of action where we experience “direct 
appreciative enjoyment” (EN LW1.73). Dewey identifies these as the successfully achieved 
ends of labour and effort. Of course this does not leave him in the proximity of utilitarians, 
who he accuses of depreciating the means for reaching the state o f enjoyment and thereby 
betraying the value of the end as well (cf. ’’Means and Ends” and QC LW4.215).
Dewey’s agency theory allows for no separation o f employed means and enjoyed 
consummatory experience. The latter are sufficiently defined as the coordinated use of 
instruments. What distinguishes work from leisure and effort from achievement is not that 
the former employ instruments to cause some self-sufficient states in consequence (as 
Utilitarians would hold). We have already discussed the transactive nature of all experience 
(cf. chapter 3), and we will continue to do so in the chapter 6: Consummatory experience is 
not a private mental state but a form o f transaction in which agent and environment are
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effortlessly unified and means and instruments are free from tensions and inhibitions; (TV 
LW13.234):
“The attained end or consequence is always an organization o f activities... The form or 
an attained end is always the same: an adequate coordination.”
Consummatory experience, the end o f all labour and effort, is itself a harmonious, enjoyed, 
and instrumental activity.
However, realised ends (“ends as termini”) are not exhausted by the immediacy of 
consummatory experiences. Our labour produces objects and conditions that we call the 
products of our efforts. Dewey frequently uses the example o f building a house: the end as 
the terminus of effort and construction is not merely enjoyment, but an edifice.
The building itself is an enabling condition for further activities, such as dwelling, cooking, 
and raising children (HNC MW 14.184). As an object it never leaves the context of  
instrumental activity. What defines a house as an end is the same thing that defines it as an 
enabling condition or a means for further activity. The object as an end must be 
reinterpreted as a factor to facilitate further transactions. In this respect, instrumental and 
terminal categories also coincide with each other in Dewey’s work.
Ends-in-view
Ends that guide our planning, deliberating, and acting are very different from ends as the 
achieved “termini.” Dewey gives the name “ends-in-view” to those guiding ideas that are 
present in our actions.
One of the most pervasive failings o f traditional agency theory is that it does not make this 
distinction, or that it reduces the distinction between ends attained and ends-in-view to the 
difference between a future state anticipated and its realisation after successful 
instrumental action. For Dewey the difference between ends attained and ends-in-view is 
not the one between an idea about the future and the realisation o f this idea.
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Ends-in-view, goals, and plans have their entire existence in the present. It is trivial to say 
that a plan is only an idea that we have well before we realise any part o f it. Dewey 
contends that the object of a plan, end or goal is a thing o f the present, or better yet o f a 
current context of activity. This means that the content of a plan is not adequately 
characterised as a vision of the future. Although the anticipation of a future state may be the 
way that a goal becomes intelligible to us, Dewey maintains that (EN LW1.280)
“[t]he end-in-view is a plan which is contemporaneously operative in selecting and
arranging materials.”
He defines the meaning of an event or object as something that reaches beyond the 
immediacy o f qualitative experience (present in senses or current transactions). Meanings 
point to the future in an “operative” sense. If current objects have meaning, they refer to 
subsequent acts and coordinations.7 The meaning o f an aspired end or plan refers to a 
coordination of subsequent action. The idea of an end-state gives coherence to such 
coordination efforts in the present, or in Dewey’s own words, “[t]he content o f an end as an 
object held in view is ... methodological1 (TV234, my italics). In this precise sense ends-in- 
view have their object (meaning) not in future ideal-states: they do not reach out for 
realised end-states, but only use ideals to coordinate much more immediate action; (Means 
and Ends, LW13.351):
“The end in view is thus itself a means for directing action.”
To understand the role o f ends in our actions we must therefore see how ends-in-view 
function, and not succumb to the temptation o f  identifying their meaning for the agent with 
distant scenarios or castles in the clouds.
71 discussed Dewey’s concept of meaning in more detail in Chapter 3.
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Ends and their functions
How, then, do ends-in-view function? I suggest distinguishing between four types of 
contributions that ends-in-view make to the success o f our action. This list is not meant to 
be exhaustive and is only partly based on Dewey’s own thought.
Selection and reduction of complexity
As I argued earlier, we cannot presuppose defined ends at the outset o f our action and 
deliberation processes. We often begin our actions before we know what we want to do. 
Situations do not come neatly ordered into ‘things to do’ and ‘means with which to do 
them.’ We have to create these labels ourselves by and through our agency. As said earlier, 
“.. .men did not begin to shoot because there were ready-made targets to aim at. They made 
thing into targets by shooting at them...” (HNC MW14.159).
‘Unified’ situations are settled and marked by a high degree o f complexity: They 
accommodate all possible influences and favour or reject none. The introduction o f a 
difference between means and ends reduces this complexity. Out o f the vast number of 
consequences that each motion has, it singles out those that are of interest and creates one 
salient perspective that focuses on a goal. In his dissertation on Dewey’s concept of  
experience, Bemd Goetz writes that the agent has to (Goetz 1970 p. 192, my translation)
“...develop means-ends relations out of an infinite space o f possibilities that help him 
to relate and mediate past and future, memory and purposes...”
This selection- or complexity-reduction function o f Dewey’s ends-in-view overlaps with 
some aspects of Nicklas Luhmann’s theory (Luhmann 1968 p.21, my translation, emphasis 
added):
“If we interpret agency as causal process, we must understand the point at which we 
make a choice as a reduction of the infinity o f possibilities to one single option or 
outcome... also the setting o f ends and the formulation o f values may be explained in
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this functional perspective. They serve to selectively stabilise a narrow definition of  
relevant causes and effects.”
Luhmann claims that organisations and administrations cannot be explained or understood 
by stating purposes as their raison d ’etre. Organisations do not exist in order to serve 
purposes. In his structural-functionalist framework Luhmann seeks to understand the 
“coding” o f administrative processes in means-ends chains as a function of self­
maintenance that organised systems produce in order to create and reproduce their “auto- 
poetic” organisation. Luhmann’s disembodied social systems, which exist only as self- 
referential structures of communication to which even brains and minds count as 
“environment,” may appear esoteric to a pragmatic naturalist. His insight about the function 
of ends and purposes in organisations, however, is valuable. It helps us understand and de­
mask the self-perpetuating tendencies of bureaucratic realities. It also provides a very dense
Q
theoretical groundwork for a functional understanding o f ends in action.
Interpretation and intelligibility
In the above-referenced contribution, Joas claims that accounts of action do not per se 
proceed along the lines of the means-ends scheme. Means and ends are ways in which we 
interpret our situations and explain our own actions to ourselves and to others. These 
interpretations are not without alternatives (cf. Joas 1996 p. 148).
Ends can confer intelligibility to our actions, which is a property that closely relates to their 
organising function (see below). Ends create coherence in a series o f interrelated acts. We 
can then understand these often diverse acts as a consistent system guided by one purpose. 
Actions as different as washing carrots, boiling potatoes, applying lipstick and laying the 
table make sense when seen in the light of preparing for a dinner party.
8 See also Joas (1996, pp. 149-153) for a discussion of Luhmann in the context of Dewey’ theory of ends and 
purposes.
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Organising function
The change o f perspective from ends as idealised future states to ends-in-view as working, 
operating factors within an action has permeated this entire chapter. It will therefore be 
enough at this point to characterise this eminently important organising function in a short 
quote from Dewey’s Theory of Valuation (TV LW13.234):
“The end-in-view is that particular activity [sic!] which operates as a coordinating factor 
of all other sub-activities involved. Recognition of the end as a coordination or unified 
organization of activities, and o f the end-in-view as the special activity which is the 
means of effecting this coordination, does away with any appearance o f [the] paradox 
that seems to be attached to the idea of a temporal continuum of activities in which each 
successive stage is equally end and means.”
Stabilising function andflexibility
An end-in-view is a function, not a precondition, of action. Revising an end does not 
necessarily mean giving up on one’s course of action or starting another one. It can be the 
logical continuation o f one agency process.
For an adequate organisation o f coordination it is important to strike the right balance 
between goal-pursuit and goal-adjustment. Understanding ends in their functional role 
within agency makes it easier to strike this balance; ends are only as good as the functions 
they fulfil, and reasonable adjustment is necessary if ends are not able to organise and 
coordinate agency. Pursuit of an end or vision against all odds can lead to the most 
astonishing human achievements. Werner Herzog’s film “Fitzcarraldo” tells the story o f  
carrying an entire opera house into the Amazon jungle. And the story o f the making of this 
film is just as impressive as the story that the film itself tells. There are, however, other 
cases where the inflexibility of adapting goals to possibilities led to catastrophe. Mao’s 
great leap to reach the end-state o f communism within five years, or the English-French 
joint venture of building the Concord (Hall 1981) are examples o f situations where ends 
remained fixed despite their inability to organise and coordinate human behaviour.
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Conclusion
This chapter challenges the view that we can separate our concern about ultimate ends and 
final purposes from technical or instrumental considerations. It counters the thesis that 
instrumental rationality can be understood as a moral-free zone, or as an algorithmic 
template that defines an efficient strategy for any pair o f ends and available means. Here I 
challenged the understanding o f a morally blind instrumental rationality by asking 
questions like where do final ends come from, and how do the origins o f final purposes 
relate to their instrumental conditions.
Following Dewey, I argued that ultimate purposes are pretentious or meaningless if 
understood separately from concrete situational and instrumental conditions. I discussed 
Dewey’s view o f the formation of ends, in which final purposes are more than contingently 
related to instrumental considerations. Ultimate purposes and the ends we embrace to reach 
them do not descend from a Mount Sinai (TV LW13.219), nor are they given by direct 
intuition. Instead they rely on judgements made in the view of instrumental experience.
This insight was the touchstone that broke down the separation between means and ends as 
distinct and unbridgeable categories (P EW2.318)
“It is evident that the end is not something intrinsically different from the means; it is 
the means taken as a harmoniously manifested whole. The means, on the other hand, 
are something more than precedents to an end. The first means, the plans, are only the 
end in its simplest, most immediate form, and the next means are an expansion of this, 
while the final means are identical with the end. When we look at the act as a realized 
whole, we call it end, when we look at it in process o f realization, partially made our, 
we call it means. But the action o f the intellect is requisite to analyze the end, the 
whole, into its means, the component factors.”
Is it enough to show ends as sensitive to instrumental considerations and to determine the 
exact position o f ends and evaluations as constitutive parts of unfolding courses o f agency
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to reject the idea of a pure instrumental rationality? Can we conclude that no mode of 
reasoning that operates independently o f the moral content o f its input variables is possible? 
This conclusion seems likely at the present point, but we will have to wait for the following 
chapter to understand it fully.
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Part III
Intelligence: Developing Deweyan Concept of Rationality
Chapter 5: Imagination in the Deliberation Process
...[OJnly imaginative vision elicits the possibilities 
that are interwoven within the texture o f the actual
John Dewey1
Introduction
The history o f occidental philosophy has left the human soul deeply cut and bruised, if not 
forever parted. In the beginnings o f our common record Plato severed the soul from the 
body and sliced it into three domains. He did so with the intent of erecting a stable 
hierarchy between all resulting pieces, whereby the soulless body had to take potluck with 
the lowest rank. Faculties that were often translated as “reason,” “courage,” and “appetites” 
described the remaining domains o f the soul. As Plato himself proposed, his incisions had 
momentous consequences beyond our understanding o f the human psyche. These affected 
the way economic and political life was construed as suspended in permanent “natural” 
hierarchies. It also left a lasting imprint on our understanding o f rational deliberation in 
both individual and political decision processes. Aristotle tried to remedy Plato’s separation 
of soul and body (with little success when judged by the influence on the subsequent 
commonsense), yet he remained loyal to Plato’s tripartite division between an appetitive 
(vegetative/nutritional), a spirited/attitudinal, and a reflective rational faculty o f the soul.
This separation o f human mental and psychological faculties into emotive and 
rational/cognitive segments was exacerbated by modem day philosophers. Kant 
distinguished human rational autonomy from all volitional impulses and appetitive factors. 
Hume (2000 [1739/40]) denied passions access to higher forms o f (instrumental)
1 AE, LW10.348
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deliberation, with the consequence that even his artifice o f reason being “the slave o f  
passions” did nothing to overturn the hierarchy between rational and emotional capacities. 
Under Hume’s hand, rationality finally received its definition as “instrumental” and 
“hypothetical” reasoning, which to the present day provides the most widespread 
understanding of what constitutes excellence in professional strategy building and decision­
making.
As Dewey emphasised, all distinctions we make are distinctions we make: they represent 
possibilities, not necessities which ‘carve the human nature at its joints’ (using Plato’s 
metaphor); being tools for structuring experience and facilitating deliberation and action 
processes (not representations of psychological facts), these distinctions must be adapted to 
the particular contexts and tasks at hand, or can, if the circumstances demand, be 
overturned altogether.
Dewey devoted much o f his earliest published work (“Psychology”) to the question o f what 
constitutes the will and how best to account for active deliberation processes. He argued 
that
“The will (as far as physical control is concerned) is the body, so far as this is organized 
so as to be capable of performing certain specific and complex acts.” (P, EW 2.328)
One o f his great influences at that point of his career was the philosopher T.H. Green, who 
wrote (Green 1883 p. 158):
“Will is ... equally and indistinguishable desire and thought -  not however mere desire 
or mere thought. ... but desire and thought as they are involved in the direction o f a 
self-distinguishing and self-seeking subject to the realization o f an idea... The will is 
simply the man, Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is.”
However, turning categories that were only invented as tools for organising experience and 
coordinating action into rigid schisms seems like the smaller o f two sacrileges. The
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‘original sin’ was committed by an uncompromising super-ordination o f analytic, deductive 
or calculating forms o f rationality over other psychological capacities (like intuition, 
aesthetic comprehension, empathy or lateral modes of thinking). This has left us with a 
stunted image o f deliberation, and with a definition o f the standards of excellence in 
decision-making that fails to do justice to the whole spectrum of human faculties. 
Traditional accounts of rationality often fail to foster human creativity and potentials, 
particularly when faced with complex problem situations, o f which the current world holds 
plenty. Historically the concepts of ‘rationality’ and ‘creativity’ were often used as 
antonyms (cf. Joas 1996; Schipper 2001).
Perhaps it is time to re-think the distinctions between rational-analytic and other forms o f  
deliberative intelligence. In the present contribution I aim to show what a revision of  
intelligent deliberation would look like if it were to integrate other psychological capacities. 
This is not equivalent to asking about the intelligence o f emotions, passions or intuitions. I 
do not investigate how emotions can contribute to rational deliberation as an intelligent 
resource. The purpose here is to cast out a pragmatist notion or framework of deliberation 
which is able to accommodate the category of emotion as a constitutive aspect. It aims, in 
short, to create room for emotion and other neglected categories within the core definition 
of deliberative rational intelligence.
This transformation is bom out of necessity rather than choice. The possibility o f making a 
deductive and purely formal instrumental rationality the final arbiter of intelligent 
deliberation has been shattered by John Dewey. But his critique of Humean instrumental 
rationality and agency has created a gap, which the concept o f “imagination” is meant to 
close. If ‘ends’ and ‘means’ were really the products rather than pre-conditions of (creative) 
agency, what can we then mean by choosing rationally? I.e. what is left to deliberate with?
This chapter begins by outlining a revised notion of a creative, self- forming, and self- 
legislating intelligence that draws upon the entire spectrum o f human psychological 
capacities, whereby it uses John Dewey as its key witness. In a second part the concept of 
“imagination” will be discussed in its projective, temporally complex, aesthetic, intuitive
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legislative, narrative, affective and creative dimensions, as a foundation for a new account 
of deliberative excellence.
A Question
The previous two chapters investigated Dewey’s invaluable contribution to agency theory, 
which can be read as a direct critique or even a reversal o f the Humean Folk-Model. While 
the latter assumes “resources” and “guides” (or means and ends) as causal or logical 
antecedents in the formation o f agency, Dewey understand such distinctions as purely 
instrumental operations the agent performs during her course o f  agency. The logic o f 
deliberate agency for Dewey follows a pattern o f inquiry (cf. chapter 6) rather than a 
deduction from such a pair o f premises. In reversal o f the Folk-Model, the positions o f 
“resources” and “guides” within Dewey’s agency model would have to be visualised as 
below.
Action & 
Deliberation
Guides
Resources
Figure 5.1 Dewey’s reversal of the Folk-Model
This conclusion was prepared and explained during the previous two chapters. Dewey’s 
theory helps us to understand better the formation of our instrumental cognitions and value- 
orientations. It also accounts for the position o f  means and ends within unfolding human 
agency. In particular it identifies the functional character o f all ends and value propositions. 
For Dewey, rational deliberation is a self-forming creative process o f inquiry rather than a 
mechanical form of deduction from premises. Yet, what will distinguish deliberation as
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rational or intelligent, if we can neither rely on instrumental calculations from means and 
ends premises, nor on other given normative fix-points? Is deliberation doomed to be 
arbitrary or are there other resources that an intelligent process could draw upon in the 
absence of clearly defined preference- and constraint sets?
Dewey’s conception o f evolving purposes poses new problems which appear even more 
virulent than those o f a reductive instrumental ideal o f  rationality. How  do we evaluate our 
ends? What distinguishes a good adaptation from a bad one? Dewey claims that even moral 
rules and normative principles have no authoritative claim on their own, save that agents 
understand and judge concrete situations as cases where such norms and principles find 
application (cf. E rev §5, LW 7). If we are at liberty to employ or reject normative 
philosophical frameworks according to the needs and demands o f a situation, what means 
do we have forjudging whether or not a particular principle finds application? The previous 
chapter suggested that we evaluate ends in view o f instrumental possibilities and 
constraints.
The danger is that our reasoning loses contours where we allow for too many reciprocal 
relationships and dependencies between means and ends, norms and situations, or agents 
and transactions.
It is not a blind trial and error procedure that Dewey advocates, but the “method o f  
intelligence” -  a method capable of understanding the consequences and ramifications o f  
our conduct, and incorporating these insights into the organisation o f our activity. This 
capacity is insufficiently defined as long as it remains mysterious just how the 
understanding o f consequences is to be reached and how it is incorporated into our actions.
The problem can be narrowed down to the question: how can deliberation rationally and 
intelligently proceed where means and ends are no longer strictly divided categories, where 
instead inquiry into means is the method of developing ends? What is rational or intelligent 
deliberation if its measure is not reaching a preordained goal under conditions of given 
means and budgetary constraints?
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The rest of this chapter will be divided into two parts. First, I will introduce Dewey’s 
project o f defining a form of deliberative intelligence which is markedly different from 
Humean or “calculating” models of instrumental rationality. This serves to trace 
systematically what position “imagination” should occupy within rational deliberation. I 
will then attempt a comprehensive faceted definition of this notion of “imagination.”
Dewey’s Argument
The “calculating” model
Jon Elster, one of the most notable contemporary writers on deliberative rationality in the 
Humean tradition, characterises the structure of rational agency with the following scheme 
(Elster 1991; 1996; 2006):
Action
Cognitions <■ Desires
Evidence
Figure 5.2: Elster’s model of deliberative rationality
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A pair o f cognitions and desires allows instrumental judgements about courses o f action (as 
in Figure 1.1). The severed link between desires and cognitions reflects Hume’s argument 
that reason can only be “the servant of passions” if is allowed to work uninhibited by 
emotions, passions or desires. We would otherwise risk committing fallacies like “wishful 
thinking,” “excess o f will,” hasty action by feelings of “urgency,” or “impatient” decisions 
in favour of immediate rather than deferred gratification.2 Elster outlines the rational model 
as one which remains undistorted by direct emotional causation on beliefs, reasoning or 
action (Elster 2006). Frits Schipper calls this the “algorithmic” view of rationality 
(Schipper 2001), which Dewey coined the “calculating” model.
In the Humean model the link between “cognition” and “desire” should severed in both 
directions. This holds as long as we insist that an instrumental deliberation should conclude 
with an unambiguous rational judgement. The model relies on relatively stable desires or 
ends as a standard for an instrumentally rational judgement. If we relaxed this demand then 
instrumental rationality would potentially fall into a regress: instrumental deliberation 
would have to be repeated continuously, considering its own effect on its premises.
Dewey’s concern
Ironically Dewey begins his critique o f the Humean model with a distinctly Humean claim 
(cf. Hume 2000 [1739/40] particularly p.413). He says that only passions have the power to 
motivate our actions (Ethics revised LW 7.269):
“‘cold blooded’ thought may reach a correct conclusion, but if a person remains anti­
pathetic or indifferent to the consideration presented to him in a rational way, they will 
not stir him to act in accord with them.”
He specifies that only present impulses have the power to motivate action, and therefore 
deliberation cannot concern itself only with “remote, inaccessible and indeterminate
2 However, desires will legitimately initiate and motivate inquiry (the search for “evidence” to support our 
beliefs).
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results” (HNC MW 14.141). “The present, not the future, is ours” (MW 14.144). However, 
the “calculating model” seems to assume that arithmetic calculation of some future amount 
of gratification could constitute a motivational cause in the present by means o f reasoned 
anticipation. This clearly contradicts the insight that the presently merely anticipated 
quantity o f a future quality never has the power to motivate us now, unless it translates 
itself into a present quality. One may interpret this as the idea that the act o f anticipating 
not the anticipated future object alone is o f present quality.
For Dewey anticipation is not what gives rise to present impulses, because the latter are 
already present and active, even though they may be undirected, partly conflicting, and 
often misguided (HNC MW 14.134):3
“Choice is not the emergence of preference out o f indifference. It is the emergence o f a 
unified preference out of competing preferences.”
The consequence o f this idea is not necessarily a form of hedonism that yields only to 
immediate appetites. Deliberation is therefore not limited to determining which of our 
appetites is currently the strongest, in order to go for it. We can and should ponder the 
future consequences of present action in our deliberation. This, however, happens in a 
different vein than in the Humean “calculating” model (HNC, MW 14.143):
“...the object of foresight of consequences is not to predict the future. It is to ascertain 
the meaning o f present activities and to secure, so far as possible, a present activity with 
a unified meaning.”
This formulation needs explanation:
3 This does not contradict the fact that we also have phases of rest, or that sometimes a sudden stimulus will 
initiate a course of rapid activity. In his seminal contribution on the reflex arc concept in psychology Dewey 
shows that we are always co-authors of what we call a “stimulus” because “hearing” or “seeing” are 
perceptual activities. Perceiving the stimulus is indeed part of our response action. Dewey also emphasises 
that even rest is a form of activity which becomes only transformed through the stimulus.
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1. Deliberation tests out the “meanings” of our present impulses and intentions: Dewey 
says that by deliberating, we attempt to understand how a hypothetical situation would 
unfold if we acted upon one o f the conflicting sets of intentions. Dewey characterises this 
understanding o f deliberation as “imagination.”
2. Activity is “unified” for Dewey when our various impulses and intentions, directly and 
without conflict, give way to one coherent course o f action, i.e. when all our intentions 
build a working harmony. Often, however, we find that several o f our impulses and 
intentions contradict each other. For Dewey, this is the occasion to begin deliberation.
Deliberation as a continuous exercise
Deliberation is not about the comparison of two points in time, one in the present and the 
other in a hypothetically better future. It is therefore also not an attempt to describe a 
feasible path from the former to the latter, which a single judgement could fix and 
prescribe. For Dewey deliberation creates continuity from the present to the future. 
Deliberation reaches out by hypothetically following present tendencies and impulses and 
observes their capacities to change our situation. In one word, present activities are not 
deduced from  the future, but the future will be (imaginatively) explored by investigating the 
present and its inherent meanings. Imagination is the human capacity to “give way, in our 
mind, to some impulse” (Ethics MW 5.293), and watch a hypothetical situation unfold.
Dewey embraces the consequence that we may never reach a point of decision, where given 
ends and instrumental considerations allow a judgement on what must be done to reach a 
prescribed future state (HNC MW14.144).
“Even the most comprehensive deliberation leading to the most momentous choice only 
fixes a disposition which has to be continuously applied in new and unforeseen 
conditions, re-adapted by future deliberations.”
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Imagination, even if it explores tendencies and future scenarios, remains concerned with the 
task of harmonising (adapting, transforming, coordinating) “confusions and uncertainty in 
present activity.” (HNC MW14.144)
Imagination and emotion in reason
What is imagination? I will spend most of the remaining chapter attempting to define and 
explore this complex concept. Often Dewey identifies deliberation with imagination; I 
prefer to treat imagination a central aspect of deliberation.4 We go beyond our initial 
impulses by making active thought experiments. We continue their potential trajectories, 
imagining what scenarios would occur if they could unfold their paths. And we do so by 
imaginatively living through the qualitative changes that our situation would undergo. This 
notion has a significant impact on our concept of reasoning (E, MW 5.292):
“Deliberation is dramatic and active, not mathematical and impersonal; and hence it 
has the intuitive, the direct factor in it.”
Distinctive o f Dewey’s notion o f practical reasoning, when compared with the deductive 
“calculating” model, is that emotions play a constitutive role in conducting deliberation, 
because the imaginative exploration is imbued with feelings and other qualities.
At this point we see just how radically Dewey breaks with the Humean “calculating” 
model. Remember that Dewey claimed (like Hume) that only present impulses have the 
power to motivate action. If we insist that reason has any bearing on our actions, i.e. that 
we are guided by an intelligent faculty which reaches beyond present experience, then we 
first have to reconcile reason with passion (HNC MW14.135):
4 Other aspects of reasoning, even though they may never be sharply separated from imagination, deserve 
discussion in their own right. Examples could be abstract ethical argumentation or formal and deductive 
reasoning.
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“... reasonableness is in fact a quality o f  an effective relationship among desires rather 
than a thing opposed to desire.”
Half a page later he adds (p. 136, italics added):
“Rationality ... is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of 
a working harmony among diverse desires.”
Emotional categories like impulses and passions therefore provide the very fabric out of 
which reason and rationality are tailored.
Dewey summarises this argument in the following quote from “Ethics” (E, MW5.292/3):
“[We are reasonable when we] estimate the import or significance of any present desire 
or impulse by forecasting what it would come or amount to if carried out.... Every 
foreseen result at once stirs our present affections, our likes and dislikes, our desires and 
aversions. But if ... their picturing did not at once arouse a present sense o f ... 
fulfilment, or o f dissatisfaction ... the process of thinking out these consequences 
would be barren o f influence upon behaviour... [to] every foreseen result ... [t]here is 
developed a running commentary that stamps values at once...”
This idea intends to mend the broken link between instrumental “cognition” and “desires” 
in the Humean rationality model.
Reason and value
Imagination transforms impulses which then form our practical dispositions and habits. By 
way o f dramatic imaginative rehearsal we gain a living picture o f complex and looming 
consequences inherent in our present intentions; we live though sequences of action in 
dynamic situations, and we thereby ponder the value of our initial desires. Our desires and 
initial preferences are, Dewey claims, susceptible to the outcomes of our imaginative
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thought experience. This insight is directly opposed to the Benthamite idea that pleasure 
and pain are “supreme masters,” also expressed in the proverb “tastes cannot be debated.” 
Imagination thus leads us from mere “appetites” to “appreciation,” a distinction Dewey 
introduces in order to make a distinction between initial “brute” volitional impulses and 
informed and adapted preferences, which reflect how worthy an option is of being pursued.
Reason itself a variable
If it is the office o f deliberation to scrutinise and thereby transform present impulses until a 
viable working harmony is created, then ‘“[r]eason’ is not an antecedent force which serves 
as a panacea” (HNC MW 14.137). It is not a template that we use regardless o f the content 
of our aims or the emotional quality of our situation (HNC MW14.137):
“It is a laborious achievement of habit needing to be continually worked over. A 
balanced arrangement o f propulsive activities manifested in deliberation -  namely 
reason -  depends upon a sensitive and proportionate emotional sensitiveness.”
Above I discussed the idea that decision-making, is not well characterised as a point at 
which we draw conclusions from our knowledge and preferences about the future, but that 
it is instead a continuous process o f adjusting, or training our intentions and impulses. 
Reason itself takes the form of a continuous process of reasoning, a practice that underlies 
changes just as our situations do (HNC MW14.136/7):
“Reason, the rational attitude, is the resulting disposition, not a ready-made antecedent 
which can be invoked at will and set into movement.”
If it therefore follows that “...reasonableness is in fact a quality o f an effective relationship 
among desires rather than a thing opposed to desire...” (HNC MW14.135), then Dewey 
seems justified in saying that (HNC MW14.135/6):
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“The conclusion is not that the emotional, passionate phase o f action can be or should 
be eliminated in behalf o f a bloodless reason. More ‘passions,’ not fewer is the answer. 
... The man who would ... cultivate intelligence will widen, not narrow, his life of 
strong impulses while aiming at their happy coincidence in operation.”
This is of course in stark contradiction to Hume.
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The Concept of Imagination
Here I will look at the concept o f “imagination,” at its multifarious aspects and dimensions. 
I will also ask how imagination can defend its attributed position right in the centre of 
rational or intelligent deliberation. My investigation profits much from Steven Fesmire’s 
(2003) excellent interpretation o f Dewey’s ethical thought. I also refer to Thomas 
Alexander (1990; 1993; 2002) and to Patricia Werhane’s (1999) studies o f the concept of 
imagination and its application.
Is imagination an inferior form of reasoning?
Some claim that imagination steps in as a makeshift methodological approach where 
reliable fix- points for deductive instrumental reasoning (means and ends) are unavailable. 
For example Reinhard Selten, in his famous article on the chain store paradox (Selten 
1978), introduces three hierarchical levels of decision-making that read as “routine”, 
“imagination”, and “reasoning,” which occupies a position superior to the other two.
For Selten imagination is able to “visualise ” alternatives, which ranks it over routine. Yet it 
lacks the analytic clarity o f  the reasoning level. In the absence of any data that would make 
decision-altematives comparable in a quantified way, imagination can still produce a 
qualitative judgement. However, it will always be second best to the calculation-based 
methods of reason.
My previous investigation discussed the problems with prioritising deductive forms of 
reasoning over imaginative resources of deliberation, as Selten seems to suggest. The 
following exploration shall indicate what this level of imagination has to offer on its own, 
particularly when deliberation takes place in complex indeterminate and socially interactive 
situations. Analytic and deductive forms o f “calculating” reasoning may turn out to be 
simply techniques for specifically framed circumstances. Their meaningful application, 
however, will always depend on a legislative judgement that requires an element of
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imagination (e.g. to frame a problem so that it is analytically solvable, or to select the right 
mathematical tools for its solution). This does not mean that deductive computation is itself 
a special case of imaginative reasoning; I only maintain that the tools o f “calculating” 
rationality require imagination for their meaningful employment, and I would regard it as 
quite a success o f the present discussion if it could establish imagination as an equal and 
not inferior to other modes of deliberation.
A taxonomy of imagination
A common prejudice against imagination is its air o f aloofness, fancy and caprice. When 
our thoughts wander we are said to be imagining. Novels and also lies are called products 
of imagination, and it is easy to confuse the words “imaginary” and “imaginative.” 
Whereas the former might very well be a form of mental meandering or fantasy, the latter is 
a highly productive form o f explorative and projective thinking. It is this difference that 
distinguishes great novels from lies or made-up stories.
Below I will introduce eight dimensions to further spell out the meaning o f “imagination” 
in the context o f intelligent deliberation. These shall vindicate the claim that imaginative 
thinking is in no way inferior to other forms o f reasoning (even if these could be sustained 
as independent from imaginative faculties). The suggested taxonomy o f Deweyan 
imagination comprises the following dimensions:
• Projective aspect
• Significance & situational horizon
• Aesthetic aspect & self-control
• Intuition
• Legislation & transfer
• Dramatic rehearsal & thick social narrative
• Affective perception
• Creative Play
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Projective dimension
Dewey champions “imagination” as part of his experimental method (HNC, MW 14.132):
“Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action 
are really like. It is an experiment in making various combinations o f selected elements 
of habits and impulses, to see what resultant action would be like if it were entered 
upon. But the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact.”
It is an experiment o f the mind. Yet as an experiment it is not merely about an outcome, but 
about (possible) “experience.” It is a complex and qualitative notion, just as Dewey’s 
concept of experience is complex, qualitative and transactive (cf. “Experience and Nature,” 
LW.l, and “Knowing and the Known,” LW 16).
As Thomas Alexander puts it, Deweyan imagination demands from us “to see the actual in 
the light of the possible” (Alexander 1993 p.384, cf. Dewey, AE LW10.348). Imaginative 
forethought is not merely prediction o f outcomes that seem determined by known causal 
antecedents. It incorporates the ability to synthesise certain possible and anticipated 
outcomes, and to produce a complex interpretation o f a looming situation or potential. 
Imagination could be defined as the power to think forward and grasp the consequences of 
a presently developing situation in its complexity with sensitivity for qualitative changes. 
More modestly imagination is sensitivity for the potential of vague possibilities and 
tendencies.
Imagination projects images or pictures, and it may be only secondary whether these are 
precise or particularly realistic. Often it is about over-emphasising aspects or tendencies a 
scenario. Dystopias depicted in Huxley’s Brave New World or Orwell’s 1984, give a vivid 
taste of ideas and tendencies that were operant in the systems o f the two cold war 
contenders.
Imaginative forethought can also take more concrete deliberative forms. Where managers 
or planners use metaphors, rough cast causal loop diagrams, images or simplified business
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models, they do not aim at giving precise estimations of anticipated future developments in 
form o f point to point predictions. Instead they create an understanding o f behavioural 
modes and dynamics inherent in a situation.
To understand the distinctive character of projective imagination in comparison to 
prediction and calculation of consequences in the classical model we may compare the two 
following examples:
Building and calculating a model of how fast our oil-resources will deplete, given the effect 
of continued consumption on both prices and profitability of previously uneconomic oil 
sands as potential supply sources, demands a high level o f technical skill and expert 
knowledge. Something more than this was required when scientists started issuing 
warnings on the threats of anthropogenic climate-change and the melting o f the polar ice­
caps around the 1970’s and before (Manabe and Bryan 1969; Manabe 1970; 1971; 
Vinnikov, Graza et al. 1980; Hansen, Johnson et al. 1981). Another prominent example o f  
imaginative thinking is Lovelock’s “Gaia Hypothesis” (Lovelock and Margulis 1974; 
Lovelock 1979; 1991). Such thinking does not arrive deductively from knowledge of the 
properties o f gases in the atmosphere alone. It demands a perspective judgement on what 
kind of data, what kinds o f methods, models and algorithms could be relevant. It moreover 
needs the capacity to think in long-term, complex and dynamic perspectives that include 
multi-causal and exponential feedback behaviour. Apart from scientific education it 
requires a vague sense of a rising catastrophe, or at least an intuitive sense o f imbalances in 
aggregated human behaviour and similar qualitative notions.
Imagination so understood envisages the future not as an anticipated change of parameters, 
but as a space of possibility where different scenarios are explored as qualitatively different 
situations, sometimes beyond all presently known circumstances and almost inconceivable.
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The dimension o f significance and situational horizon
A second dimension o f imagination, which is closely related to the first, regards our ability 
to widen our perspective on the present. Dewey rejects any stark meaning/object, or 
meaning/symbol separation. He understands meanings as constitutive aspects of experience 
and thereby integrated in organic processes o f coordination (Shook 2003). Meaning always 
refers from one object or symbol in one context o f transaction to further possible actions 
and transactions. A symbol or object contains meaning by virtue of being a potential 
stimulus for embarking on these further activities (e.g. o f perception, recognition, verbal 
expression, appreciation, employment as tools for practical tasks etc.). For Dewey, as later 
elaborated by his student Mead and the symbolic interactionists, meaning begins with 
incorporating some envisaged consequences o f one’s possible action into the organisation 
of experience. Objects are not merely experienced but their experience is organised -  and 
thus constituted by meanings. When we use a stick as a yard stick, it becomes a measure,
i.e. it gains meaning through our measuring and comparing practice. This meaning may 
extend to possible trade and bargaining practices. Meanings are best addressed as relations 
between forms of experience or forms of transaction, e.g. a line in the mud may mean a 
partition o f property. As a meaningful symbol it refers to a host o f possible practices like 
trespassing, respectful conduct, inviting and hosting, or disputing and suing. For Dewey, 
these relations constitute the nature o f what is experienced, they establish the very objects 
of our recognition. Objects of our world, i.e. objects that we can understand and recognise 
are products o f our actions within the world; they are not given conditions that exist 
independently o f transactions of which we are part. In Dewey’s metaphysics, relations are 
prior to elements, and objects are therefore defined by their relative positions and roles 
within transactions. This means that meaning cannot be treated like an add-on; it is not 
merely an attributed description. The relations o f meaning that assign a position to an 
object within our transactions are therefore “internal relations” (KI, EW1:178-9):
“If we take out of an experience all that it means, as distinguished from what it is -  a 
particular occurrence at a certain time, there is no psychical experience. The barest 
fragment o f consciousness that can be hit upon has meaning as well as being.”
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Experience is thus never exhausted in the particular instance of its occurrence here and 
now, but it incorporates meanings and thereby reaches out to future conduct. It is the office 
of imagination to extend the present continuously into the future. For this purpose 
experience also has to incorporate the past. In this way we extend the horizon o f the present 
from a moving point on a time scale into an extended whole (a situation or practice). This 
dimension of imagination as extending the meaning and horizon o f a situation bears great 
resemblance with Nietzsche’s (1873) concept o f “plastic power” (plastische Kraft).
To bring this thought a little bit down to earth think o f an employee who feels under paid 
and plans to broach the topic in a conversation with her boss. She will imagine the daunting 
situation in her superior’s office, then her embarrassment for a question that may make her 
look greedy or worse may over state her modest contribution to the company’s success. She 
will practice several approaches in front of a mirror answering to herself why her previous 
performance entitles her to a pay-rise. Then, she will imagine the reaction of her boss, and 
she will exercise a host o f different conversation scenarios. These incorporate her 
counterpart’s possible reactions. She will prepare herself for all contingencies that she can 
think of, gather counter-arguments against all objections that the executive manager may 
bring up. In this way she bolsters her present position and slowly builds up the confidence 
that eventually leads her to take the courageous step. She has extended the meaning of her 
present situation so far that she will almost certainly feel disappointed if the conversation 
ends without any negotiation but with an instant and generous rise instead.
Aesthetic dimension and self control
Imagination creates an “image” and is thereby a formative act. The German word 
“Anschauung” has many translations: “outlook,” “visualisation, ” “perspective,” “sensual 
receptive awareness, ” and “vivid picture. ” It can also mean “a holistic grasp o f a context” 
or even “an ideological understanding o f an issue or context. ” The aesthetic dimension of  
imagination is closely related to the wealth o f meaning o f “Anschauung. ” Imagination 
creates living and sensual pictures o f situations as complex and coherent wholes. 
Imaginative understanding does not remain outside o f the beheld situation.
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In developing his concepts situational experience Dewey shows great affinity to 
phenomenological approaches and Gestalt ideas in psychology. Experience understood as 
material for aesthetic imagination has “a beginning, a direction, potentiality [and it is] 
extending o u t... and into the world” (Burke 1997). According to Gestalt psychology, space 
around us is not a neutral coordinate system but it has salient directions o f very different 
qualities like “up” and “down” or “in front.”
Dewey’s concept of “qualitative immediacy” (cf. chapter 3) is essential here. We have said 
that experience is neither something that happens inside (the mind) o f a subject, nor is it 
part o f an objective world outside the perceiving agent. Both subject and object are actively 
involved in a process (“transaction”) that we call experience. Even emotional qualities like 
“frightening” or “cheerful” are part of natural transactive processes (in which the categories 
of “subject” and “object” are constituted fist of all and out o f a unified concept of 
transaction). This transactive understanding of quality makes Locke’s dualism of primary 
and secondary qualities redundant. All qualities are immediate in experience.
If the aesthetic dimension employs this notion o f “immediacy” is imagination then a 
romantic notion? Is it “Schau,” i.e. a revelation of nature itself by direct exposure or 
immersion? This conclusion would be misleading. Dewey is not a romantic. Such an ideal 
would involve a passive receptive form of access to nature, and not a deliberative and 
formative one. Instead taking a “transaction” perspective it would produce the image o f a 
subject approximating nature as a given totality to immerse in it. The aesthetic dimension 
of imagination, however, is one o f co-authoring an understanding o f a situation and it has a 
distinctly critical dimension.
This critical notion within the aesthetics of imagination has been succinctly expressed by 
Peirce, who saw progressive forms of self-reflection (“self-control”) working behind the
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scenes in deliberation and higher forms of reasoning (Peirce 1867-1914 5.3 Chapter 2, 
Paragraph 4)5:
“When a man trains himself, thus controlling control, he must have some moral rule in 
view, however special and irrational it may be. But next he may undertake to improve 
this rule; that is, to exercise a control over his control o f control. To do this he must 
have in view something higher than an irrational rule. He must have some sort of moral 
principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference to an [a]esthetic ideal o f what is 
fine.”
In this quote Peirce does not establish a hierarchy o f norms, similar to the hierarchy o f final 
and intermediary purposes that the “calculating” model relies on. It is not the search for a 
final normative-aesthetic meta-principle in some foggy heights, but hierarchy is about 
levels of self-control. Therefore the aesthetic idea o f what is fine is a mode o f functioning, 
not a given legislative principle.
However, only Dewey makes it unambiguously clear that self-control works bottom up and 
not top down, by showing how each level yields experience that allows generalisation on 
the next level (c.f. TV, LW13 or QC LW4).6
Intuitive dimension
Returning to Peirce’s quote above, one can also misinterpret this aesthetic idea o f  
imagination as a reduction to feelings or emotions. Dewey addresses the relation between 
(aesthetic) quality and feeling as follows (Dewey: ‘Teirce’s Theory o f Quality” LW 11.94):
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all further references to C.S. Peirce will refer to the Harvard edition of collected 
works in the conventional way.
6 This idea of levels of self-control harmonises well with Dewey’s more organic evolutionary idea of 
“growth.” Growth is the product of self-reflective inquiry, i.e. inquiry that questions and develops methods of 
inquiry itself.
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“...we do not define or identify quality in terms of feeling. The reverse is the case. 
Anything that can be called a feeling is objectively defined by reference to immediate 
quality: anything that is a feeling ... is o f some immediate quality when that is present 
as experience.”
This is an important step toward seeing emotions in their functional position within our 
practices and transactions. We must not deem emotions to occur randomly at whim, at least 
not normally. Emotions are not merely given and they do not spontaneously erupt for no 
reason (at least not in the normal case). They are embedded in transactive processes, and 
they play a functional role in organising experience and action. Emotions are trained and 
learned dispositions on which we can in the normal case rely as a primary resource of 
intelligence (Damasio 1994; Gigerenzer 2007). A neurologist, Damasio showed that 
subjects with brain injuries that affected only their capacity to experience emotions but not 
their ability to perform analytic tasks were severely limited in making reasonable practical 
decisions. The economist Robert Frank (1988) pointed at an important functional role of 
emotions in decision-making. Emotionally influenced decisions can be intelligent even if 
they appear irrational on first sight.
Received theories of rational deliberation look with great suspicion at action that is directly 
instructed by emotions. “Wishful thinking” or “excess o f will” are only a few terms of the 
trade that discredit feeling as guides to the achievement o f purposes. Dewey comments this 
ironically as the belief that “the intellect is a pure light and the emotions are a disturbing 
heat...” (DE MW 9.345). His objection to the idea that reason, better than emotions, should 
steer our deliberation-processes, is discussed above.
In a more optimistic light, emotions and intuition are often characterised as gut feeling 
(Gigerenzer 2007). Such intestinal sensations are said to account for gainful and frugal 
decision-making, without elaborated calculation, but instead with an immediate sense for 
what is right and wrong. Here admiration is mixed with astonishment that emotional 
responses can embody far-sighted qualities that were originally deemed properties reserved 
for the domain of reason.
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Already in his Psychology Dewey had distanced himself from reliance on distinctions like 
intellect and feelings as separate psychological faculties or segments in our deliberating 
will. For Dewey intellect and emotions are functional and heuristic distinctions within 
wilful activity (P, EW 2.328):
“The will is the concrete unity of feeling and intellect. ... The intellectual operation o f  
representing the means and the end, and the feeling which impels us to the end, have no 
separate existence.”
In fact, conscious reasoning and emotive responses are only different modes o f reacting to 
varying situational demands, and are both more or less adequate. Through reflection and 
training we form our character and habits, o f which our emotional capacity builds an 
important part. A well-trained character is capable o f sophisticated and morally sensible 
emotional reactions. These may sometimes impel us to take direct action (e.g. helping 
where help is required, or developing a healthy level o f suspicion in a “fishy” situation). 
Reflection, in contrast, is a mode of deliberation demanded in situations where our well- 
rehearsed habitual and emotional responses face challenges, i.e. where explicit conscious 
inquiry is needed. This happens for example when we enter a moral dilemma where two 
emotional imperatives contradict each other (cf. chapter 6, below).
Legislative and transfer dimension
Gigerenzer and the ABC Research Group have forwarded empirical arguments indicating 
that we are not only willing but also well advised to violate fundamental norms of  
deliberative and epistemic rationality, in some situations. Even canonical rules o f logic 
should and will be violated in some choice situations in order to promote practical success. 
In situations concerning social justice or in tasks of “cheating-detection” we would make 
good use o f classical fallacies like affirming the consequent or commutation o f  conditionals 
(Gigerenzer 1996).
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How do we find out if the rule ‘if you work extra-hours you get a day o ff  holds?’ His 
answer: ‘by checking if  the one who got the day off actually worked extra-hours,’ which 
amounts to an attempt to disprove A—>B by producing a precedent of B&-A. This 
constellation, however, would only contradict B—>A, not A—>B! It would disprove the idea 
that everyone who gets a day off worked for it, rather than disproving the original sentence 
that everyone who worked gets the day off It remains a question whether subjects so tested 
really believe in the validity of this faulty inference or if they rather intuitively change the 
semantics of the original question into the case of “disprove B—>A.”
Other examples of ecological rationality may be more convincing, e.g. when we observe 
rats in a T-maze that offers a 0.8 chance o f food in the left option and a 0.2 chance o f a 
reward in the right option. Rats do not always choose the “rational” maximising choice, but 
go instead for the mixed strategy o f “probability matching” (choosing correctly in 20% of 
the cases). Gigerenzer (2007) argues that this strategy pays in situations o f severe 
competition with conspecifics.
Examples like these pose questions about what defines man as a ‘rational animal.’ At the 
very least it is no longer credible to assume that the application o f a given set o f a priori 
norms that makes no allowance for situational conditions is sufficient to make us rational. 
In Logic: Theory o f Inquiry (LW12), Dewey contends to show that logical forms are not 
eternal laws o f thought but are rather methods of inquiry. Inquiry (or better inquiry into 
methods of inquiry) produces logical forms and principles. If this were true, we would need 
to define some level o f thought or reasoning that is able to mediate between candidate 
normative claims. Three criteria are important here:
1. It must be a mode of reasoning that allows us to grasp a situation as a whole in 
order to see how a norm would be applicable to the current context.
2. It needs to be a capacity that goes beyond a particular situation and allows us to 
compare several situations.
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3. It must be able to understand the consequences that are likely to follow from 
adopting a rule or norm.
We have explored the concept o f imagination enough by now to see that it is at least a 
strong candidate for this job. Imagination grasps a situation as a whole, reaches beyond it 
by comparing other real or hypothetical situations to the present, and examines present 
tendencies by evaluating their potential future consequences.
This does not mean that imagination would not itself rely on normative principles. Dewey 
introduces an interesting distinction between “rules” and “principles”: whereas a rule 
prescribes a “readymade and fixed” procedure,7 a principle is a generalised statement that 
needs translation into practices by a judgement. By the example o f a moral judgement 
Dewey explains (E, MW5.280):
“A moral principle ... is not a command to act or forbear acting in a given way, it is a 
tool for analysing a special situation, the right or wrong being determined by the 
situation in its entirety, and not by the rule as such.”
Deductive or “calculating” forms o f rational deliberation follow rules by definition. 
Imaginative thinking has the capacity to evaluate and mediate between competing rules and 
norms.
Whereas Hare sees in imagination no more than a supplementary “sentimental education” 
that only fosters a more sophisticated ability to apply rules (Hare after Alexander 1993 
p.376), Thomas Alexander envisages a more constitutional role for imagination in our 
reasoning (Alexander, 1990, 339):
7 Sure enough, this definition has little in common with the post-Wittgensteinian understanding of “rule,” cf. 
Winch, P. (1990). The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. London, Routledge.
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“...This aesthetic and imaginative mode of understanding is a precondition for any 
cognitive or analytic one.”
This insight, if correct, poses a serious challenge to Selten’s idea o f ordering “reason” 
above “imagination.”
Dramatic dimension and thick social narrative
Dewey uses “dramatic rehearsal” as a metaphor for imagination in action. Interestingly 
the German word “Vorstellung” has two meanings: (1.) imagination and (2.) theatre 
performance.
Dramatic rehearsal represents to us “what experience [one] ... would get if [one] were to 
follow out a given tendency or act upon a particular desire” (Dewey after Fesmire 2003 
p.74).
This must be understood as an improvisational rather than a scripted rehearsal. Patricia 
Werhane claims that “... nothing short of active free-playing imagination will enable us to 
distance ourselves from our scripts, roles, or narratives to envision new possible scripts. To 
be truly imaginative, we have to be disengaged, yet even ‘at a distance’ we will be 
operating within a scheme” (p.l 13).
The dramatic component is one of the most defining characteristics that distinguish 
imagination from “calculating” models of deliberation. Yet, we find some formal similarity 
between imagination and standard models o f decision theory: William Caspary illustrates 
the force that moral perplexities and practical dilemmas have on the way we deliberate: by 
engaging in thought experiments we act out different scenarios and courses o f action. Each 
time we arrive at a painful decision point we mentally rehearse both options, until we come 
to a conclusion. This reasoning in scenarios, in its “branching set of alternative lines o f  
development and moves and countermoves” (Caspary 2000 p.l 13), somewhat resembles 
decision trees as used by decision- and game theorists. However, in dramatic modes of
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imagination we engage by playing through whole processes instead of anticipating only 
quantified outcomes o f alternative decisions. As the above example o f the employee 
requesting a salary rise demonstrated, we think in whole lines of action and possible 
reactions from other players. We five through conversational and emotional exchanges with 
other peers. This engaged approach is for Caspary both “lens and mirror ... an occasion for 
exploring the reactions of others, as well as discovering our own tendencies” (Caspary 2000 
p.l 15). Even in cases where the emotional component may be reduced, e.g. where a team of 
analysts discusses the possible strategies of partners and opponents in a hostile takeover 
bid, they will use descriptions of characters, and roles given by the positions of other 
players, their knowledge, ideas and their characteristic ways of dealing, in order to assess 
the space o f possibilities. In this respect dramatic rehearsal bears little resemblance to 
outcome oriented point-to-point predictions of decision-trees. “Dewey’s dramatic rehearsal, 
then, is complex and contextual, involving ‘thick description,’ not simple, general, and 
‘thin’” (Caspary 2000 p. 117).
Affective perceptive dimension
One aspect that has coloured the understanding o f imagination as a moral term is sensitivity 
and sympathy toward the feelings and needs of other people. Adam Smith identified 
imagination with “... a faculty that enables us to understand the sentiments o f others” 
(Adam Smith after Werhane 1999 p.90).
However, affections are not imperatives per se. Empathy is a complex faculty of 
imagination. As a form o f functioning empathy must itself be trained and matured in order 
to influence practical judgements in an intelligent manner. Other faculties and dimensions 
of imagination play an important role in forming and informing our affective responses. 
Children may originally have the same affective reactions toward dolls, dogs, and siblings. 
It demands a lot o f “dramatic rehearsal” to train emotional responses and reactions so that a 
child knows correctly in which cases to apply practices like “cleaning,” “feeding,” or 
“respectfully addressing in language” appropriately. In this process, learning about the 
possibilities in interaction, if-then relations, and phenomenological categories (like looking
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like a person, or having expressions of pleasure and pain), are as important as sparring with
Q
abstract learned norms and parental imperatives.
Creative playful dimension
Dewey’s metaphor of dramatic rehearsal for imagination at work, and the previous example 
from child development, hints at the possibility of seeing deliberation as a form of play. 
Dewey often uses the examples o f children and artists to illustrate the idea o f imaginative, 
creative and experiential practices. Hans Joas sees the key to creativity in Dewey’s 
distinction between work and arts or play (Dewey, DE MW 9.214):
“Work is psychologically simply an activity which consciously includes regard for 
consequences as a part o f itself; it becomes constrained labor when the consequences 
are outside of the activity as an end to which activity is merely a means. Work which 
remains permeated with the play attitude is art— in quality if  not in conventional 
designation.”
For Joas creative activities are those in which the agents are at the same time players and 
authors o f the game they are playing. Art stops being art and becomes craft where the 
standards and ends of its production are fixed, e.g., children playing hide and seek use 
learnt rules but are likely to turn their game into something else: they find a wild garden 
and become explorers; they find a staircase leading to the basement of an abandoned house 
and their play becomes a test o f courage etc.
Imaginative creativity can be addressed as the power to integrate the formulations of goals 
into the context o f action.
8 This holds irrespective of the fact that playing with dolls or animals is itself a means of training emotional 
responses to human interlocutors in different situations.
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Conclusion
So far I have argued that imagination and rational deliberation must not be understood as 
competing strategies. Imagination is not the name for a host of implicit and intuitive 
makeshift methods by which we gain orientation when “truly rational” (i.e. instrumental 
deductive) strategising fails. On the contrary our imaginative capabilities are the backbone 
of any comprehensive definition of intelligent or “rational” human agency. Moreover, I 
have developed a taxonomy o f features and aspects which characterise imagination as a 
method of deliberation. However, some objections against overemphasising the importance 
of imagination in deliberation seem possible. Perhaps the method of imagination limits our 
cognitive capacities to conservative estimates o f future developments. Is imagination only 
good for relatively ‘normal’ situations? After all we need the horizon o f previous 
experience to ‘live through’ imagined scenarios in our dramatic rehearsals. Does the call for 
imagination not limit our readiness to anticipate changes o f ‘unimaginable’ proportions, i.e. 
changes that go beyond what we can relate to by our previous experience? Winston 
Churchill’s fierce opposition to the Munich Agreement gained him the reputation of 
understanding early what most leaders of liberal western powers failed to ‘imagine’ in the 
beginning: The true potential o f terror and malignance that Hitler and his ideologically 
overcharged Germany posed, which remains ‘unimaginable ’ to the present day.
Such examples do not serve to show the limits of imagination. By the definition given 
during this chapter, imagination reaches beyond what is widely held or ‘imagined.’ 
Churchill’s perceptiveness for the looming danger is precisely o f the kind that I discussed 
as the “projective dimension” o f imagination where we afford the capacity o f  anticipating 
qualitative transformations o f  a situation instead of merely extrapolating parameter 
changes. “Unimaginable” in this context can either express a moral sentiment or else it 
means what most people failed to imagine at that time; this is very different from saying 
that education and training o f our imaginative faculties could not raise our sensitivity to 
such abnormal scales o f development.
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There is another related worry about placing imagination at the centre o f all rational 
deliberation: Empirically the human ability to estimate future development fails 
systematically in typical situations. It has often been demonstrated that the human mind 
performs poorly in predicting exponential growth. Moreover, we suffer from an innate 
weaknesses in grasping the behaviour of complex, multi-causal systems, particularly when 
they involve feedback relations and delays (cf. Forrester 1971b; Richardson 1991). Also we 
are quite inept at making reliable long term estimations of any moderately complex 
system’s behaviour. For this reason we make use o f mathematical modelling tools (such as 
system dynamics programs like “Vensim”) that allow us to formulate our basic intuitions in 
the form of mathematical equations (or stock and flow diagrams), and then to deduce 
behaviour resulting form our assumptions or to simulate possible courses o f intervention. 
These calculations don’t use imagination while crunching the data. I have never claimed 
that imagination should be the only method o f intelligent deliberation. Deductive forms of 
reasoning and computing are essential tools in complex decision environments, but such 
methods crucially depend on human imaginative abilities: The formulation o f any model, 
the judgements where boundaries are to be drawn between endogenous and exogenous 
variables, the definition o f different scenarios for simulation-runs, and the choice o f  
mathematical tools, all fit the description o f imaginative thinking. Imagination is only aided 
by symbolic mathematical transformations.
It is no imposition to say that dealing with the world’s complexity and taking a long term 
perspective are the particular strengths of imaginative deliberation.
I hope that this analysis has yielded some clarity about the notion o f imagination and its 
role in decision-processes. In particular I meant to propose a notion of intelligence that does 
not define reason as an antecedent category, i.e. a given set o f norms and rules. I explored 
Dewey’s reconstruction of reason as an elaborated creative resource that draws on all 
human psychological faculties. It explores rather than predicts, and it experiments rather 
than deducts.
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Chapter 6: Situation and Inquiry -  
From Agency Theory to Rationality
Deliberation is a work o f discovery.
John Dewey
A pragmatic intelligence is a creative intelligence, not a routine mechanic.
John Dewey
Introduction
If this dissertation were an arc, we would now have arrived at its zenith. Looking back at 
previous chapters, we have achieved three main things. The first two chapters established 
the need for a reform of our conception o f rationality in planning. Chapters 3-5 introduced 
some fundamental aspects of Dewey’s reform of agency theory, and chapter 5 developed an 
alternative account of rational deliberation and decision-making.
The aim o f this exercise was to criticise the Humean Folk-Model of agency (“means-ends- 
action scheme”) that underlies traditional models of rationality in planning (LIR model); 
though devastating to the model, this was a constructive critique because it pointed out a 
new way of understanding creative human agency. Dewey’s notions o f “imagination” and 
“dramatic rehearsal” were systematically introduced and discussed as alternative notions o f  
rational strategising and reasoning.
Until now the discussion falls short o f providing a systematic conception of rationality. The 
previous chapter on “Imaginative in Deliberation” gives insights into the modes and 
methods of reasoning, but it does not provide a satisfactory theory o f rational agency. The 
present chapter will finally provide a systematic account of the physiognomy and logic o f a 
pragmatist concept o f rationality.
I begin by introducing Dewey’s concept of “situation” as the foundation for a new agency 
theory. I then explore how common patterns of problem solving efforts allow for a new 
understanding o f inquiry processes. Dewey’s notion of intelligent inquiry is then introduced 
and discussed as the basic model for rational action and planning.
At this point we face a twofold task: first we must elaborate upon an alternative conception 
of rationality as a theoretical possibility, and second we must clarify how such a revision 
would offer great advantages in understanding and dealing with problems o f deliberation in 
contemporary contexts.
The Quest for a Foundational Category of Agency
Joas referred to the basic structural elements and concepts that an agency theory rests on as 
“foundational categories of agency.” “Reason” and “passion” would for example be the 
foundational categories in Hume’s agency model; modern economic decision theory might 
prefer “degrees o f beliefs” (or “probabilities”) and (revealed-) “preferences”; Humanistic 
schools that emphasise the symbolic character of agency would distinguish “meaning” and 
“expression” as foundational categories o f agency (c.f. Joas). Depending on the agency 
theory, foundational categories have been understood as basic logical components 
(v.Wright, MacIntyre), causal antecedents (Davidson, Hempel), or basic symbolic 
structures (Levi Strauss, Charles Taylor) o f agency.
The concept of “situation ” is fundamental in Dewey’s philosophy and particularly in his 
agency theory. Joas suggests (Joas 1996 p. 160):
“...the concept of situation is a suitable replacement for the means-ends schema as the 
primary basic category of a theory of action...”
Two questions follow suit. What exactly is the meaning o f situation as a “primary basic 
category o f a theory o f action” rather than simply the field o f means, opportunities,
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obstacles, resources, and facts of low relevance or impact? And how can a theory of 
agency, building upon “situations” instead of on means-ends logic, provide the material for 
a normative theory of intelligent or rational agency?
The former question is the issue in this section, and the latter will be discussed in the 
following two subchapters.
A concept of situation as foundation of agency theory
Dewey does not think o f agent and situation as two juxtaposed realms o f being. He objects 
to the notion that the agent would passively rest in herself until a motive incites her to 
interact with her environment. For Dewey the agent is not an “unmoved mover” who pre­
exists her activity (“transactive” relations). Of course agents do often spontaneously begin a 
course of coordinated activity after being incited to it (by impulse, by a sudden rising 
desire, or by the realisation that a certain activity would serve her ends). But his basic 
model o f agency does not rely on such primary excitation because activity and interaction 
between agent and environment pre-exist the formation of distinct and directed impulses, 
motives, preferences, or plans. Dewey claims that the interaction between agent and 
environment is primary; it is essential to maintaining the distinction between agent and 
environment (cf. also Maturana and Varela 1992). Agent and environment are always 
suspended in processes o f “transaction.” This field of transaction is what Dewey calls a 
“situation.”
On this transactive account o f agency, neither the distinction between agent and 
environment nor the determination o f means and ends (or preferences and cognitions) can 
serve as foundational categories of action. How can the concept of situation take their 
place? And what exactly is the nature of this category?
Three characteristics are central to understanding this complex concept:
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1. Situations are unique qualitative wholes.
2. Situations are not neutral sceneries of events and unfolding activities -  they create a 
need for action and contain requirements for action.
3. Situations follow alternating patterns of habitual activity and phases o f disturbance.
1. Quality and coherence
Developing the concept of situation gave Dewey’s philosophy a distinctively pragmatist or 
“experientalist” outlook, taking it a step beyond the Hegelian idealism he had absorbed 
while studying under George Morris.
Indeed, there remained strong Hegelian leanings in Dewey’s philosophy right until his last 
major work (“Knowledge and the Known”), e.g. the claim that epistemic processes are 
constitutive for the objects of knowledge, or the defence o f an organic relation between the 
parts that make up a situation (e.g. defined as “subject” and “object”). Dewey explicitly 
talks about experience as a philosophical “absolute.” He also made a strong turn toward 
claiming primacy o f social experience (culture) over individual experience. In developing 
his concept of Situation, however, Dewey turns Hegel’s holism into a functional rather than 
abstract philosophical category.
James had already directed his concept of a stream o f  thought against both the modem 
empiricists’ and Hegel’s understanding of the relation between ideas, consciousness and 
reality. James rejected the empiricist belief in atomic and inherently meaningless sense 
impressions that the mind has to synthesise and organise in order to produce complex ideas 
and meaningful connections between elements (e.g. cause and effect). Like Hegel, James 
believed in a primary unity between experience and what is experienced. He concluded that 
relations between experienced elements were not established by a separate synthetic 
function o f understanding but belonged to the fabric of experience itself. Against Hegel’s 
“block universe holism,” in which all elements are, by the principle o f internal relations,
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fully intelligible only through their relation to everything else in the universe, James 
introduced a dynamic psychological concept of actually experienced conscious processes. 
His alternative, the “stream of thought,” refuses to model conscious processes as a 
sequence, train or chain of distinct and separate ideas. The metaphor of stream (or river) 
avoids stark separation o f discrete and discontinuous elements. James sees all impressions 
and elements of experience as fused together, thus having experiential quality and 
significance not as elements, but by reference to their relative contexts. He even tried to 
integrate sharp interruptions and disturbances within his idea o f synchronic and diachronic 
continuity o f experience: a clap of thunder fuses an already existent quality o f which it 
becomes a part. (James: Principles of Psychology, abridged in Thayer, p. 142-150)
Dewey retains some o f James’ psychological points,1 in particular his critique o f early 
Empiricism, by identifying experience “with a life function [that] is temporally and 
spatially more extensive and more internally complex than ... a single thing like a stone, or 
a single quality.” (Rejoinder, LW 14.29) By limiting the horizon Hegel’s internal relations 
to actual transactive contexts o f an organism’s functioning, he also discards Hegel’s 
indefinite holism: “... On the other hand it is impossible to imagine a living creature coping 
with the entire universe at once” (Rejoinder, LW 14.29).
Dewey differs from James in one important respect: he insists that situations are unique and 
whole, and that “a situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality” 
(LW15.39).
For Dewey quality pervades a situation, i.e. quality is the experiential transactions which 
comprise the agent/organism and her environment. Experienced quality is therefore not 
subjective or purely mental (PIE MW3.160):
1 It may be mentioned here that according to Shook (2000), Dewey takes his main influence for his 
Psychology from William Wundt rather than from James.
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“I start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically, that noise is fearsome, it really 
is, not merely phenomenally or subjectively so. That is what it is experienced as being. 
But, when I experience the noise as a known thing, I find it to be innocent of harm. It is 
the tapping o f a shade against the window, owing to movements o f the wind. The 
experience has changed, that is, the thing experienced has changed -  not that an 
unreality has given place to a reality, nor that some transcendental (unexperienced) 
reality has changed, but just the concrete reality experienced has changed.”
Hence, qualities like “fearful” or “problematic” cannot be reduced to mental states or 
attitudes.
2. Situations are practical -  they demand action
My previous chapter on valuation has yielded that the “guides” o f our actions (desires, 
purposes, norms and values) are not external to our transactions. I discussed how we refine 
our impulses into objectified desires in response to the possibilities and impasses given by 
our surrounding. We formulate precise purposes and commit to values and norms after 
reflecting upon our situation and upon experiences that we or others have had in the past. 
Finally, the application o f more general norms and values in particular circumstances is 
primarily a matter o f judging them suitable and appropriate for a specific context. This 
simplified account does not do justice to the differentiated capacities of our ethical 
reflection, but even in this form it implies a strong argument against reducing the concept 
of situation to an ethically neutral surrounding of potential means and obstacles. Dewey’s 
category of situation is not external or neutral to our plans, desires and purposes, but is 
intrinsically practical. As Joas (1996 p.161) says:
“Situations do not trigger our action, but nor do they merely provide the terrain on 
which we carry out our intentions. Our apperception o f the situation is predefined in our 
capacities for action and our current disposition for action.”
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Joas discusses Boehler’s notion o f a “quasi dialogical” relationship between action and 
situation by saying that “situations are not mute, they demand that we take action” (Joas 
1996 p. 160).
3. Pattern of situations
If we consider adopting “situations” instead of “means” and “ends” as the foundational 
category o f agency, this concept should be at least as good, if not better, at accounting for 
the way agents form intentional and coordinated courses of action.
James’ “stream o f thought,” in which qualities continuously fuse and merge in a flow, is 
not entirely capable o f doing so. James’ stream fails to account for structured, coordinated 
and planned agency aspiring to reach beyond the qualitative context of one (problematic 
situation) and reach a unified quality. The stream does not offer many orientation points 
which could help to form concrete intentions. Hence we may fear that James’ “stream of 
consciousness” will ultimately remain in a state of “blooming buzzing confusion” (James, 
principles voll. p.488).
Dewey holds that a situation is a complex and unique whole that is bound together by a 
“pervasive quality.” This concept allows for distinct transitions from one situation to 
another. However, more than the mere progression of unique situations is needed to 
introduce a concept that could inform and orient agency. Dewey’s suggestion of a 
“rhythmic pattern” in the succession o f situations offers exactly this.
Although every situation is for Dewey a dynamic qualitative whole, there are two different 
types of situations or transactions. All situations are defined by a unique pervasive quality, 
but only in some situations are transactions in a settled state o f equilibrium (“unified 
quality”). In such situations transactions take a habitual form. In other situations, however, 
such habitual ways are threatened, troubled, interrupted or inhibited. Such situations are not 
unified because the concert o f all impulse and efforts does not give way to a coherent form
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of coordination but some of our impulses meet external opposition or come into conflict 
with one another.
Our experiential transactions oscillate between settled phases o f equilibrium and challenged 
situations in which habitual ways are threatened (or pose themselves a threat) and where the 
predominant quality is problematic.
Human agency, like all organic behaviour, is directed at transforming problematic 
situations into settled and well-coordinated experiences. Once such a state has been 
achieved it will be only temporarily sustained.
How this oscillation (or “rhythm”) between situations o f habitual and problematic quality 
creates the platform for a theory o f inquiry, and how this theory of inquiry implies a novel 
conception o f rational agency, shall be discussed in the following subchapter.
Inquiry
A definition
Dewey gives the following definition (Logic, LW12.108):
“Inquiry is the controlled and directed transformation o f an indeterminate situation into 
one that is so determined in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of the original situation into a unified whole.”
Dewey spells out this definition in his “Logic.” He explains that inquiry is always directed 
toward creating a situation o f transactional equilibrium out o f an indeterminate situation 
where coordination had been interrupted or imperilled. “Unified” in the above quote refers 
to “qualitative unity,” or in Peirce’s terms “firstness” -  the quality of an uninterrupted 
habitual flow of transaction where elements coordinate rather than conflict with each other.
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In this definition the programme is laid out to reinterpret inquiry as an active quest for 
settling problematic (or “indeterminate”) situations. This interpretation explicitly includes 
scientific inquiry.
Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce
The notion o f science as inquiry which settles problematic situations is one that Dewey and 
C.S. Peirce widely agree on.
It is difficult to establish exactly how much influence Peirce had on Dewey. Although 
Dewey was a student in Peirce’s department at Johns Hopkins University, these two 
beacons of American philosophy had neither a personal relationship nor an inspired 
philosophical exchange. Indeed, if we believe Alan Ryan, Peirce hardly took Dewey 
seriously as a philosophical heavyweight. Dewey on the other hand failed to appreciate 
fully the potential importance o f Peirce’s thought for his own work. Instead, during his 
student days, he filed an official complaint against his teacher, scorning the over-formalised 
style in which Peirce taught the subject o f Logic (Ryan 1995).
There are indisputable differences between Dewey and Peirce in their styles, methods, and 
intentions, but Dewey surely absorbed many o f Peirce’s ideas into the fabric o f his own 
thinking. Whatever the biographical details, it seems worthwhile discussing Peirce’s 
concepts of inquiry as a foundation for understanding Dewey’s notion of inquiry.
Truth and inquiry
It was Peirce’s declared aim to develop a logic o f scientific research that identified inquiry 
as an involved practical effort in problem solving. The intended result of all inquiry is to 
settle “doubt” and to arrive at “belief’ (Peirce 1958). What makes a belief adequate is not 
its conforming to a standard o f “truth,” thought o f as independent o f any particular inquiry 
context. Belief is justified on account of its ability to surpass doubt in the context of  
inquiry.
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Was Peirce therefore a relativist regarding the notions o f truth and falsity? Quite the 
contrary -  he trusts that continued inquiry has an inbuilt dynamic and direction toward 
agreement and convergence. This concrete faith led him to introduce the ideal o f truth as 
regulative idea, which intended the ultimate agreement of the community o f all inquirers - 
following an unlimited continuation o f unconstrained inquiry. Habermas later interpreted 
this regulative idea as a transcendental condition for all science and argumentative speech. 
For Peirce, however, the idea o f ultimate convergence of theory is a very concrete means 
for conducting and orienting research. This idea of convergence is not a device to argue for 
the transcendental necessity to assume that any actual proposition would come with a 
definite truth value (Depew 1995). Habermas would exclude James’ point that truth or 
falsity is something that happens to propositions, not something propositions would come 
with. Peirce’s position on this point is certainly less straight forward.
For Dewey the notions of “truth” and falsity are not free floating signifiers. They do not 
depend on free selectable discursive contexts or language games. Dewey agrees that 
renewed scientific inquiry increases the chance of a definite improvement o f our theories. 
Inquiry progressively clarifies ideas and their relations so that the resulting beliefs become 
better at meeting the challenges o f dynamically changing situations. However, Dewey’s 
reference point for inquiry is not the eventual agreement by all inquirers after indefinite 
unconstrained inquiry, although agreement plays an important part in his logic of inquiry. 
The measure and warrant for any epistemic judgement is how well a belief settles and 
“unifies” a particular troubled situation or similar situations o f its kind.
Showing that this is far from saying what is true is what works, what satisfies, or what is 
expedient would require a lengthy argument on Dewey’s notions o f truth as “warranted 
assertibility.” In brief, Dewey claims that conflicting ideas can produce indeterminacies in 
our reasoning (“cognitive dissonances”). This means that a quick fix to an immediately 
perceived problem will not necessarily settle the problematic character of a situation which, 
because of its quality, is partly made up of such cognitive dissonances.
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Dewey manages to avoid the relativistic tendencies o f some of his successors without 
succumbing to a Unitarian foundationalism (Dorstewitz and Kuruvilla 2007). This 
presupposes a better acquaintance with the concept of “problematic situation” and its role 
in determining our inquiry.
Doubt as a quality
Peirce sought to define the meaning of ideas as formulae for possible action, i.e. as 
dispositions to meet the contingencies of life. Belief is for Peirce an active stance toward 
actual or possible interaction; it is a way of acting or a disposition to act, not a cognitive 
representational state of information stored in a memory. Beliefs are stabilised or “fixated” 
in our habits. Peirce’s argument against scepticism and against the Cartesian method of 
radical doubt is that we need far more than the theoretical possibility o f placing a question 
mark after a statement to have material for an inquiry. Beliefs cannot be challenged by a 
mere sceptical hunch o f doubt. Doubting a belief requires as much justification as 
committing to it in the first place. What really starts the process o f inquiry is not the mere 
possibility o f the falseness o f a belief, but the fact that an already acquired set o f beliefs 
(habits) becomes existentially problematic and unsatisfactory, i.e. the (cognitive) habits in 
which belief is embodied become troublesome.2
These ideas are crucial for understanding Dewey’s notion of a pattern o f inquiry. The 
change from belief to doubt is, for Peirce, a practical matter. It is quite akin to Dewey’s 
notion of an “indeterminate quality” of a situation. Peirce develops three categories that 
may be called universal categories in the sense that they cannot be categorised as either 
epistemological or ontological categories. They are both at the same time and they are 
fundamental in establishing the very distinction between epistemological and ontological 
concepts. E.g. these categories constitute the possibility o f distinguishing between 
epistemic subject and object.
2 This notion must be taken with care, as Peirce is less committed than Dewey to a view that integrates inquiry 
and beliefs as sequences within a continuum of organic life-coordinations.
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The category Peirce calls “firstness” is perhaps identical to Dewey’s idea o f a unified 
situation or a harmonious habitual transaction. It is “the unanalysed total impression made 
by any manifold not thought of as actual fact, but simply as a quality, as simple positive 
possibility o f appearance” (Peirce 8.329).
“Secondness,” in contrast, is the occurrence of shock or resistance within a situation of  
firstness.3 Doubt as the initiation of inquiry is the experience o f such resistance of 
“secondness” which objects to our habitual co-ordinations in a situation where the 
transactional unity between subject and object ruptures. For a thorough discussion of all 
categories including “thirdness,” see Bernstein (1971).
The concept o f habit
In Dewey’s and Peirce’s conception o f agency, “habit” plays a crucial role and is 
immediately linked to the idea of a “pattern of inquiry.” There are three reasons for this:
1. Primacy of action: Habit steps in as warrant for what previous chapters established as 
the “primacy o f action.” It is the key to understanding how agency theory can 
accommodate the idea that basic distinctions (such as means/ends or subject/object) are 
produced from within agency processes. For Dewey action is primary and is in the form of 
habitual transactions, and therefore not dependent on motivation through desires and 
beliefs. Deliberate agency springs from a lack of successful coordination rather than an 
excess o f motivation.
2 Unity of agent and situation: Dewey defines his concept o f habit as transactional, by 
which he means to reserve the “right to see together” what philosophers distinguished as 
agent and environment and similar subject-object separations (Ryan 2004, Dewey 
LW16.67). Dewey uses the picture of the well-rehearsed violin player. According to
3 It is perhaps not Plato’s idea of a universal oneness (“hen ”) that logically precedes the splits into 
“unlimited/indeterminate duality” (“ahoristos dyas”). It seems to have more affinities with the Heraklitian 
notion of duality as oppugning forces (or “fires”).
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Dewey, “interaction” between person and instrument may not be the way to understand the 
interplay between instrument and artist. Both are so well coordinated that 
phenomenologically and functionally they build a unity. If we wanted to introduce 
structuring distinctions and juxtapositions in this concert situation, we would try with one 
between the violinist (as a unity of instrument and player) and a tired audience, whose 
resistance the performer experiences. The concept o f habit as a transactional unity o f  
subject and object in situations suspended in an equilibrium o f habitual co-ordination 
allows us to understand how Dewey saw the distinction between agent and environment as 
a creative product of agency rather than an a priori given distinction.
3 Normative orientations: Dewey’s concept o f habit is distinctly normative. It is true that 
we deliberate over norms only where problematic situations demand reorganisation of 
activity, i.e. when our habitual co-ordinations are interrupted. On the other hand, habitual 
situations are expressions o f previous practical deliberation and embody earlier normative 
commitments in lived practice (HNC, MW14). Dewey and Peirce often identify the 
character of a person with his or her habits (HNC, MW14.33). If so, habits are, like 
characters, neither mechanically repetitive nor void o f value judgements. Dispositions to 
make value judgements in everyday situations form our character. Habit is the product of 
practical (or explicitly moral) inquiry and is itself the source o f practical judgement. Our 
habits embody practical wisdom and experience, along with our ability to conform to social 
customs and cultural norms. Christopher Hookway speaks about “habitual evaluative 
practices” that involve “an acute sensitivity to the fine details o f our environment” 
(Hookway 2000 p.261).
Inquiry as problem solving
Why is inquiry equivalent to problem solving? How does inquiry work? What is the 
connection between inquiry and intelligence? For Dewey inquiry is a systematic way o f  
dealing with problematic situations. But what exactly does this mean?
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Apart from pockets of resistance from those who insist on a stark separation between 
science and practice or between contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, the 
trend is to acknowledge that we cannot sharply separate our scientific results from our 
epistemic practices. From physics to anthropology scientific disciplines have began to 
locate the observer inside the field of her investigation, and to interpret observation as an 
involved participating activity. Yet it is one thing to point to the practical character o f our 
beliefs and to emphasise the mechanisms we use to generate knowledge as (scientific) 
practices. It is quite another to say that all scientific research is about solving problems of 
action. Classical Pragmatists are prepared to argue this contentious claim, and Dewey even 
goes a step further. He claims that the broad pattern of problem solving activity is 
essentially the same when a single cell organism reacts to a chemical change in its medium, 
when a boy-scout hunts for a treasure, or when a scientist formulates a migration model of 
birds infected with avian flu. Dewey holds that there is a logical and methodological 
continuum reaching from the behaviour of primitive organic life-processes to the workings 
of scientific institutions, proverbially from the amoebae to Einstein (cf. Logic LW12.30ff).
The method of intelligence
Dewey argues that science is but the product o f ever more sophisticated applications of the 
“method of intelligence” in solving predicaments of everyday life.
In a significant transition, taking place sometime between 1917 and 1919, Dewey begins to 
replace the terms “reason” and “rationality” with “intelligence” in his terminology (HNC 
MW14.136-7, see also Vysnowsky 2004 p.159):
“There is thus involved more than a verbal shift if we say that the new scientific 
development effects an exchange of reason for intelligence. ... [Intelligence is] 
associated with judgement, that is, with selection and arrangement o f means to effect 
consequences and with choice o f what we take as our ends. A man is intelligent not in 
virtue of having reason which grasps first and indemonstrable truth about fixed 
principles, in order to reason deductively from them to the particulars which they
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govern, but in virtue o f his capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act 
in accordance with his estimate. In the large sense o f the term, intelligence is as 
practical as reason is theoretical. Wherever intelligence operates, things are judged in 
their capacity o f signs of other things.”
The upshot of this thesis could be to delete “rationality” from its title; yet in the 
introduction I pointed out that ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ are still such strong and 
authoritative orientation points in planning that it seems more practical to reconstruct 
almost all that substantiates these concepts rather than replace them with a new word.
Inquiry for Dewey is a broad concept that covers all vital efforts and life-expressions 
directed at building and sustaining successful coordination. Trial and error, natural and 
sexual selection, and the method of intelligence are different types o f  inquiry, and so are 
forms of religious quests and aesthetic explorations. “Intelligence,” in contrast, is a more 
restrictive notion. The method of intelligence is one in which the anticipation o f the 
consequences o f agency systematically enters both the inquiry process and the formation o f 
our beliefs, dispositions and habits. As spelled in “Logic -  Theory of Inquiry” (LW12) the 
method of intelligence is common to all scientific projects.
Dewey does not reduce the value and purpose of scientific research to its application in 
solving every-day problems (as claimed by the often cited vulgar-pragmatist straw-man). 
But the method of intelligence, applied in everyday contexts, creates beliefs and methods 
that have the potential to become issues o f scientific inquiry: The application o f the method 
of intelligence does not only solve problems, it creates new problems inherent to the 
concepts and solutions it produces. Science is but a follow-up to such higher order 
problems; (Logic LW12.41):
“Inquiry, in settling the disturbed relation of organism-environment (which defines 
doubt) does not merely remove doubt by recurrence to a prior adaptive integration. It 
institutes new environing conditions that occasion new problems. What the organism
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learns during this process produces new powers that make new demands upon the 
environment. In short, as special problems are resolved, new ones tend to emerge.”
Planning as inquiry
Defining inquiry as an active process for resolving existential problematic situations makes 
it easy to see an affinity between scientific research and the methods of planning and policy 
making. Not only are both efforts in problem solving, but they also embrace the method of 
intelligence. For this reason Dewey concludes that science and public deliberation must not 
be seen as two different projects. The common pattern of inquiry shall be elaborated below 
(cf. also chapter 8).
My project here may be challenged as simply reversing what Dewey did: Dewey showed 
how scientific inquiry is based on logic for intelligent problem-solving, whereas I am going 
to use this logic or method of inquiry to show that it has application in the practical 
contexts o f planning and decision-making. This would be equivalent to claiming that a 
logic of problem-solving could also be applied as a logic for the solution of problems. I 
would happily accept such a charge if  I could convince the reader of some progress made 
on the way. My aim is actually to integrate this pragmatist conception o f inquiry into a 
revised notion of rationality in planning. The result would then be a rationality model that 
is better able to deal with complex, problematic, and insufficiently understood situations.
The Pattern of Inquiry
Dewey chooses to introduce his definition o f intelligent (and in particular scientific) inquiry 
as a procedural sequence of steps:
1. Indeterminate Situation
2. Attention, institution of a problem (“problematic situation”)
3. Determination of “problem-solutions”
4. Reasoning/practical judgement
5. Consummatory Experience: Restoration o f a habitual equilibrium state
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This model has been described and commented on in many places (cf. Logic: Theory of 
Inquiry LW.12: The Pattern o f Inquiry, Studies in Logical Theory MW2.307, How we 
Think MW 6:236-7, Bernstein 1966 pp.101-13; Shook 2000 p.185).
Frank X. Ryan (2004 p. 18) notes:
“[I]nquiry is a pattern, not a prescription -  nothing is gained quibbling about five, or 
seven, or nine distinct stages. Sometimes we start in the middle, or with a solution to 
which there is not clear problem.”
I will argue that this “logic of inquiry” provides the basic material for a reconstruction of 
rationality, ready to challenge and supplant the LIR model.
At first glance, the five-step-sequence resembles any other linear progression scheme (cf. 
Chapter 2). In response to critiques, Dewey agreed that these stages could be read in a 
linear fashion, but pointed out that “the subject ... was written for pedagogical purposes 
rather than for strictly logical ends” (Experience and Education MW 13: 61). He clarified 
that the ‘steps’ o f inquiry were explicated separately just as one would separately consider 
the respiratory and circulatory systems when teaching biology. These five points would 
therefore be a logical format of different activity modes that constitute a system of inquiry 
rather than a linear progression scheme.
Underlying these activities is Peirce’s “doubt-belief’ scheme, which Dewey translates as 
“rhythm o f situation.” This scheme only provides direction with regard to the framing of  
inquiry. It leads from settled to indeterminate/problematic back to settled transactions. 
Since the actual process of inquiry (as captured by steps 2-4 above) does not follow a fixed 
procedural order, these modes o f activity could be represented in the following way, 
slightly diverging from Dewey’s original list by adding a centre o f methods and norms:
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Figure 6.2: A graphical model of the intelligent inquiry
Later I will introduce a model of rational policy making that strongly resembles this graph.4
I will now explain and comment upon these modes o f inquiry in further detail:
i. Antecedent condition: indeterminate situation. As previously stated, a situation becomes 
indeterminate when a habitual flow of transaction becomes inhibited or jeopardised. 
Dewey’s category o f an “indeterminate situation” must be distinguished from a 
“problematic situation.” “Indeterminate” refers to the immediate change o f quality in 
transaction, not to a reflected perception o f disturbing factors: my situation is indeterminate 
when I find myself in an unfamiliar place but before I realise I am lost or what it means to 
be lost at such a late hour. It is a situation that provokes us to wonder whether we are still 
on the right track. This step is a significant contribution to the logic o f inquiry. An 
indeterminate situation invites many different characterisations, framings and reactions. 
Such reactions include attempts to ignore imminent problems, a fiercer pursuit o f the
4 This resemblance, however, is not an identity with regard to the categories then discussed.
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already chosen path, or an examination of the situation in its new light and the initiation of 
a more systematic inquiry.
Introducing this category of an “indeterminate situation” captures experience were 
managers and planners realise that previously successful ways might not be sufficient in 
future. Planning theory has often referred to the gradual process of formulating a position 
as a problematic situation (Rosenhead 1989; Checkland 1999). In a more normative 
interpretation o f inquiry as the foundation for rationality in planning the concept of 
“indeterminate situation” can promote an attitude of proactively looking out for challenges 
instead o f waiting until problems appear: an equilibrium state may seem solid but can be 
challenged in the next moment.
ii. Attention, institution o f a problem: Explicit attention and awareness of an interrupted 
transactive equilibrium turns an indeterminate situation into a “problematic” one; (Logic 
LW 12.111):
“To see that a situation requires inquiry is the initial step in inquiry.”
Such attention is not equivalent to having a definition o f a problem. It is only the beginning 
of a challenging and creative process in which a viable problem-definition represents an 
advanced state o f the inquiry process.
Amongst the challenges to the LIR model is the often expressed worry of recent theorists 
that planners can rarely rely on the availability o f well-defined problems. Instead their main 
challenge is to achieve orientation in “messy” and insufficiently understood situations and 
to produce shared visions and goals (cf. Checkland 1981; Rosenhead and Mingers 2002).
Dewey had similar worries at least half a century earlier:
“... [A]mong persons directly occupied with management o f practical affairs, it is 
commonly assumed that the problems which exist are already definite in their main
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features. When this assumption is made, it follows that the business o f inquiry is but to 
ascertain the best method o f solving them...The inevitable result that methods for 
resolving problematic situations are proposed without any clear conception o f the 
material in which projects and plans are to be applied and to take effect” (Logic, 
LW12.487).
iii. The determination o f problem-solutions:
Dewey gives new meaning to the expression ‘a well-defined problem is on its way to a 
solution.’ The formulation and definition of a problem is itself a means for settling a 
problematic situation -  it is not merely a precondition for a more systematic search for a 
solution. He talks about a “fully reciprocal character of means and end” (The Logic of 
Judgement o f Practice, MW8.37), in that they are two aspects of the same process; (How 
we Think, LW8.201):
“... [W]e know what the problem exactly is simultaneously with finding a way out and 
getting it resolved. Problem and solution stand out completely at the same time. Up to 
that point, out grasp o f the problem has been more or less vague and tentative.”
Dewey claims that problems and solutions are but “changing, functional distinctions.” 
(Bernstein 106). In fact, the definition of the problem is only the outcome o f inquiry, not its 
starting-point. Correspondingly we may contend that planning ends rather than starts with a 
well-defined problem or purpose.
This line o f thought prompts Dewey to choose the hyphenated notion o f “problem- 
solution." Of particular interest here is that the temporal order o f having a problem and 
possessing a remedy or solution can be almost discretionarily overturned. We may start 
with a set o f solutions, (resources or theories), and in studying them and testing their 
employment in a problematic situation we generate a definition of our ends and aims, i.e. an 
organised and structured idea o f how to employ our means for the resolution o f the present 
problematic situation. This brings to mind the Garbage Can Model (Cohen, March et al. 
1972), according to which solutions are often developed independent o f problems and then
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stored in “garbage cans” from which they can be retrieved if  a suitable problem arises (cf. 
Chapter 2). However, the emphasis in this model is that given the opportunity, problems 
and solutions couple up more or less randomly, whereas for Dewey, processes o f problem 
definition and research into means of solutions are logically interdependent to the extent 
that they build a conceptual unity. This does not mean that research into methods and 
technology could not take place outside o f situations that make their application helpful or 
necessary.
iv. Reasoning/practical judgement
Whereas section iii dealt with the way inquiry leads to the creative structuring o f 
problematic situations and to possible definitions of problem-solutions, section iv searches 
for definite (though tentative) judgements to harmonise various possible definitions, 
conceptions of the situations and methods for settling its problematic quality within the 
complex network of existing beliefs and conceptions.
Dewey holds that in the context of scientific inquiry this means defining and shaping 
hypotheses that determine further experimental activities and give criteria for their success 
or failure.
Translated to planning and policy contexts this means that inquiry processes are not 
exhausted by finding a number of possible or even sensible descriptions and strategies. 
Building confidence, commitment to models and action strategies are tasks that rely greatly 
on exploring the consequences and ramifications of action in a situation. Reasoning here 
makes use o f imagination as a tool for generating hypothetical experiments (cf. chapter 5). 
These explorations, if shared amongst many stakeholder groups may create ownership of  
problem-definitions and solution strategies amongst participants. Where groups explore a 
situation together, where they successfully share models and perspectives, also an 
agreement on shared policies and ends will follow quite naturally (Taylor 1994).
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v. Restoration of harmonious experience: implementation and learning 
Dewey introduces this phase or mode of inquiry as “the operational character o f facts- 
meaning” (Logic, LW12.116). For Dewey ideas have no meaning save in their capacity to 
produce facts and transform experience. William James succinctly expressed the idea that 
hypotheses are not true or false per se. Instead, practical contexts bestow truth-values to 
propositions (James 1907 p. 201; quoted after Shields 1996):
“True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. ... The 
truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It 
becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process.”
Below I will argue that consequently, the categories o f planning (conceptual) and 
implementation (factual) are not separate, and that learning is not a contingent consequence 
but a necessary component o f implementation.
Before applying his ideas to the relation between planning and implementation, I will 
discuss how Dewey develops this point in the context of scientific5 inquiry, his main focus 
in “Logic -  Theory of Inquiry” (LW 12).
In discussing the relation between ideas (hypotheses) and observational facts (experiments), 
Dewey states that hypotheses are “operational” in their character, i.e. they guide the 
production of experience, and get their meaning from their capacity to inform experimental 
activity (LW12.116):
“Ideas are operational in that they instigate and direct further operations of observation; 
they are proposals and plans for acting upon existing conditions to bring new facts to 
light and to organize all the selected facts into a coherent whole.”
5 His paradigm case appears to be that of natural science and physics.
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This idea can be summarised with the proverbial wisdom that there is nothing more 
practical than a good theory. The complementary idea, that there is nothing as theoretical as 
a good practice, is the gist o f his following argument. Only after establishing both sides did 
Dewey feel entitled to conclude that ideas and facts (hypotheses and observations) work 
together as two aspects of the same process.
Also facts are “operational,” which Dewey explains in the following way (Logic 
LW12.117):
“[facts are] not self-sufficient and complete in themselves ... They are not merely 
results of observation ... Their function is to serve as evidence and their evidential 
quality is judged on the basis o f their capacity to form an ordered whole in response to 
operations prescribed by the ideas they occasion and support.”
These facts are not merely events but are produced by theory-guided experiments and are 
therefore manifestations o f the meaning of our theories. I discussed earlier (chapter 3) how 
the “stimulus” in the “stimulus-response” model is not a mere causal antecedent but an 
actively produced or designed phase o f an organism’s coordination. In a similar vein we 
should think o f the result of an experiment not as a mere causal effect o f some manipulation 
but as a product o f the theories it is testing. An experiment substantiates the meaning o f a 
hypothesis theory in just as much as it provides a corrective measure. If observational facts 
diverge even slightly from their expected values, they will change the meaning o f some o f  
our theories (even if this normally means changes in auxiliary assumptions rather than 
alterations to the Lakatosian core of theories). Hence, saying that “facts are operational” 
means they are active players which manifest, modulate, and manoeuvre the meanings of  
our ideas.
The relation between ideas and facts (and between hypothesis and experiment) is reciprocal 
and intimate (Logic LW12.117):
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“Some observed facts point to an idea that stands for a possible solution. This idea 
evokes more observations ... The new order o f facts suggests a modified idea (or 
hypothesis) which occasions new observations whose result again determines a new 
order of facts, and so on until the existing order is both unified and complete. In the 
course of this serial process, the ideas that represent possible solutions are tested or 
‘proved’.”
Observation and learning coincide if  facts are not passive results but actively 
(“operationally”) contribute to the production o f theories.
This conclusion attracts attention only when translated from the context o f scientific 
research to that of social planning. To this end I suggest two conceptual replacements that 
easily accord with Dewey’s intentions:
1. Hypothesis (idea/theory) = Plan
2. Experiment (fact) = Implementation
If this is so, the following argument pertains: Plans guide the implementation o f change 
(they are operative). Change is not a (self-sufficient) modification of circumstances, but an 
(operative) change of experience: it alters the meaning of those very plans that it manifests, 
and directly stimulates their alteration or the production o f new designs. The planning 
process is not linear, i.e. plans are not merely implemented (with positive or negative 
results), but implementation itself belongs to the learning circle that is essential in 
formulating a plan and in giving meaning to a design. If the production o f changes through 
implantation is itself part o f the operative meaning o f a design, then the result is a 
constitutive step of the plan-formulation stage.
Planning (i.e. the design-process) comes to an end only when this learning circle has led to 
a new equilibrium of a “unified situation.” This is a state in which a plan and its practical 
demands harmonise with the coordinated activities in experience.
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The LIR model conceptualises planning as a process that leads from design (idea) to 
implementation (practice/fact), which are two distinct and subsequent stages. Learning is an 
optional third stage -  a feedback loop leading from observed results back to earlier stages 
(e.g. to the definition o f “resources” and “guides,” (cf. Figure 2.1), from where they 
influence future planning enterprises).
The upshot o f above argument is that learning cannot be separated from implementation or 
reduced to an optional feedback link. If implemented changes (facts) are operational in 
their character, i.e. give new meaning and definition to plans, then any implemented change 
will in itself amount to an act o f plan-adjustment.
Upon close reading, Dewey’s definition of inquiry aims not merely at re-establishing any 
settled equilibrium in place o f a problematic situation, but demands us to “determine a 
situation in its constituent distinctions and relations” (see definition above). Inquiry with 
the aim of settling and unifying a situation is hence both the study o f distinctions and 
relations (elements and meanings), and the way we revise and upgrade our practical 
orientations. To understand how these two definitions coincide we must remember 
Dewey’s definition o f belief as habitual coordination and his definition o f meaning. This 
result is equally important for any theory of planning and for the common understanding o f  
the pragmatist philosophy and Dewey’s definition o f the “method o f intelligence.” 
Resolving problem situations through intelligent inquiry means more than getting rid o f  
troubles, it means changing beliefs and habits by studying the meanings and relations of 
things. It means creating a deeper understanding, which is the same as achieving a more 
well-informed form of coordination. This could serve as a definition o f learning.
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Rational Planning as Intelligent Inquiry
This concludes my discussion of Dewey’s “pattern o f inquiry” as the key for a new model 
of rational planning.
I have pointed out how Dewey’s situational approach, by introducing “indeterminate” and 
“problematic” situations (i&ii), allows for a more adequate account of typically 
encountered planning contexts, thereby providing conceptual means for a better orientation 
in actual circumstances.
The same holds true for Dewey’s notion o f “problem-situation” (iii) which, together with 
the results of Chapter 4 (valuation), settles thorny questions about the origin of problem- 
definitions in rational deliberation. It allows rational planners to develop their missions step 
by step and in coherence with investigations into the possibilities, risks, and chances 
inherent in a situation.
Dewey’s pattern of inquiry creates space for the exercise o f intellectual capacities or 
“reasoning” in rational deliberation (iv). This can comprise deductive forms of reasoning 
and symbolic transformations, yet as chapter 5 argued reasoning is a wider concept which 
invites a variety o f imaginative capacities for exploring the meaning of hypotheses and 
propositions in the ‘safe mode’ o f thought experiments. Dewey’s conception further 
encourages synthetic forms of reasoning such as scenario building and model formulation, 
and allows a wide variety o f human psychological capacities (“imagination”) to figure as 
equitable resources.
This pattern of inquiry that embodies Dewey’s “method o f intelligence” provides the key to 
understanding rational planning primarily as a learning exercise (point v). Moreover, it 
circumscribes a criterion for a successful outcome o f rational planning that is neither 
vacuous nor trivial: it points toward the creative transformation o f our activities and 
dispositions so that we settle a conflicting situation by generating a more thorough 
understanding of its determinants.
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For Dewey, scientific inquiry as characterised by this “pattern o f inquiry” is the role model 
of any rational action that follows the “method o f intelligence.” Intelligence demands more 
than following pre-approved recipes for the solution of problematic situations. It demands 
an active lookout for causal relations and the unprejudiced testing o f hypotheses, so as to 
expose even fundamental beliefs to revision.
Dewey concludes that the method of intelligence for social planning must be equivalent to 
an anti-authoritarian, critical stance, and that intelligent inquiry is essentially a public and 
collective task (cf. LSA LW11.58).
The following section will make the transition from this conception of rational “intelligent” 
inquiry to explicitly collective agency contexts of social and urban planning.
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Chapter 7: Social Planning and Collective Intelligence
Evolution is a change from a no-howish untalkaboutable all-alikeness 
to a some-howish and in-general talkaboutable not-all-alikeness by continuous
sticktogetherations and somethingelseifications.
William James
Introduction
The previous discussion o f Dewey’s philosophy (Chapters 3-5) has led us from a critical 
revision of agency theory to a new concept of rationality defined as “intelligent inquiry.”
The detailed exploration o f Dewey’s critique o f the Humean agency and rationality model 
(Chapters 3-5) was framed as a methodological step within a larger project. This project set 
out to develop a new conception o f rational planning and policy making that could supplant 
the outdated linear instrumental model. Chapter 6 made the step from an agency-centred 
perspective toward a theory o f rationality based on Dewey’s notions o f “method of 
intelligence” and “pattern of inquiry.”
The current chapter aims at linking these general reflections on rational agency to the 
context o f collective social planning. I shall address some concerns about understanding 
rationality as a property o f collective deliberation processes. Some scholars have explicitly 
warned against transferring any rationality model which can be applied to the purposeful, 
intentional behaviour o f individuals to contexts o f social planning. I shall discuss how 
Dewey’s theory could quell these sceptical voices, and I will investigate how the pragmatist 
concept of inquiry, which serves as the modus operandi o f our reconstructed notion of 
rationality, can be interpreted quite naturally as a social method o f intelligent action 
planning. I will further discuss Dewey’s notions o f “effective-” and “social intelligence” as 
ways o f solving the classic dilemma between technocratic expertise and democratic 
participation.
Three Indictments against Rational Planning
In his essay, “The Possibility o f Rational Politics,” Jon Elster (1991) rejects the idea that 
policy-making should conform to a standard of rationality defined by the same model that 
applies to individual rational choice. He voices three objections against any attempt at 
treating collective deliberation and individual forms of decision-making alike. His 
arguments rely strongly on the Humean model of rational action, and hence his lines of 
critique can be matched up with the three basic elements in the (Humean) Folk model 
(Fig. 1.1): beliefs, desires, and action.
Elster (1991) maintains that:
1. Information and intelligence are dispersed amongst the members of a community, 
where they remain ultimately beyond the reach o f any central planning agency.
2. The notion of preference finds no acceptable equivalent on the level o f political 
decision-making (or social choice).
3. Political or collective coordination could never be understood as the analogue of 
individual agency because the former lacks the centred integration of the latter.
It is easy to understand how these objections affect the linear instrumental notion of 
rationality, which is made after the image of Humean rational agency, and therefore 
presupposes the antecedent definition o f means (information and intelligence), ends (social 
preference ordering) and the agent as a centre o f coordination and decision making.
The following discussion has three main parts that will address Elster’s challenges in turn. I 
will indicate why a Deweyan situational transactive model o f rational agency could remain 
unaffected by them. Doing so, I will introduce some important aspects of Dewey’s social 
theory which point at the democratic and participatory character of the STR model.
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1 Democracy and Collective Intelligence
Deliberate Planning and Dispersed Intelligence -  A Liberal Worry
The fist of Elster’s indictments against rational social planning is a point that has been 
made by a number o f liberal philosophers and political theorists (Hayek 1945; Popper 
1961). The claim is that the information, knowledge and intelligence required for social 
planning cannot be made available to any central planning bureau. Most o f the relevant 
knowledge and information is dispersed among the members of a society. If rationality 
were defined as making the best use of all available knowledge in guiding action and 
strategies, the very idea of rational social planning would be spurious. Some libertarian 
anarchists and incrementalists argue that centralised planning would fall far behind those 
decentralised social deliberation mechanisms like markets and private life choices which 
are better able to employ prevalent intelligence and knowledge. The rest they tend to 
entrust to invisible hands or to incremental patchwork policies that improvise ad hoc 
solutions to problems in a trial and error fashion (Popper 1961; Lindblom 1973).
A committed liberal, Dewey rejects all centralised forms o f social control (cf. Ryan 1995 
for an extended discussion of Dewey's dispute with Walter Lippman). “Intelligence” cannot 
be monopolised by a ruling elite. He further acknowledges that many aspects o f intelligent 
social coordination do not require central planning or explicit public deliberation. That is, 
not all forms o f social intelligence (i.e. intelligent forms of collective coordination) are 
necessarily the product o f public deliberation. Deliberate public intelligence requires 
participants to understand and plan their collective action. The history of human interaction 
has yielded rules and institutions that are shaped by experience and embody the intelligence 
of generations to maintain economic and social life. Many o f these rules and institutions are 
not the product of conscious collective deliberation, and their functioning does not depend 
on participants understanding their mechanisms. But Dewey avoids talking about “invisible 
hands” because he holds that none o f their working must remain invisible. The social 
benefits of decentralised and individual management o f affairs need not be contrasted with 
public efforts at achieving social coordination. Since we are able to understand their
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working and anticipate their benefits, they may be integrated into any strategy o f public 
administration.
Dewey rejects the idea that centralised authoritative planning would be the best method for 
solving the problems of society, but he also opposes those liberals who infer from the 
decentralised nature o f skills and crucial information bases the need to eschew any form of  
deliberate collective planning (LSA LW 11.32):
“When conditions had changed [transition from authoritarian to early liberal societies] 
and the problem was one of constructing social organization from individual units that 
had been released from old social ties, liberalism fell upon evil times. The conception of 
intelligence as something that arose from the association o f isolated elements, 
sensations and feelings, left no room for far-reaching experiments in construction of a 
new social order. It was definitely hostile to everything like collective social planning.”
He fiercely contradicted those who privilege private decision-making over the social and 
collective forms of deliberation because the argument of dispersed knowledge and 
intelligence does not imply the advantage o f private decision-making. In fact even most 
decentralised forms of intelligence are social rather than private (LSA LW11).
To understand Dewey’s conception o f intelligent collective deliberation we must remember 
the intimate relationship between “knowledge” and “coordination” established in earlier 
chapters1; moreover, coordination is a transactional notion that sees agency as a set of 
processes and relations within a whole situation. According to Dewey, even the most 
personal belief cannot be fully understood as located in a private mind. It comprises a 
relationship between an agent and her (social) environment. The knowledge and skill o f a 
shop owner, for example, does not reside in her mind; it lies in the way she chooses,
1 These two are not identical of course, since coordination can be achieved accidentally. Knowledge 
incorporates the anticipated consequences of our action into our coordination. It is defined as a disposition or 
a readiness to uphold coordination in a way that is able to “unify” a situation, cf. Chapter 3.
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arranges and sells her products to customers, and thereby incorporates transactions with 
other persons.
Dewey speaks of “the intelligence, the knowledge, ideas and purposes that have been 
integrated in the medium in which individuals live” (LSA LW 11.49), and he continues 
(p.49-50):
“Each o f us knows, for example, some mechanic o f ordinary native capacity who is 
intelligent within the matters o f his calling. He has lived in an environment in which the 
cumulative intelligence o f a multitude o f cooperating individuals is embodied, and by 
the use o f his native capacities he makes some phase o f this intelligence his own. Given 
a social medium in whose institutions the available knowledge, ideas and art of 
humanity were incarnate, and the average individual would rise to undreamed heights 
of social and political intelligence.”
An IT consultant is dependent on the context o f a highly developed technical surrounding 
and an infrastructure of business processes to which he must continuously adapt. Without 
this context his training, knowledge and abilities would not only be useless, they would 
also be meaningless.
This insight is enough to refute the claim that decentralised coordination must primarily 
rest on private beliefs or choice. We may sense that decision-making, however 
decentralised, is always a social process. But it does not indicate how we can rehabilitate 
the idea o f deliberate and intelligent social planning on any significant collective scale.
The Public
Before discussing the possibility o f a truly collective form of intelligence as a foundation 
for rational planning, I will take a brief look at Dewey’s concept o f the public.
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This concept can easily be misunderstood as a way o f separating the realm of private 
management (negative freedom) from that of legitimate societal intervention.
Here I suggest a slightly different reading. A sharp separation between the private and the 
public as two domains o f sovereignty contradicts both Dewey’s concept o f the individual 
and his concept of a public sphere. According to Dewey, participation is constitutive for 
individual freedom. This is a stronger claim than saying that the individual is socially 
embedded or that community relations and a sense o f belonging are constitutive for an 
individual’s freedom to choose meaningful actions. For Dewey, participation in collective 
deliberation processes is necessary for the individual to reach their full potential. On this 
account the “public” is not merely a domain o f policy intervention, separate from individual 
freedom of choice; it is rather a platform for determining a genuinely shared way o f life (PP 
LW 2).
Dewey’s definition of the public is based on the idea that small and local decision-making 
has potential externalities that deserve explicit attention and deliberate planning (PP LW 
2.252). But also in this definition, it is not the separation between domains of management 
and influence (state and private), but the distinction between two different aspects o f the 
very same practices that defines the public sphere. Dewey’s philosophy is particularly 
relevant in contemporary contexts where we are often reminded that most private decisions 
have not anticipated long term and remote consequences.
Unmediated individual behaviour has unintended consequences that are often problematic. 
Beyond private decision-making and the laws of the market, we need a level of explicit 
planning, because, by definition, we cannot leave these problems up to the chance o f self­
organisation, since that is where they originated. What exactly falls into the remit of the 
public and its explicit efforts to plan and design is a complicated question for political 
philosophy. Here we should ask whether deliberate and intelligent social planning is 
possible and by what means it should be done. The question is how should we think about 
collective planning so as to make our designs more intelligent. How can we do justice to 
the insight that intelligence is potentially a decentralised human faculty without falling back
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on the sceptical position of laissez faire liberalism or the post hoc and ad hoc repair 
workshop of incremental “piecemeal social engineering” (Popper 1961).
If we believe that invisible hands must not remain invisible and that people should use their 
intelligence and projective imagination to foresee ramified and long term consequences of 
their actions; if we, like Dewey, believe that people have a say in their destinies and can 
improve their situations with foresight and effort, we still have to ask how. How can there 
be collective rational or “intelligent” deliberation? How can we as collectives employ 
capacities like projective imagination, conscious coordination o f complex actions, the 
estimation o f side effects, externalities and long term consequences, and sensible 
employment o f resources? And how, Dewey would add, can we make sure that all these 
tools and instruments serve us to grow both individually and as a community?
In order to answer these questions Dewey recommends the “scientific attitude,” meaning 
the method o f intelligence discussed in the previous chapter.
Science and Democracy
The scientific attitude is not a ‘positivistic attitude’ because it does not rely on a predefined 
scientific methodology or a fixed deductive explanatory scheme. Dewey’s scientific 
attitude refers to the search for new creative methods and solutions in concrete problematic 
contexts.
Deweyan political rationality is not only concerned with avoiding the sceptical positions of  
libertarian laissez faire economics and incrementalism. It also strives to avoid other 
extremes where technocratic planning experts, endowed with superior intelligence and 
knowledge, would be set to solve societal problems in central planning offices. The idea 
that knowledge, reason and intelligence are endowed to a privileged class of experts 
directly contradicts Dewey’s scientific attitude. In contrast, he defines scientific inquiry as a 
community-based and an ultimately democratic enterprise.
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I will look briefly at the importance o f community in the definition o f science and scientific 
knowledge according to Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey.
Scientific community for Peirce
The idea that knowledge is inconceivable when understood as private property was one of 
the defining tenets of Charles Sanders Peirce’s philosophy (Peirce 1831-1958)2. For Peirce, 
science takes place in a universe that is partly indeterminate -  a universe that is abidingly 
suspended in the process o f its creation. In such a universe laws are neither exact nor 
immutable -  at best they are probabilistic. Observation is part o f the unfolding story, and it 
is realised by many conflicting perspectives. The process o f conciliation or convergence o f  
an inquiring community is constitutive for the truth o f a matter. “The opinion which is fated 
to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the 
object represented in this opinion is the real” (Peirce 5.407).
The suspicion o f relativism that has haunted the entire pragmatist tradition is fuelled by 
suggestions that even reality should be the product, rather than the independent premise, of 
collective research (Peirce 4.61):
“.. .the real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down.”
However, relativism is a mistaken label for Peirce’s position because it insinuates that a 
community arbitrarily decides to establish what is real and true. The universe itself provides 
opposition and resistance, i.e. Peirce’s category of “secondness” is irreducibly part of our 
epistemic enterprises.3 Further, the purpose of science is a practical one. Human efforts to 
understand take place in a complex and evolving universe in which “[t]he mind moves 
between the poles o f doubt and belief’ (Smith 1965 p. 105). “Doubt” is existential, i.e. more
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Peirce refer to this collection and are referred to in the usual 
way.
3 In other words, “secondness” cannot be reduced to “thirdness” (rules, intentions, concepts, meanings) and 
vice versa. I.e. the resistance that we face in our attempts to fix beliefs cannot be reduced to meanings, 
definitions or conceptions (cf. Smith 1965).
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than a theoretical option to formulate a sentence in the inquisitive form. Doubt is the 
inability o f maintaining a habit (“belief’). For Peirce the aim of science in an undetermined 
universe is to overcome states of “doubt” (existential hesitation, unease, or restlessness) and 
obtain “belief,” “confidence, resolution, and that sort of adjustment ... in behaviour ... that 
we recognise as habitual action” (Smith 1965 p.105).4
It is not, however, the individual mind that will establish “truth” or define “the real.” 
Reality is defined precisely as the point of convergence that a community may eventually 
or ideally reach through its research efforts (Peirce 5.311, quoted after Bernstein 1966 
p. 132):
“... [T]he real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would 
finally result in, and which is therefore independent o f the vagaries o f me and you ... 
the very origin o f the conception o f reality shows that this conception essentially 
involves the notion of a COMMUNITY.”
Under this definition o f the “real” as decided by collective agreement, individual 
possession o f truth about reality is a meaningless concept. The very nature o f the universe 
does not lend itself to the notion that a subjective (individual) epistemic process could 
discover its structure in a stable, monolithic, independent existence. Since the universe is 
indeterminate, and since the multitude of inquiries and perspectives is an irreducible part of 
its evolution, each individual scientific investigation and result can only partially or 
temporally resolve doubt -  science is fallible.
The primary intention o f this argument is not to point out that “truth” is an inter-subjective 
term but rather that, according to Peirce, the structure o f inquiry is communal and 
communicative. From this, and given the result of the previous chapter in which 
“rationality” and “intelligent inquiry” were equivocated, we can conclude that rational 
deliberation is an essentially social process.
4 Cf. chapter 6.
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One may refuse Peirce’s optimism that communal investigation will, in the long run and 
under ideal conditions, converge and “ultimately settle down.” But this is no reason to 
discard wholesale Peirce’s notion o f scientific progress in general. Pierce uses Hume’s 
metaphor of stepping “on the shoulders of giants” to indicate how a scientific community 
as a whole can benefits from ongoing scientific inquiry as a self-correcting and self- 
improving process (7.51, quoted after Smith 1965 p.l 10):
“In storming the stronghold o f truth, one mounts upon the shoulders o f another who has 
to ordinary apprehension failed, but has in truth succeeded by virtue of the lessons of 
his failure.”
Scientific community for Dewey
This same idea appears again in Dewey’s writings, except that for him the success of 
scientific intelligence is not ‘cumulative’ in the sense o f eventually “fixing beliefs.” He 
instead points at ‘communicated’ or ‘collective’ success with respect to existing 
problematic conditions. Dewey has little use for the idea o f a gradual approximation to the 
truth or even for a gradual “fixing o f beliefs.” One problem for Peirce is how should the 
aim of science, (‘eventual convergence on one single truth’), ever be achieved by an ideal 
scientific community if the universe itself is unstable, i.e. if the world remains a creation in 
progress? Dewey solves this problem by defining scientific progress as a continuous 
adaptation5 to ever-changing circumstances. Thus scientific inquiry is not dedicated to 
reaching an ultimate commonsense; it is concerned with problematic inquiry contexts at 
hand, instead. This is why Dewey urges philosophers to develop adequate instruments of 
inquiry to meet the challenges o f their own age instead of inventing immutable answers on 
eternal questions (cf. the essays “The need for a recovery o f philosophy,” MW 10 & “The 
quest for certainty,” LW 4).
5 1 am not using ‘adaptation’ in the sense of Dewey’s restrictive definition here.
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Dewey agrees with Peirce that beliefs and ideas can be knowledge in the full sense only 
when they are shared and owned by a community (PP LW2.371):
“Ideas which are not communicated, shared, and reborn in expression are but soliloquy, 
and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought.”
For Dewey, as for Peirce, scientific inquiry is a practical matter through and through 
regarding both its occasion (“doubt”) and its results (“belief’). But Dewey goes further than 
Peirce. Peirce never saw mundane problems like the everyday challenges o f living in a 
community as the ultimate source scientific doubts. His notions of scientific “doubt” and 
“believe” remain immanent and restricted to contexts of scientific research. In short, 
Peirce’s “pragmaticism,” as a theory of science, does not seamlessly connect with life- 
practical contexts outside science. Dewey’s theory of inquiry is a theory o f life as a whole, 
not of a domain o f science. Therefore “doubt,” or questions which occupy scientists, are not 
scientific problems sui generis but problems o f life6 (Logic LW12.76):
“...science takes its departure of necessity from the qualitative objects, processes, and 
instruments of the common sense world o f use and concrete enjoyments and 
sufferings.”
It is for this reason that the scientific community inquires into problems o f the scientific 
community rather than merely into scientific problems. Science is not only about resolving 
doubt as an isolated crisis o f belief. It is by definition a communal enterprise directed 
toward inquiring into the problems of the community. It is only in this way that Dewey’s 
idea of a scientific inquiry can become a model for social intelligence and planning.
6 Chapter 6 already addressed the continuity of scientific inquiry with organic coordination in problematic 
environments.
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Science as Democracy
One thing that sets Dewey’s pragmatism apart from scientific positivism according to 
Shields (2003) is that . .pragmatism links the scientific attitude with a rich participatory 
community.”
Dewey’s great innovation is not that he understands the importance o f the scientific 
community in the inquiry process, but that he also understands this inquiry process as 
democratic in nature. This suggests that there must not necessarily be a trade-off between 
scientific expertise and democratic participation in planning processes. If Dewey is right, 
we might very well foster democratic participation in the planning process for cognitive 
rather than only ethical reasons.
Alan Ryan explains how the ideal o f democracy resembles that of science, as “it excluded 
the fewest alternatives, allowed all ideas a fair shot at being tried out, encouraged progress, 
and did not rely on authority. [Moreover] democracy offered no guarantees, any more than 
science...” (Ryan 1995 p.43).
Others add (Talisse 2000 p.76):
“In democratic discourse, ideas are advanced and examined according solely to the 
evidence that can be marshalled in their support; conclusions and decisions are taken to 
be tentative hypotheses, proposals for action, subject to the test of future experience and 
hence to revision, social status and privilege are as irrelevant as is rhetorical skill.”
Dewey’s argument about the complementary nature of democracy and scientific inquiry 
was summarised by Putnam as resting on three premises. (Putnam after Westbrook 1998):
1. In both science and democracy, we gain “warranted assertible” belief only “by 
means o f methods, practices, and values of a community o f competent inquirers.”
2. Inquiry, like democracy, extends to “judgements of practice and moral judgements.”
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3. There are “cognitive” in addition to ethical grounds as to why “a community o f  
inquiry should be democratic.”
Reasons for the last point will be discussed in the following section.
Putnam concludes that for Dewey (Westbrook 1998 p. 131, commenting on Putnam)
“.. .the quality o f inquiry is affected by the degree to which that community is inclusive 
or exclusive o f all the potential, competent participants in that inquiry and by the 
democratic or undemocratic character of the norms that guide its practice.”
Moreover, both science and democracy internalise their understanding as fallible 
institutions (cf. Garrison 2000), and it is their unique ability to face up to this fact -  to 
address failure and to improve- that gives them an advantage over known alternatives. In 
his commitment to fallibilism as a source o f both scientific and political improvement, 
Dewey agrees with Popper (1945; 1959). Popper and Dewey differ, however, on account of 
Dewey’s epistemic and political communitarianism (Ryan 1995 pp.100-101). In contrast to 
Popper’s fragmented piece-meal engineering, Dewey offers a vision of the public as a 
“great community” in which people dare to engage in large-scale social reform projects, so 
long as these fulfil three conditions:
• Deliberation must be inclusive and engage all affected participants;
• The methods and norms applied in deliberation must be compatible with a 
democratic commitment;
• The deliberation process must be flexible and open-ended. It should neither start by 
establishing incontrovertible premises nor end with irreversible judgements.
The third point reflects the situational transactive notion o f planning as developed in the 
previous chapter.
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Avoiding two extremes
Dewey explicitly encouraged social experiments and did not, like Popper, restrict them to 
incremental adjustments. Of course Dewey abhorred large-scale social experiments of the 
kind he witnessed during his own lifetime. However, we cannot avoid all large-scale social 
experiments. The formation o f states and democracy itself is for Dewey an “experiment-in- 
the-making” (Boisvert 78).
The following quote could be read as a direct rebuttal o f both comprehensive utopian social 
planning and unguided trial and error incrementalism (PP, LW2.257):
“It is not the business o f political philosophy and science to determine what the state in 
general should or must be. What they may do is to aid in creation o f methods such that 
experimentation may go on less blindly, less at the mercy o f accident, more 
intelligently, so that men may learn from their errors and profit by their successes.”
In deliberative democracy Dewey sees part of a solution to the dilemma between grand 
utopian visions and blind trial and error procedures. As we have seen, democratic 
institutions are for Dewey not merely a guarantee against abusive and dehumanising social 
experiments, they also incorporate the spirit o f free and un-coerced scientific inquiry. 
Hence democracy promises to be a most effective tool in employing our knowledge, 
intelligence and foresight to achieve improvements.
For Dewey, intelligence is a social property because it incorporates individual 
achievements as well as individual failures into a collective method o f inquiry and learning. 
But effective social intelligence does not take the form o f blind trial and error. Dewey 
charges some liberals with confusing complacency with social intelligence and thereby 
wasting the potential o f a scientific attitude (LSA LW 11.32-3):
“The doctrine o f laissez faire was applied to intelligence as well as to economic action, 
although the conception of experimental method in science demands a control by 
comprehensive ideas, projected in possibilities to be realized by action. Scientific
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method is as much opposed to go-as-you-please in intellectual matters as it is to reliance 
upon habits o f mind whose sanction is that they were formed by ‘experience’ in the 
past. The theory o f mind held by early liberals advanced beyond dependence upon the 
past but it did not arrive at the idea of experimental and constructive intelligence.”
Democracy and effective social intelligence
The idea that knowledge and truth can be communicated and shared makes Dewey 
positively optimistic about deliberative democracy as a form of scientific inquiry. Dewey 
makes the important claim that “social-” or “effective intelligence” can be democratic in its 
very nature. His notion of “effective intelligence” is opposed to the enlightenment 
understanding o f a “fixed and given reason” (Gouinlock in John Dewey’s Collected Works 
LW2.xxxiii). This distinction can be compared with the definition o f “intelligence” as 
either a specific individually possessed talent to perform complex analytical tasks, or as any 
effective social condition that enables people to apply adequate solutions to their complex 
problems. The latter depends much on social, technical and infrastructural conditions and 
less on individual talent. However, sceptics may worry that democratic forms o f collective 
deliberation would suffer severely if the average member o f a community has only a 
modest grasp o f the principles of reason. They would suspect any form o f participative 
democracy of manifesting collective folly and impudence just as much as collective reason.
Dewey’s “social intelligence” or “intelligence in operation,” in contrast, exists in culturally 
transmitted learned habits and practices. It draws from the stock o f available knowledge in 
a society and it uses instruments of communication and education for their transmission. 
Moreover, it uses differences in beliefs and opinions as resources in a creative search for 
viable conceptions o f associated life.
Dewey believes in the human powers of reflection, anticipation, and communication as 
tools o f intelligent collective deliberation. In a slightly different vein than Peirce, Dewey 
also uses Hume’s metaphor of stepping ‘on the shoulders o f giants.’ Dewey claims that our
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individual intelligence will be greatly enhanced if we live an associated life that enables 
collective access to sources of knowledge (PP LW 11.38):
“There are few individuals who have the native capacity that was required to invent the 
stationary steam-engine, locomotive, dynamo or telephone. But there are none so mean 
that they cannot intelligently utilize these embodiments o f intelligence once they are a 
part o f the organized means o f associated living. The indictments that are drawn against 
the intelligence o f individuals are in truth indictments of a social order that does not 
permit the average individual to have access to the rich store o f the accumulated wealth 
of mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes.”
For Dewey this implies a powerful argument against the elitist claim that social planning 
should rests on experts’ superior intelligence (PP LW 2.366):
“A more intelligent state o f social affairs, one more informed with knowledge, more 
directed by intelligence, would not improve original endowments one whit, but it would 
raise the level upon which the intelligence o f all operates. The height o f this level is 
much more important for judgement o f public concerns than are differences in 
intelligence quotients.”
However, what are we advised to do if we, as planners, find ourselves confronted with a 
reality that consists of many poorly educated and disinterested clients and a few expensive 
and well-informed planners? Should we encourage more participation and hope that 
measures to improve education and communication work? Should we start by engaging 
large numbers in defining new “public symbols,” as Dewey suggests, or is this too hopeful 
and naive?
As a pragmatist, Dewey would surely reject such a detached interpretation o f his work.
His ideas actually yield more concrete and helpful advice.
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For one, we can conclude that intelligent planning is never only a matter o f getting from A 
to B with a minimum expenditure o f resources and time. If planners want to benefit from 
the potentials o f effective social intelligence, they should indeed work on the framework- 
conditions o f the planning process as well as on the achievements o f their ends. Building 
up the right channels of communication, enabling all actual and potential participants to 
access debates, and not excluding legitimate critical voices are vital in drawing upon this 
resource. These measures can be realistically achieved in any planning context.
Dewey takes his faith in democracy not merely from the fairness o f numerical equality in 
balloting procedures, but from the potential high quality o f democratic deliberation. This 
potential, however, cannot be taken for granted but depends on much more than equal 
suffrage. He strongly agrees with Walter Lippman that democracy can fail, but he draws 
more optimistic conclusions (LSA LW 11.39):
“It is useless to talk about the failure o f democracy until the source of its failure has 
been grasped and steps are taken to bring about that type o f social organization that will 
encourage the socialized extension o f intelligence.”
If social intelligence is to be found in the organisation o f associated life rather than in the 
superior minds of experts or leaders, what sort o f organisation should this be? Dewey 
refuses to give a definite answer as to what an intelligence-promoting social organisation 
should look like. Institutional arrangements must always remain the outcome o f specific 
democratic inquiry in concrete contexts. However, Dewey discusses in detail the meaning 
of democracy as a form o f associated life that employs intelligence as its method and 
standard.
Dewey rejects defining democracy as merely government by majority rule. He rests his 
notion of democracy upon the idea o f equality, but this, he claims, cannot be cashed out in 
terms o f numerical vote-counts. Equally important as suffrage is the acknowledgement and 
invitation o f differences as opposed to an “egali-fication” or “homogenisation” o f society 
(Boisvert 1998 p.66). Dewey explains (Reconstruction in Philosophy MW12.329-30):
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“Equality does not signify that kind of mathematical or physical equivalence in virtue 
of which any one element may be substituted for another. It denotes affective regard for 
whatever is distinctive and unique in each, irrespective o f physical and psychological 
inequalities. It is not a natural possession but a fruit of the community when its action is 
directed by its character as a community.”
1 have already gathered some practical advice for planning that follows from the Deweyan 
“scientific” understanding of democracy as collective intelligence. It must be added that we 
need not necessarily discount democratic participation as inferior to experts’ rationality 
from a cognitive point o f view. In fact we might reject the strong opposition between 
participation and expertise, and rather search for a new role of experts’ competences within 
democratic deliberation processes and as constitutive part o f social intelligence. A 
community that would discount the contribution of learned experts or scientific evidence 
would violate the understanding o f democracy as an internalised scientific attitude just as 
much as a Lippman-style technocratic society. We may go back to Paul Appleby as quoted 
by Shields (2003) to understand the role of experts in a Deweyan democracy: “Experts 
should be on tap and not on top.”
2 Common Ends and Shared Purposes
The second o f Elster’s indictments against using the same concept of rationality for 
individual choice and public policy (or planning) was concerned with the absence of a 
convincing method for defining social preference orderings. Some liberals worried that 
defining a social preference ordering (or a definition o f  the common good) would involve 
an illegitimate imposition on at least some individuals. Kenneth Arrow’s (1963) 
“impossibility theorem” demonstrates the difficulties in defining a reliable and convincing 
method for aggregating individual preferences into a unified social ordering.
We can deal reasonably swiftly with this challenge, as it is evident that it only threatens the 
LIR model, which needs to rely on a prior given definition o f ends and purposes.
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However, the issue o f social preferences the determination o f common goods is connected 
with some important aspects of Dewey’s theory, which may help to gain a better 
understanding o f the situational transactive rationality model.
Democracy and Human Purpose
Chapter 4 established that in a Deweyan rationality model ends and purposes are not given 
as social goods or as an aggregation of individual preferences. They are functional or 
“instrumental” products of a creative planning process. Planning was identified as an 
inquiry process which is always also a moral quest. But how can we hope to arrive at good 
and agreed upon definitions o f social ends if  many individuals are involved and affected?
What surprises is not that Dewey points at democratic deliberation to solve this problem, 
but what he actually understands by this suggestion. Many would see in democracy a 
means of identifying the wishes of a majority and a fair procedure that pays equal respect 
even to a minority that is bound to lose.
However, for Dewey democracy is more than a way o f aggregating and legitimising social 
ends. He sees democratic deliberation as a means o f creating common sense or “like- 
mindedness” (DE MW9.7).
This idea must surely alarm or even terrify some modern liberals. How can we allow any 
form o f government not only to represent, serve and cherish individual wishes, but to 
influence, mould or assimilate them?
Dewey acknowledges that agreement on social ends must not be presupposed, at least not 
in large, diversified societies. He does, however, believe in the necessity o f achieving some 
agreement on substantial purposes. The path to such “like-mindedness” is neither via a 
numeric aggregation o f individual preference data, nor by mere democratic compromise. 
For Dewey “... democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of
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associated living, o f conjoint communicated experience...” (DE MW 9.93) and it is in this 
associated mode o f living that participating members coordinate their lives and plans. Some 
liberals interpret any quest for substantial agreement or ‘shared experience’ as a harbinger 
of a coercive society that gives its members insufficient room to differ substantially in their 
experiences, ways o f life or pursued ends. For Dewey this conclusion does not follow. 
Individual flourishing and participation in a community, including serving common plans 
and goods, are not by nature opposed; and this does not make Dewey a conservative with a 
taste for the normalising power of inherited ways o f life. Social agreement cannot be taken 
for granted as handed down or as something assured by the quality of received institutions. 
“Associated living” and “like-mindedness” are volatile traits that must be constantly 
renewed and creatively invented. Dewey understands democracy itself as an invitation to 
differ and resolve disputes by working out an agreement rather than merely finding a 
compromise between pre-determined interests of involved parties. Dewey rejects the 
assumption that there would be no way of rationally mediating between conflicting 
interests. For him neither individual preferences nor beliefs are given data. They are shaped 
in the context of social interaction and are therefore malleable. Public debate is a means of 
sharing and transforming views and purposes through examining the best available 
arguments.
It is important to understand that Dewey’s notion o f “like-mindedness” does not conflict 
with his avowed pluralism. Like-mindedness is not a call for assimilation. It means 
something altogether different from doing or wanting the same things. The Deweyan 
version o f an associated life does not lack cultural, aesthetic, or even religious or value 
diversity. However, a serious lack o f “like-mindedness” would mean living either 
indifferently apart or in state o f intolerable conflict, where ways o f life contradict one 
another irreconcilably. Like-mindedness involves sharing the common ground of a 
community. Religious segregation, terrorism and cultural ostracism are examples o f a lack 
of like-mindedness. Fundamental disagreement about how society mediates between 
conflicting interests can amount to such a lack if it prevents dialogue and the creation of 
new arrangements.
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Dissent beyond remedy is dangerous; dissent per se is not. Any dissent is of course a lack 
of like-mindedness, but in a functioning community it provides fuel for creativity. Like- 
mindedness is not something that should be presumed by policy, nor something that can be 
forced on people, but it is a meaningful aim for open debate and public communication.
Liberal Worries and the Public
The plasticity o f preferences and their sensitivity to interpersonal dialogue, education and 
institutional frameworks considerably blurs the distinction between social and private 
goods. Not merely with respect to their formation process, but also regarding their content, 
preferences have a natural social proclivity. Human flourishing or “growth” depends on 
associated forms o f life, which require the transformation o f individual into shared ends. Of 
course this poses a demand to make some personal sacrifices in order to achieve the 
benefits of cooperation in communal life. It also requires us to develop “...that type of 
character which identifies itself with common ends, and which is happy in these ends just 
because it has made them its own” (E, MW5.275).
To many liberals this must sound like a slippery slope towards imposing social authority 
over individual autonomy, and Dewey seems to give some occasion for this worry by 
claiming (RP MW12.191):
“Now it is true that social arrangements, laws, institutions are not means for obtaining 
something for individuals, not even happiness. They are means of creating individuals.”
His qualification that “...institutions are made for man, rather than that man is made for 
them” (RP MW12.191) does little to appease these critics.
Dewey’s notion o f socially shared purposes must not be misunderstood as the appeal that 
different individuals should assimilate their views, preferences or tastes (E, MW5.276):
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“...the chief thing is the discovery and promotion of those activities and active 
relationships in which the capacities of all concerned are effectively evoked, exercised, 
and put to test.”
Social ends and purposes are also functions within the coordination o f activity; and he calls 
it the “law of common happiness” that “must reside in the congruous exercise o f the 
voluntary activities of all concerned” (E, MW5.227).
In his strong communitarian leaning Dewey actively rejects attempts to make individual 
ends conform to pre-established common goods (E MW5.276-7):
“...a common end which is not made such by common, free voluntary cooperation in 
process of achievement is common in name only.”
With the distinction between categories o f “the social” (including “the socially useful”) and 
“the public,” Dewey limits the reach o f public administration and state intervention within 
the entire sphere of associated living. I already discussed that his intention is not to 
separate voluntary forms o f association from State administration, whereby the latter would 
have a mandate to interfere only where free trade and voluntary transactions create costs for 
third parties. Instead Dewey holds that individual and society are dynamically interrelated. 
Only together can they create and re-create conditions that are potentially formative for all 
members of society (Syllabus MW11.349):
“When the individual self is treated as isolated and fixed, social arrangements can only 
be external means to its pleasures or possessions. But in fact institutions, legislation, 
administration, etc., are necessary to the release and operation o f the capacities that 
form the individual. Society also means not a fixed organization, but reciprocal and 
growing sharing or communication of experience.”
As discussed, the criterion o f significant externalities which limits the scope o f public 
intervention therefore does not serve to define the public as a domain separate from private
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and voluntarily social transactions. Any social interaction re-creates and shapes the social 
conditions for all and thereby has a public aspect. Interacting in conversation, for example, 
shapes the public institution o f a language and its conceptual instruments, and private 
consumer decisions shape a marketplace by determining which goods are available at what 
price.
One might see a direct contradiction between Dewey’s communitarian idea that social 
institutions should aim at “creating individuals” (rather than merely serving them) and his 
liberal criterion for public intervention, which restricts intervention to cases where 
individual transactions impact third parties.
I believe that the “public” is not a means o f distinguishing where or when society may 
intervene. It is rather a device for guiding how we should determine political affairs. 
Individuals contribute to the public in the name o f creating conditions for a rich and fertile 
form o f associated living. The ‘third party’ proviso is simply a way o f raising our 
sensitivity to indirect consequences o f our intended actions on the life o f a community as a 
whole. With the right anthropological underpinning, this idea could foster our sense for the 
social and environmental embeddedness o f individual action instead o f erecting an 
individualist bulwark around a “private sphere.” The idea of a public precludes political 
demands in the name of external authorities (e.g. religion, glory of the nation, or loyalty to 
the king). In my reading, Dewey defines autonomy as a shared responsibility in the 
deliberation of the conditions o f  associated life. This explicitly includes those institutions 
that influence human reasoning, habits, values, and the character o f its participants, which 
Dewey singles out as public symbols, channels o f  information and education (PP LW2). 
However, it is not the aim of the current thesis to spell out how a Deweyan public would go 
about building an institutional framework that enables individual “growth” and strengthens 
the political community at the same time.
Here I intended to show that it is not necessary either to presume or to impose a common 
purpose when speaking about rational planning as a collective enterprise. Elster’s complaint 
about the unavailability o f a social preference function required addressing an aspect of
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“valuation” that had not yet been taken up in chapter 4. There I introduced Dewey’s 
instrumental theory of value and the functional interpretation o f purposes as enabling 
successful coordination. This theory is central for understanding the production o f purposes 
in contexts of collective deliberation. In chapter 4 I introduced values and purposes as 
product of inquiry. Here I spelled out how Dewey understands inquiry as a collective 
enterprise, and the public as a community of inquiry. “Instrumental” (or consequentialist) 
considerations determine the valuation process in contexts o f collective planning just as 
they do in personal decision-making. Particular to collective planning contexts is the 
question o f the legitimacy o f value judgements. Dewey provides a political philosophy that 
is remarkable in how it combines normative concerns for individual freedom with insights 
into human nature. Again democracy is more than a warrant for a fair procedure. 
Participation is essential for human flourishing if individual “growth” cannot strictly be 
separated from the realisation of a social self, i.e. growing as a member of a community.
Defining a social good or a collective end is every bit as difficult as any process of 
valuation (cf. chapter 4). But if Dewey is right on account of his anthropological notions 
and his political theory, it is not impossible to talk o f planning as an intelligent collective 
inquiry where the formation o f ends and purposes is part o f a shared activity.
Common Ends and Power
A pessimistic notion holds that power is exerted through coercion, that it creates barriers to 
inclusion, and that it influences or distorts deliberations on knowledge and needs. 
Paternalism and manipulation are two negative connotations o f ‘power.’ Contemporary 
theories focus on power as a primary force in shaping public discourse and actions 
(Foucault 1980; Habermas, Burger et al. 1992; Dowding 1996). Steven Lukes’ (1974) 
famous definition points beyond a confrontational understanding. Power can be more than 
the ability to affect or inhibit social change by overriding the natural inclinations o f other 
players. More pervasive forms of power can influence other parties’ thought and value 
systems, and even their perceptions of their own interests. In this definition visible conflict
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and competition can no longer serve as indicators for the exercise of power relations (Lukes 
1974 p.24):
“[T]he more effective and insidious use o f power is to prevent ... conflicts from arising 
in the first place.”
Dewey recognised that some factors shape agency and inquiry more than others. He also 
noted the ambivalent nature of power, which has both creative and destructive occurrences 
(Dewey 2002/1922):
“We attribute a will to power to others but not to ourselves, except in the 
complimentary sense that being strong we naturally wish to exercise our strength ... the 
will to power is imputed only to a comparatively small number o f ambitious and 
ruthless men... So far we have no generalized will to power, but only the inherent 
pressure o f every activity for an adequate manifestation. It is not so much a demand for 
power as a search for an opportunity to use power already existing. If opportunities 
corresponded to the need, a desire for power would hardly arise: power would be used 
and satisfaction would accrue...when social conditions are such that the path o f least 
resistance lies through subjugation of the energies o f others, the will to power bursts 
into flower.”
It follows that power can be experienced only where natural inclinations are inhibited, i.e. 
when forces or intentions oppose one another. Where this element o f counter-pressure is 
missing, the exercise of power seems equivalent to a “unified” or “harmonious experience.” 
Does Dewey lack sensitivity to the covert and nonetheless oppressive power-relations that 
Lukes and also philosophers of the Frankfurt School bring to attention?
This interpretation would be inadequate. Power for Dewey becomes a problem where some 
individuals or groups make use o f aptitudes to inhibit the potential “growth” o f others. For 
Habermas coercive power-relationships are manifest in distortions of communication. 
Emancipated members of a deliberating community will have equal access to public
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debates in which the best arguments decide on institutional arrangements. Emancipation 
begins with uncovering asymmetric relationships that prevent participants from engaging in 
dialogue as equals. Social relations and institutions can only be justified if  they adhere to 
the standards of reasonable public debate as laid out in the “ideal speech situation” 
(Bohman and Rehg 2007):
“(i) No one capable o f making a relevant contribution has been excluded, (ii) 
participants have equal voice, (iii) they are internally free to speak their honest opinion 
without deception or self-deception, and (iv) there are no sources of coercion built into 
the process and procedures of discourse.”
Dewey would agree much with this (Talisse 2000 p.76):
“In democratic discourse, ideas are advanced and examined according solely to the 
evidence that can be marshalled in their support; conclusions and decisions are taken to 
be tentative hypotheses, proposals for action, subject to the test of future experience and 
hence to revision, social status and privilege are as irrelevant as is rhetorical skill.”
However, Dewey would be likely to object to Habermas’ (1987a) separation between the a 
priori o f experience and the a priori of communication. Habermas made the distinction 
between “objectivity” as “intersubjectively meaningful experience” (cf. Ulrich 1983 p. 115) 
and “truth,” which points at the “discursive redemption o f validity claims.” His theory o f  
“knowledge constitutive interests” (Habermas 1987b) addresses the a priori of experience. 
It establishes the constitutive role of practical orientations in having any meaningful 
experience. Our recognition of objects directly corresponds to at least one o f three pursuits: 
use as an instrument, recognition as a meaningful symbol in communication, or recognition 
as an item of interest for emancipation from social power-relations. From a classical 
pragmatist perspective these distinctions seem like a valuable addition to the general notion 
that experience is an active and intentionally directed process (cf. chapter 3). We may, 
however, wonder whether Dewey would leave the demarcation between these particular
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interests unchallenged and what he would say about interpreting interests as “a priori” of 
experience.
Turning to Habermas’ “ 0  priori o f argumentation,” which are sharply distinguished from 
the “knowledge constitutive interests” (or “a priori o f experience”), we can sense some 
incompatibility between Habermas and Dewey. Habermas separates conditions for the 
meaning o f expressions from conditions for their validity. Whereas Dewey’s criterion o f  
“warranted assertibility” strictly observes the unity between truth and situated inquiry, 
Habermas constructs a (“quasi-”) transcendental7 theory o f discursive rationality, which is 
pragmatic only insofar as it understands the redemption of validity claims as a dialogical 
practice that involves speech acts. The principles o f argumentative reason are not 
introduced as outcomes o f an empirical inquiry process, but are presupposed to function as 
transcendental a priori, i.e. as inalienable (and normative) presuppositions for any 
meaningful human dialogue and the criteria for qualifying a factual consensus as “rational.” 
Only if speakers conform to these principles can their arguments be seen as contributions to 
a rational dialogue. In order to make the distinction between a merely factual and a rational 
commonsense, Habermas invokes four validity claims that participants must implicitly 
accept before engaging in dialogical argumentation. These include the speaker’s choice o f a 
“comprehensible expression;” the speaker’s intention to “communicate a true proposition” 
(and thereby the implicit acceptance that there is a ‘Truth’ to be told); the speaker’s 
intention to be truthful (“wahrhaftig”) or trustworthy; and “[F]inally the speaker must 
choose an utterance that is right [“richtig”] so that the hearer can accept the utterance and 
speaker and hearer can agree with one another in the utterance with respect to a recognized 
normative background” (Habermas quoted after Ulrich 1983 p. 123).
Habermas’ claim is that these commitments are given a priori in the structure o f all 
meaningful discourse, i.e. their acceptance must be presupposed from any participant in 
public discourse simply by virtue of the performative structure of their statements. Even
7 Habermas’ own qualification as “quasi-transcendental” means only a slight modification which intends to 
limit “transcendental” to the function of arguments rather than to categorical laws of all possible reason.
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though most of these commitments do not seem too controversial, they serve as a 
foundation for Habermas’ definition o f the “ideal speech situation,” and thereby form the 
normative base o f his political theory. Thus some implicit commitments which are said to 
build the transcendental condition of discursive statements become the chief resting points 
of a theory of human emancipation.
Also for Dewey the form of interpersonal communication plays a central role in human 
growth and emancipation. Democracy as a method o f intelligent cooperative inquiry 
requires “the improvement o f the methods and conditions o f debate, discussion and 
persuasion” (LW2.365).
However, he would object to Habermas’ resting the justification o f standards for 
“improvement o f the methods... of debate” on “quasi-transcendental” reflections on the 
formal structure of meaningful argumentation. The normative demand for an unrestricted 
and symmetric access o f all participants to public debates does not arrive as a conclusion 
from logical reflections on discursive praxis and their necessary presuppositions.
Inclusiveness of debates and symmetry between participants are essential ingredients to 
intelligent inquiry, because they are won from experience and supported by empirical and 
instrumental reflection. What would happen (or, indeed, what has happened) where these 
norms have been dispensed with is a stronger argument for their validity than reflecting on 
the necessary presuppositions underlying argumentative practice. The emancipating power 
of communication and public debate is a consequence of the experimental method it 
embodies. The potency o f this method in solving problems, resolving social conflict and 
creating “growth” gives dialogical communication its special status. The room for 
alternatives to democratic and inclusive political procedures is further restricted by the fact 
that the very notions of “growth” and human flourishing are linked to participation in 
communal deliberation. But these are empirical rather than transcendental necessities.
Critical theory after Habermas has often had a tendency to rely on debate, and in particular 
on meta-argumentation, about the structure of the current discourse as a means for
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emancipation. Exposing the power relations in the unspoken presumptions and distortions 
underlying our linguistic practices proved an effective instrument in raising peoples’ 
awareness (e.g. of the unequal relation between the sexes). A proclivity to use the critical 
faculties o f debate against forms of argumentation and the insistence that social problems 
should be tackled by such critical discourse has given the tradition o f critical theory in 
planning the reputation of ‘talk-shops.’
The following passage seems like a tailored answer that Dewey would have given to those 
champions of discursive deliberation who seek the remedy o f all social ills in debates on 
the rules of debating (LSA LW11.50):
“Discussion, as the manifestation of intelligence in political life, stimulates publicity; 
by its means sore spots are brought to light that would otherwise remain hidden ... But 
discussion and dialectic ... are weak reeds to depend upon for systematic origination of 
comprehensive plans, the plans that are required if the problem of social organization is 
to be met. There was a time when discussion, the comparison o f ideas already current 
so as to purify and clarify them, was thought to be sufficient in discovery o f the 
structure and laws of physical nature. In the latter field, the method was displaced by 
that of experimental observation guided by comprehensive working hypotheses, and 
using all the resources made available by mathematics.”
Dewey later continues (LSA LW11.51):
“The idea that the conflict o f parties will, by means of public discussion, bring out 
necessary public truths is a kind of political watered-down version o f the Hegelian 
dialectic ... The method has nothing in common with the procedure of organized 
cooperative inquiry ... Intelligence in politics when it is identified with discussion 
means reliance upon symbols ... But symbols are significant only in connection with 
realities behind them.”
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In the effort to realise the full potential of democratic and scientific inquiry and to facilitate 
the constructive rather than destructive exercise o f power, Dewey points at an ongoing 
problem that the public needs to resolve. He claims that the appreciation o f pluralism is 
critical to this endeavour, as are moral and democratic education and the employment of 
tested methods of inquiry (PP, LW2).
Dewey is undeniably sensitive to more subtle forms of influence and power such as false 
consciousness or “pseudo public opinion” (FC, LW13.168). He trusts democracy as a 
means for overcoming such distortions. At the same time he sees democracy as a concrete 
historical experiment that employs scientific methods that are the products of previous 
human experience and imaginative intelligence. The standards he applies against the 
illegitimate use of power are not those warranted by transcendental reflections, but those 
measured by their effects on human growth and flourishing. Dewey suggests the following 
critical standard o f ‘democratic’ deliberation (PP LW 2.327-328):
“From the point of the individual, it consists in having a responsible share according to 
capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs ... 
From the standpoint o f the groups, it demands liberation o f the potentialities of 
members of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common.”
3 Formation of Agency
The previous discussions about a reconstruction o f agency and rationality bypassed one 
question: how is the category of the agent constituted?
The last of Elster’s (1991) indictments against rationality as a standard for politics says 
that:
“... [Individuals, unlike polities, have an organizing center -  variously referred to as 
will or ego ... Societies, by contrast, have no centre.”
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It is unclear what Elster means by “organizing center.” Is it a Cartesian “ego” or an 
authoring agent that logically pre-exists all actions and deliberation processes? In the 
received Humean tradition an agent would be distinguished as one who holds beliefs and is 
stimulated by passions or desires. Thus the agent could be defined as an independent centre 
of motivation with a unique perspective on the world and a complete and consistent 
ordering of preferences. Given this starting point, any collective agency theory has to do 
one of two things: 1. argue that some social or collective agent could be defined after the 
same model o f individual agency so that a collective rationality model can proceed as if  
there were a unified collective agent; or 2. provide a plausible way of aggregating the 
agency o f individuals so that collective rationality can be treated as a second order 
phenomenon o f social agency. Above we have addressed some arguments as to why neither 
strategy is promising.
The discussion o f all previous chapters has envisaged agency as a creative, self-defining 
process that produces fundamental distinctions like means and ends or “resources” and 
“guides” as part of an unfolding agency process. How, in such a model, can we understand 
the category o f the agent or actor? Can we presuppose the actor as a given unit? Does the 
agent logically pre-exist the unfolding of the processes o f agency? The answer is no: a 
transactive approach, by definition, scrambles sharp distinctions between agents and their 
environments.
In the Deweyan picture of inquiry (Festenstein 2002),
“... no component is fixed in the sense of [being] beyond revision: the unit o f agency 
(the individual, some corporate or collective agent), the agent’s goals, surroundings, 
criteria for a good solution to a problem, relevant methods, etc... the pragmatist 
conception o f inquiry dislodges the assumption that any particular unit of agency should 
be taken as fixed.”
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As a “transactional” category, the centred, coordinated, and motivated perspective that is 
taken to be the author o f a course of action is itself the product o f a self-forming process of 
agency.
William James’ witticism from the heading o f this chapter meant to mock Herbert 
Spencer’s (1862) definition o f evolution as “...a change from an indefinite, incoherent, 
homogeneity to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and 
integrations.” It captures a fundamental insight that does not sit easy with the standard 
“substance” model o f metaphysics in which object and elements must pre-exist relations 
and transactions in nature. Particularly in evolutionary contexts we see the limits of  
substance metaphysics and the attractiveness o f a process metaphysics in which entities are 
the products of self-organising processes.
Individual or personal agents do, of course, enter such transactive situations as coherent and 
individuated actors. Still, arguments portraying individual agents as formed 
(“individuated”) through their transactions are of particular interest in Biology (Maturana 
and Varela 1980), Developmental Psychology (Jung 1946) or in philosophical reflections 
on concepts like “identity” and the “self’ (Simondon 1964; Mead 1967 [1934]; Taylor 
1989).
Treating the agent as a product rather than an antecedent of an unfolding agency process is 
particularly relevant when looking at planning contexts: Problematic planning situations 
normally comprise a plurality of individuals and organisations with widely differing ideas, 
interests, and viewpoints. Coordination is accomplished in the form o f habitual interactions 
(e.g. the routine links between working processes in a company) or creative responses to 
the challenges and tensions within a problematic situation. What I call ‘the formation o f  
agency’ will be attained through creative efforts aimed at achieving coordination in 
problematic contexts.
Dewey is in the avant-garde of a 20th century philosophical movement which has often 
been dubbed the “social turn” and has dealt with a revision of the relation between
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individual social categories. Traditional liberals understood the social as an aggregate 
product, which presupposes the existence of interacting, communicating and contracting 
individuals. Philosophers o f the social turn, in contrast, searched for the source o f the 
autonomous, individual self in its primary social embeddedness (Taylor 1985). Dewey 
would further argue that an “organising” centre, as Elster demands at the outset of rational 
deliberation, is only an achievement of organising activity that must be continually re­
established. He calls the category of the “actor” (KK LW16.260)
“[A] confused and confusing word; offering a primitive and usually deceptive 
organization for the complex behavioral transaction the organism is engaged in. Under 
present postulation Actor should always be taken as postulationally transactional, and 
thus as a trans-actor.”
For Dewey every organism is a product o f organising and differentiating activity within 
nature. Maturana and Varela (1980) add that being an organism (i.e. belonging to a certain 
class o f organised beings) depends on continuous action: organisms distinguish themselves 
from their environment by activities o f “autopoiesis” (literally “self-creation,” including 
self-maintenance, producing conditions for survival, and the continuous re-creation of 
boundaries).
Dewey’s critique of the stimulus response model in biology and psychology maintains that 
the self is not a passive receptor of stimuli -  stimuli become incorporated into dispositions 
(habits) and thereby form part o f the coordinating activity o f the organism (cf. chapter 3). 
Mead uses this idea to argue that the self is the product of habits formed within such 
coordination efforts, in which perception and reaction build a continuum. The model for 
these transactions that form habits, the character, and thereby the individual “self’ is that of 
communication in a conversation. Mead is anxious to redeem this notion o f conversational 
communication in naturalist terms.
Mead points out that in the beginning of its development a human organism follows 
impulses and perceives reactions from others; by learning to anticipate reactions a person
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incorporates them into her own coordinations. Her actions become intentionally directed 
toward an expected reaction, i.e. she incorporates the anticipated reactions into her own 
impulses. In social contexts this means that her expressions become “gestures.” A gesture is 
a symbol, i.e. it is no longer merely the expression o f an impulse but it intends to produce a 
certain reaction. A gesture reaches out into the future and signifies reactions and forms of 
coordination that are possible but not actual. The agent further refines her own gesturing in 
view of received and anticipated gestures of others, which is for Mead the analytical point 
when consciousness appears. Thinking is the process of internal gesturing and thereby 
refining one’s beliefs and habits. Mead intends to reveal that individual categories like the 
self, the character, and “me” are results rather than preconditions of social forms of 
interaction. From there he concludes that the other is logically prior to the self, i.e. the 
gesturing partner, the interlocutor, is a practical and analytic prerequisite for the 
constitution o f individuality (cf. Mead 1967 [1934]; Joas 1980; 1997).
Political philosophy, since Hobbes, has been infatuated with deducing the rise of societies 
and states from the assumption of interacting, associating and covenanting individuals. 
Dewey, arriving from a similar angle to Mead, concludes that the self is secondary to the 
category of the social interaction (PP LW2.250):
“There is no sense in asking how individuals come to be associated. They exist and
operate in association.”
If the above explanations hold, then a Deweyan model o f rational planning has little to fear 
from Elster’s indictment that social planning cannot rely on the pre-existence o f a ‘centred’ 
agent. However, a situational transactive rationality model will have to pay particular 
attention to the formation process o f coordinated agency in dealing with problematic 
situations. This must be done with special regard for the requirements of “effective social 
intelligence” and its demand for participation. I shall come back to this question in the 
following two chapters.
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Conclusion
It has often been argued that concepts of “intentional agency,” “decision-making” or 
“rationality” have meaning only when used to describe the actions o f individuals. Plural, 
collective or social agents have no intentions and cannot deliberate. Collective rationality 
should therefore be used, if  at all, only in a metaphorical sense. Some said that the 
organisation o f collective behaviour can be called ‘rational’ only when it represents the 
outcome o f a qualified aggregate o f individual decision-making, or if its outcomes can be 
cashed out in terms o f individual interests (Popper 1960; Arrow 1963; Elster 1991; Watkins 
1996).
The three main sections of this chapter were matched with three indictments that Jon Elster 
offered against applying the same concept o f rationality to both political and individual 
deliberation processes. My aim in this chapter was to show how the concept o f rationality 
as intelligent inquiry can be applied to problem situations that are constituted by plural 
agents. I thus intended to demonstrate that a Deweyan rationality does not need to separate 
between two different rationality concepts: one for rational personal conduct and another 
for rational political deliberation.
Planning, as a collective form of inquiry, can be rational (or “intelligent”) in its own right. I 
do not view the transition from developing a pragmatic concept o f rational agency as 
intelligent inquiry to the context of social and urban planning as a step from micro to 
macro, or as a move from an individual to a collective agency theory. Dewey’s pattern of 
inquiry is not primarily a model of intelligent individual agency in the first place. His 
theory is in no need o f a translation-ftmction to contexts of plural coordination efforts. Our 
framing o f Dewey’s project as a philosophical psychology and a critique o f the Humean 
agency model may have caused the impression that it centres on individual human conduct. 
But there is no evidence that Dewey’s understanding o f agency gives epistemic or 
ontological priority to individual agents. On the contrary, his concept of intelligent inquiry 
is originally a social concept.
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The idea of a forward-looking, deliberative planning rationality as an “effective democratic 
intelligence” had to be defended against objections from two sides: one is the view that 
intelligence remains decentralised or distributed amongst individual members of a 
community and therefore cannot be aggregated and used for explicit coordinated planning. 
The other opposing claim suggests that only the intelligence o f a few educated experts 
could yield the best possible decisions for the community as a whole -  a claim that forfeits 
the possibility o f a rationality o f deliberative social participation. Dewey’s concept of 
effective social intelligence mediates between these poles by redefining social rationality as 
a communal rather than an individual method of deliberation.
The aim here was restricted to clearing the ground for any viable notion o f social or 
collective intelligence. I have therefore avoided detailed discussions of Dewey’s “public” 
and the problem of establishing the legitimacy o f State intervention. Instead I discussed the 
idea of intelligent inquiry as a model for collective rational planning.
This concludes my argument which establishes the possibility o f a rationality o f social 
planning. It also concludes that part o f my thesis that examines Dewey’s work in order 
define a new concept of situational transactive rationality. In the following I will apply the 
results to planning theory and practice.
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Part IV
Application: A Planning Model, 
Case Studies and a Concluding Remark
Chapter 8: The Decision-Cell -  A Planning Model
Time does not run in one direction, I  guess; like so: ‘A-B-C-D... ’
She simply jumps as she wants.
Haruki Murakami1
Introduction
The title o f this thesis promises a revision of an applied concept o f rationality, and in 
particular a concept o f rationality applicable to social and urban planning. In the previous 
four chapters I expounded John Dewey’s philosophy as a source for reconstructing the 
theory of agency, and discussed his notion o f inquiry as a modus of a new and more 
comprehensive concept of rationality. Dewey does not offer new ‘nuts and bolts’ for 
applied theories of human agency, meaning a set of principles or premises that lend 
themselves to axiomatic formalisation and mathematical deductive argumentation. I know 
of only one detailed attempt to formalise Dewey’s logic, (Burke 2002) which is itself proof 
of how recalcitrant Dewey’s theory is to formalisation. This is due to the rejection o f sharp 
categorical breaks in his project, its flexible and floating distinctions with its qualitative 
notions o f situation and transaction, its aversion to a priori resting points, and its 
“rhythmic” rather than rigid patterns of change (cf. chapter 6). However, this difficulty is 
not an argument against using the revised Deweyan notion of rational deliberation in 
applied contexts like planning and policy making, and even building a differentiated model 
of planning and policy processes. The long journey through Dewey’s pragmatist project has 
yielded a revised concept of rationality that can be called “Situational Transactive 
Rationality,'> (STR). ‘Situational’ refers to Dewey’s notion as explored in chapter 6. It 
provides the foundational measure for rational or “intelligent” agency. ‘Transactive’ 
emphasises the idea that all activity, including research, planning and implementation, are 
formative in the process o f policy making. The attribute ‘transactive’ further implies that all
1 The Wind-up Bird Chronicle
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concepts and distinctions that a theory o f  rational planning introduces are heuristic 
possibilities, not categorical necessities.
My ambition until this point was to develop STR as a new conception of rationality. Now it 
is time to apply this conception in a model o f rational planning. The “Decision-Cell” (DC) 
model is the product of a long standing collaboration between Shyama Kuruvilla and 
myself (Dorstewitz and Kuruvilla 2007; Kuruvilla and Dorstewitz forthcoming). The 
following discussion is in great part a report o f this collaboration.
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The Decision-Cell
The decision-cell model is developed in the light o f the previous discussion o f Dewey’s 
theory of inquiry and his “method o f intelligence” (c.f. Chapter 6). It also takes into account 
some current theoretical understandings and empirical evidence on planning and policy­
making processes. Taken as a whole, the model is meant to capture the creative self- 
organising and self-defining nature o f agency that Dewey established.
What Peirce called the “doubt-belief ’ scheme, which Dewey elaborated into his “pattern of 
inquiry,” is the drumbeat underlying this situationally transactive DC model:
Problematic 
Situation 
Peirce: "doubt"
Inquiry
Creative
Action
Unified Situation
(new dynamic equilibirum)equilibrium 
Peirce: "belief
Indeterminate
Situation
; \ ACTIVE CHANGE: adaptation, adjustment, accommodation
Figure 8.1: Deweyan inquiry embedded in the “rhythm of situations”
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Remember that Dewey’s pattern o f intelligent inquiry (cf. Chapter 6) had been introduced 
in five (or six) steps (or modes of activity):
(0. Dynamic equilibrium)
1. Indeterminate Situation
2. Attention, Institution o f a Problem (“Problematic Situation”)
3. Determination of “Problem-Solutions”
4. Reasoning/Practical Judgement
5. Consummatory Experience (“Unified Experience”)
The “cell” shaped centre of this graph (“creative inquiring action”) encompasses the 
detailed intelligent inquiry processes that Dewey develops with regard to steps 2-4.
No one-to-one translation between the five stages model and the Decision-Cell Model can 
be provided, since the boundaries in the present model are slightly different from those in 
above scheme. While discussing the elements of the DC model I will however refer to the 
relation between it and the pattern described above.
The cell
The decision-cell proposes a set o f typical activity modes that are meant to capture the 
various types and phases of activity that participants in a planning process will engage in, 
following the idea that planning is best understood as a pragmatic inquiry.
A detailed discussion o f the elements and structure of this model will follow after 
explicating how our discussion of Dewey’s theory provides key-intuitions for its 
formulation.
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Figure 8.2: The Decision-Cell Model
The decision-cell model embodies much o f Dewey’s monistic commitment that eschews 
dichotomous divisions and sharp categorical breaks. This approach finds expression in the 
graphical appearance: demarcations and boundaries are dotted or softened to indicate that 
the suggested distinctions are tentative and evolving. The categorisations themselves are 
best understood as conceptual resources that can be used to bring order into processes o f 
policy making. I f  this model is chosen as an analytic tool for understanding and organising 
activity in a problematic surrounding, observed activities will not always fit neatly into this 
scheme. In concrete contexts segments will overlap or be absent. Dewey’s monism finds 
further expression in the presentation o f agency as an organic process, i.e. the model does 
not rely on an a priori given distinction between agent and environment but makes this 
difference a product o f creative human agency (see “formation o f  agency”, below). 
Moreover, the decision-cell disowns attempts to separate final purposes from deliberation 
over means and instruments (cf. the “deliberate” -  the core o f the model).
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Graph 8.2 shows the decision-cell model with three activity modes ( ‘define,’ ‘design,’ and 
‘realise’) centring on a core labelled “Deliberate - Imagination & Appreciation.” These 
elements are embedded in an amorphous field (‘formation o f agency’), which is enclosed 
by a dotted boundary labelled ‘problematic situation -  punctuated equilibrium.’
I will discuss these elements and distinctions, proceeding from the periphery to the centre.
Situations
Chapter 6 concluded an investigation into how Dewey’s notion o f “situation” may function 
as a foundational category o f agency and thereby replace the means-ends dichotomy as the 
final ground for explanation and normative judgements of action. The outermost dotted line 
in the model symbolises the transition into what Dewey called an “indeterminate situation.” 
This framing of the decision- or deliberation model captures three intuitions:
• The occurrence of explicit efforts in planning and policy making must be 
understood in continuity with activity that occurred beforehand. Planning is a 
transformation o f ongoing (transaction-) processes and should always be understood 
as belonging to its context.
• The continuity, however, is marked by a break, where habitual transactions become 
“indeterminate” and, once consciously addressed, “problematic.” What drives 
planning and policy making is not a goal or an end, but an inhibition of an already 
existing flow o f activity, a punctuated equilibrium.
• This starting point is normally characterised by a lack o f  definition, and only in rare 
cases by a set of defined problems and mission-statements.
In the arena o f social planning and policy making the equilibrium of a habitual transaction 
can be disturbed or “punctuated” in a variety of ways. Some examples are:
• The changing o f political majorities;
• New players entering the field or new personnel taking over;
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• Existing policy arrangements being unfavourably evaluated or new benchmarks for 
policy processes being developed;
• Economic or social mobilisation, e.g. a new investor appearing or a political 
movement gaining momentum;
• The occurrence of natural or socio-political crises;
• The loss of faith in a current practice or its sustainability;
• The violation of important values and norms, such as human rights standards;
• The increase of knowledge or information;
• The redefinition or reframing o f policy issues
Communities of inquiry
Boundaries and the formation o f agency
Where planning involves and affects several individuals or groups, it is marked by disunity. 
In the public arena, roles, rights and powers are normally a matter o f ongoing negotiation 
and therefore change over time. Such changes affect the relations between agents with 
respect to each other and their influence on the planning process.
In chapter 6 I discussed why Dewey’s agency-theory does not presuppose an agent as a 
well defined or pre-existing centre o f motivation and coordination. The category o f agent 
was defined as a gravitational centre of activities that seeks coordination. In a transactive 
perspective the ‘agent’ is an outcome of organising and planning activity. The formation o f  
a coordinated form of agency is the product of inquiry, not a precondition. Hence for 
Dewey the “community o f inquiry” is formed in response to the nature and character o f an 
indeterminate and problematic situation. “The agent” is not a static reference in inquiry 
processes, particularly in contexts of social planning (cf. Festenstein 2004 p.293, see also 
chapter 7 above). The grey shaded periphery named “communities of inquiry” reflects 
much that has been discussed above in the sections on the formation of agency.
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The idea of the agent as an entity that changes and evolves throughout the deliberation 
process rather than a fixed centred and defined unit is coherent with empirical analyses of 
the volatile nature o f groups as stakeholders participating in policy processes. It also 
reflects the varying degrees to which stakeholder interests and roles are explicit or may 
change during the process (Brugha and Varvasovsky 2000; Buse, Mays et al. 2005).
The definition of a situation is a decisive factor in the formation o f agency. The aim o f  
creating a boundary or frame is to "display the situation so that a range o f  possible and, 
hopefully RELEVANT choices can be revealed” (Checkland 1981 p. 166). Boundaries are 
framed by reflection and deliberation on the nature of the problematic situation. Using a 
metaphor from Policy- and Actor Network Theory, issues and frames (such as those 
conveyed by watchwords) create “resonances” within activity networks. Such networks 
comprise individuals and organisations with particular interests and sensitivities to the 
respective policy issues. Policy subsystems or issue networks may pre-exist or form in 
response to a specific problematic situation (Friedman 1973; Heclo 1978). The model also 
takes into account the fact that the composition of the networks could change during policy­
making and that these changes would influence the nature and substance o f the process. In 
policy-making it is important to note that influential policy subsystems and issue networks 
can control the interpretation of a policy problem and thus determine the manner in which it 
is conceived and acted upon (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).
Advocacy coalitions are another important contemporary references in explaining the 
meaning of the cell area called “communities o f inquiry” (Kuruvilla and Dorstewitz 
forthcoming):
“Given the wide range o f potential policy actors, Sabatier found that it was useful to 
analyse policy change from the perspective of ‘advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier 1988). 
Advocacy coalitions are groups that share ‘basic values, causal assumptions, and 
problem perceptions -  and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over 
time’ (p. 139). Thus changes in networks and coalitions can influence both the process 
and content o f policy-making.”
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Both theories o f policy networks and of advocacy coalitions affirm that “communities” and 
issues o f inquiry cannot be separated when determining the boundaries of the decision-cell.
The aim o f creating a boundary or frame is to “display the situation so that a range o f  
possible and, hopefully RELEVANT choices can be revealed’ (Checkland 1981 p. 166). 
Boundaries are framed by reflection and deliberation on the nature of a problematic 
situation. This process takes two directions: first, initially participating groups define issues 
and agendas, creating a preliminary boundary or a horizon of relevance. Second, different 
groups are attracted and motivated when certain issues are addressed and declared relevant.
The boundary is important for the model; it is what distinguishes planning efforts from 
more habitual interactions and events in the wider environment. An advantage of this model 
is that these boundaries drawn through ongoing interaction keep the definition and scope o f 
the decision-cell flexible.
Dewey’s notion of a “unique” and “pervasive quality” provides the idea of a situational 
horizon that sets the boundaries to a problematic or indeterminate situation (Rejoinder 
LW14.29):
“[Experience] is temporally and spatially more extensive and more internally complex 
than is a single thing like a stone, or a single quality like red. For no living creature 
could survive, save by sheer accident, if its experiences had no more reach, scope or 
content, than the traditional particularistic empiricism provided for. On the other hand, 
it is impossible to imagine a living creature coping with the entire universe at once. In 
other words, the theory o f experiential situations which follows directly from the 
biological-anthropological approach is by its very nature a via media between extreme 
atomistic pluralisms and block universe monisms.”
This situational horizon, however, is neither given nor static. It is as active and as alterable 
as Dewey’s concept of experience itself. In the context of policy making and planning the
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“pervasive qualitative” which determines the boundaries of the situation cannot be defined 
by what we experience as a sensual or emotional presence - by what Germans would call 
the “Erlebnishorizont.” A situation also comprises all actors, groups and meaningful 
elements that are involved and deemed relevant within the process o f inquiry. The 
boundaries of a situation are given by what appears worth taking into account at any given 
time. System theorists have often pointed out the importance o f system boundaries to 
reduce complexity (Luhmann 1968; Churchman 1979; Maturana and Varela 1992).2
Boundaries and power
Although Dewey does not provide a clear criterion of where to draw the boundary (between 
“atomism” and “block universe monism”) he clearly indicates the critical means with which 
we are to do so.
Where our horizon is placed is not arbitrary: the immediacy o f a situation comes with a 
horizon and with boundaries. Inquiry allows us to widen the horizon o f a situation by 
understanding causal ramifications and establishing new meanings of present tendencies.
Many scholars in the field o f systems thinking were concerned with the problem of 
seemingly arbitrary boundary settings (Churchman 1979): our plans have a very different 
outlook, depending on whether we choose to take a 5, 25, or 250 year perspective, and 
whether we plan for our clients, our organisation, or all possible stakeholders.
Many have decried Dewey for dodging these difficulties by hiding behind the assumption 
of a community as a natural reference horizon. Earlier I argued that this is not the case,
2 This reference to systems theory must be taken with caution, however, because the decision-cell model 
speaks a different language than the functional structural type of systems theory. In the latter, boundaries have 
the function of containing and maintaining self-organising and persisting agency systems or organisations. 
The decision-cell, in contrast, is a model of inquiry and intelligent agency. It is not a sociological theory of 
self-organising structures and organisations.
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since communities have to be formed in the first place and this formation process is not 
trivial but is the task of inquiry.
Dewey might be better able to cope with the problem of open-ended system boundaries 
than some systems-thinking theorists. The pragmatist precepts of equal scepticism against 
assertions and doubts protect against far fetched or narrow boundary definitions. Why 
should a local merchant worry about whether his products will please the taste of 
adolescent customers in 25 years? At the same time boundaries remain infinitely flexible to 
react to real and urgent demands o f inquiring participants. E.g. when a man-made 
environmental catastrophe becomes a real danger, a time horizon of 50 years may appear 
too short.
Werner Ulrich (1983) and other authors in the field o f critical systems thinking (CST) 
(Flood and Jackson 1991; Flood and Romm 1996) have been very concerned about the 
political process o f boundary definitions and its moral significance. These authors 
expressed suspicion that boundary judgements are often the expression o f dominant power 
relations, and called for a more critical approach to defining, framing and delimiting policy 
contexts.
For Dewey, deliberation is a form of critical inquiry (HNC MW14.150, emphasis added):
“Deliberation is a work o f discovery. Conflict is acute; one impulse carries us one way 
into one situation, and another impulse takes us another way to a radically different 
objective result. Deliberation ... is an attempt to uncover the conflict in its full scope 
and bearing.”
This quote refers to the psychological context “impulses,” but it is also the key to 
understanding collective or political deliberation, where divergent interests take the place 
of “impulses.” The aim of deliberative democracy as collective inquiry is to promote 
human flourishing and “growth.” Through collective inquiry we not only gain a better
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understanding o f underlying conflicts within the context of associated living, we also help 
transform these underlying interests.
Dewey’s own affinity to critical thinking can be demonstrated by two observations:
1. The above quote makes the claim that conflicts and impulses have to be 
‘uncovered.’ I.e. they can be prevalent without being expressed or understood. This 
could be interpreted as the “false consciousness” referred to by critical theorists.
2. The process of collective inquiry for Dewey is both diagnosis and remedy. Through 
inquiry we not only understand the direction o f individual impulses or interests, but 
we also have a chance to transform or harmonise them. Understanding the 
avoidable consequences of a prisoner’s dilemma situation will enable a community 
of inquiry to see the means of avoiding or transforming such situations, either by 
changing individual strategies or by forming a consensus about collective strategies 
like third party enforcement.
The second point shows that Dewey sees communities or social systems not merely as 
“purposeful,” i.e. as directed toward ends, but as “purposive,” meaning continuously 
concerned with developing new purposes and orientations (Checkland 1981). Checkland 
showed how in “purposive” systems the setting of boundaries is a continuous effort.
Within the boundaries of a decision-cell, the main decision activities o f Design, Define and 
Realise take place through the transactions of the relevant actors and factors delimiting the 
process at any given instance. These activity modes are the very places where boundary 
judgements are negotiated, established and changed.
Define
Doubt, the inhibition o f previously unproblematic activity, or what Dewey calls an 
“indeterminate situation,” often implies that different actors and groups operate with 
contradictory ideas and agendas. As defined in chapter 6, active inquiry becomes necessary
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if a previously held consensus becomes disconcerted and an agreed modus-operandi loses 
coherence or become conflictive. The activity mode define overlaps with the two phases o f  
Dewey’s logic o f inquiry, as presented in the previous chapter under the headings o f  
“Attention, Institution o f a Problem”, and Dewey’s hyphenated term “Problem-Solution.” It 
describes a point of transition between the two inquiry modes that John Shook 
characterised as “attention on the contradictory elements in experience,” and “the analysis 
of experience to select out certain meanings o f things (the use o f ideas to construe some 
features of a situation as especially significant)” (Shook 2000 p. 185).
As a mode of activity, define is an informal, creative and playful way o f approaching an 
insufficiently understood situation. Its purpose is to institute sets o f issues, ideas and 
descriptions that participants may recognise as shared reference points. “Shared reference 
points” must not be restricted to reaching consensus on any comprehensive description. It 
can also mean setting up a common arena for slugging out conflicts. As discussed above in 
“formation o f agency,” polarisation happens as a result o f framing and describing situations 
when groups and individuals “resonate” with certain issues.
I suggest four dimensions in which define will find expression:
• Frames
• Boundaries
• Dynamics
• Meaning
Frames
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) critique of classical decision-theory, much has been 
written about situated decision-making and the importance o f frames for agents to 
recognise meaningful acts and strategies with respect to their circumstances. The centrality 
of descriptions and frames in planning theory has also been recognised. For example, 
Kingdon in his analysis o f policy agenda setting discusses how the goal o f facilitating
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disability access in public spaces could be framed as a civil rights issue or as a transport 
issue, and he points out that these alternatives would be associated with very different 
policy considerations and implications (Kingdon 1995).
Boundaries
The sensitivity o f the decision-cell’s boundaries to issues in discussion and to the manner in 
which they are addressed has already been pointed out in reference to the concept o f  
“resonance” in the Actor Network Theory. The activity mode define is active when 
processes of boundary judgements and questions of participation become explicitly 
addressed matters o f deliberation.
Dynamics
The activity mode define also involves attempts to understand active relations that 
determine the working o f a situation. This involves both an understanding o f the causal 
conditions and dynamics and a grasp of the symbolic or ‘grammatical’ relations o f  
interactions.
Systems approaches in management and operational research have developed sophisticated 
techniques and modelling tools that are highly apt for investigating complex causal 
relations. The accounts that such theorists give o f model building processes closely match 
the activity modes presented in the decision-cell (Forrester 1971a; Checkland 1981; Lane 
1994; Vennix 1996). All these theorists distinguish techniques of extracting and 
communicating intuitions (“mental models”) about causes and consequences which 
participants often hold intuitively, from the formulation o f quantified models to the 
deduction o f system behaviours implicit in such assumptions. The former would be part o f  
a define mode, whereas the latter would count as design activities according to the present 
decision-cell model. Many o f the above theorists refer to Peter Senge’s (1990) archetypes 
as a reference point for basic causal intuitions. These archetypes simplify and summarise 
characteristic feedback-relations in complex causal systems which account for typical and 
recurrent system behaviours (as e.g. positive or negative feedback, homeostatic balancing
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loops etc.), which can be used in defining processes to gain a synoptic grasp of complex 
dynamic fields.
Structures o f meaning
A further important dimension o f the define mode gives attention to symbolic, linguistic 
and grammatical relations inherent in rule-guided human behaviour. Social scientists since 
Max Weber have often emphasised that trying to understanding a social situation in purely 
extensional terms (such as causal relations) falls short o f accounting for the intentions o f 
agents and the rules they follow as socio-linguistic agents. These dimensions are not only 
interesting for a comprehensive interpretation o f events that includes the perspective o f  
agents, but are necessary for enabling adequate predictions o f events. Dennett (1987) shows 
that it is practically impossible to predict or explain as purely causal the simple story o f a 
man driving home in his car, avoiding all traffic and obstacles on the way, and buying a 
bottle of wine at an off-licence after having received instructions from his wife over the 
phone. Intentions and rules are necessary for understanding the most basic transactions and 
must be reflected by any definition of the define mode.
The activity mode define is perhaps best characterised as a creative and communicative 
process for exploring and proposing ideas about problematic situations. It is a mode where 
techniques like brainstorming, scenario development, empirical analysis and conceptual 
development are applied.
Design
Most activities that traditional theories identify as decision-making fall within the ambit o f  
this cell sector. Design is probably the most technical phase in the process of policy­
making. The use of formal assessment methods and modelling tools is frequent. While all 
concerned actors may or may not be directly involved in the technical aspects o f this 
activity, they can play a critical role by evaluating different policy approaches and their 
possible consequences.
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The difference between define and design is to some extent inspired by Checkland’s 
distinction between “root definitions” and “conceptual models” (see above):3
“The step from root definition to conceptual model is the most rigorous in the whole
methodology, the nearest to being ‘technique’” (Checkland 170).
Design produces detailed models to estimate how certain trends and manipulations may
influence the future, e.g. by formalising certain qualitative insights and available data into a 
quantitative model that allows simulation of developments or various scenarios.
Design is distinguished as an activity mode where different and sometimes conflicting 
approaches to addressing problems are evaluated and negotiated until one particular 
approach or strategy is committed to. Agreement has to be reached among the various 
participants on operational definitions, strategies, allocation o f resources and roles or 
responsibilities in further transactions.
The emphasis on “agreement” in this part is certainly optimistic and refers to the use of this 
model as a normative guide rather than a descriptive account o f policy processes. However, 
we should keep in mind that define describes a mode o f intentional activity concerned with 
creating coherence and commitment within a group o f participants. It describes an efforts 
rather than a result.
Realise
The word realise is ambiguous in an appealing way: It means ‘putting into practice ’ (an 
idea or a plan), and is also used as a term of learning, evaluation, or ‘becoming aware of. ’
3 However, for those familiar with Checkland’s methodology, the demarcation between “root definitions” and 
“conceptual models” does not fully capture the difference between ‘define’ and ‘design.’ ‘Define’ 
incorporates constitutive elements of Checkland’s conceptual definitions: “ ...writing down ... half a dozen 
verbs which cover the main activities implied in the root definitions,” would certainly be at home in the 
‘define’ mode of the decision-cell.
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The decision-cell model refuses to separate epistemic (research and planning) from 
formative (policy implementation) processes (cf. Chapter 4): its structure presents all 
activities involved in planning as working together on the same level and even operating 
simultaneously in order to bring about coordinated change. It refuses the hierarchical 
pattern of linear models according to which research and decision-making phases precede 
implementation, which they direct, authorise, command or control.
Learning
In addition to the structure o f the model, the content of each segment also reflects the idea 
that inquiry and change-activity are inseparable categories. This idea distinguishes the 
activity mode o f realise from the “implementation” stages in traditional planning models. 
Realise comprises “implementation” and “learning;” and more than that it denies any 
fundamental difference between the two and links them as co-reportive terms. This idea has 
been explained in detail in Chapter 6.
It may however be put to the test with an objection: if I paint my house lilac, I might 
afterwards learn that I despise this colour. Still we would like to separate the object “the 
house is lilac” from our learning. The fact that the house “is” lilac is undoubtedly a fact that 
transforms any future experience o f the house. For Dewey this amounts to a transformation 
in our habits and dispositions to experience, and hence to some form of learning. However, 
we would like to make such subtle distinctions in our language as whether the change o f  
experience results mainly from changes in our surroundings, or whether “learning” is best 
located within the structural changes of our internal dispositions and habits. If our every 
day experience changes because our house is lilac seems like a significantly different type 
of “learning” than when we learn for example to overlook the bad habits of a spouse, or 
when we “learn” to live with a disability.
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Modes o f active change
Dewey makes this difference clear in his tripartite distinction between the different modes 
of active change that he labels “adaptation,” “accommodation” and “adjustment” (ACF, 
LW9).
“Adaptation” means changing the world to match an anticipated or desired state. Linear 
instrumental models focus only on this one o f the three change-types. They identify 
planning processes with changes that Dewey would call “adaptation.” The instrumental 
idea of rationality promotes this “positive decision” concept in as much as means are 
employed to achieve predetermined goals by effecting external change (Dewey 1934; Joas 
1999; Howlett and Ramesh 2003).4
Taking this systemic view, the decision-cell model moves beyond “adaptation” to include 
the two other types o f active change.
In “accommodation” the direction of change is reflexive: Agents deal with a problem 
situation by changing their own beliefs, dispositions, habits or attitudes with which they 
continue to meet its challenges. A paradigm example is an agent learning to live with 
conditions beyond her control. This mode o f change goes beyond the concept of “negative 
decisions” - i.e. deciding to do nothing externally (Howlett and Ramesh 2003). 
Accommodation additionally involves an internal process directed at changing the 
evaluation o f circumstances and potentially changes values with respect to that particular 
situation. Agents learn to accept the conditions rather than persist with a desire to change 
them (Dewey 1934; Joas 2000). “Accommodation” is by no means a passive attitude or a 
form of surrender. It is an active and constructive approach to re-organising cognitions and 
dispositions so as to cope with adverse conditions. The frame or perspective that Dewey 
would associate with this change in action is that of “self-action” (c.f. KK LW16.71).
4 In Dewey’s notation “interaction” would be the best frame or perspective to describe “adaptation-processes” 
(cf. KK LW16.71).
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Example: I learn to accept foibles in the character of my spouse. Or, I learn to accept my 
future life in a wheelchair.
“Adjustment” is the third of Dewey’s changes modes. It is defined as a more fundamental 
transformation that implies a change in the character of interactions that define an agent 
with respect to her environment. This type o f thorough systematic change is perhaps 
closest to Argyris’ and Schon’s “double loop learning.” (Dewey 1934; Argyris and Schon 
1978) But it goes further than changes in values and fundamental orientation. Adjustment is 
a transformation resembling processes o f the “formation o f agency” (see above). When the 
outcome of deliberation processes is best described as an “adjustment,” it implies a 
fundamental change in the way an agent interacts with her environment. It changes the 
architecture o f the ‘decision-cell’ in which the transactions are formed. “Adjustment” 
revises boundaries between the inside and the outside o f the cell. It re-determines the 
relationships between the constituents o f the decision-cell and the problematic situation. 
Only a “transaction-perspective” can account for this notion of change (KK LW16.71).
Example: I do not merely change my attitude in a constructive way so that I can live with a 
disability, but I transform my life, e.g. by learning sign language and thus becoming an 
accepted and acculturated member o f the deaf community.
Unified situation
One may ask what happens where implementation amounts to quick fixes that serve to 
resolve symptoms o f a problem without transforming the dispositions o f agents, or what 
about lucky hits, where interventions work out without resulting in a better understanding 
of a situation. Will we still uphold that these cases, even successful implementation, equal 
learning? These are semantic questions about how far we are willing to stretch the 
definition of learning and apply it to cases o f ad hoc changes or even undesirable 
transformations. Most current learning theories accept that not all learning is good, and 
some have addressed the vital importance of “unlearning” (Dewey 1934; Nystrom 1984). 
Learning must not be identified with either success promoting transformations, or with
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acquiring what is, in Dewey’s terms, “warranted assertible” knowledge. Recently 
psychologists have suggested that addiction might be a learned behaviour, turning against 
traditional explanations that emphasise disposition, weakness o f will, or physiological 
changes in neuronal chemistry. The formation o f a drug habit, with its skewed changes to a 
person’s behaviour pattern and her mechanisms of self-gratification resembles, to some 
extent, the process of learning to play the piano (Kiefer after Schnabel 2006): Acquiring a 
drug-habit presupposes that we leam practices like preparing a shot and administering it, 
and not only this, the theory claims that a junkie must first learns to gratify herself with it, 
i.e. to translate the performed practices and the experienced states as pleasurable, 
comforting, satisfying.
Even though a policy may appease the symptoms of a problematic situation, this change 
does not necessarily settle the situation in the sense Dewey defined as the end of inquiry: A 
“unified” situation means a problem situation that is transformed so that conflicts are 
satisfactorily settled.
Executing or forming policy
The present model eschews the very term “implementation” because o f its tendency to 
separate the formulation o f plans from the formation and execution o f policies. 
“Implementation” as used in classical linear stages models means the execution of 
predefined tasks and the furthering of given ends with allocated resources. The creative 
potential o f administrators and technicians entrusted with realisation tasks has been 
systematically underestimated. In fact however, lower ranks play an important role in 
forming and reformulating given plans.
Several theorists have pointed out that policy is often only decided when it hits the 
implementation stage at “street-level.” At this level, administrators, technicians and 
stakeholder groups define and debate concrete steps toward abstract ends, thereby often 
changing the very character of a policy (Lipsky 1976; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, cf. 
chapter 6). The label realise is forwarded for this activity mode as an alternative that means
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recognising that activities o f plan realisation are more than acts of execution. Just as any 
other activity conducted in the decision-cell, realise is creative and formative for the entire 
policy-making process; as much as it means putting into practice, it also means planning.
To account for the fact that some coordinated policy action does take place, theorists like 
Sabatier (1986) had to develop “bottom up” approaches, which define lower ranking 
administrative staff as initiators and co-authors of policy as well as implementers and signal 
receivers (John 1998 p.29):
“Rather than just frustrating implementation, lower levels o f government, agencies, 
bureaucrats, and interest groups have a role in deciding policy...”
The consequences from this for establishing realise as an activity mode within the decision­
cell model is also expressed by Peter John (1998 p.30):
“In order to understand how implementation works, the analyst needs to understand the 
policy-making process in the round. It is not possible to separate the stages of policy 
formulation and policy implementation.”
In summary the activity mode “realise” eschews two liabilities that seem unavoidably 
connected to implementation categories: it allows the integration and even identification of 
learning with the very process o f effecting change; further, it refuses to see planning as a 
temporal and hierarchical one-way-road. Realise defines planning as continuous with 
formation and accomplishment.
The Core: Deliberate -  imagination and appreciation
Imagination and conflict
Activity in the three modes appears fairly unmediated at this point; especially the way 
activity in one mode influences other modes and the way we form coordinated activity: 
which of the mental models and possible root-defmitions formulated by ‘definers’ will be
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adopted and influence the activity and worldview o f participants in other sectors? What will 
‘designers’ and ‘realisers’ decide and do, and which of their activities will be regarded as 
relevant for further runs o f policymaking?
In chapter 5 I discussed Dewey’s understanding of ‘deliberation’ as it concerned 
harmonising various conflicting motivations and impulses.
In opposition to Hume, Dewey claimed that “...reasonableness is in fact a quality o f an 
effective relationship among desires rather than a thing opposed to desire...” (HNC 
MW14.135).
In political contexts the psychological terms ‘desires’ or ‘impulses’ may be changed into 
‘interests’ or ‘initiatives.’ We must assume that activity in the different fields o f the 
decision-cell will often yield disparate motivations and forces, considering that several 
parties are involved in each activity mode. Hence, a “reasonable” planning process needs a 
space where such divergent endeavours can be transformed into an “effective relationship” 
enabling coordination and shared experience.
In the previous chapter I explained why aiming for compromise is not ambitious enough if 
compromise merely means some middle ground between unmediated conflicting interests.
In contrast, Dewey suggests a transformation or “sublimation” (HNC MW14.82) of 
conflicting interests into shared practices as the favourable alternative. I pointed out that 
Dewey’s theory of democratic deliberation rejects numerical aggregation as the gold 
standard for political judgement. Democratic deliberation involves a public investigation of 
the merits and dangers inherent in different parties’ intentions. The aim of such deliberation 
is not compromise but understanding and arrangements that rest on accord.
Imagination as a “dramatic rehearsal” can help to evaluate individual endeavours and 
mediate between conflicting parties in a non-confrontational way. An imaginative course of 
deliberation does not evaluate a partisan interest by measuring it against some public value
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standard. Instead it takes all parties down a route of exploring the ramified consequences o f  
different scenarios where this interest would gain the upper hand. Given that our interests 
and motivations are susceptible to such exploration, there seems to be a real chance o f  
transforming seemingly irreconcilable clashes because such thought experiments have the 
power to transform both those individual motives and the public standards for their 
evaluation. Done in a creative way, imaginative exploration can help to find new and 
unexpected ways of reconciling opposing parties and allowing for successful cooperation 
without coercion.
This form of “like-mindedness” is an ideal and should be allowed to function as an ideal.
I.e. the possibility o f achieving a genuine unity must not be discounted altogether. 
However, in confrontational situations where this ideal seems too remote, a pragmatist 
theory of deliberation must provide further answers.
In any situation of conflict there must remain the possibility for an honest public debate on 
the sources o f conflict and some room for creative solutions as to ways o f living with 
conflict. Encouraging experiences in Northern Ireland have shown how conflicts can be at 
least contained or channelled to further avoid the most destructive consequences for all 
parties.
In all cases where divergent interests cannot be easily transformed and harmonised, 
compromise is a workable option. But even in that case a pragmatist would favour a 
reasonable over a merely numerical compromise, i.e. one that an educated and impartial 
mediator could provide.
Appreciation
It would be misleading to portray discord and conflict amongst parties as the standard 
model of problematic planning situations. Although the existence of some “conflict” is part 
of Dewey’s own definition of a “problematic situation,” it does not necessarily have to be a 
conflict between entrenched factions. Dewey’s understanding o f a problematic situation
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refers to a conflict within practices, i.e. conflicts with regard to habitual ways o f conduct 
and coordination in changed situations. In this sense a problematic situation can be 
cooperative rather than conflictive. The formation o f factions is often the result o f mistakes 
made in some o f the above discussed areas of the decision-cell. E.g. where situations have 
been framed in the vocabulary of already entrenched positions or where some groups have 
been excluded from participation.
Huckfeldt and Johnson (2004) found that in confrontational situations (such as during 
election campaigns), political networks have a reduced capacity to move public opinion and 
are weakened in their ability to generate new ideas, whereas less confrontational situations 
are conducive to creative change and innovation.
Hence, it would be beneficial to frame the activities in the core o f the decision-cell not as 
“mediating conflict” but as generating understanding.
Sir Goeffrey Vickers’ (1970; 1970; 1983; 1995) philosophy o f management and planning is 
centred on personal and collective sense making (Varey 1998), rejecting the model o f top 
down control in business processes.
A pioneer who broke with the linear instrumental idea in planning, Vickers refused to see 
social systems, such as companies, as instruments that serve externally set goals. Social 
systems are interpretative: directed at mutual understanding; and they define purposes 
rather than fulfil them (Vickers 1970; 1983).5 Vickers summarised both properties by 
referring to the concept o f “appreciation.” His decision-makers would not command change 
or the fulfilment o f targets, but would establish critical and flexible standards that help 
members o f their organisations interpret and evaluate their situations. Vickers defines 
“appreciation” as a property o f communication where members o f a group overcome the 
separations in the sender -  transmission -  receiver model and form collective intentions. In 
settings with a common culture, human beings can relate to shared meanings.
5 Cf. Checkland’s (1981) discussion of “purposeful” vs. “purposive” systems. See also chapter 2 above.
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These shared meanings make it possible for groups to better understand their situations. 
Appreciation is a (Vickers 1970)
readiness to notice particular aspects o f our situation, to discriminate them in 
particular ways and to measure them against particular standards of comparison, which 
have been built up in similar ways.”
Vickers’ “appreciation” and Dewey’s “prizing” are quite similar. Appreciation is a process 
of valuation. Checkland interprets the relevance o f values and norms in decision-processes 
by referring to Vickers (Checkland 1981 p.262):
“... [Standards, norms and/or values lead to readinesses to notice only certain features 
of our situations, they determine what ‘facts’ are relevant, the facts noticed are 
evaluated against the norms, a process which both leads to our taking regulatory action 
and modifies the norms or standards.”
It is important to show how norms and values can be at the very centre of a planning model 
that spells out the idea o f a situational transactive rationality, where they offer guidance for 
the formation of intelligent action. At the same time a Deweyan rationality model must 
insist that the re-evaluation o f norms and standards is always part of the deliberation 
process.
In Vickers’ concept of “appreciative systems,” norms and standards are parts of the fabric 
of the processes that facilitate change. They account for which models will be believed, 
which facts will be recognised, which interests considered legitimate and which suggestions 
will be realised.
The above quote (Vickers 1970) speaks of appreciation as a “... readiness to notice 
particular aspects of our situation, to discriminate them in particular ways.” This points to 
the ‘interpretative’ aspect of this concept (see above), which is also at the heart o f the
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decision-cell. Appreciation can be understood as giving a voice to a context. Whereas a 
linear instrumental planner would ask how we can adapt a situation to match anterior 
defined ends, or how to improve it with regard to certain external performance indicators, 
an ‘appreciative’ planner will try to understand a given situation and develop a vision that 
matches its inherent potentials. This demands a heightened sensitivity to local 
particularities and an ability to see “the possibilities that are interwoven within the texture 
of the actual” (AE LW10.348), as in Dewey’s definition of “imaginative vision.”
This aspect will be of particular importance in one of the two case studies presented in the 
next chapter.
How to read the model
Looking at linear stages models Churchman confessed (Churchman, quoted in Checkland 
1981, p.246):
“I’m often inclined to put the implementation question first..
However, it is still tempting to read a linear notion into the decision-cell model by ordering 
the three activity modes in a sequence as define —> design —► realise. This describes indeed 
one possible path that a planning process may take, but it is not the only, or even the most 
salient, ordering. The experience o f planners and policy makers confirms that processes 
normally shift back and forth between these three modes, and that activities typical for 
different modes often take place concurrently; (John 1998 p.29):
“Policy decisions can move ‘backwards’ from implementing organizations, such as 
local authorities and government agencies, to the policy formulators, the politicians and 
top bureaucrats.”
We may think of the process of writing an academic paper to understand how the 
situational transactive model o f rationality works. Teachers are sometimes tempted to
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render the process in a series of logical steps: 1. Research and reading, 2. formulating a 
working hypothesis, 3. directed research, and 4. writing in the following order: introduction 
- main part - conclusion. Yet anyone who has ever undertaken such a task will know that 
writing is an iterative process, where conceptualisation, research and drafting stages 
constantly swap places and intermingle. We also know that such a jumpy order in the work- 
process is not necessarily a sign of inefficiency and can lead to a well-structured and subtle 
argument.
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Evaluation and Results
Harold Laswell introduced a number o f criteria by which to measure the quality of any 
theoretical contribution in the study of policy. The following list, which will be used to 
evaluate the decision-cell model, is based on these criteria:
1. The model should be designed as a tool to organise a host o f typical aspects of 
recurrent situations and integrate them into one comprehensive framework.
2. It should be the best tool available.
3. The model should be inclusive, i.e. it must not seek to replace other contributions 
and theories but should integrate and supplement them; this Laswellian request must 
be made subject to a proviso: a theoretical contribution should not try to 
accommodate just any theoretical position. This would only serve to make it 
vacuous or false. Yet it should be generous in appreciating the merits even of those 
theories that are deemed wrong.
4. It should be flexible in its application rather than being a “one size fits all” 
conception. The requirement of flexibility increases with the level of abstraction and 
generality that a model obtains. More precisely, the greater the number and variety 
of particular contexts of application, the more adaptive a model should be to the 
particularities of these contexts. This means that a model must, by all means, avoid 
imposing its own structure on a context.
5. The model should incorporate both explanatory and normative aspects of the policy 
process.
How well does the decision-cell model perform with regard to these criteria?
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Comprehensiveness (1)
The ambition o f the decision-cell was clearly stated as systematising typical aspects and 
modes of planning activity. The context of dealing with insufficiently understood 
problematic situations was tribute to the accounts of many practitioners and theorists in the 
field.
Best available (2)
Whether the decision-cell model fulfils the Laswellian requirement o f being the best 
available model shall not be prejudged here. However, I have shown many o f its 
advantages when compared with traditional LIR models. The previous chapter defended the 
STR approach against other frameworks (like incrementalism, libertarian anarchism or 
rational choice centred models). Etzioni’s (1973) mixed scanning approach provides an 
interesting point of comparison. This has been explored in (Kuruvilla and Dorstewitz 
forthcoming):
“Etzioni saw mixed scanning as a process, combining a wide perspective on the field of  
potential policy solutions with an in-depth analysis o f the most compelling options ... 
While describing rationality as forward-looking inquiry, Dewey additionally 
recommended the use o f ‘imagination’ and ‘dramatic rehearsal,’ which, together with 
the provision o f communication, work as tools for successfully coordinating action 
through generating a shared ‘thick’ understanding o f situations.”
The question whether the decision-cell model is the “best” available model can be 
reformulated as follows: why should a planner use this model as opposed to some other 
one? Aside from the arguments I provided until now, the answer would point to three 
important properties of this model:
1. The decision-cell model reflects the experience o f planners in various actual 
planning contexts (c.f. chapter 2).
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2. It embodies a concept o f rational agency that more adequately accounts for the real 
nature of human conduct than many other models and enables participants to use the 
full spectrum of human deliberative capacities to find creative solutions.
3. This model is able to provide guidance without being prescriptive. It offers a certain 
perspective on problematic contexts that enables participants to inquire and augment 
their own social and effective intelligence. At the same time the decision-cell model 
is flexible and encourages amendments to its structure in view o f concrete contexts.
Inclusiveness (3)
Developing the decision-cell model was a joint project of a policy scientist (Shyama 
Kuruvilla) and me, a philosophy graduate with a business background. Theories and 
concepts such as sociology, planning and organisational theory, and operational research 
were frequently introduced. The model is multi-disciplinary in that it allows for an 
integrated approach across different levels o f analysis. These include organisational 
processes and change or formal and informal relationships in policy formulation, theories 
of democratic participation, and scientific or evidence based policy making.
Problem focus and situational approach (4)
Dewey’s situational approach is expressed in the decision-cell model in the following way: 
(1) It is framed as a process o f re-establishing a unified harmonious situation; (2) its 
procedural and conceptual distinctions are never rigid but respond to the demands of 
unfolding situations, and (3) all norms and guides are placed in the centre to symbolise that 
they are owned and employed by those involved in concrete contexts o f inquiry, who also 
develop and adapt these guides.
Normative orientation (5)
In Chapters 3-61 explained the intimate relationship between understanding a situation and 
knowing what to do about it. In the introduction chapter I discussed why a strict separation 
between normative and descriptive aspects of a policy model is impossible. This claim was 
substantiated during my critique o f the linear instrumental planning model in chapter 2. For 
this reason I avoid excessive repetition of the idea that descriptive models have to be
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normative in so far as they claim to provide orientation for planners and agents, and that 
normative aspects of a policy model must reflect realities in order to serve as guides in 
concrete experienced circumstances.
The present model is normative only insofar as it offers guidance. This guidance consists of 
providing several heuristic orientation marks for planners and participants in the planning 
process.
The lessons to be learned from the decision-cell model are all premised on the idea that 
‘good planning’ is ‘good planning in a specific and unique situation.’ Helping to 
understand a context better is therefore the first and fundamental step in giving any 
normative guidance. But the council that one should use a recipe for which one has the 
ingredients only partly justifies why this model has a normative character, and why 
facilitating processes in the way the decision-cell envisages is a recommendation and not 
only an account o f typical conditions. The decision-cell is not a neutral descriptive model 
of some self-organising processes; it is introduced as a model of social inquiry, and that 
inquiry is proactive and makes demands.
Inquiry has been introduced as both an epistemic investigation and a moral quest. Both 
aspects of inquiry can be summarised by the aim of gaining orientation within a 
problematic situation. Epistemic and ethical aspects of inquiry are complementary also with 
regard to their methodology (cf. Chapter 4).
But how exactly can STR and the decision-cell model provide normative guidance? The 
Deweyan inquiry and STR eschew categorical imperatives for cogent reasons. If we talk 
about a ‘normative aspect’ does it mean that Deweyan rationality would yield hypothetical 
imperatives that allow for situational conditions in their “i f ’ clauses? This would be a great 
misunderstanding.
Hypothetical imperatives are, indeed, imperatives', a hypothetical imperative instructs a 
course of action whenever certain conditions appear to be fulfilled. Thus hypothetical
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imperatives exert normative authority over types o f situations. The application o f a 
hypothetical imperative is no longer in question if all the conditions in the ‘if  clause’ are 
fulfilled.
E.g. Harry Markowitz’s portfolio theory claims that an investor should diversify her 
portfolio in a certain way if she wishes to obtain an optimal ratio between risk-level and 
expected income (i.e. if she intends to invest “rationally”). The strategy o f an 
entrepreneurial investor who is willing to “put all his eggs in one basket” violates this 
hypothetical imperative. Consequently his investment would qualify as “irrational” on 
account of the demands of the reigning standards of portfolio-theory. Alternatively the 
investor can only rationalise his decision with reference to ulterior, non monetary payoffs 
like social status or a gambler’s attitude o f favouring risks. An entrepreneur who has no 
exorbitant profit expectations and admits that risks are significant cannot defend his 
decision by saying that it seemed like the right investment given the situation. Markowitz’s 
theory was developed in the context o f portfolio management with tradable papers and 
money deposits. However, this specific context gets lost in the above definition o f a 
hypothetical imperative.6 This is why a normative reading o f Deweyan rationality cannot be 
reduced to a “hypothetical imperative.”
All we can hope for from a normative reading o f a Deweyan rationality model is guidance 
without imperatives. The decision-cell as a Deweyan model o f planning is a tool in the 
hands of an inquiring community. But it is not Simon’s “gun for hire.” The decision-cell 
can serve only those who are willing to understand this model and its underlying reasoning. 
The recommendations that follow from seeing the planning process through the eyes of the 
decision-cell model are neither rigid nor categorical, yet once we have understood the 
reasoning behind this rationality model, we need good grounds for flouting its advice.
Some of these recommendations may be stated as follows:
6 1 do not claim to report Markowitz’ intentions accurately here. This example is meant purely for expository 
purposes.
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1. If you are a planner, try to organise your perception of seemingly chaotic processes 
with the conceptual instruments that the decision-model offers. Avoid judging 
random and seemingly chaotic developments as deviations that need to be remedied 
by fitting the processes into the mould o f a rational procedural model. Instead 
distinguish which tasks and initiatives can be labelled as ‘define,’ ‘design’ or 
‘realise’ type.
2. Allow parallel developments in all these modes as the need arises, and do not force 
the processes into an order.
3. Try to distinguish potential and actual participant groups, and open deliberation 
processes to all in a way that treats participants as a community of inquirers. Trust 
the inquiry process to build structured forms of agency. Participation does not mean 
giving everyone an equal role or influence in the decision process, but requires 
allowing everyone to voice their point o f view in a place from where he/she can be 
heard and exert some influence. Hierarchies and governance structures can be 
allowed to form in response to situational necessities and should be open to constant 
public revision in view of developing contexts.
4. Treat decision-making as an extended process involving define, design and 
realisation type activities. Do not think o f decision-making as a single authoritative 
act o f a decision-maker.
5. Excellence relies less on the superior intelligence of a few experts than on lived 
social practice and shared experiences. Give priority to communication and learning 
in a social system, even if this may appear less focused or goal-oriented at times.
6. Organise close exchange between the different cell segments and facilitate dialogue 
between participants. Avoid confrontational frames and try to lead participants to an 
understanding of their own initiatives as part o f a collective and creative inquiry 
process.
7. Expect problematic planning situations to be insufficiently defined and understood 
for most of the planning process. Do not demand clear and binding mission 
statements in the beginning o f a planning process. Treat initial problem definitions 
as heuristic tools for guiding further inquiry. Problems, definitions and purposes
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must be manufactured throughout the planning process. Hence, treat planning not 
only as an instrument to achieve a goal but as an ethical quest. Valuation should 
take place by means of appreciating a concrete context and reflecting on its dormant 
possibilities.
8. Treat the decision-cell model as a resource that can offer helpful conceptual ways of 
organising experiences in unique situations that never exactly repeat. Do not merely 
exchange an old model with a new one.
The ultimate pragmatist test of a conceptual model is its value as a tool that can be 
employed successfully to resolve the predicaments of concrete circumstances. Whether or 
not by means o f this model or another it remains to be hoped that the policy scientists and 
planners take up Dewey’s challenge and determine whether by their methods and models of 
inquiry “experimentation may go on less blindly, less at the mercy o f  accident, more 
intelligently, so that [individuals and societies] may learn from their errors and profit by 
their successes” (Dewey, PP LW 2.34).
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Chapter 9: Mines and Malls -  A Tale of Two Cities
It's a weird city because the uglier the weather, the more beautiful the city. And the uglier
the buildings, the more coherent the city.
Rem Koolhaas
Introduction
Early in this dissertation I introduced Le Corbusier’s model o f a “radiant city” as a starting- 
point for the development of an idea o f rationality in planning. I explained the roots o f a 
planning model that I dubbed the “linear instrumental rationality” (LER). I then criticised 
this model and reconstructed it using Dewey’s philosophy (in particular his contribution to 
agency theory and rational collaborative action). After this conceptual reconstruction I 
turned back to the context o f planning, and provided a model o f “Situational Transactive 
Rationality” (STR), spelled out in terms of a process model (“decision-cell”).
At this point I would like to return to the field of urban planning in order to illustrate the 
results of my theoretical investigation. I introduce two cases o f challenging urban land-use 
projects from the German Ruhr region, which I will analyse in order to give the 
juxtaposition of LIR and SIR approaches some tangible reference points.
Duisburg and Essen are two prominent cities in the Ruhr region, which faced similar 
problems after the collapse of the coal and steel-based industries in the 1970s and 80s. 
Urged to undergo a structural transformation (“Strukturwandel”) from labour intensive 
industries to service-based economies, the region suffered from extraordinarily high 
unemployment rates. Compared with other urban centres in the region like Dusseldorf,
Cologne, Bonn or Aachen, the Ruhr cities fell behind, and as a result saw a rapid decrease 
in population. As incomes stagnated, some Ruhr cities lost their purchasing power to more 
attractive nearby cities. Aside from these economic problems, the Ruhr region faced a full 
blown identity-crisis. Throughout Germany it is dubbed the “Pot,” and seen as a grey and 
polluted industrial labour hub where no one in their right mind would spend their holidays. 
Due to heavy industry and weapons production in this region during WWII, the imprints of 
the war are deeper on these cities than anywhere else in the country. This can be seen in 
Essen, for example, where 85% of the city was destroyed, (a degree comparable to the 
destruction o f Warsaw or Dresden, yet without their elaborate reconstruction efforts). For a 
long time there were few things besides its industrial vitality and the success o f its football 
teams that the Ruhr cities were proud of. Tackling the region’s image problem and 
improving quality o f life and urban flair became important goals for planners in the era of 
the Strukturwandel.
Both cases are set in this context, but as they address very different types o f problem- 
contexts, a direct comparison between them seems unwarranted. I will refrain from judging 
one case in light of the other. I intend to illustrate aspects o f the Linear Instrumental 
Rationality conception and the Situational-Transactive model in action. This I do by 
comparing themes that I have treated on a theoretical level in previous chapters with 
manifest processes, and with cues about the beliefs and planning models that decision­
makers adhered to.
I shall first discuss Duisburg’s “Multi-Casa,” an ultimately failed project to build a huge 
shopping centre at the site o f an abandoned freight depot. I will point out how leading 
planners were inspired by ideas and methods that correspond to the LIR model.
I will then introduce the case o f “Zollverein,” an abandoned colliery and coking plant in 
Essen, which later became a UNESCO world heritage site and a hub o f creative activity. I 
argue that the planning process in and around Zollverein has been quite compatible with the 
“Situational-Transactive-Rationality” model.
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It goes without saying that neither o f these cases perfectly matches the theoretical 
frameworks of LIR or STR. In fact these case studies should not even be treated as 
approximate manifestations o f either. Both cases diverge so significantly from these ideal 
types that critics might claim I should have used them in reverse fashion to illustrate the 
LIR and the STR approaches. This would be an exaggeration, but it calls for a clarification 
of my purposes: My aim is not to give an adequate account o f these two model cases, 
instead it is to show how decision-makers in charge employed methods and exhibited 
intuitions that I identify as central to the LIR or STR approaches. Moreover I suggest that 
the STR approach would offer good services (perhaps better than LIR) in framing the 
planning situations in the two cases. I suspect that planners and decision-makers might have 
had an easier way to “find their feet” (Geertz 1994) in their respective contexts had they 
used a situational transactive perspective. In this sense I introduce the two studies as part 
of a larger project that explores the advantages of using a situational transactive model as 
an over-arching methodological framework for planning and policy making in complex 
social environments1.
In spite of its limited scope, I have done a great deal o f research on both cases, including 25 
interviews, a detailed newspaper survey, on-site visits, archive and literature searches, and 
the screening of publications from various individuals and institutions.
Throughout the discussion o f both cases I will use a transactive perspective o f  the planning 
processes. This means that I will look at the complex network of actions and interactions of 
various individuals and institutions, without framing the planning problem in terms o f one 
party’s perspective (e.g. that o f the city administration or the main investor). This allows 
me to scan the entire process for evidence of my claims, and makes it possible to 
reconstruct the formation of agency in each case. I treat the activities and decisions of 
various agents such as party organisations, private investors, heritage foundations, and town 
councils equally as planning activities, allowing me to investigate the ways that the actions,
1 Venturing from our common project (Dorstewitz Kuruvilla 2007), where we first introduced the decision­
cell model, Shyama Kuruvilla has done much work in applying STR to diverse policy contexts, particularly in 
the health care sector. I look forward to joining her results with my own in future projects.
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intentions and approaches o f individual actors relate to the entire process, and how they all 
compare to the discussed rationality models. Only from this transactive perspective can I 
analyse and compare both the intuitions of decision-makers and the processes within an 
unfolding situation, and put them into context with the two rationality frameworks.
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Planning as Projection and Project-Management: 
Duisburg’s “Multi-Casa”
Ideals are like stars; we steer by them not toward them...
John Dewey
A brief history
During the 1990s Duisburg’s neighbouring city o f Oberhausen planned and realised 
Europe’s largest shopping complex, “CentrO” or “Neue Mitte” (“new centre”), which 
drained not only the old centre o f Oberhausen but also attracted retail customers and 
purchasing power from all neighbouring cities, including Essen and Duisburg.
In this period the German Rail company “Die Bahn” decided to sell a 4 hectare estate o f an 
abandoned freight depot near Duisburg. Located next to the main railway station, near two 
highways, and less than half a mile away from Duisburg’s main shopping mall (Koenigs- 
Strasse), the old freight depot had a strategic advantage for any investor dependent on large 
numbers of visitors.
The story of this planning process is marked by confusion and rapid changes of plans and 
projects. The actors and planners involved changed frequently, particularly on the side o f  
interested investors. Several generations o f private developers came in, produced elaborate 
plans, and left without achieving their purposes. The role and involvement o f private and 
semi-public initiatives also shifted significantly. On the part of the City administration, an 
election in 2004 dramatically changed the majority and thereby the political support for the 
project. Multi-Casa became a point o f discord that divided groups into its strong supporters 
and a powerful resistance-movement.
The initial plan was to build a multifunctional sports arena that would include cinemas, 
retail shops and restaurants. As potential investors approached the scene, (initially a
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consortium headed by the Phillipp Holzmann AG), this concept was soon modified in 
favour of extending its more lucrative retail aspects. (Kluemper 1998; WAZ 1998a)
The city administration was reluctant to interfere with plans that investors came up with2 
(Massmann 1999). It feared that private developers would lose interest, and did not want to 
interfere with the creation of new jobs.
The name “Multi-Casa” came from combining the idea o f a sports arena with a funfair, a 
shopping centre, and a “children’s paradise.” Several such ideas cropped up and fell out of 
favour again in their early phases. Among these were plans to create an indoor ski-arena, a 
large-scale discotheque, or a Casino. Ideas about the profile on retail business also changed 
frequently: there was talk o f a 30,000 square metre complex o f factory outlets (traditionally 
a low market segment), and of furniture stores.
The idea of creating a sports arena was abandoned altogether when Trizec Hahn, the 
Canadian Mall giant, took over from Phillipp Holzmann AG (Chudobba and Kluemper 
1999). This also marked a turning-point in the formation o f a vested opposition mainly 
from the side of retail shop owners in the nearby centre (DS 1999). Trizec Hahn preferred 
upmarket shops and brands to furniture stores and factory outlets, exacerbating the clash 
between new investors and locally settled retail businesses.
When Trizec Hahn withdrew from the project (because o f an “internal reorientation o f its 
investment activity in Europe”), the Westdeutsche Immobilienbank joined as new chief- 
investor with the OMG-Group in forming the GID (Gesellschaft filer 
Innenstadtentwicklung Duisburg), with the intent of reviving the idea of a shopping mall.
The GID then commissioned the ECE to develop the project and later manage the Multi- 
Casa. The ECE had experience of undertakings of this type and scale, and had developed 
several such projects in Germany, most famously the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin.
2 Until a new election in 1994 changed the general policy.
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In 2000 the city council approved a master-plan by Albert Speer and Partners (AS&P) that 
laid out the development o f Multi-Casa and its immediate surroundings. Shin Takamatsu 
and his team o f architects, together with the landscape designer Andreas O. Kipar, won the 
competition for designing the Multi-Casa with their project “City Harp,” a compact three 
level complex that would have occupied the largest part o f the building site. It included a 
redecoration o f  the existing space in front o f the passenger railway station. An aesthetic 
highlight o f the plan is a tapering and sharply pointed roof that some have nicknamed “jelly 
bag cap” (Green Major Janicki qouted by FDP), which was to hold a ring with steel ropes 
attached, faintly reminiscent of a harp.
Fig. 9.1: Multi-Casa Duisburg
On an area o f about 4 hectare, the design envisaged 70,000 m2 o f retail space plus another 
14,500m2 for a travel agency and more shops in the integrated and re-developed railway 
station.
The economic prospect o f large scale investment seemed promising: In the Ruhr region 
Duisburg has the status of an “Oberzentrum” (main metropolitan centre), due to its 
population size o f more than 500,000 inhabitants. According to normal economic 
expectations, such an Oberzentrum should be able to provide for the surrounding smaller 
cities and settlements. Retail centrality is the relation o f a city’s overall retail sales to the 
total income spent by its inhabitants. It thereby measures how much of the purchasing
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power available to the inhabitants a city receives, and how much purchasing power it is 
able to attract from the surrounding cities. It is expected that an “Oberzentrum” will have a 
centrality o f more than 100% because o f its function as a provider for the surrounding 
areas. However, Duisburg persistently showed figures o f  around 90% (Diisseldorf in 
comparison has a centrality o f  140%). This finding suggests that Duisburg suffers from an 
underinvestment in the retail and service sector -  the most powerful argument o f the Multi- 
Casa supporters.
While all this was going on, the local Chamber of Commerce, together with organisations 
of retail businesses, built up pressure against the Multi-Casa idea because they felt it would 
tip the balance within the city and damage many established retailers in Duisburg’s core 
area. Contrary to the proclamations o f the investor group GID and the city council, it was 
felt that the Multi-Casa site was not an integrated part o f the city centre, and due to the 
several hundred metres between it and the Koenigs-Strasse, it could never be made so. It 
was therefore suspected that the proclaimed advantage that the city centre and the Multi- 
Casa would attract more customers for each other was not realistic. It was in fact feared that 
the severe competition between them might bring job losses in the centre that would cancel 
out a significant proportion o f the 2,400 expected new jobs created in the Multi-Casa 
(WAZ 1998b).
An alternative suggestion was to develop an integrated concept for redeveloping the city 
centre. As a step in this direction, IHK and BAG commissioned a study (DIA) to 
investigate the potential of developing the city centre itself, thus attracting new investments 
and stimuli for the job-market (Reitzig 2003/4). This study envisioned a number of  
innovations, from a congress centre to new shopping facilities, in the midst o f Duisburg’s 
established retail centre.
Irrespective o f the concerns o f the IHK and the retailers, Duisburg’s Lord Mayor Baerbel 
Zieling and Klaus Mueller o f the GID signed one contract on the exact timetable for the 
project, and another defining the duties of each side and the services to be rendered. Spring 
2008 was named as the latest date by which the Multi-Casa was to be opened (Putz 2003).
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It is now difficult to find material about the Multi-Casa online; and this is understandable 
considering the shock and frustration o f the planners when, on the 27 o f June 2005, after 7 
years o f planning and acquiring all the necessary legal approvals for the project, the city 
council passed a motion effectively bringing the project to an end. The old railway depot 
was declared a “special zone” (“Sondergebiet”), which meant that the city could put 
restrictions on its use. It was expected that the city would preclude subcontracting retail- 
businesses o f all those types which would pose a threat to established city retailers.
The project Multi-Casa was abandoned with immediate effect, and Duisburg now plans to 
develop the centre according to a new urban master plan by Rem Koolhaas. This is 
precisely the result intended by the “DIA” study (Duisburg inner city development) 
commissioned by the IHK & BAG. As part o f this plan it has now been decided that a 
“Duisburger Forum” will be built right in the centre of the city, a project that was seen by 
many as a competing alternative to the Multi-Casa.
Interpretation of analysis
LIR and its limits
Looking at the history o f this project from its beginnings in the late 1990s, the planning 
process seems to have very little resemblance to the ideal type o f linear instrumental 
procedure:
Decision making
Final purposes 
and values
Action/
Implementation
Resources
Guides
Fig. 9.2: The linear instrumental model (cf. Dorstewitz Kuruvilla 2007)
2 9 0
There are many differences between the Multi-Casa story and the LIR model: The process 
in the Multi-Casa case was marked by frequent and radical changes to the designs and 
projects envisaged. An arena, a ski-hall, a casino, a furniture outlet, and eventually the all­
round “experience-centred” mall system were discussed.
I discussed in chapter 7 that the LIR model presupposes a coherently organised agent or a 
planner’s perspective, which stands at the centre o f all instrumental activities. This 
condition cannot be found in the Multi Casa case. Frequent changes o f investors, their 
heterogeneous composition, changing majorities in politics and the reluctance o f  the city 
administration to define its own material visions for the site make it even harder to 
recognise the ‘agent’ within the Multi-Casa planning process. I will, however, argue that 
most o f the involved agents take a Humean perspective on the field by entering it with a 
fairly set list o f priorities and motives.
Finally, decision-making in the case o f the Multi-Casa cannot be reduced to a “decision- 
point” which concludes a research/planning phase and initiates its implementation. The 
decision that finally ended the project was formed gradually and was levelled on a political 
playing field. It expressed the existential fear o f already established businesses, an 
encroaching feeling o f alienation amongst many citizens, and a changing majority in the 
city council. (I will discuss these and other reasons below). Multi-Casa was ousted after all 
the formal decision-phases had been followed out according to plan. Hence it surprised the 
planners of ECE and many city administrators to see the project falter after the plan had 
matured in all its financial, contractual, legal, and administrative aspects.
All of these reasons show how little the Multi-Casa case conforms to the model described 
and prescribed by linear instrumental rationality. Why then was it chosen as an example to 
illustrate the LIR model? The short answer is that I believe LIR does a good job of 
describing the intuitions and aspirations o f important players in the planning process. I will 
explain this below.
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Linear progression
Companies like Philip Holzmann, Trizec Hahn, or the ECE are experts in managing and 
coordinating large-scale projects. They tend to treat urban construction projects like 
shopping centres, airports or sports facilities as large-scale engineering projects. The Multi- 
Casa was planned as a single complex under one roof. The way responsibilities were 
distributed and diverse organisations employed gives a clear impression o f the linear 
understanding underlying the process.
Once a group of investors led by the Westdeutsche Immobilienbank had taken on the 
project, the logical first step seemed to be to form an organisation dedicated to the project. 
The GID was founded as a unified agent representing the side o f the investors. This 
organisation commissioned several market- and feasibility studies from experienced 
institutes such as the Prisma in Diisseldorf.
The project was then referred to a political process in order to obtain the necessary 
permission. I will not exhume the lengthy process o f public hearings and council decisions 
at this point, since my aim is not to write a history of the Multi Casa but to demonstrate 
how aspects o f the LIR model may have influenced the planners’ conception o f the 
planning process. When several basic permissions had been granted, and general support 
for the project had been expressed by the local authorities, a master-plan was 
commissioned. This master-plan was followed by an architectural competition with the end 
of deciding the physical structure of the project and its surrounding. Further necessary 
planning permissions were obtained and the GID entrusted the ECE with all subsequent 
planning and management tasks of an executive nature.
The mandate o f the ECE comprised organising and supervising the construction o f the 
project according to the chosen architectural design and defining the profile o f contractor 
companies to be settled in the Multi-Casa in detail. Further the GID entrusted the ECE with 
managing, running, and maintaining the Multi-Casa after its completion.
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The commitment to a linear instrumental model becomes evident in one publication o f the 
GWF (a local development office) which reports on a presentation by Klaus Muller with 
the purpose of showing “the path from the Idea to the realisation of the Multi-Casa” (GWF- 
News 04/03/2004).
Decision points vs. hierarchically nested structure
A close look at the process shows that the LIR model is too crude even in accounting for 
the rationale applied by the involved private sector investors and planners (GID and ECE). 
This becomes clear when we search for the crucial decision-point which the LIR model 
postulates, supposedly to conclude research and to initiate implementation phases. Instead 
of a single pivotal point o f decision-making, we find several strategic moments that were 
communicated and celebrated as milestones in the project’s history. We come across 
official press releases stating the intent o f various bodies, publicly exchanged signatures 
between representatives of the GID and the lord mayor, and unveiling o f plans and designs 
(GWF 2003; Putz 2003).
The linear instrumental model must be modified into a hierarchically “nested” (cf. 
Friedman 1987 p. 130, referring to Lindblom) model, in which decision processes are re­
iterated. These iterations take place on different levels o f concretisation. The overall 
direction o f this model is linear, reaching from planning to realisation, but the decision 
procedures move in a circular manner: earlier stages yield general visions and strategic 
decisions, while later stages obtain permission and detail plans and designs.
In the current example this nested linear structure may be recognised in several major steps. 
The foundation of the GID marked a clear commitment to embark on this project on the 
side of investors -  perhaps concluded by internal commitments that followed the 
presentation of market- feasibility studies. Planning then proceeded on a more concrete 
footing. The approval o f AS&P Albert Speer and Partner’s master plan by the city council 
in 2000 marks another strategic turning point, leading to more detailed and committed 
planning phases on the side o f the investors. When on September 5th 2002 Shin Takamatsu
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and Andreas O. Kipar were announced as the winners o f the architects’ competition, the 
design of the Multi-Casa and its surrounding seemed decided (Dressier 2003/2004). Further 
decision-points were marked by commissioning the ECE with the extensive task of 
building and managing the centre, and with the ECE’s commitment to a detailed marketing 
strategy, comprising a small number o f “flagship-stores” (large department stores and 
retailers with a broad assortment o f products) and a large number o f small and popular 
specialised high-street retailers. This nested planning procedure had arrived at a very 
detailed level and was just about to enter its implantation stages when it was stopped and 
abandoned.
Ends ex-ante
Although in the case of the Multi-Casa the concrete projects changed on a regular basis, I 
have discovered that the high-ranking objectives o f the key players remained relatively 
stable throughout the process. Moreover, these super-ordinate ends had little to do with the 
specific character of this place and its context. I have summarised below a few strategic 
aims that were put forward:
The owner o f the site, a subsidiary o f the German railway company, Die Bahn, was 
interested in securing a high sales price for its real estate (NRZ 1998). According to one of 
my interviewees, the opportunity to develop a passenger station as a spill-off from the 
Multi-Casa was pursued only as a subordinate priority by the rail company. This lack of 
interest was due to the organisational detachment between different sub-divisions in the rail 
company’s organisation: DB Station & Service as organisationally separated from DB 
Immobilien -  Aurelis.
The priority o f private investors was, unsurprisingly, to put the object to its most lucrative 
use. This can be seen in the changing profile o f the plan from a sports arena to a budget 
factory outlet and eventually to even more profitable middle and up-market retail shops that 
could drive out core business in the old centre (Putz 2003). This transition followed directly 
from what was deemed politically feasible at any given point in time.
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The city officials, as I mentioned, had a settled agenda to promote the “Strukturwandel” 
(regional structural transformation) by creating new third sector businesses (retail and 
services) on a large scale. Its two prime targets were creating new jobs and attracting direct 
investment to stimulate economic growth. Economic key-data like the city’s retail centrality 
or its retail sales space per capita were the focus o f the council and its planning offices.
Because of their proximity and structural similarity, cities in the Ruhr region are in a 
constant state of rivalry. Improving Duisburg’s profile through economic success and by 
means of prestigious or impressive development projects was high up on the agenda. 
Duisburg’s prime reference point was the “CentrO” in Oberhausen, a highly successful 
drawing-board project that had turned a large stretch of industrial wasteland into Europe’s 
largest shopping centre. The attractiveness to city planners of a project similar in style and 
size is understandable. The desire to build something flashy, even domineering, like Shin 
Takamatsu’s design, was fuelled by this competitive attitude.
Town planners and officials have admitted to the lack o f colour and flair in Ruhr cities, 
which were built during the 1960s to 1980s.3 However, what constitutes “life quality,” a 
“welcoming atmosphere,” or an “urban boulevard feeling” was defined in general terms 
which made no reference to places and contexts. Designers of the Multi-Casa made 
promises of “Mediterranean flair,” a “world of experience” and “paradises” o f various 
descriptions (GWF-News 04/03/2004; 22/12/2003).
Some further criteria were evidently important to the city council. Private investments are 
often used by public administrators to further infra-structure projects. For example, the 
administration expected investors to create access roads and ramps to the local highway 
system. There was also discussion of building a slab over the highway, which was seen not 
only as a noise attenuator but as a way o f re-connecting quarters on the other side of the
3 Indicative of this perception was the decision to plant an enormous Niki De Saint Phalle sculpture in 
Duisburg’s centre.
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highway with the city centre. The promised creation o f4,300 parking lots was an important 
argument for a city that suffers from a chronic shortage o f parking space. Finally, the re­
development of a railway forecourt was a welcome spill-off that the Multi-Casa promised 
to deliver.4
If one compares earlier and later statements on the project and its promises and values, 
neither the aims and criteria nor their relative weights changed significantly during the 
planning process (cf. NRZ 1997; WAZ 1998a; GWF 2003; Dressier 2003/2004; GWF 
2004).
At the point when the GID had formed and the ECE was commissioned as the project 
developer, Multi-Casa had quickly become a vision no less comprehensive than Le 
Corbusier’s radiant city. The plan not only defined the architectural features and the 
structure o f flagship stores and smaller retail businesses that were to be settled, it envisaged 
a precisely defined lifestyle and all-round experience for its visitors (NRZ 1997). 
“Erlebniswelt” is a terrifying German word-creation: literally translated it means a “world 
of experience,” and is often used by investors and project developers to point to planned 
qualitative aspects of a project that go beyond shopping opportunities and services. 
References to the creation of an “Erlebniswelt” insinuated that it was the explicit aim o f  
planners to create a pleasant all-round experience.
Duisburg’s Gesellschaft fuer Wirtschaftsfoerderung (society for economic development) 
summarised the Multi-Casa project in the following way (GWF 2003, my translation, my 
italics):
“Aim o f ECE’s planning effort: Duisburg’s centre should gain a magnet o f first rate and 
first quality. A gastronomic landscape, highly attractive sojourn areas, water-fountain- 
shows, interactive stages and cultural events are planned... In the metropolitan Multi-
4 The whole list is a result of interviews that I conducted with Ralf Krumpholz (Secretary of the “B’90 Die 
Gruenen Fraction im Duisburger Rat” -  1/3/2007) and Andreas Haack (from the local Chamber of Commerce 
“IHK” -  8/3/2007).
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Casa one will find everything that the “shopping- heart” desires... A special highlight 
is the novel concept o f a “food court” [in fact this idea had long before been realised in 
the ‘CentrO’ Oberhausen] with attractive culinary offers. In sum the generously planned 
and elegantly designed shopping-mall, which will include several “piazze,” and light- 
flooded rotundas, will create a Mediterranean atmosphere and a high quality to stroll, 
window-shop and live in.”
Opposition
This unambiguous avowal of a comprehensive ex-ante approach flies in the face o f the 
situational transactive idea that treats planning as a gradual process of unfolding purposes 
and qualities. Some o f the voiced criticisms against this project and its planning procedure 
have come from a similar direction.
B’90-Gruene (the Green Party) opposed the undertaking from the beginning, but this 
resistance was by no means limited to alternative segments of Duisburg’s society. Many 
argued that the city would lose a part o f its identity by yielding to a universal tendency of 
Americanisation. A related complaint was that leaving such a large and prominent area of 
Duisburg’s city centre in the hands o f a private owner and single project developer would 
significantly reduce the ability o f citizens to form, determine and own their city.5
5 In Berlin, where the ECE has realised its most prestigious project, this planning strategy has led to 
disquieting consequences. The Potsdammer Platz, once Berlin’s centre point, which had fallen victim to both 
WWII and the Berlin wall, was redeveloped all at once during the 1990s. This was done in an international 
style of corporate architecture with some ostentatious cultural monuments (e.g. the main cinema of the 
Berlinale and a concert hall), whence it become a slick island that remained somewhat disconnected from the 
rest of the city. The entire estate is privately owned and managed by the ECE. The management of this estate 
reserves the right to ask visitors who are deemed inappropriate to leave.
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Situation and context
With regard to the plans for London’s largest development site north o f  King’s Cross 
Station, Graham Morrison o f the joint master-planner office Allies and Morrison said 
(Goodman 2006):
“It’s easy to design something like a business park, it’s harder to do a job where you 
can walk across the site and it still feels like you are in ... London.”
The design o f the Multi-Casa is reminiscent of a space station or a futuristic rocket 
launching pad. The architectural design by Shin Takamatsu is loud, attention-seeking; even 
exhibitionistic. It is tempting to read this as an exaggerated architectural statement by a city 
that feels the need to compensate for its complexes.
Aside from such attempts to psychoanalyse architecture, it is plain that this new shopping 
world would have looked like a foreign body in the humble post-war reconstruction 
architecture o f the city. It would have overpowered the railway station, a plain Bauhaus 
brick complex and a heritage protected monument. The plan also intended to turn the main 
square in front o f the station into its own front-yard. This intention is most evident by the 
suggested paving of the square in lines that would run diagonally along the station building 
toward the entrance o f the Multi-Casa, thereby breaking the rigorous and stem rectangular 
character of the station’s front aspect. The roof extension pointing out from the Multi-Casa 
onto the square asserts its claim o f supremacy over the place rather than its integration into 
the city.
Less from an aesthetic and more from an economic urban planning perspective, this lack of 
coherence with the rest of the city became a bone o f contention. The reason that finally 
brought Multi-Casa to an end was the fear o f many local businesses and employees that, 
because of its detached and self-enclosed character, it would attract streams of customers 
away from the centre rather than acting as a gateway and a stimulus to the rest o f the city. A 
similar problem was felt in Oberhausen where, after the creation of the “CentrO,” the city’s 
old centre dried up economically.
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A new master plan for developing Duisburg’s city centre (post Multi-Casa) now intends to 
integrate the newly developed Innenhafen6 with the city. The Multi-Casa site was located 
on the opposite side o f the centre, and it was therefore feared that it would tip the balance 
of the city away from the Innenhafen, by building a counter-pole to the newly developing 
harbour area, possibly reducing it to a fringe o f the city.
Situation as problematique
In previous chapters the “situational” aspect was introduced as a methodological reference 
point. It addressed the framing o f planning-situations. A situational approach understands 
action in problematic situations as primarily stimulated by indeterminacy or by conflicting 
impulses, and not by definite goals or problems.
It is quite evident that important decision-makers in the Multi-Casa project applied this 
linear instrumental perspective and consequently underestimated the political 
indeterminacies and conflicting potentials that made this situation what French literary 
critics might call a problematique (a complex meshwork of ambitions, efforts and diverging 
worldviews).
Early planning documents looked more like an economic and legal feasibility study trying 
to establish the sense o f a Multi-Casa from an investors’ perspective. The older o f two 
independent studies by the Prisma-Projekt Beratungs GmbH (1998), which served as an 
important orientation for both investors and city planners, takes a detailed look at the 
location and its macro surrounding. It investigates the infrastructural location and the 
structure and strength of competition in the city centre and in neighbouring centres. It 
analyses macro data of Duisburg’s economy, customer behaviour and other economic data. 
Yet there is only one sentence about the role and impact that this investment may have on 
surrounding quarters, in which the study claims that the project would mean an extension of
6 An old part of Duisburg’s harbour which has been re-developed as a boulevard with restaurants and cultural 
highlights.
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the city centre, which would serve to “complete” its retail and services provision and 
“revitalise” the entire centre (p .ll). Ironically in the very same paragraph the study states 
that the estate occupies an “isolated position,”7 which was precisely the argument used by 
opponents of the Multi-Casa.
Only after the Chamber o f Commerce had become an active player in criticising the project 
and after Multi-Casa had been challenged by a rival plan (“DIA”) was the planning project 
successively defined as a political mine-field and an unresolved problematique. At this 
point, however, the Multi-Casa plan had matured to so far the different perspectives o f  
Multi-Casa planners and inner city revival (“DIA”) supporters had become locked in a 
polarised confrontation that was no longer favourable to forms o f collective deliberation 
where all local agents and groups would search for creative and satisfactory solutions.
I say all this quite tentatively, because it was not easy to gain full access to the studies and 
materials on this case, particularly from the side of investors and project developers.
Surely conflicts arising from the appearance of a new competitor in a marketplace cannot 
be resolved merely through communication and participative deliberation. However, the 
conflict around the Multi-Casa cannot be reduced to the local fear o f new competition in an 
established marketplace. It was rather a specific type o f business that was feared to tip a 
balance in the local economic structure. These were accompanied with questions about both 
Duisburg’s character as a marketplace and its identity as a city. The effects of increased 
competition were important, but so were geographical reflections on the coherence o f the 
city (GMA 2004; cf. 2005; ["mitteilungsvorlage" no author] 2005a; 2005b). The great 
support for the alternative project of the “Forum,” which envisages the settlement o f several 
new large-scale retail businesses in yet more central locations, indicates that the mere threat 
of competition was not the crucial point leading to the widespread resistance.
7 “Insellage.”
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It is not my aim to pass judgement on the Multi-Casa project. I only intend to illustrate 
some features of the LIR approach in practice. The city council and its planning offices will 
be ready to prove that the public had been informed and invited to participate in each stage 
of the planning process. They have even provided a laborious moderation procedure in 
which all the contributions o f citizens and institutions were collected, summarised, ordered 
and made available in an online domain. It is not part o f my claim that public decisions 
were reached in an undemocratic way. Several studies were conducted to prove the 
economic and social compatibility with public purposes and policies. These regarded not 
only the impact of the project on the city but also on the region, and were necessary for 
obtaining official approvals from several North Rheine-Westphalian regulatory authorities. 
On the other hand several interviews with representatives o f  the B ’90 Gruene Party and the 
Chamber of Commerce indicate that Multi-Casa was planned, designed, and evaluated by 
its key planners in relative isolation from its context, and not as part o f a comprehensive 
development concept for the whole city. The master plan by AS&P Albert Speer and 
Partners from 2000 did not have the scope to integrate the Multi-Casa with the structural 
needs of the entire city. Such a master plan was only later provided by Rem Koolhaas, after 
the Multi-Casa had been abandoned.
Neutrality o f inquiry
Using feasibility studies as the main planning tool in the beginning of the process is a clear 
sign of a linear instrumental approach. It follows the assumption that matters of fact (about 
the economic feasibility o f a project) can be decided in a relatively value-neutral fashion. It 
is therefore interesting how these “objective” and “independent” studies met with great 
suspicion right from the start. It was felt that they were not neutral but promoted the 
interests of their initiators. This suspicion was not only uttered in interviews that I 
conducted but it also led to the commissioning o f a further study with the purpose of 
evaluating two prior studies which respectively favoured the rival projects of Multi-Casa 
(Prisma 2004) and Duisburger Forum (CIMA-Stadtmarketing). The IFH conducted this
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third mediating study and concluded that both prior studies must be regarded as insufficient 
warrants for the cases they make (Kaapke 2005 pp.6-8, my translations):
“The IFH cannot subscribe to the conclusions drawn by either of the two studies; this is 
due to the insufficient transparency o f establishing numerous determinants, which 
would have been necessary for their conclusions.”
The evaluation o f both studies ends with the conclusion that
. .drawing the opposite conclusion would have been equally justified.”
Only from a qualitative estimation does the EFH lend more support to the “Forum-project.”
These points lend some credit to the pragmatist claim that inquiry into the determinants o f a 
situation can never be neatly separated from evaluating action-strategies and ultimate 
purposes.
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Planning as Appreciation: 
Colliery and Coking-Plant “Zollverein”
Tradition is passing on the flame, not worshipping the ashes.
Gustav Mahler
A Brief History
After a visit to Zollverein, the architect Claude Vasconi wrote: “Today I saw a miracle...” 
(Das Magazin Zollverein 2006, my translation).
Franz Haniel (1779-1868), founder o f the colliery Zollverein, bought 14 coal fields, and in 
1848 began sinking a pit in the northern Ruhr region. The idea o f a central extraction plant 
(Schacht XII) in the north of Essen took shape only during the 1920s, after the pit had been 
taken over by the steel consortium “Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG.” The architects Schupp and 
Kremmer were commissioned to plan and design the world’s largest extraction and 
processing plant of their time. The plant boasted an impressive extraction capacity o f 
12,000 tons a day until coal production was finally abandoned in 1986.
Zollverein was built the year the famous Bauhaus in Dessau closed. All constructions on 
shaft XII were designed by Schupp and Kremmer in the style o f “Neue Sachlichkeit” (“new 
objectivity”). Apart from their aesthetic value as pristine and rare surviving examples o f  
their period’s industrial architecture, these constructions were in the avant-garde of 
technology and structural engineering. Schupp and Kremmer were amongst the first to use 
suspended steel frame facades, which later became standard in high rise buildings.
Fig. 9.3 Perspective on shaft XII
(source: http://www.thomas-lehr.de/gallery/ruhrgebiet04/7ZecheZollverein)
After ending operations at this location, the “Ruhrkohle AG” (later named “RAG”) 
relinquished an area o f 100 hectares, including the pit with its magnificent shaft frame, 
numerous halls, conveyor belts, workshops, railway lines, stockpiles o f coal and rock, and a 
coal processing-plant. The neighbouring coking plant is part o f the ensemble but was taken 
out o f service in 1993.
Conservators today call the period that followed “the time o f anarchy.” For about 10 years 
the site was left more or less unprotected.1 This invited many idiosyncratic visitors like 
artists, rail buffs (who occupied a number o f retired train carriages), and urban adventurers 
who explored this bizarre and nostalgic landscape. I myself loved to explore the place. I
1 Only a small service was continued to protect the mine’s underground systems and remaining coal 
depositories from water damage.
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used to study for my business degree on the rock piles and often climbed to the top of the 
ramshackle pithead frame to watch the sun set over the Ruhr. These sunsets used to be 
famous for their colour explosions, which were caused by high levels o f industrial air 
pollution.
Unfortunately these early years o f “anarchy” at Zollverein also attracted a great deal of 
destruction and theft. Many o f the old engines were damaged, graffiti appeared, windows 
were smashed, and almost everything portable of any value vanished from the site.
Zollverein has since been established as a prestigious heritage site and is a thriving centre 
of culture, design, and education. Last year Essen won the bid for Europe’s cultural capital 
in 2010 and made Zollverein its centre venue for coordination and events.
A Problematic Situation
When the gates o f Zollverein closed in 1986, it marked the end o f  an era o f coal production 
in the Ruhr valley. This brought economic and social change that the region has only now 
begun to digest.
Zollverein has become an object o f prestige in Essen and the Ruhr region, which explains 
why it is so difficult to reconstruct the history o f the attempts to demolish it in the 1980s 
and 1990s.
According to Karl Ganser, the Ruhrkohle AG filed an application in 1986 to demolish parts 
of Zollverein, which was swiftly granted by Essen. The city proposed to buy the site with 
the intent to “demolish, condition and develop the area and to create jobs -  if possible in 
equal number as had previously worked on the site” (Ganser 2002 p.24, my translation). 
Ganser summarises the officials’ views as follows: “existing architecture unsightly; 
preservation unaffordable.”
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Ruhrkohle AG (later RAG, today EVONIC) even filed a lawsuit with the administrative 
court o f Gelsenkirchen against the motion to list buildings o f Zollverein 6/9 under the 
Heritage Protection Act because it had plans to erect a new settlement on the site. Shaft 12 
(the main complex) was also endangered according to these reports. Ruhrkohle AG resisted 
attempts at preservation, and acknowledged only the shaft head frame to be of heritage 
value. As Buschmann claims, the protection o f even this part was rejected because the 
company had no further use for it (2002 p.32). At this point only an expedited motion could 
rescue the site from demolition. Fortunately the protection efforts were successful on the 
whole. However, some smaller parts, namely all the buildings surrounding the head-frame 
of shaft 6, were replaced with residential houses (Buschmann 2006).
The city o f Essen bought the estate through the LEG (a land owned administration agency) 
with the following purposes: 1. to bare the site, 2. to make it ready for new construction, 
and 3. to sell the property to private developers (Der Oberstadtdirektor, Schul- und 
Kulturdezemat et al. 1993 p.4). The low sales price of only 500,000 Euro for shafts XII and 
1/2/8 reflected the assumption that the acquisition was a burden rather than a benefit. 
Although the area is located fairly near the centre of Essen, it is surrounded by low-income 
quarters. Nearly 100 years o f heavy industry left long-standing ground contaminations. 
Many o f the constructions were poisoned with asbestos. In their dilapidated state they were 
regarded as a liability rather than an asset o f the purchase.
Walter Buschmann (head o f the regional monument preservation office) confirms how 
difficult it was to get the pit and its buildings listed under the monument preservation act 
and talks about a tug of war over several years (Buschmann 2002; 2006). In an interview 
with Walter Buschmann I learned that Essen’s administration was merely interested in the 
“street aspects” (those buildings immediately visible from the entrance gate) and was ready 
to sacrifice the rest (including the coal wash) to new development projects.
Only the fast intervention and enduring engagement o f a few individuals, including Walter 
Buschmann and Karl Ganser, could stop plans that would have destroyed or ruined this
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heritage site. The fight continued long after Zollverein XII had received its status as a listed 
monument. Further disputes erupted over the use of vacant areas such as coal and waste 
rock-piles, and about smaller neighbouring shafts (e.g. 1/2/8) and surrounding settlements.
In 1991 I joined a demonstration against the establishment o f an industrial waste dump 
which was meant not only to fill sub-surface mining areas but also to occupy the site of 
today’s sculpture forest. In 1992 this idea was fortunately abandoned.
After 1993 new quarrels broke out over the neighbouring coking plant. The owner had 
plans to disassemble the entire plant and sell it to China (Heidner and Mehrfeld 2002, p.8).
The IBA Emscherpark (an international building and construction exhibition) lasted from 
1989 to 1999. It promoted visionary urban planning and construction projects in the region 
and gave decisive impulses for changing the entire region’s perception o f its industrial 
heritage. It is safe to say that without this engagement, large parts if not all o f the area 
would have been destroyed.
Not only is this historical background interesting in and of itself, it is also a good example 
of a “problematic situation” as introduced in earlier chapters of this dissertation.
Prior to 1986 the daily extraction and processing of coal created an equilibrium o f habitual 
processes routines. Around the time o f Zollverein’s closure this equilibrium gave way to an 
“unsettled” situation. Abandoning production on an area of this size demanded a 
reorganisation o f future uses, developments and the ownership o f the site. The phase 
leading up to the closure o f the site may be called an “indeterminate situation” as defined 
by Dewey. At that point no one had a clear idea of what should be done afterwards, and 
most did not even perceive the urgency that was required. Only a handful o f people 
understood how politically explosive the field could turn out to be. The situation soon 
turned from “indeterminate” to “problematic” when various opposing views were expressed 
on what to do with the site. All parties were suddenly forced to pay attention to the 
situation. One cannot speak o f the perceived need for a “solution” because at this point
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there was no clearly defined problem. What was needed was a new understanding or 
framing of the situation.
Even those factions that urged a comprehensive preservation o f the entire estate were not 
committed to a defined goal or a clear vision. However they were convinced that the site 
was a masterpiece o f industrial architecture and that there was great potential for future acts 
of planning.
Heidner and Mehrfeld confirm that all the early supporters o f Zollverein had the hope that 
“patience and curiosity” would help to raise fascination for the location (Heidner and 
Mehrfeld 2002 p.20 my translation):
“And good concepts [for its use] would then arise almost by itself.”
Later developments justified this intuition.
Zollverein rapidly gained recognition in the region as an important historical identification 
point, as an architectural monument o f first rank, and as a vibrating cultural location with 
countless exhibitions, projects and events.
The greatest breakthrough was the recognition Zollverein received in 2001 from UNESCO 
as a world cultural heritage site. Only in the lead-up to this change o f status was it possible 
to make the case for admitting the entire ensemble, including the coking plant and even 
some nearby mining settlements, to Essen’s protection list.
Through this transformation from an expired industrial ruin to a popular and nationwide 
revered heritage site and cultural centre, I would like to illustrate some further ideas that 
constitute the situational transactive approach as embodied in the decision-cell model.
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Planning as Inquiry, and Inquiry as Appreciation
Norms in context
Earlier I discussed Dewey’s reasons for rejecting the “hierarchical model” o f ends and 
purposes. This model claims that concrete aims and strategies are designed to yield the best 
possible realisation of ultimate ends and purposes. Although concrete goals and strategies 
take situational constraints into account, these ultimate ends and purposes are ranked 
independently o f conditions that influence their realisation. I.e. on account of the 
“hierarchical model,” situational constraints have no rational import on the formation and 
ranking o f ultimate ends. In this model some high-ranking norms would normally occupy a 
super-ordinate position and would pose demands and constraints on concrete decisions. 
Dewey’s view was that ends should be regarded as means or “instruments” that enable an 
agent to organise her activity within a situation. Ends evolve out o f a situation. Norms are 
general principles that have been extracted from experience through abstraction and draw 
their authority from their ability to guide action in these concrete contexts. Dewey 
concludes that norms themselves have an instrumental character. Their authority and their 
quality o f guidance rest on how well we employ, interpret and adapt them in a particular 
situation.
Zollverein is an interesting case to illustrate this idea: Heritage protection and the 
preservation o f monuments is an established and well-rehearsed framework o f norms that is 
not only recognised by the general public, but is expressed in the legal and political realms. 
It is commonly accepted that certain buildings should be protected on account o f their 
historical significance and their cultural or aesthetic value. Cathedrals, cloisters and palaces 
are traditionally listed under protection acts, i.e. buildings that were designed for 
representative purposes. These are often ornate or designed by famous architects.
In the case o f Zollverein, the application o f heritage preservation norms was extremely 
difficult and ambiguous. The ensemble did not mach the public understanding of protected 
heritage sites, even though the Zollverein XII was in fact designed with a distinct
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representative element. The style o f the entrance area is commonly seen in Baroque court 
architecture. It leads to a square with side wings, and the pit-hall in the front has an 
impressive hoist frame. Zollverein’s prestige also came from its being on the cutting edge 
of the industrial technology o f its time. However, by the time it closed it was by no means 
clear to most citizens and city planners that there was anything worth protecting amongst 
the sinister, dirty and purely functional buildings. In particular the wider surrounding (e.g. 
Shaft 1/2/8 and the coking plant) seemed like an outdated industrial relic with nothing 
edifying or uplifting about it. The vast conveyor belts, the jungles o f pipes and the towering 
chimneys were an eye-sore for most people in the grey and industrial Ruhr valley.2
2 This appetite for colour often lead city planners to favour architecture that borders on the ridiculous, like the 
pastel-coloured constructions “city-center” at Porscheplatz, or the two pink towers including the Cinemaxx at 
the Berliner Platz, that were built during the same time period.
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Fig. 9.4: Shaft XII -  Coal Wash and Hoist Frame3
On its own, the normative demand for protecting important heritage sites and monuments 
did little to preserve Zollverein. The norm, on its own account, had no authoritative claim 
over this particular situation. Applying the normative toolbox o f monument preservation to 
the case o f Zollverein demanded a great deal o f situated judgement, or what I have called 
the “transfer dimension” o f imagination (chapter 5). More than that, it demanded the 
adaptation o f the normative framework o f “monument preservation” to the concrete context 
and the development of a fundamentally new aesthetic -  a  new way o f seeing.
3 Source: http://www.thomas-lehr.de/gallery/ruhrgebiet04/7ZecheZollverein.
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Remember that Dewey says (HT, MW6.263):
“There is no label, on any given idea or principle, that says automatically, ‘Use me in 
this situation’— as the magic cakes of Alice in Wonderland were inscribed ‘Eat me.’ 
The thinker has to decide, to choose; and there is always the risk, so that the prudent 
thinker selects warily -  subject, that is, to confirmation or frustration by later events. If 
one is not able to estimate wisely what is relevant to the interpretation o f a given 
perplexing or doubtful issue, it avails little that arduous learning has built up a large 
stock o f concepts. For learning is not wisdom: information does not guarantee good 
judgement. Memory may provide a refrigerator in which to store a stock o f meanings 
for future use, but judgement selects and adopts the one to be used in an emergency—  
and without an emergency (some crisis, slight or great) there is not call for judgement.”
This “emergency” arose after RAG and the city of Essen had drafted their demolition plans. 
However, some cogent arguments had to be dealt with before the norms of heritage 
protection could be used to preserve Zollverein. Schupp and Kremmer’s constructions were 
designed as “outer skins” for the protection of machinery, not as indoor spaces that would 
readily yield new uses. Further, the economic method of construction had produced 
buildings that were designed to last for only 30 to 60 years. This was not only the result o f  
the companies’ tight budgeting, which already anticipated the exhaustion of coal 
depositories at that location, but Schupp and Kremmer interpreted the Bauhaus motto “form 
follows function” to imply that “function” also exhausts the raison d ’etre o f an 
architectural monument. The philosophy behind this movement o f “new objectivity” 
positively rejected the idea o f building for eternity. When in the nineties these buildings 
were in a deplorable state of disrepair, and some were even in immanent danger o f  
collapsing, it had to first be established that it was appropriate to preserve these buildings. 
Schupp and Kremmer were not widely recognised as first rate architects at that time. It was 
said that Norman Foster, who later took over the task o f re-designing the interior of the 
boiler-house, had never heard of them.
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All this did not make the case for preservation an easy one. Even after it was acknowledged 
that the central area o f Schacht XII was indeed worthy of protection, it seemed utopian to 
preserve the entire ensemble, including Schacht 1/2/8, the coking plant, and the rock-piles 
and empty areas, without at least some appealing new ideas for its use.
Means and ends
The recipe for Zollverein’s eventual success had many components. One was a series of 
initiatives that grew into a framework of functions and thereby provided perspectives for 
future developments. These activities helped create a new identity for the place.
In the beginning there were a few artists (like Ulrich Rueckriem and Stefan Pietryga) who 
were not only inspired by the space, but were able to make use of the abandoned halls and 
the old equipment o f the mine to construct, lift, and transport large sculptures. Ulrich 
Rueckriem created a sculpture park o f monolithic granite blocks in an overgrown stretch of 
wasteland. These multi-ton granite blocks were officially integrated into the renowned 
exhibition for contemporary art, “Dokumenta,” in Kassel.
Many other artists came and made use o f the location in very original ways: walk-around 
theatre performances turned constructions and machinery into sceneries, and contemporary 
composers used the acoustics of the oddly shaped halls for experimental concerts and sound 
installations. It is well known to architects that the optimal acoustics for traditional music 
performances is achieved in shoe-box shaped rooms, yet few concert halls have ever been 
built this way. Many o f Zollverein’s halls were originally designed in this shape, making 
them ideal concert halls.
In the mid-nineties choreographers discovered the location. An international dance fare was 
held there, and dance companies used all possible locations on the estate as natural stages 
for their performances. Later, the chorographical centre PACT was set up in the old pithead 
baths.
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Many creative ideas were inspired by the bizarre character of the location, and old mining 
tools and technology were used as resources for new artistic purposes.
Designers also showed a lively interest in Zollverein. Students of FB4 (Essen University’s 
design department) were the first to use the “coal wash” as an exhibition space, and even 
planned to move their quarters to the location. A significant step toward establishing 
Zollverein as a first-rate cultural site occurred when the famous British architect Norman 
Foster re-developed the boiler house for the new “red dot” design museum.
Under the leadership o f Karl Ganser, the IBA Emscherpark, (the regional building 
construction and urban project exhibition that lasted from 1989 to 1999) was the first 
initiative that appreciated the adjacent coking plant in its own right. Its bizarre industrial 
landscape harboured a world o f visual and spatial experience. It attracted some 300,000 
people during the exhibition “Sonne, Mond und Sterne” (sun, moon, and stars). Visitors 
were able to see a chimney from the inside with its camera obscura effect, and were guided 
along the industrial stages of coke production.
In 2001 the artists Dirk Paschke and Daniel Milohnic created an out-door swimming-pool 
on the roof o f the old coal mixing facility by joining two blue cargo containers. This 
popular installation, which the artists called “Badesaison” (bathing season), is still in use 
during the summer months. Next to it, a cooling basin, stretching alongside the coking 
plant, has been turned into a 150 meters long winter ice rink that attracts up to 22,000 
visitors each year.
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Fig. 8.5 Ice rink and Ferris wheel on the coking plant
(source: http://www.thomas-lehr.de/gallery/ruhrgebiet04/7ZecheZollverein)
The only significant new building on the site is the Zollverein School o f Management and 
Design. It is a white cube with square windows quasi randomly scattered over the facade, 
designed by the architects Kazuyo Sejima and Ryue Nishizawa (office Sanaa). Even here 
the idea o f using the context to inspire new purposes has been honoured. The architects 
managed to use the warm waste water that the mining company had not yet drained out of 
the pit to heat the entire building (Schuler and Matt 2006).
These are all illustrations o f how means and ends can co-evolve and arise out o f a single 
context. All these purposes grew out o f the situation “Zollverein” more or less organically, 
thereby creating their own means. The sum o f these activities and projects has helped to 
shape the very distinct character of the location and give it a new functionality.
Engelskirchen writes the following about Zollverein (Engelskirchen 2006 p.216, my 
translation):
“A thing taken out of its functional context becomes ‘garbage’ with regard to features 
of its design-purpose. But not everything that is garbage will be thrown away. Some 
things undergo a process o f re-evaluation: A pit becomes a shut down pit, hence 
garbage, and then the monument of a pit. No longer coal but historical insights are now 
produced and a lateral shift has taken place.”
Zollverein has produced much more than “historical insight” since the mine shut down. The 
point I would like to make is that a curious study of a situation -  an inquiry that employs 
imagination as its main tool -  is able to turn “garbage” into useful resources and use these 
resources to develop new purposes and projects. Zollverein has proved that purposes and 
the means for their realisation are intimately related and mutually dependent. In 1986 it 
would have been inconceivable to preserve the entire ensemble, on account o f the cost 
alone. By 2002 the site had attracted 70 million euro for its conservation and re­
development. As Ganser (2002) mentions, knowing this sum in advance would have 
immediately turned all decision-makers off the project. Yet, Zollverein turned from what 
some deemed a liability called “garbage” into an invaluable resource -  a resource for 
cultural projects, a heritage site, a point of identity for the whole region, and the location of 
many creative businesses. Although Zollverein consumed significant amounts o f public 
funds it does not appear to be a bottomless pit for subventions. Zollverein is more and more 
able to generate income through the use of its own resources (e.g. renting out properties), 
and through the growing independence of the foundation “Stiftung Zollverein,” which runs 
effective fundraising campaigns.
The planning-process: inquiry and philosophy
I chose to introduce Zollverein and its planning history as a way o f illustrating an unfolding 
problematic situation. In this history the achievement o f “world cultural heritage” status 
and the protection of the entire estate by law had been an important transition, but not an 
end point to the problematique: A new stable equilibrium had not been reached. In fact it 
marked only the beginning o f a new phase o f urgently needed inquiry. Until that point
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inquiry had centred on questions like what would justify preservation o f diverse parts of the 
ensemble. Subsequent inquiries asked what “protection” and “preservation” actually meant 
in this context. These are only a few of the many problems and conflicts between 
competing ideas and institutions.
Zollverein’s planning history, read as a Deweyan inquiry, illustrates more than the process 
of structuring and settling a problem situation. Inquiry produces solutions, but these 
solutions, in turn, give rise to further indeterminacy and a need for further inquiry. This 
inquiry aspect o f planning was taken very seriously, and once given answers always gave 
rise to further questions and research. Debates often became philosophical, necessitated by 
the search for concrete definitions.
One example o f such an iterative inquiry process is The Stiftung Zollverein (foundation 
Zollverein), which is in charge of running the place. Two core items of its mandate are 
seemingly incongruous: it is supposed to protect the monument as a heritage site while at 
the same time making it accessible to a large number o f visitors. Ingrid Krau speaks about 
the opposed demands of authenticity and utilisation as a tightrope walk (Krau 2006 p. 177). 
The annual number o f visitors has increased between 1998 and 2005 from 20,000 to 64,000 
(Noelle and Durchholz 2006 p.222), and UNESCO lists tourism as one of the prime threats 
to heritage sites worldwide. Easy solutions, for example cordoning off sensitive areas and 
channelling visitors along defined and affixed paths, were rejected. Instead much thought 
was given to reaching a genuine synthesis between opposing demands. The right choice o f  
programme, the adequate involvement o f visitors in the projects, human guides who were 
familiar with the location (many ex-workers), and elaborate signpost systems4 were 
considered as ways to keep the site open but protected.
4 During an onsite interview with Ute Durchholz I learned that Zollverein has now, for a fourth time, installed 
a new sign-posting system.
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Problems like this conflict between heritage protection and new forms of use can rarely be 
solved by quick fixes and improvised compromises. They require further inquiries into 
conceptions and ideas o f this place and its unique character. It has been argued, for 
example, that the central area o f shaft XII was originally designed by its architects as the 
high ground o f a “machine-rationality,” i.e. as an area o f automated processes devoid o f  
people. Only the odd engineer would be found in this “giant machine without workers” 
(Krau 2006 p. 177), and even the miners entered and exited their workplaces at shaft 1/2/8, 
far from the main area. The question therefore arose again on a more theoretical level: how 
could the preservation of the character and architecture o f this site be reconciled with 
frequent visitors?
I will remark as a side-note that it is not without irony that I chose Zollverein to illustrate 
the situated transactional model o f rationality. Being a contemporary o f Zollverein’s 
construction, Dewey was a vocal critic of its dehumanising machine-age rationality, which 
Buschmann (2006 p.60) explains (my translation):
“In the turn toward geometrical and stereometrical design, the entire philosophy of this 
epoch finds its expression. It demonstrates a specific relation between man and 
nature... [a] renunciation of the organic... This style expresses the unbroken belief in 
the omnipotence of human reason and its unlimited power over nature.”
The very application o f heritage status to the Zollverein ensemble created conceptual 
problems and dissonances that needed further inquiry on a philosophical level: what exactly 
was it that we wanted to preserve by giving Zollverein this status? How does turning 
Zollverein into a museum square with the ideas o f the architects and their rebellion against 
permanence? Is heritage protection not really a form of betrayal of the architects’ vision, 
worse even than destruction? Can we really separate these building from their functions and 
should they be seen as monuments in their own right?
After asking on what grounds we should protect Zollverein as a heritage site, Boris Goys 
writes (Boris Groys quoted after Ganser 2002 p.28, my translation):
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“It seems that this question cannot be answered by claiming that such modernist 
constructions [like Zollverein] are just as beautiful or as interesting as the monuments 
of pre-modem periods. The problem must not be treated by a mere equalisation o f  
diverse epochs. In fact this problem cannot be solved at all, because o f the paradoxical 
nature o f the particular context: we are asked to treat and protect something as a 
museum that originally resisted the very concept o f preserved heritage and rebelled 
against the very idea o f something permanent or remaining. It is this notion that 
[Zollverein] embodies and which lends it its remaining quality.”
Dealing with this paradox gave rise to one o f Zollverein’s most defining inquiry projects. 
The answers given evolved over time: the fear of killing through preservation was joined 
by an urgent need to raise popular awareness for the entire ensemble in order to protect it 
from various destruction plans. In the mid-nineties Zollverein was frequently used as an 
events location. These events and programmes were committed to maintaining a level o f  
“high culture,”5 but were nevertheless meant to attract many visitors (and often did so 
successfully, as in the case o f the “Sonne, Mond und Sterne” exhibition).
This development was important for winning the necessary support for the ensemble, but it 
was also eyed with great suspicion. For example, it led to the construction o f a Ferris wheel 
on the coking plant, something that would have little chance o f approval under the current 
regulations.
Groys had an appealing answer to the paradox of preserving a piece o f architecture that was 
designed in a spirit o f “rebellion against the idea o f the permanent.” These “monuments of 
modernity” should neither be seen as “museums” nor as leisure parks. Instead they should 
continue as “locations for projects, research, reflection and experiments” (Dettmar 2006 
p.97, interpreting Groys, my translation).
5 A commitment that opened whole new dimension of conflicts: how to distinguish “high” from “low” or 
“popular culture” from “high culture”. How can “high culture” ever be made at home in a quarter with 
predominantly low income inhabitants and ex-mine-workers?
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This spirit was at work when the red-dot design centre was established. Zollverein was seen 
as a workshop o f transformation, destined to become a beacon o f a successfully 
accomplished Strukturwandel. Buschmann and Walgern (2006) suspect that Norman 
Foster’s modest and cautious design for redeveloping the boiler house left those who had 
expected a strong architectonic statement from this illustrious architect rather disappointed.
Fig. 9.6: Shaft XII the Boiler House6
Another great shift followed later when the coal-wash was redone. The “cool elegance” o f 
the design museum gave way to the search for a more down to earth identification with the 
roots o f the place (Buschmann and Walgern 2006). The traces that the coal dust had left on 
the walls o f the plant have been preserved. The machinery o f the plant was kept, following 
the idea o f allowing each step in the process that the coal underwent to be represented by at
6 Source: http://www.thomas-lehr.de/gallery/ruhrgebiet04/7ZecheZollverein.
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least one of the original machines. This concept meant a great sacrifice to further uses of 
the location, since even a single line o f machinery took up much o f the available space. 
This new modesty with respect to the old structures is o f course challenged by the 
impressive new structure of the “gangway,” a recently added escalator leading from the 
ground to the fifth floor of the coal wash. However, this construction followed 
considerations o f necessity more than aesthetics because the plant, standing on concrete 
stilts, did not provide other natural entrances. Though it is a stark architectural feature, the 
“gangway” fits surprisingly well into the landscape o f boldly cast conveyor belt bridges and 
pipelines.
For Dewey a satisfactory outcome of inquiry is not merely settling a situation, but it means 
transforming it “... into one that is so determined in its constituent distinctions and 
relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole” (Logic, 
LW12.108). I have interpreted this as an appeal to inquirers and planners to develop a 
detailed and subtle understanding of their field, so as to avoid superficial fixes in a complex 
environment. Zollverein is a good example of how planning can fruitfully involve a 
differentiated inquiry into the meanings, “distinctions and relations” o f a situation.
Rhythm of situations
What I call planning as inquiry is a continuing project on Zollverein. No reliable 
equilibrium point has yet been found, nor can one be expected in the near future. However, 
the ‘problematic situation ’ has changed and new questions arose. Current inquiries have to 
address the relationship between industrial monuments and natural habitats on the estate 
(Dettmar 2006). Is Zollverein really only about “cultural” heritage? Are its natural habitats 
not part of the ensemble and its heritage status, and can there really be a strict dividing line 
between “cultural” and “natural” heritage? Further questions have to clarify the 
implantation and role of master-plans (like the one provided by Koolhaas and its office). 
They will also address the form o f organisation and leadership in the ensemble (see below). 
Although for the foreseeable future the development will remain defined by further 
fundamental questions and inquiries, this is not to say that Zollverein will forever remain in
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a state of changing indeterminate and problematic situations (as per Dewey’s definition). 
Although important structural decisions can surely crop up at any point in time, it can be 
anticipated that the immediate presence of a problematic quality that engulfs the whole site 
will level off at some point, and will give way to a more regulated and habitual routine of 
dealing with tasks and problems.
Structuring a situation
In discussing the role of instruments and purposes in human agency and planning in 
previous chapters, I defended the claim that agency creates distinctions such as “means” 
and “ends” in order to gain orientation in un-structured situations.
The gradual process o f structuring a situation is well documented in the history of the case 
at hand.
Fairly early on planners struggled with framing the principles for guiding the planning 
process. The University o f Essen has reports on the IBA’s (1989-99) planning efforts. In a 
time when the city and the RAG saw the goals of protection and economic development as 
incompatible, the D3A together with the Bauhuette developed the idea that jobs could be 
created through the conservation and development of the monument. In order to achieve 
this, the job-creation company EBAG was founded and settled on the site.7
With this strategy at hand, and with the resulting support from officials, it became realistic 
to introduce further strategies. Three general principles on the development of the ensemble 
were introduced (Mettler-v. Meibom, Kaltenbom et al. 2000):
1. preservation, which demanded nothing be tom down without necessity,
2. re-development in a “sensible way,” and
3. creation of a “reserve” or “sanctuary”8
7 It soon became clear, however, that the tasks at hand required highly specialised personnel.
8 “Indianerreservat” in the original.
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Though somewhat vague, the first principle in particular decisively influenced further 
developments.
Successively Zollverein became dedicated to “high culture,” partly because Zeche Karl, 
another pit in the vicinity, had recently been turned into a club and concert venue with an 
orientation more toward popular culture. But only after a host o f new initiatives and 
developments on the site had taken shape was it possible to define Zollverein’s key 
purposes more precisely.
Buschmann and Walgern (2006 p. 110) write about four pillars on which the future 
development of Zollverein should rest:
1. design and creative business (the red dot museum and a number of small and 
medium sized companies),
2. science, research and education (the Zollverein School),
3. culture (fine art, choreography, theatre, events and exhibitions), and
4. history and identity
These pillars tied together and conceptualised activities that were already in full swing. 
With these “development pillars” at hand it was easier to determine how new projects 
should be fostered.
Two master plans were subsequently commissioned that were far more specific about 
Zollverein’s functions, purposes, and development stresses (cf. Krau 2006 p. 178).
Master planning and the decision-cell
Buschmann and Walgern write that “the process of redeveloping Zollverein was frequently 
challenged as lacking a coherent conception” (2006 p. 107). My argument until this point 
can be framed as an attempt to show that the redevelopment was not as incoherent as it may
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appear. Some order, rationality, and intelligence become visible if we read the evolution o f  
Zollverein as a Deweyan inquiry, and not as a failed linear instrumental planning project.
The history of developing master plans for the ensemble allows us to recognise the 
relevance of the decision-cell model. Astonishingly, in 1993 the “Entwicklungskonzept 
Zollverein” (development concept for shaft XII) had already laid out a redevelopment plan 
for the core area (Der Oberstadtdirektor, Schul- und Kulturdezernat et al. 1993). This 
included assigning main areas and buildings certain purposes (e.g. theatre stages, concert 
halls, the design museum), and it exacted a timeframe for the diverse redevelopment 
activities (p.26). This early plan has been realised with very few changes. Even the 
timeframe turned out to be fairly adequate. The linear notion of adhering to such a plan 
must not be overestimated. The development plan only concerned the core area of Shaft XII 
and was spelled out in very rough lines, leaving much room and demand for further 
planning. Finally, with regard to future functions and uses, the development plan from 1992 
only spelled out the four pillars (Design/Business, Science/Education, Culture and History), 
which already had some roots there. In this respect one cannot speak o f a master plan 
preceding the implementation of a new strategy.
The era of master planning really only began after Zollverein had been ennobled with the 
status of a world heritage site. The first document called a “master plan” was produced in 
2001 by Rem Koolhaas and his Office o f Metropolitan Architecture (OMA). A second 
master plan by Agence Ter / Professor Henri Bava was then formulated in 2003. These 
plans were meant to provide a general framework for the use and development of the entire 
estate. Ingrid Krau reports on how Rem Koolhaas’ plan collected, documented and 
systematised all initiatives and ideas for future uses which had “grown out o f a wide 
participation” (p. 177). His master plan thus meant to summarise present uses and active 
ideas, and group them in order to define their geographic location in centres and 
development zones. This was meant to give priority to a sensitive preservation policy.9 
Koolhaas distinguished 47 core projects, ideas and initiatives and bundled them into five
9 Hence Koolhaas’ expression “walled city,” referring to the central parts of the ensemble.
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categories (Business, Service, Info&Education, Art&Design and Event). He then defined a 
detailed geographic plan with seven areas, among them an “inside zone” (core heritage), a 
“business” (some new settlements), and “attractors” (new architectural and functional 
highlights meant to draw more attention to the place).
Policy makers hoped that Zollverein would become the “pivot o f a new economic advance” 
(Krau 2006 p.77). Koolhaas’ design focused on this dimension, but it was not greeted with 
universal enthusiasm. Not only did his expression “walled city” imply an idea o f isolation 
and detachment from the context (e.g. neighbouring quarters and the Route Industrie- 
Kultur), but the heavy emphasis on new construction efforts raised suspicion that it could 
interfere with the many different perspectives and vistas that this bizarre location offers.
The second master plan by Agence Ter / Professor Bava emphasised this latter point. 
Bava’s plan saw the reduction o f bushes and the creation o f vista-points as a way to “satisfy 
tourists,” who were expected to come in ever greater numbers. The idea o f a “walled city” 
was thereby negated in favour o f transparency and perspective integration of the ensemble 
and its context.
It may be said that both master plans introduce too much planning into the situation. Both 
tend to overemphasise marketing the place to a mass audience, (Koolhaas by his dedication 
to events and festivals, and Bava by catering to sightseers). Joerg Dettmar fears, for 
example, that turning the rail tracks into a rail “boulevard,” and reducing vegetation in 
favour of better vistas, would be too invasive, both in terms o f aesthetics and for the 
thriving biotope that he sees as part of the memorial. He believes that the natural habitats 
are an essential part of the heritage environment (Dettmar 2006). Overgrown railways, 
birch forests and bramble hedges do in fact contribute to the time and memory dimension, 
and are an essential part o f the nostalgic touch o f this enchanted place. Zollverein must be 
discovered through curiosity, not offered to tourists a la carte.
Krau (2006) poses the question “whether the two master plans offer enough flexibility for a 
future that may demand a more modest approach” to planning (p. 182). It may seem that
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these master plans depart from Zollverein’s previous recipe for an organic planning 
approach. This however is only partly true. As I have argued, the late occurrence of this 
phase o f master planning is a key indicator o f how the phases o f the decision-cell model, 
define, design and realise, remain interrelated: Master planning is predominantly a define 
type o f activity that often extends into design. It is particularly evident in Koolhaas’ project 
that define relies on previous realise and design activities (e.g. if one looks at the 
systematisation o f core activity fields). In fact, these three types o f activity modes have 
been concurrently active and mutually dependent throughout the planning history o f the 
memorial site.
The exhibition “Sonne Mond und Sterne” with its discovery o f the coking plant, focused 
mainly on realise-type activities, in the creative learning-centred definition o f the term: 
many ideas and projects sprung from the immediate interaction between planners and their 
location. For this reason the exhibition was an important contribution to the definition and 
design o f the Zollverein area. Exhibitions held by design students in the coal wash in the 
earliest days o f Zollverein’s rediscovery were also mostly realise types o f activities. I 
already pointed out that define and design activities, like master plans, strongly relied on 
such initiatives. Foster’s design of the design museum, in turn, became possible only after 
defining the heritage value of the space, and reflected the interests of designers and creative 
visionaries on the site, who had already left their traces (Rueckriem, several art galleries, 
designers from the University Essen). How, without Rueckriem’s realisation o f a sculpture 
park, could the design of a heritage walk through the onsite rock piles and birch forests 
have been conceived? And how, without the conceptual design o f the “Sonne, Mond, und 
Sterne” exhibition and the realisation of the design centre, could the idea for the “Entry”10 
have been defined?
10 The Entry is an exhibition/fair/event, with the idea of being for contemporary developments in design what 
the “Dokumenta” in Kassel has become for the fine arts.
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Zollverein is an excellent example that illustrates the parallel exercise o f all activity modes 
of the decision-cell model and the rapid and unpredictable moves o f participants between 
activities in these modes.
Formation o f agency
I would now like to discuss the coordination of activities around the heritage site. It is 
striking how many organisations were involved in and responsible for the planning process. 
It is therefore not surprising that Karl Ganser speaks of a “jumble of competences” (Ganser 
2002 p.25) that the planning process suffered from. Ganser explains that (2002 p.92, my 
translation):
“The gradual path o f unfolding that Zollverein took was accompanied by many
accidents and lead to a parallel existence of institutions, actors, and competences...”
Dettmar lists nine key actors that determined Zollverein’s destiny (Dettmar 2006 p.92):
• LEG/Grundstuecksfond, the estate administration and development agencies o f  
the land in North Rhine-Westphalia and the current owner o f large parts of the 
estate, including Schacht XII and 1/2/8,
• The city of Essen’s diverse planning and administrative departments of the city o f  
Essen and the “Wirtschaftsfoerderungsgesellschaft,” an organisation for economic 
development that runs the EBAG (Essen’s job-creation company),
• The Foundation “Stiftung Zollverein,” installed as the successor of the Bauhuette 
and coordinator of the programmatic dimension o f Zollverein’s development,
• The Foundation for Industrial Heritage (“Stiftung Industriedenkmalpflege”), 
established by RAG and responsible for the “black side” (coke production) of the 
coking plant,
• Montan-Grund, an estate company owned by RAG and responsible for the “white 
side” (chemical processing) o f the coking plant,
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• RVR (formerly KVR), an organisation of associated communes in the Ruhr region 
responsible for the “Route Industriekultur” (industrial heritage route across the Ruhr 
region),
• The North Rhine-Westphalian Design Centre,
• Restflaechenprojekt/Insdustriewald Ruhrgebiet, an organization for managing 
the forests spaces without constructions, and
• A member’s club for the history of Zollverein
Further actors have more recently entered the field, including:
• The Zollverein School for Management and Design,
• PACT, a chorographical association,
• UNESCO,
• KMU, an organisation of artists and small and medium sized businesses,
• Triple Z, an organisation responsible for the external shaft (4/7/10),
• Koolhaas/OMA, an architecture and planning office and authors of the first master 
plan, and
• Agence Ter/Prof. Henri Bava, authors of the second master plan
The sheer number of involved organisations is baffling, and most o f the ones listed above 
have formal participation- and decision competences. If it were assumed that rational or 
intelligent planning presupposed the category o f a well-defined agent, this meshwork of 
responsibilities would be a recipe doomed for failure. In the case o f Multi-Casa an effort 
was made to unify the category o f the agent at the outset by creating the development 
company GID which in turn commissioned the ECE with the complete task o f planning, 
coordinating, and running the place. No effort was made in the case o f Zollverein to put all 
competences for planning and management into the hands of one organisation. This 
certainly created problems and conflicts, but it did not have the paralysing effect that could 
be expected when applying an LIR perspective. As a working hypothesis I would like to 
suggest that Zollverein’s planners reacted to demands for better coordination in the cases 
where problems occurred. Efforts at more coherent forms o f organisation were made where 
the planning situation demanded it. The solutions were therefore tailored to the
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requirements of a given situation. This is, without a doubt, an idealised description, and I 
do not intend to gloss over the problems and inefficiencies that came from the hurly-burly 
of voices and competences. However, just as master plans were only commissioned when 
the heritage site reached a level o f structural differentiation that made it essential to commit 
to a strategic framework, so were competences bundled when the situation demanded better 
coordination. The LEG for example established the “Bauhuette” when the heritage 
preservation aspect gained importance. It thus reacted to demands that any traditional 
public owned redevelopment agency could not have met.
Defining new responsibilities and developing the structure o f organisations is a continuous 
theme. Forms of administration and organisation have co-evolved with the projects and 
responsibilities of this site, and hence the formation o f agency is an important part of 
Zollverein’s planning process. A further example is the involvement of the IB A and the 
RVR in the wake of an increasing regional recognition o f this ensemble.
At the present moment the question o f coordination is again high on the agenda. 
Buschmann (2006) writes:
“What is missing is a position of overall responsibility and coordination between the
old colliery and its surrounding quarters.” (p. 120, my translation)
In an interview with the press officer o f Stiftung Zollverein, Ute Durchholz, I asked about 
the most urgent issues of the current planning process. Her answer was that a major 
revision of competencies and responsibilities was immanent. However, the focus will still 
be on experienced problems and inherent weaknesses in the present system. The 
dimensions of construction and substantive development activities, for which the LEG with 
its sub-organisations are responsible, cannot always be neatly separated from the 
foundation’s service mandate to run and develop the programmatic dimension o f the 
ensemble. The situation became difficult when events like a European meeting of 
Environmental Ministers, the popular “Extraschicht,” and the world heritage day coincided 
with planned measures to redevelop bridges and conveyor belts. The more pressing
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problem, however, seems to be the perceived lack o f a unified organisation. This had 
repercussions for the Stiftung’s ability to fundraise, and also created problems for 
communicating Zollverein’s programmes and developments to the public. Another problem 
is the organisational integration o f the coking plant into the entire ensemble, which is 
currently under separate ownership. Such problems are solvable as long as no entrenched 
interest groups actively block solutions or attempts to change the current framework. 
Zollverein has successfully maintained the necessary flexibility and has been able to turn its 
pluralistic planning structure into a strategic advantage. The active involvement o f a great 
plurality o f agents has contributed to a great wealth o f ideas. The visionary perspectives of 
the IBA, the intellectual competences of the NRW conservation office, and the creative 
networks o f the design centre, were indispensable conditions for the variety and quality o f  
the present programme.
Conclusion
I have introduced two cases from neighbouring cities in the Ruhr region to characterise 
basic intuitions that I attributed to the conceptions o f LIR and STR. My aim was to 
illustrate how these conceptual distinctions help us interpret real planning contexts and how 
STR may provide a better platform for understanding a situation and gaining necessary 
orientation on actions and strategies.
Multi-Casa was analysed as a case in which important aspects of the linear instrumental 
approach could be recognised. A caveat is necessary here: It is easy to diagnose diseases in 
a dead duck; I therefore refrain from judgements on what should have been done to make 
the planning of this vacant estate in the centre of Duisburg a success. I am only analysing 
similarities between the facts of the matter and traits of the LIR conception that I had earlier 
explored in theory (cf. chapter 2), and I show how they appear problematic in these 
particular settings. I refrain from making direct comparisons between the two case studies. 
Their settings are too different to allow such judgements, and it is impossible to say that 
one should have adopted the approach of the other. Duisburg’s freight depot is not a
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heritage site, and offered much less material than Zollverein did for new and creative 
developments. However, I do believe that the Duisburg’s planning disaster could have been 
avoided if the development had been treated earlier as part of a complex and dynamic 
problematic situation. Judging from the ideas and experiences explored here, the new 
master plan for an integrated concept of the city centre is a promising innovation.
The aim o f the second part o f the chapter was to show how situational transactive 
rationality (STR) can be understood in practical contexts as an alternative to the linear 
instrumental rationality model (LIR). What are the lessons that can be drawn from studying 
the planning history o f Zollverein? Some principles may be transferred from this case to 
others, but they should not be established in the form of a “to do list” for planners. 
Following previous arguments about the situated application of norms and guiding rules, 
there can be no universal recommendations for planners, safe one saying that we should not 
rigidly follow norms or procedural schemes without taking particular demands o f a 
situation into account. Nevertheless we can summarise a few ideas and guiding principles 
that seemed helpful and fertile in the present case.
• It was helpful to appreciate the indeterminacy o f the context in its own right. E.g. 
decision-makers could be persuaded to protect the area before settling on exact 
definitions of a mission, a purpose or a goal for the old pit.
• Establishing the scope and source of available resources was not treated as a 
necessary precondition for the first steps in planning and implementation. Important 
decision-makers allowed for an iterative evolution o f the project in which the 
success o f earlier investments would secure further funds to be realised at a later 
time. Planning was never treated as chiefly an allocation problem with given 
resources and budgetary restraints. Instead the planning process itself was 
concerned with creating new value and instrumental possibilities. Often the projects 
benefited from the creative use o f given conditions as new resources, as 
demonstrated in using warm waste water from the mines to supply the new 
Zollverein School with a central heating.
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• Ends and visions were developed iteratively and were encouraged to co-evolve 
together with projects and initiatives. The late and repeated formulation of master 
plans testifies this.
• Planning was treated as an exploration of the potentialities that this area had to 
offer. It thereby often took to the form of explicit and theoretical inquiry, with the 
aim of understanding the meaning and architectural language of the place in order to 
develop a sensible approach. Zollverein thereby embodies the idea o f  planning as 
learning.
• As the history o f applying heritage protection statutes proved, the application of 
normative principles was no matter of course, but part o f a complex deliberation and 
adaptation process, which did not only change the status of the site but also altered 
the meaning of those principles of heritage protection.
• Imagination was an important deliberative tool. It played an important role in 
establishing industrial history as cultural heritage for future generations (c.f. in 
particular the “projective” and “situational horizon” dimensions and also the 
dimension in chapter 5). Other dimension of imaginative vision can easily be 
distinguished in the process (e.g. the “aesthetic” dimension, thinking particularly of 
the aesthetic and educative mission of this place).
• The planning process o f Zollverein proved that it is not only possible but also 
beneficial to allow parallel operation of activity modes and rapid shifts between 
them, where the LIR model would allow only a linear ordering o f subsequent 
processes in a rational planning process. The modes of defining the situation, 
designing projects and implementing changes were often so intricately connected 
that it would be difficult to tell their difference, safe as an abstraction. The resulting 
flexibility was a motor for Zollverein’s development and interestingly it was a 
warrant for the coherence o f the entire project because it facilitated the possibility of 
adapting visions to actual experiences in local realities.
• The management and planning of Zollverein was not initially in the hand o f a single 
organisational structure. Like the heritage site itself, also the organisational form  of 
its management was allowed to evolve in response to situational demands for co­
ordinated intervention. This allowed a plurality o f agents and organisations to
332
participate and contribute their ideas. It is possible to interpret the history of 
Zollverein as a form of inquiry based on collective intelligence as introduced in 
chapter 7.
• This also meant that decisions were normally formed or developed over an extended 
period involving a large number o f participants. Decision-making was generally 
understood not as an authoritative judgement by a central body which would 
separate investigation from implementation stages, but as a process o f collective 
deliberation.
All these observations easily yield to a formulation recommendations or guiding principles. 
Such guidelines are o f course the product of my interpretation of the case in the light of a 
theory that I developed during this thesis. There is little evidence that these principles were 
formally adopted during Zollverein’s planning process. However, this case-study was 
chosen because its planning history appeared to have great affinities with the situational 
transactive approach as developed here.
On caveat is important at this point, situational transactive rationality is not a form of 
anarchy or anti-planning: letting an indeterminate situation evolve, allowing ends and 
purposes to form in response to instrumental possibilities, not insisting on clearly defined 
organisational structures from the start, involving many heterogeneous participant groups, 
following no strict procedural norms, initiating implementation before plans are fully 
matured, rejecting the universal applicability o f normative principles, all sound suspiciously 
similar to an outright rejection o f planning as a pro-active, forward-looking effort at 
coordinated action within a coherent strategy. The important difference is that all these 
seemingly unconstrained and unmediated activities have their constitutive place within a 
larger process o f inquiry. This inquiry process is itself an enterprise to employ human 
intelligence in order to achieve highly complex forms o f coordination through explicit 
reflection and communication between participants. Planning as Deweyan inquiry is not an 
uncommitted form o f self-organisation, following spontaneous piecemeal adaptations 
without a clear perspective on the whole. It does not, like incrementalist and laissez faire 
approaches neglect long term effects of local interventions. On the contrary, imagination
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directed at the ramified consequences o f each act build the foundation of this method. STR 
may appear like the rejection of all classical principles of planning only in the beginning o f  
planning processes, where situations are still marked by indeterminacies and a lack of 
definition and agreement among participants. It seizes to be “anarchic” as the planning 
process advances and the methods of inquiry produce a situation “determined in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements o f the original situation into 
a unified whole” (Logic, LW12.108).
Another caveat regarding this chapter is of a personal nature. When I first visited Zollverein 
in 1991 I fell in love with the ensemble and its site, and this love has never ceased. My 
view as a researcher may therefore be biased, although I meant to present a fair perspective 
of the evidence. I hope this discussion has at least served to characterise my understanding 
of the difference between LIR and STR approaches to rational planning.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion -  Deweyan Rationality in Perspective
The saxophonist John Coltrane was the greatest innovator in the jazz idiom since Charlie 
Parker reminted the coinage o f  jazz expression in the mid-1940s. Playing with Miles Davis 
Quintet, Coltrane took to playing long long solos which might last fo r 20 minutes or more. 
On one occasion at the Apollo in Harlem, when he eventually finished a very lengthy solo 
he was asked why he had gone on so. He is said to have replied 7  could not find nothing 
good to stop on’, whereupon Davis answered, ‘You only have to take the horn out of your
mouth ’ 
Peter Checkland1
It has been a long road. This thesis has attempted a fundamental reconstruction of our 
concept o f rationality. It undertook a thorough investigation o f the foundations o f agency 
theory and developed a pragmatist concept of rational action and deliberation. This concept 
is aimed at an understanding o f rational action that is adequate to the empirical reality of 
human conduct and able to foster its intelligent and creative potential. This project was not 
bom of pure philosophical curiosity. My intention here was to reconstruct the concept of 
rational planning, and I followed my intuition that Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy was the 
key to solving a series of problems that have marred planning theorists and practitioners 
with regard to their concept of rationality for several decades. I showed how this project of 
philosophical conceptual reconstmction can yield a concrete deliberation model that is able 
to account for planning processes and guide planners and participants. In order to show the 
practical difference that this theoretical contribution can make, I illustrated my results in 
two case studies.
At the end of the introduction chapter I provided a list o f requirements that any 
contemporary conception of planning rationality should fulfill. I encourage the reader to 
turn back to these criteria in order to evaluate the results achieved so far.
1 (1999, p.A41)
I will now raise a few questions that will require future research, and will outline possible 
strategies to meet the challenges posed.
Challenges to the Project
Practical Relevance
In spite of Dewey’s extensive and detailed writing on almost every topic of philosophical or 
social concern, his claims may be considered vague in terms o f quantifiable 
recommendations and material consequences. Critics therefore claim that his project lacks 
practical relevance. The substance that such an allegation can have is this: If the only 
criteria used to make judgements on conduct were those established in the process of 
inquiry, there would be no further criteria by which to judge and discriminate between 
better or worse types o f inquiry (or better or worse systems o f planning and policy design). 
Should every system therefore freely establish the standards according to which it chooses 
to be judged?
Earlier I addressed the criticisms of inherent relativism and reiterated that they ignore the 
fact that pragmatist inquiry is rooted in processes o f social transaction that are set within 
real problematic situations. Norms and methods of reasoning are developed against the 
backdrop o f an existentially problematic experience that they either manage or fail to settle 
in a systematic and sustainable way. This also means for inquiry to develop its own 
methods and standards for knowledge and value claims is not an empty project, as long as 
we do so in the context of real problematic situations.
False Objectivity?
From the above argument a converse challenge arises, one that would claim that a 
rationality o f problematic situations would cater to an objectivist understanding o f the 
problems that planners and policy-makers face. Hans Joas (1996) briefly mentions this as 
one o f the key critiques against pragmatism. It is often in the hands o f planners or
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participants to turn a settled situation into something more indeterminate or problematic. At 
times, using a specific word to describe a situation is enough to alter its nature. E.g. 
apologising instead of expressing regret for crimes can trigger an avalanche of 
compensation claims. Calculated moves can turn a habitually settled situation into an 
indeterminate or problematic one. Moreover, such moves can be important driving forces in 
politics. Perhaps planners do not have to wait until the quality o f an experienced situation 
turns from settled to “indeterminate” to start getting active.
Dewey explicitly rejects the idea that situations are “problematic” only by virtue of a 
subjective judgement: The adjectives disturbed, ambiguous, troubled, confused, conflicting 
and obscure characterise the indeterminateness of situations; all these categories seem 
beyond the control of planners (Logic, LW12.109, italics added).
“It is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the situation is 
inherently doubtful. Personal states o f doubt that are not evoked by and that are not 
relative to some existential situation are pathological.”
Does this quote imply that the “situation” must make the first move in becoming 
“indeterminate” before a planner can define it as “problematic,” i.e. that there is little or no 
freedom to define problems in stable habitual situations?
Various sociologically-oriented policy theories reject the idea that problems are given or 
pre-determined by the nature of a situation. Ian Hacking describes how policy programs, 
e.g. for the benefit o f “women refugees,” require conceptual taxonomies that identify some 
female migrants as “women refugees” and assign to them a special epistemic and legal 
status (Hacking 2000). A movement in policy and management theory that calls itself 
critical systems thinking makes the definition of a situation almost entirely a matter of 
discursive deliberation amongst various groups of participants (Ulrich 1983). These 
examples indicate that a naive objectivist understanding of an “indeterminate quality” will 
not do justice to many contemporary panning contexts. For Dewey the “indeterminate 
situation” implies a compelling imperative to engage with it and turn it into a problematic
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situation. Without this imperative there seems to be no convincing way for planners or 
participants to address an existing equilibrium as a concern or to turn a settled situation into 
a problem.
As a short answer to this problem we could point out that the above argument relies too 
heavily on a separation between situation and planning agency as opposing categories. A 
transactive view, in turn, would understand all moves undertaken by planners or 
participants as processes within a situation. Hence, when a planner takes an initiative, it is 
still the situation that becomes indeterminate. However, this answer is insufficient to 
account for the motivation to such a move. Remember, Dewey’s agency theory saw the 
perturbation o f a previous equilibrium as the only reason for agents to deliberate 
intentionally.
This is indeed a serious concern for Deweyan rationality, and it is closely related to another 
challenge to which I will now turn.
Is Deweyan Rationality Conservative?
Given the above points, one could suspect that a Deweyan concept o f rationality may have 
a dangerously conservative leaning. A problematic situation is defined as an interruption or 
inhibition of existing practice. Such a definition seems to imply that we should wait until a 
crisis is rife before engaging in inquiry and problem-solving activities. A Deweyan inquiry 
may therefore come too late to be o f any assistance in solving very pressing problems. If 
we think o f threats like anthropogenic climate change, a faltering pension system or a 
failing education policy, we simply cannot afford to wait until our habitual practices 
become interrupted by effective repercussions. Any concept of rationality purporting to 
face the demands of contemporary situations must afford a long-term perspective and 
engage proactively with looming problems that have no immediate adverse manifestations.
This challenge cannot be dealt with swiftly. However, Dewey appears to have been very 
well aware o f it. His notion o f agency defies the idea that deliberate action would be merely
338
a re-action to external conditions. Already, critiques of classical behaviourism show that his 
notion o f organic behaviour is incompatible with the idea o f behaviour as a reaction to a 
received stimulus. Receiving a stimulus presupposes a readiness and even a proactive 
search for the triggering experience by directing sense organs toward sources of perception 
and by coordinating them (RA EW5).
An answer to this challenge of passive reactive conservatism in Deweyan rationality can be 
found in Dewey’s concept o f an inquiring mind (The Quest for Certainty, LW 4.182):
”A disciplined mind takes delight in the problematic, and cherishes it until a way out is 
found that approves itself upon examination. The questionable becomes an active 
questioning, a ... quest for the objects by which the obscure and unsettled may be 
developed into the stable and clear. The scientific attitude may almost be defined as that 
which is capable of enjoying the doubtful; scientific method is, in one aspect, a 
technique for making a productive use o f doubt by converting it into operations of 
infinite inquiry.”
Thinking does not take place outside our habitual co-ordinations but is part of this process. 
Thus if we are able to anticipate a distantly looming catastrophe, this anticipation may 
perturb our habitual equilibrium; anticipation has the power to cause cognitive dissonances 
within present experience. A rationality model that rests upon the idea o f an oscillating 
pattern of habitual and problematic situations does not imply a passive -  reactive mode of 
conduct, but is compatible with a proactive attitude.
“Growth” as an ideology of progress?
The concept of “growth” is central to Dewey’s philosophy. We must therefore ask, as was 
Bertrand Russell’s concern (1939), whether a Deweyan situational transactive rationality 
does not embody a western or even capitalist idea o f continuous limitless progress.
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One could see a potential tension between Dewey’s concept of “growth” and his 
“rhythmic” conception o f alternating habitual and problematic situations. The concept of 
“growth” connotes a typically western faith in unlimited progress, whereas the ‘rhythm of 
situations’ is reminiscent o f more cyclical models o f history.
However, Dewey’s concept o f “growth” is not a teleological notion such as that implied in 
concepts like ‘growth of income.’ Nor is it an Aristotelian “entelechy” or growth toward 
the completion o f an innate plan or potency, like an acorn growing into an oak tree. In order 
to resolve the tension between the concepts o f “rhythm” and “growth” in Dewey’s 
philosophy, both perspectives may need to be viewed from an evolutionary perspective 
(Dewey 1997 [1910]). Evolution favours neither unstable nor stagnant processes. The 
equilibriums gained in evolution and inquiry processes do not imply a return to previous 
habitual practice; they entail new forms o f coordination, and lead to an increased readiness 
to meet future challenges. Progress is the ability to adjust to changing circumstances and to 
augment one’s adaptive capacities in unreliable contexts; “growth” is a qualitative notion of 
forming a character that is rich and complex and ready to face the world.
How can we tell whether Planning was successful?
How do we decide whether we have arrived at a “unified” situation? Or in other words, 
who decides whether a status quo is settled or problematic? This question is again closely 
linked with the previous challenges and appears to touch upon a weak point in Dewey’s 
theory o f inquiry. Dewey seems to assume that the “immediacy” of an “indeterminate 
quality” will suffice to convince everyone concerned that a situation must be defined as 
“problematic.” A unified situation, in contrast, is by definition one in which conflicts and 
disagreement disappear.
But what about situations where a ruling elite crushes opposition and manages to uphold a 
routine of public order? How shall we evaluate situations where a few individuals attend to 
problems that the majority prefers to ignore?
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It is true that Dewey does not give clear enough criteria to pass unambiguous judgements 
on the problematic or settled character o f a situation. Yet settled or problematic qualities of 
situations are not subjective states of participants but are determined by natural and social 
transactions. This means that dissent in a society is a disturbance in the social transactions 
of a community even if the majority chooses to ignore it. By the same token we must not 
call an imposed public order a ‘unified state of equilibrium.’ A situation can only be 
“unified” if  it does not suppress or ignore dissent and if  it learns to live with a plurality of 
viewpoints and life projects. It must be able to encourage differences in order to benefit 
form the creative potential o f dialogue.
The intuition that it is not arbitrary to define a situation as problematic is strong in Dewey’s 
theory. Indeed this distinguishes Dewey’s from many post-modem approaches. The idea 
that indeterminate and problematic qualities are existential properties of experience and not 
merely differences o f definition may be contentious. However, human life in society and in 
nature faces challenges that we cannot overcome with speech acts alone. Other acts must 
not be neglected in our “world-making” (Goodman 1978). Many o f our problems can be 
transformed or solved by changing descriptions. Yet even these cases are not internal 
affairs o f an independent realm of language. Changes in our frames o f reference directly 
change our transactions and the way we relate to our contexts.
Dewey’s theory maintains that we can intuitively grasp when we have lost a previously 
existing equilibrium and when a situation merits the attention o f inquiry. This inquiry gives 
us hope but no certainty that we will return to the relative safety o f successful habitual 
coordination. In this respect Dewey’s theory gives us some guidance as to where planning 
begins and where it temporarily pauses. At the same time Deweyan rationality never 
releases us into the complacency of having finally solved a problem or achieved an ultimate 
end. The best we can do is temporarily enjoy a phase o f “consummatory experience.” 
“Growth” is always in progress. Dewey’s inquiry is truly a rationality of learning.
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Power
Earlier, in chapter 7 ,1 discussed the idea that Dewey’s philosophy cannot be charged with 
being naive about power. I pointed out that he was indeed sensitive even to more subtle 
forms o f power that later philosophers labelled as ‘false consciousness’ or ‘distorted 
communication.’
However, in the vast body of Dewey’s work the question o f power leads an existence on 
the fringes. Even one of his most ardent admirers noted that (Bernstein 1998 p. 149)
“...at times, in his reliance on metaphors of harmony and organic unity, Dewey 
underestimates the conflict, dissonance, and asymmetrical power relationships that 
disrupt ‘the harmonious whole.’ I do think that, at times, Dewey is excessively 
optimistic.”
The question o f how power figures in situational transactive rationality must be addressed 
in a separate investigation. In previous chapters I pointed to this concern and repeatedly put 
forward arguments to help secure STR and the decision-cell model against expected 
barrages o f criticism. I am, however, quite aware that the topic o f power will need special 
attention in future visits.
A Rationality for our Time?
These are but a few critical issues that can be raised for a Deweyan rationality of planning 
and policy-making. I do not claim that my reconstruction project is complete. Many more 
problematic issues will need to be discussed if situational transactive rationality is to 
become a viable philosophical conception for planning and policy-making. I hope that this 
work falls into the hands of planners and policy-makers who will consider the situational 
transactive model of rationality and the decision-cell benevolently.
I believe that situational transactive rationality can be a strong contender in sparring with 
other rationality conceptions. Throughout this thesis I have pointed to a number of its
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advantages. Some o f these make situational transactive rationality particularly relevant to 
contemporary planning settings. These I will summarise in a few bullet points:
• STR has the ability to steer a middle path between the extremes o f realist 
foundationalism and relativism. It understands problems as real and simultaneously 
as subject to construction, and it integrates divergent descriptions and perspectives 
in a transactive perspective.
• It fosters human creativity through several techniques: It is a notion of intelligent 
deliberation that joins together all psychological capacities, including imaginative, 
emotional and cognitive ones. It does not limit human creativity with external 
constraints (like an a priori definition of purposes o f given resources). It facilitates 
inquiry as a collective task in which all participants, rather than only a few experts, 
are encouraged to contribute.
• The model o f situational transactive rationality is ethically perceptive without pre­
judging moral issues. This makes it able to meet rapidly changing contexts where 
re-evaluation of normative commitments is more important than in relatively stable 
environments. This also allows for a sensible way o f dealing with moral 
disagreement and pluralism. Instead o f being either neutral or partial, it provides a 
public platform for critically evaluating moral claims.
• Obtaining a transactive perspective that sees human agency as part of a natural 
context, STR is particularly prone to environmental sensitivity (McDonald 2004).
• STR does not try to impose a normative model of rationality on a reality that does 
not match it. Deweyan rationality allows normative and descriptive elements to 
mingle and encourages any normative conception to develop continuously in view 
of and in response to experience. In this way, rationality becomes a general tool that 
can serve in unique contexts.
In evaluating this project I ask the reader to allow his/her intuition to play a part. Does 
Deweyan rationality appear like a more natural way of looking at deliberative contexts or is 
it just another philosophical brain child? Does this approach have the power to give us 
confidence in dealing with insufficiently understood circumstances or does it add to the
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general cacophony o f well-intentioned advice? The following anecdote will help to see how 
important intuition is in comparison with the laborious task o f thinking: Tara, the little 
niece o f my colleague Shyama Kuruvilla, had to take a test in her primary school. The task 
was to recall the past and perfect forms o f a number o f irregular English verbs, and she 
performed very well: be -  was -been, catch -  caught -  caught, know -  knew -  known.
Later she recounted to her aunt, “I knew them all -  except for one: ‘to think’  I
thought and thought and thought... then I wrote ‘thunk’.”
This, I believe, is a good note to finish on and ‘take the horn out of my mouth.’ Dear 
reader, for your patience and attention, many “thunks!”
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Abbreviations
Dewey’s Works:
ACF A Common Faith
DE Democracy and Education
E Ethics
E rev Ethics revised
EN Experience and Nature
EW Earlier Works
MW Middle Works
LW Later Works
HNC Human Nature and Conduct
HT How we Think
KI Knowledge as Idealisation
KK Knowing and the Known
LSA Liberalism and Social Action
NRP The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy
P Psychology
PIE The Postulate o f Immediate Empiricism
QC Quest o f Certainty
RA Reflex Arc Concept in Philosophy
Rejoinder Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder
RP Reconstructions in Philosophy
RP Reconstructions in Philosophy
Syllabus Syllabus of Eight Lectures on “Problems o f  
Philosophical Reconstruction”
TV Theory o f  V aluation
Other Abbreviations:
DC Decision-cell
LIR Linear Instrumental Rationality
STR Situational Transactive Rationality
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